

**CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE 3 SOUTHERN BORDER  
PROVINCES OF THAILAND: POLICY PROCESS  
AND OUTCOMES**

**Suchart Monkongpitukkul**

**A Dissertation Submitted in Partial  
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
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## ABSTRACT

<b>Title of Dissertation</b>	Conflict Resolution in the 3 Southern Border Provinces of Thailand: Policy Process and Outcomes
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The roots of the problem of insurgency and violence in the 3 southern border provinces of Thailand, which occurred 11 years ago, are deeply seated in the areas and have affected every aspect of society. Therefore, this study is intended for an overview of the conflict resolution: policy, process and outcomes. The objectives of this study are to analyze 1) the development of the unrest situation from the past to the present 2) the development of policies to tackle the unrest in the 3 southern border provinces 3) the policy implementation process by considering the role of the main agencies that respond to the conflict resolution in the 3 southern border provinces 4) the policy implementation outcomes 5) the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes and 6) the remaining problems and obstacles. This study is a qualitative research, employing several research methods, including documentary research, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions by providing key-informants. Then, the data were analyzed in descriptive analysis for its description.

In this study, relevant academic papers conducted by Thai researchers as well as oversea scholars on the unrest in the 3 southern border provinces were reviewed as well as the lessons from Thailand, China, Indonesia and the Philippines. The lessons learnt and experiences from the conflict resolutions, the results of the action plan of the agency, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) and the in-depth interviews of Executives and Head of Operations were compared and evaluated. To find the factors that resulted in policy implementation outcomes, the Pressman and Wildavsky model is synthesized and a new concept is designed called

the NIDA Deep South Model to fit the context and security policy in the 3 southern border provinces.

The findings show that there are many factors that have led to the consequences of policy implementation, especially, the factor of communication. Communication should be given high priority in the policy process at all levels: from the policy level, converting the policy into implementation level, policy implementation level and the public service delivery client level. The communication factor is the key factor in supporting the variable three groups and the other factors being the affected policymaking factor, the complexity of joint action factor and the factor of policy associated with the implementation that allows the policy implementation to be more effective.

To solve the conflict in the 3 southern border provinces it is necessary to have the support through organization competency such as adequacy of resources, quality of personnel, good leadership and motivation that contributes to the factor of communication in the policy process at all levels in order to make the communication process more efficient. These factors must be supported as they can affect the policymaking which is essential to the agencies that cooperate with the other agencies. The complexity of joint action requires organization competency in order to coordinate with the other agencies as well as to have the ability to solve the lag in project problems that occur including the following factors: value, feeling management and popularity factor of urban areas.

The authority should have a powerful role in shaping the discourse such as the peace dialogue process discourse and the Tung Yang Dang Model, to solve the problems in the 3 southern border provinces, to cause rapid, continuous and concrete impacts.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations	Equivalence
ASPSA	The Association of Southern Political Science and Public Administration
AEC	Asean Economics Community
AFP PPO	AFP Peace Process Office
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
B4P	Buddhists Network for Peace
BB	Bureau of the Budget
	Bersatu The United Front for the independent of Pattani
BIPP	Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani
BNPP	National Patani Liberation Front
BRN	Barisan Revolusi Nasional
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
CIB	Central Investigation Bureau
CICOT	The Central Islamic Council of Thailand
CICT	Central Islamic Committee of Thailand
CMI	The Crisis Management Initiative
CPM 43	Civil-Police-Military Joint Taskforce
CSCD	Center for Conflict Studies and Culture Diversity

DBPMT	Dewan bahasa pustaka melayu Thailand
DDG., ISOC.	Deputy Director General of Internal Security Operations Command
DSJ	Deep South Journalism School
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic acid
DSW	Deep South Watch
DSWC	Deep South Watch Center
ETLO	East Turkistan Liberation Organization
EU	The European Union
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
GMIP	Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani
ISOC	Internal Security Operation Command
IHRP	Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies
ISOC 5 <sup>th</sup> OCC	Internal Security Operations Command's 5th Operations Coordination Centre
ISOC Region 4	Internal Security Operation Command Region 4 Forward Command
Khor. Por. Tor.	The Steering Committee to Resolve the Issues of the Southern Border Provinces
MARA PATANI	Majlis Syura Patani
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOU	A memorandum of understanding

NCPO	National Council for Peace and Order
NESDB	Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NIDA	National Institute of Development Administration
NRC	The National Reconciliation Commission
NSC	Office of the National Security Council
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
ONIE	Office of the Non-Formal and Informal Education
PAO	Provincial Administrative Organization
PCC	Patani Consultative Council
PEA	Provincial Electricity Authority
POSBO	Peace of Southern Boundary's Organization
PPS	Photo Peace of South
PPP	Pattani Peace Process
PSU Pattani	Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus
PULO	Patani United Liberation Organization
PULO-DSPP	Pertubuhan Pembebasan Patani Bersatu
PULO-MKP	Pertubuhan Pembebasan Patani Bersatu

PULO-P4	Pertubuhan Persatuan Pembebasan Patani
RfP-IRC Thailand	Religions for Peace, the Inter- religious Council of Thailand
RKK	Runda Kumpulan Kecil
SAO	Subdistrict Administrative Organization
SBP	Southern Border Provinces
SBPAC	Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre
SBPACC	Southern Border Provinces Administrative Coordination Center
SBPPC	Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command
SBPPOC	Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SPB	Southern Border Province Police Bureau
UN	United Nations

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM**

#### **1.1 Statement and Significance of the Problem**

First, the government gives priority to the three southern border provinces, that have the image of militant unrest in the region together with the delicate and complex problems, especially a misunderstanding and mistrust of the relationship between the authorities and the people, because of geographical conditions. It is away from the centralized administrative center and close to the neighbouring country where it has a similar unique culture in both society, and religion (Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center:SBPAC, 2013a).

The unrest problem in southern border provinces has a wide range of issues, to begin with the ethnic problem that people in the southern border provinces are mainly Malayu. Each has a respectable religion, which is considered an issue. However, the problem has not been unrest caused by religious conflict. Insurgent groups use religion as a tool to control people and produce difference in the public as Buddhists being their enemies. The issues of identity are very obvious. In the southern border provinces, people have identity problems caused by Islamic guidelines. Because the majority of the population is Buddhist; the Islamic way of life, court and language causes issues. In the early history of the southern border provinces, there was peace between Muslims and Buddhists. But they began to feud and became enemies instead of coming together when the insurgents sharpened and quickened the identity of the Pattani Malayu. Additionally, a group of insurgents attempted to create violence and terror to drive Buddhists out of the area. The ongoing problems from the history section, the southern border provinces that belonged to an Islamic State have come before prosperity and appended to a country brings with it a demand for autonomy, just as in the past (Apasara Fuangfu, 2012).

Solving the problem of unrest in the southern border provinces, throughout the period of 34 years (1981-2015), has caused uncertainties in policy. The nature of the changes in policy; has been caused by the change of organizations and leaders in that time span. In addition, there is a negative attitude towards insurgents, people and officials in the three southern border provinces caused more problems, and as a result it leads to the failure or the success of policy implementation which is a problem due to lack of unity over unity government in solving the problem. Moreover, Thailand's Government and the army have a different opinion on peace talks and the insurgents groups also have lack of unity as well (Apasara Fuangfu, 2012).

From the draft action plan of the SBPAC for the development of the southern border provinces in 2013 to 2014, the evaluations of programs/projects in fiscal year 2012 total 588 programs/projects of university academic network in eight areas of the campus reflect that the public participation and benefits are at a medium level. While government officials, found that people participate in and benefit from high level plans and projects. When considering the budget, it was the observations of the committee that found that the plans or projects of various ministries and departments are redundant and lack of integration, most activities such as training, seminars and study which are political issues. In the past, the deep south has had less political participation. But today, in the southern border provinces, there is more opportunity for local people to have greater space and role in both national and local politics (Apasara Fuangfu, 2012). In the research of Margaret Amy DeGroff and Cargo (2009); evaluating the success of policy implementation, the political factor is one of the three factors that should be considered for the evaluation of policy implementation. This includes factors such as; networked governance, political and democratic systems and new public management.

There is also the problem of injustice. The cause is the seizure of evidence and acts of discrimination. Discrimination based on religion occurs when choosing clothing to wear for work. International graduate persons are concerned by government. Because of this, the identity of the Malayu is being crushed and the allocation of state land is delayed. Injustice, which is mainly caused by the state department, has been used by government as a tool in the fight against insurgency. In the South there are delays in the administration of justice particularly in the major




incident and the disappearance of lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit, as separatists' lawyer (Apasara Fuangfu, 2012).

A current public issue that occurs in Thailand's deep South is continued violence. The problem of unemployment and poverty are also considered to be problems. Public attitude surveys show that the primary issues citizens want the government to fix quickly, are youth careers and employments from (Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, 2013a).

Although the performance of the main agencies of the SBPAC involved in the policy implementation have concrete outcomes, summary reports show problems and obstacles in the performance of the SBPAC. This is according to the urgent government policy and the basic State policy, interval 2 (23 August 2012 - 23 August 2013). After the projects being performed in the period of August 2012- August 2013, the number of incidents in the dimension of SBPAC showed that the number of incidents decreased from 706 incidents to 672 incidents decreased by 34 events per cent 4.18 when compared to the period of August 2011 - August 2012.

The SBPAC found that the number of casualties from incidents fell from 1,077 cases to 870 cases. That is a decrease of 207 cases, which is down 19.22 percent. Statistics showed that in a majority of events geared towards action, primarily military and police, the number of 364 cases increased to 461 cases. That's an increase of 97 cases, increasing the percentage to 26.65. But the weak target (people) was found that the number decreased from 713 cases to 409 cases, down 304 percent as a decline of 42.63 percent.




**Figure 1.1** Statistics of Unrest Accumulated since 2004 - 2014, Classified Annually.

**Source:** Deep South Watch, 2014.

Finally, the number of deaths from the events dropped from the 343 cases to 304 cases, down by 39 cases. That's a decrease of 11.37 percent. Statistics showed that the state officer cases increased from 74 cases (military 50 and police 24) to 106 cases (military 79 and police 27). That's an increase of 32 cases, increasing the percentage to 30.19 and statistics also showed that citizen's death decreased from 269 cases to 198 cases, dropped 71 cases, as 26.39 percent.

Although in the year 2014, there was the least amount of unrest in the past 11 years according to figure 1.1, the number of injuries and deaths decreased drastically by the year 2014, unrest had amounted to 793 incidents, that's an average of 66 incidents per month. From figure 1.2, in the year 2014, 330 people were killed with an average of 28 people per month and 663 people were injured with an average of 55 people per month. It is also found that in 11 years the number of dead bodies was 6286 bodies with an average of 571 deaths per year and a total of 11 366 people were injured with an average of 1,033 injuries per year.



**Figure 1.2** Total Cumulative Number of Deaths and Injuries Accumulated since 2004 - 2014, Classified Annually.

**Source:** Deep South Watch, 2014.

Nevertheless, violence still occurs constantly until this day. The conflict resolution in the southern border provinces is a challenge to government at all levels. But by looking at the problem (to not receive justice in terms of dominance, economic, education and natural resource accession, as well as to not get justice in the justice process) more in context, resolution can occur. An issue-oriented person, the insurgents have used violence against the state to resolve the problem. But the cultural problem is not the main issue. The issues are the ethnic, linguistic and religious differences in the identity of the Muslim Malay Pattani people. It has been used as an excuse to create conflict in the area in order to put pressure on the government. This is consistent with the report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), that religious conflict is not the root of insurgency and violence in the southern border provinces

In this study, the researcher would like to study the development of the unrest of the past up to the present for the purpose of policy making. And also to study the policy implementation process performed. This can be done by; examining the role of

the primary agency responsible for resolving the unrest, examining the outcomes and key factors of policy implementation outcomes and to study the problems and obstacles that still exist. To analyze that, there are significant issues that need to be studied. Particularly because when the programs are implemented, the figures above it have noticeable decreases. However, the ongoing violence has occurred until the present.

A study of the policy, processes and outcomes shows how urgent it is for the government to make the crucial policies that will solve the problems in the southern border provinces. So, the researcher has to study the government's policy which has the main agencies involved and is responsible for the policy implementation. Here are the questions to be asked; How does a step in the process of policy implementation be implemented? What are the key factors that affect policy implementation? What are the outcomes? And what are the obstacles and problems that still remain? Lastly, the researcher must study those issues in order to create guidelines for conflict resolution in the southern border provinces that are sustainable, effective and efficient.

## **1.2 The Objective of the Research**

1.2.1 Analyze the development of the unrest from the past to the present.

1.2.2 Analyze the development of policies to tackle the unrest situations in the three southern border provinces.

1.2.3 Analyze the policy implementation process, by considering the role of the main agencies that respond with resolving the unrest in the three southern border provinces.

1.2.4 Analyze the policy implementation outcomes.

1.2.5 Analyze the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes.

1.2.6 Analyze the remaining problems and obstacles.

### **1.3 Scope of the Study**

This research is to study the conflict resolution in the southern border provinces. The issues are; policies, processes and outcomes which are analyzed in the overview of the six objectives by analyzing the developments of both the unrest and public policy from past to present to solve the unrest since the rule being changed to the Monthon system during the reign of King Rama V until present in the period of the head of National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and the Prime Minister Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha (2014-2015). In order to study how to solve the problems, the researcher needs to analyze the policy implementation process. This can be done by considering the role of the main agencies which respond with conflict resolution. Once those are considered the researcher can learn the key factors that affect the policy implementation outcomes. The information from the results of the action plan of the SBPAC, in the government's urgent policy and policy on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013 was analyzed. As well as, the results of research from Thai and oversea scholars, lessons from China, the Philippines, Indonesia and also the organizations involved with studying the conflict resolution in the southern border provinces were analyzed to find the new model of the factors that results in policy implementation which are adapted from the Pressman and Wildavsky model.

In addition, whether the policy implementation ends with success or failure, the researcher needs to study and analyze the remaining problems and obstacles in order to present the conflict resolution with efficiency and effectiveness.

Finally, the researcher will attain qualitative research on the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes by in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to analyze the data and compare the result of the analysis data from the primary documents and bring the research to a conclusion.

### **1.4 Benefits of the Study**

1.4.1 For those who are interested in studying the development of the unrest in the southern border provinces, from past to present.

1.4.2 For those who are interested in knowing and understanding the key factors that affect policy implementation outcomes in the appropriate context.

1.4.3 For those who are interested in studying the comparison of present lessons from overseas conflict resolution.

1.4.4 To propose guidelines in resolving the issues in policy implementation, so that state agencies can perform successfully and approach solving the problems and obstacles properly, to create successful public policy.

1.4.5 To guide the study research in extended results.

## **1.5 Definitions of Key Terms**

1.5.1 Public policy are the guidelines or measures that the government or government agencies define with the intent to resolve issues.

1.5.2 Policy analysis is the pursuit of facts, in order to explain the phenomenon which is occurring. The policy analysis is a rational argument to support the controversy of the policy, despite what the people may wish, or if others may have a different view.

1.5.3 Policy implementation process is the process in which all managed resources are used to operate the tasks for achieving the goals of the defined policy.

1.5.4 Policy implementation outcome is the output stemming from the government implementing a policy, and operational accomplishment, success or completion of its implementation.

1.5.5 Outcomes are the results of productivity from the output, which can be measured by considering the benefits that the target group received from the policy.

1.5.6 The appropriateness of the population in the target area is the population in the area of the southern border provinces whose identity in language, religion, traditions and culture are of Thai Muslim Malay and they live in the areas that have violence continuously.

1.5.7 Ability to learn from experience is the ability to study the lessons and experiences of resolving conflicts abroad, for the purpose of applying that knowledge in order to resolve the problems in the southern border provinces.

1.5.8 Appropriation theoretical is the policy implementation, which is related to the theoretical concept or policy research that can be described accurately and appropriately.

1.5.9 Communication is messaging between individuals in the organization. It includes communication within the same agency, between agencies and to external organizations; for the purpose of benefiting performance tasks or helping to achieve the defined objectives. It includes any communication with the word “Message.”

1.5.10 Organization competency is the characteristics that make the organization gain a competitive advantage or can show roles and performance that is superior to other organizations.

1.5.11 Efficiency of the Policy Process is the process or steps of policy formation, policy alternative, policy decision-making, policy implementation and policy evaluation, which is performed by efficient means of the implementation of goals.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Research of conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces was carried out by studying the policy, process and outcomes, and the researcher studied the necessary concepts and theories which are related to the correct analysis in the theoretical framework. The related concepts and theories are as follows.

2.1 The Unrest Situation in the Three Southern Border Provinces

2.2 The Evolution of the Conflict with Insurgent Groups in the Southern  
Border Provinces

2.3 Thai Lessons

2.4 Public Policy Development

2.5 Public Policy Process

2.6 Public Policy Analysis

2.7 Process of Policy Analysis

2.8 Outcomes

2.9 Policy Implementation Concept

2.10 Policy Implementation Approach

2.11 Problems of Policy Implementation

2.12 Problem Solving of the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces

Related Researches in Thailand and Foreign Countries

2.13 Lessons from Abroad to Solve the Problems in the Three Southern  
Border Provinces

2.14 Discourse and Conflict Resolution in the Three Southern Border  
Provinces



## **2.1 The Unrest Situation in the Three Southern Border Provinces**

When mentioning the causes of unrest or violence which the world called terrorism, there are possibly several causes and factors which are complex and interlinked. The causes and major factors in the world class include prejudice or bias in the dealing with Muslim problems, divided into two social standards, unverified of justice, eliminate to be unjust, satisfaction or ignore various policies which are unfair, starvation, attack and finally, killing without inquiry and prosecution. (Addullah Numsuk, 2015)

The unrest problem in the three southern border provinces due to social structure in the area has characteristics, in particular of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun, which differ from other regions. That is to say, most individuals over 80 percent are Islam, use Malay in daily life - Thai language is unpopular-some parts cannot speak Thai language, there is tradition that differs from locals. The social surrounding mentioned above is a barrier to development. These lead to social psychology problems and also affect the stability of the Southern region. Three southern border provinces consist of 3 main problems-economic problems, social psychology problems and stability problems which are as follows:

- 1) Economic problems Production Structure of the southern border is narrow, mainly focused on only the production of rubber trees and fishery-and also requires foreign marketing. Moreover, problems of population have their own land to agriculture of less than average which is only about 12 acres per household. Many farmers have a lack of land to make a living and low productivity. And in parts of fishery, it is the main occupation of the population of Pattani and Narathiwat. Experiencing the marine resources is declining, production costs are higher, and have lowered the price. It makes the fishermen poor. Therefore, there is a need to develop the manufacturing base to wider and frontier economies that are closely linked with the economy of the Southern region and the Country. In addition, the poverty problem of farmers-especially fishermen, people which lack arable land and those of orchardists, must be solved.

- 2) Social psychology problems Due to the social structure of the people of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat being different from other parts of the South region, it

causes problems of education management, family planning, management of social welfare of the government for poor children and orphans, and there is a need to promote the development activity of youth and the role of women as a special case.

3) Security problems Due to social psychology problems the causes for the issue of terrorism are multiple. There are performance issues of the administration system, coordination of local agencies, and then, there is the issue to have to eliminate these problems immediately.

However, in the view of the scholars who want to resolve the conflict of sustainability, the following concepts could be considered: (Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Sukri Langpute, 2008)

1) The balance of the living system and in the symbolic battle arena is ongoing. Designing the format of administration and management for solving a problem by righteousness and peace requires the analysis of the various social and cultural contexts. Interesting issues are Management and administration of nature- it is the administration or any action that makes humans and society be happy and live well. Whoever takes up the lead, any organization that is established, must have the ability to make people who live under the rule, people in the district, and in the municipality live well and peacefully. What should be done is create a mechanism from the population in the local area and it should be the balance of power for each part.

2) The sense of culture - Factors to consider are elements of a sense of identity ethnic and religion, which are important in driving the conflict causing violence and is the main variation of the solution in the process of building social institutions and local politics. The solution in administration can also solve the problem. And it will cause a feeling that there is correctness and righteousness in the solving of a problem for reducing pressure, obstruction of ethnic identity, religion and history. The solution mentioned above is a reaction to the continuous fighting with the symbolic center of importance of feeling which is a combined characteristic of the religious and cultural administration, in order to contribute to the resurgent power of social control that is correct, and contains righteousness and fairness for managing all problems that happen.

3) A problem of power in the government - Another structure that is important, is one that accompanies the social structure of the government. The meaning of this is how does the government provide funds and officiate in the areas that differ in terms of social, culture and ethnicity. The government officer and other staff should manage how to reach and serve the population for confidence, trustworthiness at the local and community level. However due to the performance of the leader of the administration, religion and community; there is a need to see whether that can control and dominate the action and the idea of the society and community or not; and whether the society that responds to the role of government, staff and leader of locals is good or not. Therefore, there is a need to solve the problem with the administration and management both in the region and locality which has interesting elements of the government in the regional and local level-in order to combine and integrate characteristic of culture to characteristic of politics and executives. The structure government and bureaucracy is an agent that has the quality of the population, society and culture, and these are main variables to make the government able to get along well with the community

In addition, the root of conflict and violence is not the fault only of the BRN group or Malayu struggle group; but the government of Thailand, also creates a condition that causes violence. (Srisompob Jitpiromsri, 2015) And there are some variables in the process of peace talks, which from the perspective of the government, is hard to accept, such as accepting that the unrest in the southern border is a conflict of politics and requires finding solutions to political problems and admit a status of Armed insurgency of an official partner in the dialogue about peace. (Ropers, 2015)

## **2.2 The Evolution of the Conflict with Insurgent Groups in the Southern Border Provinces**

In 1995, with the birth of the Dusun Nyor Rebellion, about 400 Malay Muslims died and more than six thousand people have migrated to the Malayan Union. Afterwards, it has called for an independent to the Pattani state throughout. Dusun Nyor rebellion reacts offensively to Malay Muslims in Thailand because of the government. Initially from the canceling of the Sultanate system and becoming the

Monthon system in the reign 5, things intensified during the Cultural revolution in which Field marshal P. Pibulsongkram was the prime minister. This also included starvation during World War 2 in which the population that was Islamic thought that they do not receive equal care as Buddhists.

Furthermore, there is also pressure from the outside by the British support to Tonku Mahaiyiddee Ubdulgadeh who is the youngest of Raya Pattani to break up Thailand, in order to take revenge on Thailand that cooperated with Japan. The mainstay in resisting the government during that time was Hahyee Salon Ubdulgadeh whose role was to oppose the justice investigation, and that required a separate court for each religious aspect and offered the request for 7 items to the government.

On January 16, 1948, Hahyee Solhong was arrested by insurgents of allegation. This offended the people immensely; and it caused a clash between the authorities and the Muslims during 25 to 28 April in 1948 at Dusun Nyor, Janae, Narathiwat province. This situation caused the two sides to have many casualties.

In 1959, Tonku Updulyalan had established the BNPP which was the first group of separatist armed forces. And Ustas Kareem Hussan who was the leader of the progressive group, established the National Revolutionary Movement Alliance or BRN in 1963, while Karbee Ubdul Lohman established Save the independence Patani Organization or PULO in the same year. (Daily News 2013, 1 May). After that there were the BNPP group, BRN group and PULO which operated between 1968-1979; and they dealt with the attack of officials and arresting of businessmen for ransom, but they still did not achieve their goals according to demand.

Later in the year 1991, all three groups reached an agreement to form a joint group on behalf of "The ally sovereignty of the Pattani" or Bersatu by Dr. Wan Ubdul Kadir Cheman who was the principle and he could raise awareness that called for the sovereignty of the Pattani state, because the concept of politics and the military were clear. Although, Dr. Ubdul Kadir Cheman had been appointed chairman of Bersatu group, he still was not accepted by the group because he was not trusted.

Dr. Wan Ubdul Kadir had an interview with a correspondent of Al Jazeera by identified Bersatu during the time the three groups had been formed: BNPP group, Pulo group and BRN Coordinate. The statement as above caused the BRN group to be disappointed when being impersonated that BRN was cooperating with him. And he

also said that a new generation of warriors did not want to negotiate and seminary school was a hideout. The guerrilla of Pattani started creating unrest again in the year 2001. The identity of the insurgents, who wanted to push the conflict, is vague for the most part. Experts at local and regional level indicate the situations involving separatist groups in the original regions: for example: the BRN group and the BNPP group and especially BRN Coordinate. (a branch of the BRN group) The group carrying weapons that had been allegedly involved with the BRN group were the Randa group, the Campuran group and the Kizil group. Others suggested that the violence occurred under the influence of foreign Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Jabal Ahmad Islamic Sassanid there. However, with the working methods of the guerrillas in the south, which created assault with weapons and military schools, it was unlike the practices of other groups which attacked the West. So the view that the guerrilla group in the local area was involved with the foreign group is impossible. In the same year, Thaksin said "There is no separatism, no terrorists, there are only petty thieves." And in 2004, Thaksin Shinawatra who was the Prime Minister had changed the general attitude that the situation was the war on terror in the country. On July 20, 2005, Thaksin announced the emergency situation by Decree on the Government Administration in Emergency Situations B.E. 2548 to cope with the unrest in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani in September 2006. On October 25, 2014, a group known as the MARA PATANI or AMANAH council of people's Pattani was founded, and was renamed as MAJLIS SYURA PATANI which had the English name PATANI CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL. (PCC) Initiated by members of the revolutionary Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) it presented the concept and opportunities for group fighting in Patani, among others. Its motto was to join one of these organizations together, and the intend to fight together. It defined the claims into peace of negotiations with the government of Thailand, due to the participation of 6 organizations including 1) BRN 2) BIPP 3) PULO-P4 4) PULO-DSPP 5) PULO-MKP and 6) GMIP. These arise from the cooperation and consensus of all organizations without guiding or supporting or the pressure of Malaysia as facilitator. (Abu Hafiz Al Hakim, 2015)

### 2.3 Thai Lessons

The most important issue to be involved in the conflict of ethnic and identity issues is in fact the foundation of violence in the deep south (Srisompob Jitpiromsri, 2014) and it is clear that there is a need to be aware of the root causes of the conflict (Ropers, 2013).

The unrest situation in the southern border provinces during the start of the conflict between the government and the regions, since reign 5, changed the regime to Monthon caused the original power clique to be angry and claim the descent from the old leaders in the local area-in which the Thai government should understand the historical issues. The Thai government must understand the identity, language, religion, traditions and culture of the Malay Muslims with the implementation of the reform of education in the national integration policy as the National Education Act B.E. 2464. These are promotion of using the Thai language and encouraging everyone to read and write, and closure of schools not teaching the Thai language correctly as per the course.

In 1939, Field marshal P. Pibulsongkram are announcing that Thai people must acknowledge the costumes and traditions of Thailand and the usage of the Malay language and some religious ceremonies of Islam had been designated as illegal by the Thai-government in B.E. 2487. This was the cause of more dissatisfaction and unrest in the three southern border provinces: Dusun Nyor Rebellion during the years 1948-1957 until in 1959, when Tonku Ubdulyalan established the BNPP group as the first of separatist armed forces. And Ustas Kareem Hussun was a progressive leader, who established a BRN group in 2506, while Gabee Abdul Laohman established the Pulo organization. (Daily News 2013) Later in 1991, all three groups had reached an agreement to establish a joint enterprise on their behalf, the "United Front for the Independence of Pattani" or Bersatu by Dr. Kadir Cheman, who was the chairman.

The main policy issue in solving the unrest in the three southern border provinces in 1923 during the reign of King Rama V could be solved by the King having announced the Principles of Public Administration for performing one's mission in the Pattani state. Since Thailand had occupied land that was the state of Pattani before, it had also occupied others territories such as Lanna, some of the East

that was the land of Vientiane etc. From what is mentioned above, using the occupation policy and governing one's favour, such detainees were quite satisfied with the performance against the occupation. This action demonstrates the wisdom of the leaders during the time to understand and recognize the identity of the people in the community and most of the public which was of utmost importance by adjusting to the weaknesses of the administration of the country in accordance with the terrain and the people of the state of Pattani-which had various strategies for successors to the present. (Panngam Ngaodharmasan, 2003)

In the year 1937, the government has to accept the cultural differences, and improve the efficiency of the bureaucracy (Political Science Faculty, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, 2007). On March 20, 1937 according to the report of the operation of the Board that monitors the situation in the four provinces appointed by the Cabinet for investigations, suggestions were made to improve the situation of the southern border provinces and concluded that the population has to earn a peaceful living, and the movement of the various situations that occurred because of the leaders of the Thai-Muslims was a demagogue, disrupted the nationalism, the unrest was quite traumatic to people in the area. When the government's narrowing culture of war during the era and after the war was prevalent, people encountered poverty and the corruption of officials resulted that caused some of the population to be happy.

The importance of the lesson learned by the Thai-government in the solving of the unrest in the three southern border provinces reflects that the Thai government has to determine the policy, structure, and the role of the organization in each era which is different. In troubleshooting the problems in the three southern border provinces, there is a need to understand the issues, in order to define the policies to be implemented correctly and successfully.

In the government of General Prem Tinsulanonda there were policies of solutions separation of the territory agency and terrorism in the southern border with the establishment of the SBPAC. For solving the unrest in the area by considering more justice the following were needed to be done: solving the assassinate, attitude adjustment, eliminate corruption in all its forms in bureaucracy and establish the civilian-military police (CPM43) which was the authority for suppressing terrorism in

all its forms, performing cultural policy. These caused the Muslims to be more distant than ever and promoters became more serious.

Thaksin Shinawatra abolished the SBPAC and the civilian-military police headquarters at 43 because he thought that the ally in the area was weakening more and wanted the policemen to get into solving the problem in the area. According to the report of Thaksin's government, it was confirmed that there benefit groups, illegal goods groups as illegal arms, barbarian oil, drugs were involved with the separatist insurgents.

In the period of the Prime Minister, General Surayud Chulanont, there were ways that the situation would improve by avoiding the use of undue influence and started negotiations with the separatist insurgents. There was the resurrecting of the SBPAC and the civilian-military police headquarters at 43 to come back. However, when reaching the period of Abhisit Vejjajiva, which encountered the problem of severe political conflict it caused solving the problem in the southern border provinces difficult, making troubleshooting decline, a lack of continuity and without the negotiation for peace.

In the period of Yingluck Shinawatra, there was the use of peaceful means, and a focus on open space in order to accept those with a different opinion that shared solutions, an opportunity to all sectors to solve the problem together, respect and honor, uphold justice and take remedial measures to rehabilitate victims who had been affected by the unrest as a turning point from violence to peaceful means.

Nowadays, in the government of Pol.Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, there have been structural changes as ways to manage the problem the southern border. Divided into three levels: policy level has the National Security Council (NSC), the management consultancy, at the policy implementation level there is the Board of Directors to resolve the issues driving the unrest in the southern border provinces that are operating under the control of the Internal Security Operations Command and the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) and finally, performance of the level has the Internal Security Operations Command which is the primary agency that is responsible. Moreover, Pol.Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha as Prime Minister, gave the precedence to the Internal Security Operations Command which is the security administrator and the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre



(SBPAC) to oversee the development in the southern border by delegating Pol.Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan to control the SBPAC.

The Thai-government applied the strengths and took lessons from the negotiation of the peace in the period of Prime Minister Yinglakh Chinnawatra during the experience in order to analyze the situation. The government during the period of Pol.Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, reduced the troops in usage during the violence with the instigator.

There was a change to not only use the military government but also give precedence to negotiation for peace by Prime Minister Pol.Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha. He visited Malaysia on December 1, 2014 and established the committee to discuss peace and negotiate quickly.

## **2.4 Public Policy Development**

The development of public policy is a social process in which people need to participate in society, powered by social issues such as the problem of violence, the conflict and unrest problems in the southern border. The process aforementioned happens when the government gets involved in solving the problems. The government is not a monopoly power, must do the work and acknowledge the need and diversity of opinions. The accessory with an analysis of the policy is necessary to specify the problem structuring, compile information about the issue, solutions and then review results after practice. For the purpose of checking and solving of the results of the trouble in both the political situation, and the social and economic situation, the attitudes of the leader and the decision-maker are extremely crucial (Dunn, 1994).

So policy decisions must be on the knowledge base and overview of the problem, give precedence to human rights, fairness, and equality. Although stakeholders might be minorities such as Malay-Muslims in the three provinces- they must ensure fairness and generosity to those groups, and not put the interests of the majority of claims. This information will be useful to change the resolution of the problems.

Even though the development of public policy must consider and focus on the education in the past, there is a need to adjust in the future. To find information on the

policy is not based on their ability to study only the problems of the past and include the expectation that the problem will be resolved (Dunn, 1994). Most policy problems are not only general problems but also associated with other problems such as the three southern border provinces-which is unrest and violence and related with unemployment problems, poverty problems, drug problems etc. The policy problem is one part of all of the problems which caused resentment among various segments of the community (Ackoff, 1981).

The development of public policy is a process that happens in politics that offers freedom to people to participate in politics. There are processes driven socially from the population who have knowledge and intelligence for the benefit of the society. The development of public policy should consider the social context, social capital, alternatives to the solution, how to solve the problem of the community and changes or risks that occur in society: the rapid development and disaster etc. (Tipaporn Pimpisut, 2007).

And at last, the relevant authorities must resolve to achieve the desired objective in which finally the solutions may appear in the form of law by the lawmaker (Anderson, 1994).

The main factors to be taken into account are the relationships between the variables involved which is in the preliminary stages, these relationships may be just only a concept or assumption. The problem is limited to empirical data but the effort to identify the problem clearly helps to makes a logical structure for analysis in order to know the real problems that need to be resolved. (Quade, 1982; Jones, 1977; Mitroff and Featheringham, 1974)

Academic and officials concerned are not to focus on these factors but rather focus on the policy and policy measures. So the development of public policy is a process-driven policy of the community. It is data indicative of social problems that must be studied in-depth. The social process should be used as a model because it has been limited by the government and the bureaucracy (Tipaporn Pimpisut, 2007).

## **2.5 Public Policy Process**

Research studies on the issues in the three southern border provinces are the issues of policy, process and result which in this study require understanding of the public policy process by the details that are as follows.

### **2.5.1 Policy Formation**

The policy formation is the first step of the process of public policy by the beginning of considering the type of the problem of the public. In general, starting from the individual problem until the problem of the public up to the government, there is a need to draw attention to make the policy issue for the unrest problem in the three southern border provinces because it is the problem that must be resolved urgently.

Therefore, the policy formation is not only identified by the policy issues and presenting the options in the solving of public problems but it must closely relate with the practice. In order that public problems will be solved effectively, it depends on the successful implementation of the policy. The policy formation makers must be aware of the possibilities in order to practice it successfully (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 317-318).

The policy formation requires the necessity to study the issue of public policy by recognizing the problems of the policy which are needed to be known and the problems related to policy or any organization, and such organizations must present a solution to the government, and finally the interaction between perceived problems and related organizations. This means that institutions or organizations that are involved in the policy must be analyzed and verification of information done in order to offer the most appropriate choice to decision-makers for guarantee that when taking the policies to the operating level, the results will be achieved (Bosso, 1994).

### **2.5.2 Policy Alternative and Policy Decision-Making**

The development and the specified options of the policies to present an alternative to the appropriate policy decisions involve the government officer to take the policy and put it into practice. So the analyst must be always aware to not only

serve to present alternative policies to those policy decisions, but also to consider the possibility of taking a policy to practice to make it succeed. In case of problems in the three southern border provinces, analysts of the policy should develop and formulate alternative policies that improve the quality of creative resolutions for conflict and the analyst who can do it, must have the skills, expertise and experience (Deutch, 1973).

So, to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces it is necessary that the all relevant organizations brainstorm the ideas about the policies and is specifically through a seminar. (Lasswell, 1960; Brever, 1975) The specified options for policies is the process of repetition by starting from bringing the original issue up for reconsideration, survey to develop and move up, make the original concept more clear and combine it to generate new ideas (Quade, 1982).

The policy decision-making relevant with the action of the government officer or the organizations should have authority in the approval, adaptation and refusal. The policy options should be presented for consideration most of the process requires actions by lawmakers to enact or actions by the administrative section in resolution of the cabinet. However, the factors affecting the decision to choose a policy include social values and political values. Values of the selected policy are succeeded from the political and social surroundings causing beliefs and values of the decision-maker (Devos and Hippler, 1969).

The factors relevant to the political party are that each party has policies that are a standpoint which influence how to determine to choose the policy. The part of constituency interest is an important factor because it benefits the population in the electorate of the politician. However, in the political science public opinion is dominant and contributes moderately to the decision such as solving the problems in the three southern border provinces and the most important is the decision of the public policy that should aim at public interest. So, the public interest is another important purpose of the public policy.

### **2.5.3 Policy Implementation**

The policy implementation is the process of the measure that happen between the determination of the policy and the policy agreement to be announced such as an act, executive command or resolution of the cabinet, adjudication of the Supreme

Court or ministerial regulations. When taking the policy into action, it will affect the people involved. Therefore, the process to take the policy into action regards key steps in the system which in the past would often have been overlooked and not been interesting. The decision to choose the policy inappropriately if put into practice, would not succeed. It may make an existing problem worse that would deteriorate things further.

#### **2.5.4 Policy Evaluation**

The policy evaluation is an important step of the public policy and to know whether it is successful or a failure in case of taking the policy into practice. And it also refers to the purpose or objective along with resources, procedure, the organization responsible, product, result, effect and social environment linked to the policy. These are factors important in making decisions about whether the policy should carry on or be rectified or finally the need to terminate the policy (Anderson, 1979).

Therefore, the evaluation is the analysis of the problem from the policy implementation systematically in order to solve problems effectively. The policy evaluation and the project of the government at the national level and local level cause benefit widely to both the government and the population. In order for the evaluation of the pledge to the development of new alternatives along with innovation to have an effect on economic and social issues, there is a need to bring about improvement in the living conditions and the environment of the community members.

As per the policy of evaluation in the process there is an ongoing relationship between creating and taking until the effect of the policy. So evaluation may be specially such that the evaluation policy may be at any stage or assess policy throughout all stages. And the choose a style or approach in our evaluation depending on several factors such as unrest, stakeholders, the purpose of the project, benefits of an assessor and environmental, political etc. This is due to the fact that the approaches and models each have different strengths and weaknesses. The evaluation should apply the methodologies and models to suit the conditions, quality and the purpose of each project.

Good evaluation must include a plan to evaluate the system in order for the assessment to follow the steps correctly. The evaluation must define the framework for the evaluation plan to be concrete to ensure that evaluation will be complete as the purposes of assessment. There is a need to be extremely careful of the reliability of the results of the evaluation, how the evaluation takes place and to describe the process of planning, and the assessment system. This can be checked for accuracy and reliability so that it will be accepted with the accessory widely (Owen, 1993).

An important aspect in the evaluation of those plans will have to be assessed. The roles and responsibilities of the assessor is ethics which they will evaluate as a reality. As a result, the assessment must take into account ethics because the value and expectation there affects policies and projects of each group which may be more or less different depending on the specific characteristics of each situation (Greene, 1994).

However, the assessor will have to decide how to use proper evaluation in order to achieve the results that reflect the real needs of each group. For this reason, the selection methodology to evaluate the situation or the quality of the policy along with needs of the group is to be evaluated. It is important and necessary for the evaluation as well to see which methodology evaluates various ways such as combining qualitative and quantitative methods and are conceptual and philosophical about the evaluation.

## **2.6 Public Policy Analysis**

Research study of troubleshooting in the three southern border provinces shows us the education policy process and results. These are necessary to analyze the public policy of the relevant authorities and the SBPAC which is the organization of the coordinator and responsible for bringing the policies into practice in the form of programs and projects. This analysis requires a policy framework that will make it clear in any direction, for what purpose and conform the actual objective (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 257 ). The policy analysis is to find the truth to explain the phenomenon that occurs. The attitude of the people that the policy is a rational

argument is to support the policy they wish. For others, they may have a different view of this (Barnes and Dubnick, 1980: 123).

So to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces we will have to seek the truth in the area. Because the local people there have revealed the problems mentioned above, these will be the people in the area participating in solving the problem as much as possible. The policy analysis is the analysis of the problems of the social sciences and to conform to reality. Thus most policy analysts are interested in developing an appropriate description more than the suggesting an alternative to decide on policy issues that they are facing (Dye, 1984: 7).

The research study of analysis of the public policy was done in order to clear understanding. This should draw attention to elements of policy analysis because it will be understood that the conceptual introduction of the analysis of public policy involves some major issues. This is fundamental to the study of public policy in the future (Quade, 1982). Importance should be given to consider the composition of the public policy analysis of researching how to fix the three southern border provinces. The elements of policy analysis that are important as the attitude of Quade (1982: 45-46)

- 1) Objective to find the real purpose of the policy in order to know what the decision will be to achieve results in which the decision is expected to lead to a successful outcome.

- 2) Alternatives are the conditions or procedures that are possible. The choice depends on the specific policy issues.

- 3) Impact is the upcoming results due to the selection of alternatives to achieve the desired objective. The impact of each alternative leads to both positive and negative.

- 4) The criteria are rules or standards that the priority of choice is as desired. The criteria are to measure the relationship with the aim of choices and consequences by ranking the lowest cost alternatives first.

- 5) Model is the process or invention that can predict occurrences in each choice.

Therefore the elements of policy analysis allow policy analysts to determine that the point of the analysis was correct and in line with the solving of social

problems. These make analysis more efficient (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 273)

## **2.7 Process of Policy Analysis**

The process of policy analysis should understand the key of methods especially in terms of the cycle of policy analysis and process.

The iterative nature of policy analysis process is that the process of public policy is a cycle which happens over and over again continuously (Quade, 1982) as follows.

1) Clarifying the problem. The policy analysis must begin by identifying a clear policy as to what is the problem, happens to which group and how it affects society.

2) Determining objectives. When informed of the problem, the analysts must be targeted or the purpose of the solution explained explicitly.

3) Searching and designing alternatives. It is finding solutions to policy problems involved in the objective. The choice has to be many. There will be a choice of several ways that are possible for the sake of comparison, each choice showing an alternative clearly.

4) Collecting data and information. Should gather relevant information in order to be adequate for the analysis of alternatives and for each choice there are strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and limits its practice to a real one. You need to analyze the economic, social and political situation for comparison, the choice is very clear.

5) Building and testing models. It is the alternative to building a model and to test whether the introduction of each choice is possible and consistent with the results of the analysis performed more or less.

6) Examining alternatives for feasibility. An assessment of alternative options that is consistent with the values of any society.

7) Evaluating costs and effectiveness. Should assess the costs required in implementing each alternative choice to perform as well as evaluating the effectiveness of each of the options clearly.



8) Interpreting results. Should the assessment that is happening possible and whether the objectives are defined or not or there. Also, to find some obstacles that may occur in the implementation of policy into practice.

9) Questioning assumptions. The results should be reviewed to make it clear that the assumptions are not just accepted, in case, the results do not meet the defined objectives. There might be assumptions in determining whether the policy is not valid or not clear about the objective or a problem with the practice or a problem with the change of environment, and so on.

10) Opening new alternatives. In the case that results do not appear as scheduled, there is a need to research what is the cause of the failure in order to determine the problem and find new ways that fit the solutions.

## **2.8 Outcomes**

The study's results are assessment of the success and failure of policy implementation. But why is the education policy successful while many policies have failed. The 6 factors influencing this are 1) Conflict of interest groups involved. 2) Social needs. 3) The advantages and disadvantages of each policy. 4) The issue of the change of environment. 5) The relationship between policies. 6) The determination of an extent of the problem and the purpose is not clear (Ingram and Dean, 1980 ). Other than that success and failure can be measured by the sum of various dimensions (Voradej Chandrasorn, 1997: 3-12).

1<sup>th</sup> demension is evaluation of Policy action is required to measure the process from start to finish of the policies. This is important to know the purpose or goal of the policy or nation. Whether the overall evaluation is successful or not depends on 1) Outputs; Can be measured by the criteria of quantity, the time, cost, quality and satisfaction. 2) Outcomes; Continue from the result and consider the benefits that have been targeted by the policy. And 3) Ultimate Outcomes; Productivity and overall results contribute to the cause and effect factor in developing countries.

2<sup>nd</sup> dimension is the result of the successful implementation of policy into practice. These must not cause problems for other projects or policies.

3<sup>rd</sup> dimension is the summary of all the policies into practice causing national development as needed.

## **2.9 Policy Implementation Concept**

The research study of bringing the public policy into practice requires practitioners to understand its meaning. By Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 12) the definition is the implementation that the occurrence of anticipated policy and the process of interaction between target and practice focus on actions to achieve results, and the ability to manage and integrate what will happen later and to get the desired effect. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 447) define that actions by individuals or groups of individuals influence the government and private sectors that aimed at causing the achievement of the objectives of the policy that was defined earlier.

The famous scholar of Thailand, Suphachai Yawaprapas (1990: 90) sums up the opinion of most scholars and has agreed on the implementation of 2 important issues. 1) Bring the policy into a practice of process, there being continuity and process activities. No activity occurs occasionally and then disappears. There are relationships of all time and 2) Implementation of the various steps undertaken to achieve the goals of the policy.

## **2.10 Policy Implementation Approach**

The research study reveals the conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces by study of the policy, process and outcomes. Due to most of the policies being such that that the government determines it to be in the most political institutions as the unincorporated area, it is only a coordinating agency and policy implementation is the Top-down approach. There are assumptions that the implementation will not affect most of the clarity of institutional policies and regulations (Sabatier, 1986). Expect policy to be performed according to the intention fully. This attitude is normative. The policy intends to cause its operating effectively. Even if it is the attitude of normative, it is the basic model of the ideal research of policy implementation which has 6 of the main assumptions that are (Calista, 1994: 132-134).

1) Institution or organization as designated by the effectiveness of policy implementation.

2) The clarity of the theory of cause and effect. Requires the enactment of appropriate legislation and promote the practice of adequate resources and tools needed.

3) Delivering policy to practitioners. There should be a legal regulation for practice, according to the objectives of the policy.

4) Even if people bring policy implementation they must be highly skilled and committed. But the operation could be performed by personal interests.

5) Incentives from the executive or legislative are necessary to establish cooperation with policy leaders to act. Meanwhile, the participation of interest groups in policy making operations is more efficient (Riple and Franklin, 1976).

6) Bringing the policy into practice. It is unable to review the changes in the economy and society and the defects may occur (Sabatier, 1986). This shows that the policy approaches into practice are from top to down. Also featured on the review and changing in line with changing circumstances.

The synthesis of knowledge obtained from the literature review for guiding the development of policy theory to practice. By the mention of Top-down approach (Voradej Chandrasorn, 2005: 80-85) from the first study of policy implementation of Pressman and Wildavsky (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) which is the study of the failure of policies to create jobs for minorities in Auckland, California.

It was found that it was more of the policy implementation of the Top-down approach because the work is structured hierarchically including co-operation in turning the policy into achievement. Pressman and Wildavsky summarize the main cause of such failures that the project is not located appropriately such that the project plan repaired the plane and made an exit connecting to the airport which required a skilled workforce and high quality. Most workers have insufficient knowledge because it was not necessary to have training. It delayed the project and could not be implemented. Besides there were also many steps that needed to be decided because their agencies involved caused many delays and also faced opposition from political parties such as the environmentalist groups that oppose the reclamation of the bay etc.

The study by Pressman and Wildavsky determine the cause of the failure of the policy that looks like a Top-down approach focused on the majority of the policy.


By developing a model for studying, the process of adopting a policy implementation is based on the fundamental belief that the policies would reflect the goals and means.

Therefore, researchers have taken an interest in the policy implementation model, to be used for analyzing the factors that affect the policy implementation. To solve the problems in the three southern border provinces and adjust the context appropriately with the areas. It focuses on the analysis of the problems and difficulties of policy implementation, which is divided into three groups. The first and second variable that is a factor that is associated with a group of third variables which will affect the policy implementation outcomes as following.

Variable Group 1: factors that affected the policy making include: 1) the appropriateness of the population in the target area 2) the social features and regional cooperation 3) the cooperation of the relevant agencies, and (4) the changes that occurred in supportive agencies or related individuals.

Variable Group 2: the variable factor of complexity of joint action consists of: 1) the ability to coordinate between different departments that are able to work together 2) the complexity of the decision-making process (multiplicity of decisions) 3) the goal of the project conflicts or inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one goal (4) the ability to address the issue of project delays that occurred.

Variable Group 3: the linkage of the factors that affected the policy making and policy implementation to practice together include: 1) the ability to develop and learn from the experiences to solve the problems 2) the effectiveness of the policy process which must understand and accept the importance of continuity and the relations between ends and means 3) the appropriate theory for explaining the policy characteristics. According to the figure 2.1



**Figure 2.1** The Key Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation Outcomes of Pressman and Wildavsky C

Other than that Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) is a scholar that proposed that the successful implementation of the policy depends essentially on three factors together that are the process of communication, the performance organization of policy implementation and collaborative support of the operation. These have mutual relations.

The researcher found out that communication is a major factor to solve the problem in the three southern border provinces due to the effectiveness of policy to perform depending on an understanding of the officer that they should do it. These depend on the policy level, specifications of the policy and clarity of policy both in terms of objectives and targets. But if the communication is not understood, it inevitably causes distortions in goals and objectives of the policy. Activities that contribute to a better understanding as well as the cooperation of practitioners lead to communication that builds on the successful implementation of the policy into practice which must include clarity, accuracy and consistency (Voradej Chandrasorn, 2005: 129-130).

According to the attitude of Van Meter and Van Horn: policy implementation is educational interaction and communicating that happens in the hierarchy of the message from top to down (Voradej Chandrasorn, 2005: 86)

There are also many scholars that featured on the communication factor. Scholar Hood (1976: 6) presents the model of perfect administration that the conditions of the possibility of providing external resources and political consent to integration with management in order to formulate a policy to practice perfectly may be possible, especially perfect communication and coordination between related organizations. This is consistent with the concept of Gunn (1980) that these processes lead to operational efficiency even more among coordinates, the factors related and all agencies' joint responsibility (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 427-428).

For the communication for peace in the process of creating a public space, the key is communication, so the concept of communication to the public peace should be done in a pluralist way of many of the various regions. Even though it is multi-dimensional and has fluctuated over time (Srisompob Jitpiromsri, 2013), and being the last issue of plural way of the communication process in this area. It is also processed to strengthen the cultural capital and cultural reproduction which is the foundation of communication to make this communication independent of the economic capital, business capital and political power.

Communication of language to achieve peace is very important. Do not stick to the language of security and common space. Peace should be from the people in the area. In addition, we need to be careful in using the language. Must consider their

language to emphasize what we can do in the future. Moreover there is the issue of security (Rorpers, 2013).

Thus, the researcher found that the communication factor should give high priority to the policy, the process at all levels, from the policy level, converting the policy into practice, the level of policy into practice, the level at a public service. This will need to be appropriate in the context of the three southern border provinces. The media and communication are the key factors in supporting and associated factors among three variables mentioned above as well. This allows policy into practice to be more productive.

The success of policy implementation, depending on the capabilities of implementing units that will work just as expected is the factor organization competency. Such capabilities depend on the availability of resources to support the activities, the incentive to work, the quality of personnel, leadership, the importance of each organization and consist of economic, social and political conditions in general. (Voradej Chandrasorn, 2005: 84-85)

Conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces needs to be supported by the organization competency and related to the communication factor, every process of the policy should make the process more efficient. And also support the relations of the factors that affected the policy making factor groups essential to the agencies that are working together between the agencies involved. And the complexity of the joint action factors that required organization competency in order to coordinate between departments as well as to have the ability to address the issue of project delays that occurred.

The conclusion of the essence of the Top-down approach is associated with the control of policy makers greatly under the environmental policy that is established, bringing policy to perform and the extent to which the policy is changed by the operation. The policy will be separate from applying to practice or to the proper or not. Policymakers take power to take control. The guidelines have to be considered for taking the policy into practice, from top to down. Authority in determining the policy is who is to command everything actually (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 428-429).

## 2.11 The Problems in Policy Implementation

Williams and Elmore (1976: 280); The problems in policy implementation the problem comes from politics and bureaucracy. This barrier is a major obstacle to the success of the implementation and this is because the structure to work within the government is a hierarchical one and the behavior of the bureaucracy in the view of scholars Thailand. Voradej Chandrasorn (2005: 169-170) lists the issues related to the implementation of policy

1) The problem of performance is the main problem on one side of the policy implementation. Such problems more or less depend on various factors and sub-factors, the factors of personnel, the factors related to capital, factors of materials, tools, academic factors and the technology involved in the policy

2) The success of the policy implementation which are based on the study of the control, the ability to measure the progress, the practical effect of policy plans or project, problems of control are more or less dependent on

(1) the ability of the authorities responsible for the conversion policy

(2) the clarity of the activities planned and the project that is derived from the policy and the ability to define the mission to the standard practice in accordance with the practice work included or consistent with the plan or project

3) The problem of policy implementation will be increased greatly, if the member in the organization or resistance to change is the result of the policy

4) The problems in policy implementation and the issue of power and the relationship between the organizations responsible for policy implementation with other organizations involved are more or less dependant on the conditions, the minor factors for several reasons

(1) the characteristics of contact and relations agency's compliance with agency policies

(2) the units will be required to seek cooperation which will depend on agreements with other agencies

(3) the possibility of the authorities of each unit to be able to work together



5) The problem of the support and the commitment of the organization or important persons are the main problems on the other side of the policy implementation. Such problems may also affect the failure of the policy if the organization or important person including the group influence, benefit group, politician, government officials and mass media do not support political and capital budgets as well as creating a barrier in terms of resistance and thus oppose the policy.

Conclusion : Evaluation or consideration to judge the success of the policy implementation considering the practical effect in the short term must be consistent with the objective or the goal of any policy and will have to see the impact of that policy in the long term. To achieve the objectives set by it it is necessary to measure the level of cooperation of stakeholders and the level of conflict in the process of policy implementation.

To evaluate the success of policy implementation it must be done while the policy is still in the process of implementation to assess and to find a solution .To know the effect of the policy, plan or project, requires a waiting period until the affected information is available. The role of political parties is very important. It is necessary to check the process of policy implementation from time to time and make sure the policy has been approved. It is necessary to follow up continuously from the political department and for government officials to take an interest and to prioritize the implementation. As a result policy implementation is likely to succeed even more.

Bureaucracy always tend to choose the state policy implementation, but only the policy that benefit themselves, the cooperation of the bureaucracy, it is crucial to the success of the implementation, in addition to the bureaucracy, government officials as a person should be considered to be involved or contribute greatly to its success, or failure of policy implementation, service providers or who are affected by the policy, both individuals and groups in the process of policy implementation, service providers, or the benefit will be the contact interaction with government officials in the lower level directly, the role of the client or the beneficiaries if an assembled group is to be more important and affect the policy implementation.

The success of the policy implementation needs enormous support from locals, the mass media, from the power, leaders from the community are the extra factors that have the potential and the ability of the agencies to put policies into practice, the

success of the policy implementation is based on the control measures, taking care, evaluation, motivation, encouragement, reinforcement of appropriate practitioners, and systematic, which conclude: for the policy implementation to succeed, to achieve the benefits received, target group, clarity of purpose, and the target is an important issue in determining the mission.

## **2.12 Problem Solving of the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces Related Researches in Thailand and Foreign Countries**

Research on policy implementation in Thailand have been done by scholars who have studied about problem solving of the unrest in the three southern border provinces, the details of factors influencing the results of policy implementation are as follows.

The Variable Group 1, factors in determining policies, policy making as key factors, which has sub- factors that are detailed as follows.

The appropriateness of the population in the target area factors, from the research of Arkom Jaikaew (1989), the study is about important factors in successful policy implementation in the southern border area, in addition the policy must comply with the problems in the area and must not conflict local faith, culture and tradition which is consistent with the research of Ittichai Seedum (2010), who conducted a study to understand the factors that influence successful policy implementation to strengthen peace in the southern border provinces. His case study on the compliance policy of local people in Pattani province found that the factors of the characteristics of policy, the policy objectives and the area under cultural identity consideration affects the successful implementation of the policy in maintaining peace in the southern border provinces positively, resulting in public participation in solving the unrest, building safety to life and property in Pattani province and reduction of condition in the causes of unrest, even more.

The factors of social features and regional cooperation, from the research of Arkom Jaikaew (1989) found that any assignment policies in problem solving of the area needed to be consistent with the culture in order to succeed. And civil servant

factors including career ambitions, adaptations, and professional careers being an important part of the success in the policy demonstrate a willingness to cooperate from local communities.

In addition, the research of Ittichai Seedum (2010) is a study of factors that influence successful policy implementation concerning maintaining peace in the southernmost provinces. The study of the compliance policy of local people in the Pattani province found that the support and cooperation from various groups and the area under cultural identity consideration affecting the successful policy implementation in maintaining peace in the southern border provinces positively, resulted in public participation in solving the unrest, building safety to life and property in the Pattani province and reduction of conditions in the causes of unrest.

In a view of the future southern border provinces in 2013-2015 from public views of the southernmost provinces, an aspect of the peace and friendship for south of the border is still the social and regional cooperation with characteristics particularly not engaging in the public sector's peace building process together with Buddhist Thais and Muslims being fear, suspicion and mistrust between two parties, leading to the violent situations and violent tactics used by some groups and some joint exploitation groups. The groups focus on nurturing the public sector and youth to politics and violence continuously (Noppadol Viseshsuvarabhum, 2013). In addition, the communication factor, lack of language skills and the selection of useful information from senders to receivers generate the communication gaps between bureaucracy and the public. There are rumors and false news which lead to the confusions of Thai Buddhists and Muslims, as well as the doubts on the intentions of a large number of various groups in the area currently. As a result, some violent groups make use of it to incite and produce citizens' coalition to have the joint concept of the negative political and violent ways of thinking and cause ongoing violence in Thailand's Deep South. In the future, Thai Buddhists will be a symbol in local and cultural contexts.

However, according to the international conference on resolution in the three southern border provinces of Thailand during 21-22 August 2014, this conference was conducted by Faculty of Communication Sciences and Faculty of Political Science. Moreover, College of Islamic Studies, Institute of Peace Studies, Center for Conflict

Studies and Cultural Diversity, PSU, Pattani, and Deep South Watch conducted Joint International Conference on Communication, Conflicts and Peace Processes: Landscape of Knowledge from Asia and the Deep South of Thailand, which reflected the resolution in the three southern border provinces of Thailand in the aspects of communication, conflicts and peace processes, and the details are as follows:

1) Research of Pumpipit Pipitpun about Thailand's National Security Policies toward the Islamic Unrest in the Deep South: Comparing Thaksin, Surayud and Abhisit Governments, concluded why the policy on conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces has failed by identifying the 3 main problems that were: 1) to have the concepts of Malay-Muslim ethnicity in which the government made a difference in society; 2) some local people get no education because of poverty; and 3) social inequality: injustice in various fields as well as fair procedures;.

2) Research of Kularb Phansasiri, journalism lecturer, Chulalongkorn University, about Beyond Conventional Professionalism: The Diverse Roles of Thai Journalism in the Southern Conflict, concluded that the Thai mass media role in three southern border provinces should play 3 important roles in: 1) fact distributor; 2) public forum provider; 3) conflict resolution support service for all parties. (Kularb Phansasiri, 2014)

3) Aminoh Jehwae from University Sains Malaysia, presented the issue of the conflict through the writings of Pol.Gen. Wasit Dejkulchorn, on border story, which was told through the perspective of conflict and conflict management in the southern border provinces (conflict Resolution in Southern Border provinces of Thailand in the Novel Promdaen) and which was a joint literary work with Siti Hajar Che man. The story details were about the conflicts that occurred in Jana district, Narathiwat involved in the ethnic conflict, discrimination towards Malay Muslims, the implementation of policy against Muslims, and dispute resolution with both forms of violence and nonviolence by John Burton, Eben A. Weitzman and Patricia Flynn Weitzman.

A wide range of conflicts in the southern border provinces took place, and some said that protracted conflicts have happened because the government failed to solve the target issues or local Malay Muslims sent their children to schools in the Middle East and got back with a secessionist concept then the fights took place or it

arose from Malaysia's support for separatism due to Malaysians wanting their original territory back and finally, from the point of view of a police officer who moved back into Ra-ngae district, Narathiwat, he wondered how the southern provinces were not horrified, as he expected people of diverse cultures could still live together peacefully as well. Amin Jaewae analyzed that the literature gave multi-dimensional views on conflict, which matched the real situation that the conflict arose from multiple overlapping variables.

Lastly, Jaewae and Che Man (2014) proposed that conflict resolution in the southern-most provinces should start from having an opportunity to talk to each other and understand each other. Moreover, Thailand should open up to have an understanding of historical and cultural Malay Muslims while Malay Muslims should stop violent tactics and take turns to talk.

4) Zakee Phithakkumpol, (2014) a lecturer at Prince of Songkhla University's Institute for Peace Studies, Hatyai, presented "Re-examining the Past in the Indonesia Present: An Analysis of the Documentary Film "The Act of Killing". He initially presented that historical narration though the film was different from the narration through the book, especially the massacre of communists in the history of Indonesia's 1960s genocide was told through the film *The Act of Killing*, in which the film lead to the public debate over the history of the controversy in past ages.

5) Kanuengkwan Nunkaew, (2014) a lecturer of Faculty of Communication Sciences, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani campus, presented *Cross Media Ownership and its impact: A Comparative Study of Media Organization in India and Thailand in the Context of Conflict*. Suggestions for the study, in reporting the conflicts, journalists should remove bias and their own needs from news stories, and in receiving information, especially information-based conflict, recipients should receive a wide variety of news sources and should not select to read news from one party only because it can help to check facts and give more details.

In summary, from the academic portfolio presented in the international conference on Communication, Conflicts and Peace Processes: Landscape of Knowledge from Asia and the Deep South of Thailand, communication reflecting factors, variable group 1, factors affecting policy making, in the aspect of social characteristics and local cooperation factors, local media should engage to solve the

conflict. The role of news media apart from finding and presenting news, news media should involve in various activities which are set by various parties and should develop their role than any other aspect of a professional organization because of their limited role, they could not have a role to play in managing conflict (Kularb Phansasiri, 2014).

The research of Aminoh Jehwae (2014) from University Sains Malaysia, Malaysia presented the issue of Conflict Resolution in Southern Border provinces of Thailand in the Novel Promdaen of Pol.Gen. Wasit Dejkulchorn, which was told through the perspective of conflict and conflict management in the southern border provinces. It demonstrates that the majority of the population has an incorrect concept, such as separatism as a concept from students who were studying in the Middle East and understanding Malaysian support for separatist groups consistent with the research of Zakee Phithakkumpol. The research reflected the truth that the film distorted historical figures from the historical truths of Indonesia in the textbook. Although there was an open space to argue about the facts, it could cause a bad example for other countries to use the same method to solve the argument.

The interview of Krongchai Huttha, chief of geography department, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, PSU Pattani, (2010) related history, the history factor was a hidden factor accounting for the conflict of the southern provinces. To hold on to the wrong history, the distorted messages of the history were conveyed through media, as an example, in the year 2004, 400 years of relations between Thailand and Holland were celebrated in Pattani by Thaksin's government which should be conducted in the year 2001 based on the documents (Welimah Pusu, 2010).

In the academic aspect, it is a link between the situation above and violence wherein 400 years ago, Pattani had been denied recognition as a Thailand (Siam)'s state, then we should have a good feeling for the citizens of the state with the correct understanding of history.

Established policy study of the government in each period with scholar comparisons, such as the study of Pipitpun Pumpipit (2014), "Thailand's National Security Policies toward the Islamic Unrest in the Deep South: Comparing Thaksin, Surayud and Abhisit Governments", to see why policies in resolving the Southern conflict problems had failed and established policy factors did not take into account

the social features as well as physical such as the ethnic Malay Muslims, identity, religion and culture, poverty, an education lacking in the target population, causing social inequality and policy-makers did not take into consideration in regards to injustices as well as unfair procedures, then it would create their hatred toward Thailand and aggravate things more than before.

Regarding the factor of communication, Kanuengkwan Nunkaew and Raja Pokharapurkar (2014) suggested that in reporting the conflicts, journalists should remove bias and their own needs from news stories, and in receiving information, especially information-based conflict, recipients should receive a wide variety of news sources and should not select to read news from one party only because it can help to check facts and give more details. In addition, distorted historical films could cause passing wrong messages to audiences in which it led to less effective conflict resolution in the future (Phithakkumpol, 2014), and roles of journalists should be played with regard to facts (Kularb Phansasiri, 2014).

### **2.12.1 The Result of Analysis Factors Affecting Policy Implementation from the Researches of Thai and Foreign Scholars**

The literature review from Thai and international scholars' works, shows that the conclusion of the review is consistent with the objectives of the research of problem solving in the three southernmost provinces in policy, process and outcomes. By analyzing factors that affect policy implementation outcomes leads to a Top-down approach which focuses on the policy and control of policy implementation abiding by the policy makers. In particular, factors that affect the policy making needs of the appropriateness of the population in the target area. According to Arkom Jaikaew (1990), the established policy must comply with the problems in the area and must not conflict with the local faith, culture and tradition which is consistent with the research of Ittichai Seedum (2010), the factors of the characteristics of policy, the policy objectives and the area under cultural identity consideration affecting the successful policy implementation in maintaining peace in the southern border provinces positively. In addition the policy formation in problem solving in the three southern border provinces must take into account social characteristics and local cooperation. Jehwae and Che Man (2014) found that the majority of the population had an

incorrect concept in the aspect of separatism showing that the communication had gone wrong, which produced the wrong ideas for the local population regarding the unrest in the three southern provinces. Moreover, Pumpipit Pipitpun agreed that established policy factors did not take into account the social features as well as physical such as the ethnic Malay Muslims, identity, religion and culture, poverty, an education lacking in local cooperation. Kularb Phansasiri (2014) had an opinion that local media should be involved in problem solving of the unrest. Arkom Jaikaew (1990) gave an opinion that civil servant factors including career ambitions, adaptations, and professional careers were an important part of the success in policy, which demonstrates a willingness to cooperate from local communities.

The Top-down implementation approach bidding with policies forms a hierarchical structure consisting of departments and people from different levels working together (co-operation) (Voradej Chandrasorn, 1997: 82), thus local co-operations and related authorities have been taken to account in policy-making of problem solving in the three southern border provinces. Ittichai Seedum (2010) found the support and cooperation from various groups affecting the successful implementation of the policy in maintaining peace in the southern border provinces positively and importantly, the complete messages need to be conveyed during the coordination among the various authorities (Gunn, 1980).

Privacy policy for the peace dialogue process is seen as one of the significant processes for the policy in solving the problem of the Deep South. Especially factors influencing policymaking, policy makers must take into account the changing factors that occurred in supporting agencies or related individuals. Apasara Fuangfu (2012) proposed that negotiators including mediators and facilitators must have the abilities or skills to talk, willingness, sacrifice, trust, confidentiality and continuous working and time. (Hood, 1976)

In addition, policy implementation guidelines abiding with the Top-down approach must also be taken into account and the complexity of coordination among agencies, especially conflict factors and inconsistencies of the primary target with more than one goal. Apasara Fuangfu (2012) found that there were problems with negotiating with partners in the peace dialogue due to many insurgent groups with hidden leaders and structures. Also they had small groups operating freely and it



caused the complexity in the decision making process in which each group could not decide in the same direction causing the complexity of decision making in each group to increase. In addition, there was no harmonization between the government and army, saying that the government proceeded to the peace dialogue process while the army denied causing the complexity of the decision-making process (Apasara Fuangfu, 2012) according to Table 2.1 Comparison of factors affecting policy implementation by related scholars with Thailand's lessons.

Compared Thailand's lessons with the studies of Thai and foreign scholars in problem solving of the three southern border provinces has concluded to see policy implementation processes of related factors as following.

**Table 2.1** Comparison of Factors affecting Policy Implementation between Thai and Foreign Scholars and Thai lessons

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Studies from Thai and Foreign Scholars</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
1) Policy Making The appropriateness of the population in the target area	Akom Jaikaew (1990) The policy must conform to local needs and not conflict with local beliefs, cultures and traditions. Itthichai Seedam (2010) Policy character and objective, and consideration to local cultures and identities were positive factors to the success of peace policy implementation.	The Muslim Malay ethnic group has the identity, religion, language and culture which resembles those of the Malaysians.

**Table 2.1** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Studies from Thai and Foreign Scholars</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
Social features	<p>Jehwae and Che Man (2014) The majority had a wrong concept on territory separatism.</p> <p>Pipitpun (2014) The policy was made without consideration to actual social conditions, such as Muslim Malay ethnicity, religious and cultural identities, poverty and the poor education.</p>	<p>There were other factors aside from the conflict between the separatist group and the authority, unequal treatment from the officer, drug, oil and goods trafficking.</p>
The important characteristics of the history	<p>Krongchai Hattha (2010) Faulty narration of history may be picked up to spark insurgency.</p>	<p>The conflict is chronic and complicated. The religion issue has been used to wedge the conflict and promote the separatism idea</p>
Regional cooperation	<p>Kularb (2014) Local media should participate in the insurgency settlement.</p>	<p>The government pays more interest to the demands of the local, makes the priority list and practice accordingly.</p>

**Table 2.1** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Studies from Thai and Foreign Scholars</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
	<b>Akom Jaikaew (1990)</b> Officer factor is the earnestness, adaptivity and professionalism. The success can be measured from the co-operation of the locals.	
The cooperation of the relevant agencies	Itthicahi Seedam (2010) A harmonized collaboration of different parties will lead to the success of the implementation of the peace policy for the deep south area.	Non-government organizations and mass media should join hands with state agencies and participate in projects or events of the officer.
The changes that occurred in the supporting agencies or related individuals	Apasara Fuangfu (2012) The middle person/ the facilitator must be highly skilled in negotiation, sincere, credible, keeps secrets well, and performs the task continuously. The frequent change of the middle person will cause negative effects.	The general secretary of the National Security Council, who took charge of the leader in the peace talks, switched from Lieutenant General Paradon Pattanathabut (2012 – 2014) to Thawil Pliansee (2014) during the administration of Yingluck Shinawatra, although, the facilitator was still from Malaysia.

**Table 2.1** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Studies from Thai and Foreign Scholars</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
2) Complexity of joint action Conflicts and inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one goal	Apasara Fuangfu (2012) To mark representatives for the other dialogue party is difficult as there are multiple insurgent groups and they have hazy administration structure and operate as loosely-knitted cells.	Insurgent groups are numerous. Some are independent and to pinpoint the leader is difficult. Thus, insurgent groups do not have congruent main objectives.
The complexity of the decision-making process	Apasara Fuangfu (2012) The government and the military did not unite. The government ran a peace dialogue whereas the army kept its cold hostile stance. Thus, the decision making was tough.	Insurgent groups are independent from each other. Thus, the decision making is complicated and the peace dialogue progresses slowly.
The ability to address the issue of project delays that occurred		In the administration of General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the Peace Dialogue Panel has been set up to prevent the delay of the peace dialogue.

**Table 2.1** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Studies from Thai and Foreign Scholars</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
The ability to coordinate between different departments that are able to work together		The Committee on the Mobilization of Southern Border Province Policy and Strategies has been set up for better co-ordination and integration in the administration of General Prayuth Chan-ocha.
3) The linkage of the factors that affected the policy making and the policy implementation The ability to develop and learn from the experiences to solve the problems		Thai authorities have analyzed weaknesses and lessons from peace dialogues held in the administration of Yingluck Shinawatra. The use of military force has been lessened.
The effectiveness of the policy process which must understand and accept the importance of continuity and the relations between ends and means		Peace dialogue policy has been a main policy of the government. Although the ruling body has been changed from a civilian one to junta, the continuity of the peace dialogue is kept and concerned. General Prayuth Chan-ocha visited Malaysia on December 1, 2014.

## **2.13 Lessons from Abroad to Solve the Problems in the Three Southern Border Provinces**

The researcher had studied many lessons of the Philippines, China and Indonesia for comparative study and introduced the lessons of each country for analysis of significant factors which affect outcomes of policies and practices. There are some details as following.

### **2.13.1 Lessons from Philippines**

Philippines consists of many large islands which have different culture and ethnic language identities. The Southern Philippines has had many conflicts taking place. There are many minority groups, including 18 indigenous groups and there are also 13 Muslim ethnic groups in this region. Although members of those ethnic groups are Muslim and Christian, all of them have languages and cultures based upon their territories (Russel, 2014). Nevertheless, there is a Muslim secessionist movement, MILF which is a major and big group. According to the Philippine government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the biggest secessionist movement in the country, declared arrangement of insurgency termination prolonged for a long time and signed the declaration on October 15, 2014.

So that the peace negotiation procedure in the Philippines is satisfied for both parties (Win-Win Solution), by the government party, it is accepted from international countries and effected good popularity, while MILF still has power in their local administration. The negotiation procedure is a problem solving model by the peace process in which the Philippine government has clear policies to negotiate and this way is accepted by all parties. Therefore, it led to peace negotiation by the peace method. Nevertheless, if the process does not follow the agreement condition, it may lead to a war situation again.

In case of Thailand having a different context, problem solving by the peace method needs all sectors cooperating to drive and get acceptance of each other in social with culture diversity for happiness of union living. Especially, all sectors should drive on concrete education to people in and out of the system. Although it

may use a longer time than the situation in the Philippines, it may lead to a better change and sustainability in the future, as well.

The problem solving with military forces and heavy counterinsurgency in President Joseph Estrada's (1998-2001 A.D.) age had a harsh standpoint which supported military execution to MILF and neglected development, promoted more battles in Mindanao. It was reflected by Colonel Dickson P. Hermoso, inspector general and spokesman of the 6<sup>th</sup> infantry army of the Philippine army who has some experience in peace negotiations. He advised to solve the problem without any weapons in an academic lecture when the troops work in peace: lesson from Mindanao, established by Center for Conflict Studies and Culture Diversity (CSCD) and Deep South Watch (DSW) on February 19, 2015 at a peace room, CSCD, Pattani province. It was seen that the conflict in problem solving should be overcome with peace, not weapons, and negotiation with different thinking groups would be an important initiation of making peace (Family News 3, 2015). Colonel Dickson was a commissioned officer who was working in Mindanao for 15 years and was a commander in the conflict area for 2 years, during 2007-2009 that made him be a part of Mindanao Peace Procedure.

Colonel Dickson said that the government policies were the first significance "Fair peacemaking, cover all parties and have a rule of law that is 1 of 5 policies of President Benigno Aquino. The proposal of the government is to conquer by peace, not by wars that show an attempt to peacemaking of the Philippine government in fire ceasing negotiation and political negotiation, until it led to peace agreement with Moro National Liberation Front; MNLF in 1996 and with Moro Islamic Liberation Front; MILF in 2014.

In addition, Colonel Dickson said that although we used 18 years for negotiation, but it made the Philippines learn that peacemaking had occurred by participation, strength and ownership from all parties in the society because the problems solving procedure could not use only military force, it had to manage political problems covering needs of state-different thinking groups, that had to start at the troops by making reliability, confidence of peacemaking, especially fire ceasing has 3 steps which were disarmament, reduce military regulations and recovery to the society.

The spokesman of the 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, Philippines Army said that the rule of the army was essential to regulate in the national policies that it has to use the rule of law covering all groups and people is centered. By that point, the army has set up AFP office for peace process or AFP Peace Process Office (AFP PPO) in 2011 and the army has established peace curriculum in troop training and learning in secondary schools to colleges.

According to Coronel Dickson's experiences, he has an opinion that for conflict management, the military has to create reliability and reduce any prejudices to different thinking groups, mindfully work for peace. Under new paradigms emphasizes the military to understand that the Philippine Army or AFP PPO should not differ from the society, but has to be a partner with social organizations, appreciate and negotiate to different thinking groups with sincerity. These are the experiences which local academicians think that they are more advantageous for the problem solving of southern border provinces.

Last, Coronel Dickson thought that the peacemaking in the southern border provinces should start negotiations. Although the peace agreement should have happened in the selection government, it happened in the military government who initiatively set a peace negotiation committee. The local academicians hope that in full 2 years occasion of the peace negotiation on February 28, it would see some progresses of the peace negotiation by the government.

And opinions of Thai academician, Professor Assistant Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Director of Center for Conflict Studies and Culture Diversity, Prince of Songkla University said that the importance of government policies had a purpose to solve problems as "Win Peace not Win War" that is to win by peace not war as per the 230<sup>th</sup> statement of Prime Minister Office issued last year. It is similar to that of the Philippines, but it is not clear to set up the organization under the Prime Minister's Office or the government level. Anyhow we thought that we should have continuous organization, although any governments working would be the same as Philippines did (Thapanee Iadsrichai, 2015).

Besides a special administrative type which is seen by some groups in Thailand may be one of the solutions. If the problem solving was compared to the Philippines, the special administrative type may not end the problem, because



supposing various group leaders have no chance of empowering in the administration, they may arm to use violence as a MILF leader (Political Science Faculty, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, 2007).

Summarily, the lessons from the Philippines on problem solving in the 3 southern border provinces still has significant problems in the first group parameter: factors that affected policy making. That is the factor of appropriate target population in the area having different cultures and language ethnic identity. In the south where conflict occurred, there are many indigenous groups, including native groups of Muslims and Christians, social characteristics and local cooperation, and cooperation of the relevant agencies. It can be seen that in President Ferdinand Marcos's age (1965-1985), even though there was policy determination for social and economic development in the local Muslim southern region, it could not solve the problem, since most of social characteristics and local cooperation, and cooperation of the relevant agencies were under control of Spanish and upper class Filipinos. There was injustice to southern Muslims, till it was developed to be hatred and distrust in each other. In President Fidel Ramos's age (1992-1998), it still gave precedence on parameters of social characteristics and local cooperation by determining policies by means of development and people participation by allocating a budget to the south, especially, rural areas and let people cooperate and propose their needs to the government. Consequently, violence of the secession problem was greatly reduced, only MILF still remained, they wanted to separate the 14 southern provinces to be another country.

As for the second group parameter: complexity of joint action, consists of the ability in coordinating many agencies to work with each other and multiplicity of decisions on negotiation by compromising means, set up a referendum, let representatives by the third party country coordinate the negotiation between the government and agitating groups. All of them have to use ability of joint action and should have no more complication or hidden agenda of the decision process such as the referendum of Tripoli Agreement 1976 which had allegation on unreliability of the referendum set up in President Ferdinand Marcos's age (1965-1985), (Panngam Ngaodharmasan, 2003: 324-328). The coordination and helping of the third party country such as Tripoli Agreement 1976 under patronage of Libya in President

Ferdinand Marcos's age (1965-1985) and using compromising negotiation means with Muslim secession groups by helping of President Soeharto, Indonesia in President Corazon Aquino's age (1985-1992), including setting up the BIMP-EAGA program which is a coordination program among Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines by using their existing potential of being located closely, having co-cultures for many centuries and using communicated languages. In order to develop the south, the Philippines consequently made MILF appreciate to join the government in President Ferdinand Marcos's age (1965-1985). It let the existence of the referendum of Tripoli Agreement 1979 on political autonomous plans in November 1989 that affected establishing an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in 1990 in 4 southern provinces i.e. Lanao Delsue (in Mindanao island), Tawi-Tawi, Magundanao and Zulu. There was an election of restricted administrative governors in February, 1990.

Furthermore, there was a negotiation with MILF by helping of the Malaysian President who was the president of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's age (2001-2010), but it was not successful, since Nor Mizuari, leader of MILF expected that he could not be elected as a provincial governor the second time (Sida Sonsiri, 2002: 74). Finally, in 2010, President Benigno Aquino (2010-present) started hidden negotiation with the MILF leader group and both parties had more negotiations by the Malaysian facilitator, until it led to signing the Mutual Framework Agreement on Bungsamoro Autonomous Establishment in October, 2012 and there was signing of the Framework Agreement on Bungsamoro Peace Agreement on March 27, 2014 (Isranews Team, 2014).

### **2.13.2 Lessons from China**

Experiences of China in solving problems of Muslim terrorists in Xinjiang have significant issues as the problem's characteristic is connected to history, ethnicity and religion that are similar to the problems of the three southern border provinces (Political Science Faculty, PSU, 2008).

Muslim terrorists in Xinjiang belong to the Turkish race. They call themselves Uyghur and established the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) to secede Xinjiang as an independent country administrating as the Muslim state.

The problems regarding conditions on the determination of policies under China's administration are very similar to the three southern border provinces such as;

Transferring punished Chinese noblemen to administrate Xinjiang instead of Muslims that those people fleeced and corrupted, and who also hated Muslim traditions, made Muslims hate and oppose the China government all the time. These traits are similar to the problems of the three southern border provinces that an administration system was changed to a subdivision of bureaucratic administrative system in King Rama V's age, aborting the governor position in the entire country; consequently making old power groups who descended from local primitive sultans unsatisfied.

Introducing a suppressing policy to strongly oppose Muslims in the Qing Dynasty extended the problems even more. In Field Marshall P. Piboonsongkram's (1948-1957) age, Thailand's government had used troops to suppress the Dusun Nyor rebel, there were about 400 Malay Muslims who died and 6,000 others who had to migrate to Malaya state. Later, there was fighting for independence all the time.

In the first age of China's communist government, they introduced a policy of strictly controlling Muslims such as announcement of Islamic religion was prohibited, changed mosques to museums, and killed many hundred thousand protesting Muslims, since many new terrorist groups occurred. This is similar to Thailand where using Malay language and some practical procedures of Islam were prohibited under the dictator Field Marshall P. Piboonsongkram who determined them as illegal in 1944.

The present Chinese government reviews the last problem solving policies. They found that the root causes of the development policies by announcement of Xinjiang was an Xinjiang Uyghur's administrative region in 1955 with a continuously developing economy, till it was highly accomplished in 1990, but it could not reduce the level of problems and violence, because of local officers' behavior and problems of Uyghur Muslims were pressed on their identity and culture realization for all the time.

Therefore China's government conducted the root causes of the problem as

- 1) Punished the corrupted officers and having inappropriate behavior.
- 2) Used the potential of the Xinjiang region with Uyghur Muslims as

a center of China in coordinating and contacting member countries of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established by China and Russia coordinating with Muslim countries in central Asia.

3) Used special characteristics of Xinjiang people having the same race, language, culture and religion as people in central Asia to be advantageous for economic coordination by rehabilitating border trading and promoting Xinjiang as a Halal food industry exporting to Muslim countries.

Those policies made Muslim Uyghurs participate in China's economic development as per their potential, having a better quality of life, reducing terrorism and government office striking, but they were not absolutely terminated (Political Science Faculty, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, 2007).

China has policies similar to Thailand on an attempt to accept culture diversity, but China intends to use the potential of the Xinjiang people for developing the economy. While Thailand cannot use potential of Malaya Muslims to seriously coordinate in economy with the Malaya and Muslim world. The border trading of Thailand-Malaysia which is a part of the economic way of life of people in the three southern border provinces is prohibited. This is done according to suspicion and intention to solve the problems of security, since the investment of the Halal food industry is not seriously done by the government and also private agencies do not invest. The lessons from China provide an idea for Thais that "good living is the permanent security and diversity is the ability of potential to coordinate for country development".

In conclusion, the lessons from China with the problem solving of the three southern border provinces still has significant problems in the first parameter group: factors that affected policy making having factors of social characteristics and local cooperation. The social administration characteristic is clearly seen by the noblemen who used power to fleece, corrupt and disrespect Muslim traditions. It made Muslim hate and oppose the Chinese government all the time. Furthermore, it can be seen that the Chinese government determines policies by realizing social potential for development of their region. The Chinese government used the potential of the Xinjiang region with Muslim Uyghurs as China's center to coordinate and contact with member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which was

established by China and Russia coordinating with Muslim countries in central Asia. It realized factors of coordination among concerning agencies and propriety of population groups in target areas. After the Chinese government had stressed on economic development in Xinjiang, it made more social gap and difference problems. Since education problems of youths, and uneducated people and no working persons in rural areas were realized, it was an unemployment problem making the youths return more to support the Muslim terrorists, especially in 2000 A.D. until now. It was the age of hardline Islamists ideology and terrorism spreading entirely over the world.

### **2.13.3 Lessons from Indonesia**

Indonesia is one of the Asian countries having experiences on solving agitator problem of secession. That was called fighting for independence of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in December, 1976. Mr. Hasan Ditiro descending from the last Sultan was a movement leader for secession of Aceh province using weapons to make violence for 29 years, and then peace negotiation happened.

The experiences in Indonesia are similar to problems of the three southern border provinces. There are 3 significant issues i.e. 1) the agitator groups want to secede, 2) use an ethnocentrism issue, no rule of law from the state and use historical reasons for movement and 3) organization members who lived in Malaysia, Europe and Scandinavia were used as practical planning, hidden and living sources.

Nevertheless, there are different conditions and environments such as Thailand's secession organizations which consist of many groups who work independently and cannot clarify the real group leader. The biggest problem is non-appearance of members and the lack of any official organizational structure. Moreover, most of Thai governors and people are still believers of religion which are different from most of the people in the southern border provinces (Apasara Fuangfu, 2012). It is seen that the actors of conflict who clarify amount to less practices in the three southern border provinces, since it is less complicated (Chaninthira Na Thalang, 2013).

The problem conditions that determine the rule of law of Indonesia are awareness of nationalism, being aware of the history of the civilized independent state, and injustice of natural resources are appropriate (Dolaya Thianthong, Worawit

Baru, Sarawut Aree, Suphapharn Tangtrongpairot, 2007). Moreover, it was misusing the history, controlling Islam rule of the government and increasing Javanese in Aceh. Aceh people want to be an Islam state and do not want a semi religion state as Indonesia wanted (Andrea, 2014: 21)

In President Suharto's regime (1967-1998 A.D.), the Aceh group was suppressed by troops and weapons, but after the country was reformed it became more democratic. In the age of President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (1998-1999 A.D.), there was evacuation from Aceh. Later, in the age of President Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004 A.D.), she decided to increase the troops in Aceh and opened a big intrusion in 2003-2004 and accomplished her mission. A lot of civilians died. GAM lost 50% of its members but the negotiation was completed in the age of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014 A.D.), and consequently Helsinki Agreement happened in Finland in 2005. Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, was the establisher and chairman of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). He was the third party to manage and facilitate the negotiation. Martti Ahtisaari is the strong third party. Moreover, Helsinki negotiation contained representatives of both parties with no more people and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono could control the state mechanism to be united; especially the army, in order to conduct the following government policies (Apasara Fuangfu, 2012) and they continuously had policies on peace negotiation. Although, the government changed, the people group supporting peacemaking policies in Aceh by the negotiation was still the same group. This issue is very important to bring unity in the group (Chaninthira Na Thalang, 2013).

To summarize, the lessons from Indonesia with problem solving of the three southern border provinces still have significant problems in aspects of the first parameter group: factors that affected policy making, having factors of social characteristics and local cooperation. It is clarified that the Aceh society is ethnocentric and has no justice from the state. Furthermore, the factor of local cooperation has shown that international communities from the European Union and Asia have set up the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in order to observe the practices following a memorandum of understanding on conflict management and investigate any indictments if there are infringements of the agreement. The second

parameter group consists of the linkage of the factors that affected the policy making and policy implementation to practice together. There are factors of effectiveness of the policy process which has been understood and accepted on the importance of continuity and relations between ends and means that the Indonesia government continuously has peace negotiation representatives with the Aceh group in every government. As for the third parameter group: it is the complexity of joint action that connects the project conflicts or inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one goal. It was seen that the Indonesian government in the age of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014 A.D.), both representatives were not many, so the conflict was less that so that it could make the agreement fast and the third party of negotiation was strong, the negotiation would be more accomplished. The factor of joint action has the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) as a central office which can coordinate with the Indonesian government as well, because the CMI has experiences on the negotiation process management by letting both parties offer all their needs and they absolutely concluded all agreements at one time and all-around. Besides the third party should have experience and accept prestige, they should rely on both parties including having a controlling mechanism to follow the agreement; therefore there are no factor problems by multiplicity of decisions (Apasara Fuangfu, 2012).

The lessons from the foreign countries; China, Philippines and Indonesia with problem solving of the three southern border provinces lets the researcher compare Thailand and have comparative conclusions to see the policy implementation process model with the concerned factors as shown in Table 2.2 as following.

**Table 2.2** Compare the Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation Outcomes, the Lessons from China, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand

<b>Factor</b>	<b>China Lessons</b>	<b>Indonesia Lessons</b>
<b>1) Policy Making</b>	Xinjiang Uyghur	Aceh residents are
<b>The appropriateness of the population in the target area</b>	Autonomous there are ethnic Muslims, identity of religion, language, cultural alienation from Chinese culture, the remote areas, poverty and underdevelopment	Ethnic Muslims, a sense of national identity
<b>Social features</b>	There is a conflict between the government and the secessionist movement in the south by the Muslims, and less educated, out of work, the countryside was overcharging, corrupt and do not respect the Muslim tradition	The conflict between the government and separatist movements by the Aceh, do not get justice from the government in the allocation of the benefits of natural resources, control the use of Islamic law
<b>The important characteristics of the history</b>	Have originated from the demand of autonomy by the Sultan but China needs to fight against colonialism and make Xinjiang cut off with the Muslims in Central Asia	The sense of history as an independent prosperous state, the insurgents are demanding secession and want an Islamic state



**Table 2.2** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Philippines Lessons</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), there are ethnic Muslims identity of religion, language and cultural specific areas have far been neglected due to the lack of development	Ethnic Malay Muslims, identity of religion, language and culture similar to Malaysia
	There is a conflict between the government and the secessionist movement in the south by the Muslims They hijacked their land, Justice	There are factors other than the conflict between the state and separatist movement. They do not get justice from the government, drugs, of smuggled goods, oil smuggling
	Have originated from the demand of autonomy after the end of colonialism and there are conflicts between religions	The conflict is long and more complex but there is a religious issue to a separatist group

**Table 2.2** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>China Lessons</b>	<b>Indonesia Lessons</b>
<b>Regional cooperation</b>	Uyghur Muslims participate in China's economic development with their potential that exists in the area	Created the participation with the local people by presenting their needs to the government
<b>The cooperation of the relevant agencies</b>	Using the potential of the area of Xinjiang Uyghur Muslim center of China in cooperation and contact with the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO ), China and Russia jointly established with Muslim countries in Central Asia	The international community from the country, both in the EU and ASEAN has established the Aceh Monitoring Mission: AMM .The observation of treatment according to a memorandum of understanding in Aceh, conflict management and investigate the allegations if they are violated
<b>The changes that occurred in the supporting agencies or that people who involved</b>	China has announced Xinjiang as an autonomous region of Uyghur people, concentrated in development, to facilitate organization for negotiations	To establish the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and Martti Ahtisaarim, the former president of Finland presided as the acting mediator to manage coordination and to facilitate the negotiations strongly

**Table 2.2** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Philippines Lessons</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
	The participation of citizens in the area offer needs to the government	Thailand's government to focus more on the local people involved and find out what are the requirements and prioritize the urgency of the problem
	A voluntary organization Community Organizer develops activities together with both Christians and Muslims	To give civil society organizations media attending the event or a government program with the government agencies involved
	The central organization or the director, convenient in the peace talks makes a change from the President Suharto of Indonesia when Corazon Akino is president of Malaysia, initially, Gloria Arroyo	Changes the Secretary-General Office of the National Security Council; the leader is responsible for the peace talks process, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra era from Lt.Gen. Paradorn Pathanatabut (2012-2014) to Mr. Tawin Pleinsri (2014-2014). Prevent the process circuit from interruptions. But those who facilitate the peace talks are still the source from Malaysia.

**Table 2.2** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>China Lessons</b>	<b>Indonesia Lessons</b>
<b>2) Complexity of joint action</b>		
<b>Conflicts and inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one target</b>	There are not many Muslim separatist groups .East Turkistan Liberation Organization: ETLO; a core group. The main goal is not to make too many Xinjiang separatist groups	The group claims in dependence Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM; the main group, The main goal is clear.
<b>The complexity of the decision-making process</b>	ETLO, no complicated decisions with the Chinese government	A separatist group, there are organizations and leaders with clear powers. The leaders have the power to decide with less complexity

**Table 2.2** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Philippines Lessons</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
	Muslim separatists, there are not many groups, The MILF is the main group the main goal is not to make too much	The insurgents have a lot of groups, some groups are independent and did not know who the leader is, the main goal is not consistent in each group
	Because each separatist group is an enterprise and a leader with clear authority, the leaders have the power to decide and there are no complications	The insurgency has no connection with the complexity of the decision making process.

**Table 2.2** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>China Lessons</b>	<b>Indonesia Lessons</b>
<b>3) The linkage of the factors that affected the policy making and the policy implementation to perform</b> <b>The ability to develop and learn from the experiences to solve the problems</b>	The lessons focusing on the practice of the early Communist Party of China, use strict Muslim control policy such as: declare that Islam is prohibited, change the mosque into a museum, kill the Muslims against hundreds of thousands of people; China's current government has turned to the Muslim Uyghur participation in the economic development of China	The lessons focus on increasing the number of soldiers in Aceh, and launched an offensive act in the years 2003-2004 when the president Megawati Sukarnoputri, next to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; modified the focus on the negotiations instead
<b>The effectiveness of the policy process which must understand and accept the importance of continuity and the relations between ends and means</b>	Continuity in the peace policy of each government and the negotiation process officially	Continuity in the peace policy of each government and the negotiation process officially, but those who support the policy of peace building in Aceh negotiated by a group of people .

**Table 2.2** (Continued)

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Philippines Lessons</b>	<b>Thai Lessons</b>
	The lessons focus on practical military, and neglecting development .In the days of President Joseph Estrada the president began to modify the next focus on negotiations instead.	Thailand's government to remove weaknesses, and lessons of peace talks during President Yingluck Shinawatra. The experience is further analyzed, in the government initially Gen. Prayut Chan-ocha reduced the use of military force in the use of violence against the insurgents
	Continuity in the peace policy of each government and the negotiation process officially	Although a change of government from the civilian to the military government, also see the importance of continuing the peace talks, President Gen. Prayut Chan-ocha to visit Malaysia on December 1, 2014.

#### **2.13.4 The Result of the Analysis of the Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation Process Lessons from Abroad**

Literature lessons from abroad, made to analyze the results of such research findings, conclusions have happened, the objective of the research problems in the three southernmost provinces; policy , process, and outcomes, by analyzing the key factors that affected policy implementation outcomes to make it understand the Top-down approach, the concept is to focus on the policies, and control policy to abide by policy makers, in particular, factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes that consider many factors.

Lessons from abroad: China, Indonesia and Philippines. Compared with Thailand found: factors in policy making, the key factor in the appropriate population group in the target area, lessons from China, Philippines, the minority population in the area, similar to Thailand, a nation with a Muslim religious identity, language, culture specifically there is poverty, but different from Indonesia, Aceh had ethnic Muslims, in common with most of the population of Indonesia, but there is a sense of identity that is nationalism, by the society; whether China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, there is a conflict with the government because there is exploitation and do not get justice from the state, less educated, Out of work, and respect for Muslim traditions, was robbed of their land, and natural resources, Thailand has some of the benefits of trade, goods are sometimes smuggled, and the drugs involved.

The appearance of historical significance that are found in China, Indonesia and Philippines is a matter of having originated from the need to have a self-government, and the sense of history as an independent state that flourished before, Thailand took the issue as a religious tool. So rather than separatism, the cooperation of the locals, all focused on the participation of citizens in the area, the potential that exists in the area, and prioritize the urgency of the problem, operations and solve the problem, with the cooperation of relevant agencies, an international organization, the international community, voluntary organizations, as well as civil society organizations, and the media, however Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand: a facilitator organization, or who facilitate the negotiations for peace except China; there is no facilitator organization in the peace negotiations since China announced Xinjiang as the area of the Uyghur people. The changes that occur between



government support or the involvement of China; so different, this is consistent with the policy implementation of the Top-down approach, a practice that has a hierarchical structure, the structure consists of units, and those involved in various levels to cooperate (Voradej Chandrasorn, 1997: 82), in addition to policy action that will succeed or fail, also depends on the policies that have been affected by other variables such as economic, social, support from the people, leader, or cooperation of authorities, more or less (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980).

The international lessons, discovered that: factors complicated to coordinate the operations of the various departments, more clearly, especially the goal of the project conflicts or inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one goal, including China, Indonesia and Philippines, Muslim separatist groups are not large. The main target is clear unlike Thailand; a group of insurgents have a lot of groups, some groups are independent and did not know who the leader is, the main goal is not consistent in each group, the complexity of the decision-making process of the insurgency in Thailand, in each group, insurgents have no connection, make a complex decision-making process, each group had to negotiate in order to benefit their group. China, Philippines and Indonesia: A group of terrorists have leaders with the power to clear the leaders, have the power to decide and no complications consistent with the concept of Majone and Wildavsky (1978), that policy implementation is evolution, the process of the policy implementation, there must be a bargain, and are seeking benefits, to meet the needs of each group involved, it also supports the model in the negotiation, and conflict, shows that the decision of the organization is to be composed of bargaining, between the parties. This resulted in a common approach between the various parties; the organization is very concerned about the complexity of the decision (Elmore, 1979).

The lessons from abroad show that there are factors, namely, making efficient policies and learning from foreign countries. For the factors the linkage of the factors that affected the policy making and the policy implementation to practice together are important factors which can make policy implementation to accomplish or fail. That each country concentrates on an ability of developing the means, getting from learning and experiences to solve the problems by attempting to use lessons and experiences regarding the problem solving from foreign countries by focusing on

development, troop and violence reduction. Moreover it is concerned with the efficiency of the policy processes which has to be understood and accepted in terms of importance of continuity and relations between ends and means. All of China, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand have seen the importance of continuous peace negotiation with insurgents groups in each government and have official negotiation processes that policy implementation processes should have and institutes or organizations for determination of a structure of policy implementation efficiency and have clarification of theories, causes and effects. It has to use an appropriate legislation and promotion of the practitioner with enough resources and tools that are needed (Calista, 1994).

#### **2.13.5 The Results of Analysis of the Factors that Affected Policy Implementation Outcomes Comparing Related Scholars Researches and Lessons from Abroad**

The researcher introduces the results of the analysis and the factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes comparing related scholars' researches and lessons from abroad for making comparative conclusions to investigate various factors which are consistent, different or having any additional factors that affected policy implementation outcomes by Pressman and Wildavsky. The researcher has adopted the factors and adapted the model to suit with the policy implementation for conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces.

The results of analysis of the factors that affected policy implementation outcomes can be seen as a Top-down approach which is important in the policies and in controlling the policy implementation by the policy makers, especially, the factors that affected policy making in realizing the appropriateness of the population in the target area. The determined policies should actually conform to the problem conditions in local areas and have no conflict with local beliefs, culture, identity and tradition. Many scholars such as Akom Jaikaew (1990) and Itthichai Seedam (2010) have ideas conforming to lessons from China and Philippines. Local populations are a minority, similar to Thailand who are Muslims having identities on religion, language and proper culture, and they are poor, but it is different from Indonesia where Aceh people are the same as Muslims are the majority. As for the factor of social

characteristics and local cooperation, the social characteristics have to be realized as actual characteristics such as Malay Muslim ethnicity, identities on religion and culture, poverty, and entire lack of education of the population in the target area making a social inequality. This would specially be the policy determination without realization of various injustices through a justice process which is repeatedly inducing more hatred in the Thai government. The scholar, Pumpipit Pipitpun (2014) has supported that lessons from China, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand are conformed, there are conflicts with the government because they are exploited and have no justice by the government. As a result there is a decline in education, jobs are minimal, there is disrespect towards Muslim traditions, arable land are raided and natural resources in Thailand are used by benefit groups for smuggling and drugs.

Regarding the factor of local cooperation, Kularb Phansasiri (2014) has seen that local mass media or media inside the southern border provinces should participate in the conflict of problem solving. For street level bureaucrats' cooperation in implementing the unit, it is seen that the officers should have real intentions, adjustment and be professional. These are important to policy accomplishment (Arkorn Jaikaw, 1990). If the mass media and officers unite with local cooperation it will make the policy implementation accomplish problem solving in the three southern border provinces with the participation of social sites such as mass media. These are consistent with the results of analysis of the lessons in which all countries emphasize the participation in the population area following their potential and priority, and solving problems.

The policy determination for solving problems in the three southern border provinces should not only realize the importance of local cooperation, but also consider the factors of the cooperation of the relevant agencies having support and coordination by various groups (Itthichai Seedam, 2010). According to the results analysis of lessons from abroad, there are the cooperation of relevant agencies such as international organizations and unions, and volunteer organizations including civil society organizations and mass media. However, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand have facilitator organizations which facilitate peace.

The factor of the changes that occurred in the supporting agencies or related individuals can be seen in the research presentation of Apasara Fuangfu (2012) where

she proposed that participants including the third party or facilitator should have a high ability for peace negotiation, willingness, sacrifice, reliability and trust, confidentiality and continuous working, without changing from time to time. From the lessons of foreign countries or Thailand, if there are always changes among the responsible people of the peace negotiation, it would be delayed and caused by changing of the responsible people in policy implementation.

Moreover, the policy implementation's Top-down approach should be based on the complexity of joint actions, especially factors of the goal of the project conflicts or inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one goal. Apasara Fuangfu (2012) found that the peace negotiation has problems since the agitators of the southern border provinces consist of many groups unrevealing structures and leaders. There are sub-groups, independent cells of operation which make a factor of complexity of making decisions. These bring about a delay in the policy implementation process. It is different from the foreign lessons of China, Indonesia and Philippines where there are lesser Muslim secession groups having accurate goals.

The linkage of the factors that affected the policy making and policy implementation to work together would be based on the ability to develop and learn from the experiences to solve the problems. An attempt to use lessons and experiences of unrest problems solved by each country's means is clearly seen as an emphasis on development and troop reduction and reduction of violence. As for the factor of efficiency of policy processes one has to understand and accept an importance of continuity and relations between ends and means. All of China, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand have seen the importance of continuous peace dialogues with insurgent groups of each government and have had the official peace dialogue process.

According to the results of the analysis the factor that affected policy implementation outcomes from Thai and foreign scholars, based on Pressman and Wildavsky model, the communication factor was seen as a very important one, Kanuengkwan Nunkaew and Raja Pokharapurkar (2014), found that journalists reporting the conflict news should not have their bias and needs from the content of the news and receive the information, especially the conflict news, from the audiences and select various news sources. They should not read proper news because it will

help the actual investigation and give more details. Moreover, a distorted historical cinema making will create a miscommunication which will result in the disadvantage of using it as a lesson for conflict resolution in the future (Zakee Phithakkumpol, 2014). The journalists should help the reporters proposing actual news (Kularb Phansasirir, 2014). That is consistent with foreign scholars Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) who believe that the accomplishment of policy implementation still depends on the communication factor and perfect communication including perfect coordination among relevant agencies (Hood, 1976). As for the results analysis of Thailand's lessons, it was found that there was a connection factor of related groups, benefit groups, influential groups, separatist groups, smuggled groups (such as illegal weapon, drug etc.) and politician groups (Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2004: 3). According to the results of a study of the students from Thailand National Defense College, the government is not brave to conduct an interrogation among the politicians concerning unrest problems in the three southern border provinces.

According to research studies from Thailand and foreign countries scholars and the lessons from abroad for conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces, the researcher has synthesized and adjusted from studying the model policy implementation of Pressman and Wildavsky, especially the issue of the linkage of the factors that affected the policy making and policy implementation to work together. It has to realize the effectiveness of the policy process and must understand and accept the importance of continuity and the relations between ends and means, and additionally the factor affecting policy implementation which is found from the results of analysis of the related researches by scholars and lessons from abroad such as the communication factor, factor of organization competency and factor of related groups such as benefit groups, influential groups, smuggled groups (such as illegal weapon, drug etc.) and politician groups.

The political factor, according to analysis of development of unrest problems in the three southern border provinces from the past to present, the influential, local politicians and corrupt officer groups who support the unrest groups inside the country, are the root causes and strengthen the organization in the south because they have been embedded for a long time and the government cannot catch the corrupted politicians and it is found that some national and local politicians use the terrorist

groups having influence in local areas for election. The key person of political parties vote for the leader of the politicians and use the local people for conquering the election and use some local politicians to set up troops to eliminate the government. The problem of support and relationship of the organizations to important individuals is another main problem of policy implementation. This problem may spread and consequently bring a direct failure to the policies, if the organizations or important individuals such as influential groups, benefit groups, politician and executive official including the journalists etc., have no support in political, capital and budget aspects through making obstacles by countering, delaying or opposing the policies (Voradej Chandrasorn, 1977).

Summarizing the literature review of related researches in Thailand and foreign countries and lessons from abroad with conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces by studying the key factors affecting the policy implementation outcomes to cover the most related factors, there is a need to study all of the policy processes according to the research objectives in 6. The researcher studied it further in chapters 4, 5 and 6 which considered the key factors for accomplishment in policy implementation. These should be systematically considered with continuity containing various concerned people, starting from the policy determination processes, convert policy to implementation and policy implementation to succeed the target of the policy (Voradej Chandrasorn, 1997: 95-96).

Nevertheless, significant contents of a Top-down approach are very concerned with controlling power of the policy makers under the policies that determined the environment and under the policy implementation and scope of policies that are modified by practitioners. Not only are the policies separated out of implementation, the policy makers will also suitably use power on controlling, but in the policy implementation of the Top-down approach, the powered person of policy determination is the person who can absolutely order command of all the concerning issues (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 428-429). And the conclusion and recommendations are in Chapter 7.

## **2.14 Discourse and the Settlement of the Unrest in the 3 Southern Border Provinces**

### **2.14.1 Characteristics of the Discourse**

Discourse is the process to give meaning to the world and the society, including any identity, in a structural way and the system of the order to designate what is reality and what is not, via the spoken or written message on a particular subject. The message falls in the frame of episteme and flows into social practice. (Sanoh Charoenporn, 2005: 300) Thus, the 3 main components of the discourse are language, knowledge and power, which are connected to form “truth”. (Revel, 2002: 22-23) In this modern world where the communication technology and mass communication institutes set the agenda with a particular system and agreement, the society supposes “news” as truth. Thus, the mass communication has become a major social institute, functioning as the producer of discourse and establishes the deemed truth.

According to Michel Foucault, (Chairat Charoensin-olan, 2002) discourse is the system and the process constituting the identity and significance of everything in the society surrounding us, the knowledge, the truth, the power and even our own selves. It preserves the existence of what constitutes and raises public acceptance. On the other hand, discourse subjugates or displaces some identities and significances.

The discourse also constitutes the truth of anything, to constitute a set of knowledge, regulations, norms, and establishment of social institutes and discursive practice resulting from the knowledge. Moreover, it changes how a person defines oneself in congruent to the set of constituted knowledge. In Foucault’s opinion, knowledge always is woven with power, and always can be used to support it as long as that set of knowledge is still accepted.

Foucault believed the custom; the norm set the identity and the meaning for the society, as both the discourse and the practice of it. Nevertheless, identity and meaning are fluid, not fixed, and flows along the discourse constituting them. Discourse involves the treatment onto everything and is forced onto the world of reality as it creates conditions and regulations to be enforced onto everything.

On the other hand, the same discourse subjugates, conceals or terminates what deviates from the identity and the meaning it creates. It is not simply an attribute. The constitution of discourse is controlled, regulated, selected and distributed under a set of regimen, which roots on power.

#### **2.14.2 Power and Truth**

Power is the social historical process by a group of persons of influences that find the “Realm of Truth”. The truth will then lead to multiple social practices either in macro or micro scale. Or, power is the process to constitute/ produce a set of knowledge, truth, nature, or normality which is advantageous to influential persons or the producer of the discourse, and subjugate any other set of knowledge via subtle techniques. The target of the power will not sense the process and eager to take the role. How a person identifies himself as is effected by the position he is set in the realm of truth. This is the technique to position an individual in the discourse with power.

#### **2.14.3 Power and Knowledge**

Overall, most people do not see the connection between “power” and “knowledge”. They view that knowledge is the truth free of any bias, whereas power is about bias. But, Foucault did not mean the raw power of coercive nature, but the purged power in the form of knowledge, specialized knowledge, such as science of economics. The success of power depends on if it can conceal its mechanism. It is not the law, contrast to what the general public understands. It is the norm, the custom of the society, especially the norm and the custom from the expert in the form of academic discourse on a specific topic. Thus, one may say “knowledge” is the power in disguise. The ultimate power is one that can hide its true self, but cloaking itself as bias-free knowledge and truth.

#### **2.14.4 Authority and Role of the Discourse Creator**

As discourse constitutes the identity and meaning to the society, rules which are true and not false in any verbal way. Power and knowledge lead the social practice that helps relieve the insurgency in the southern border area. The powerful one should constitute the discourse.



To solve the unrest, a process should be made to constitute the discourse or a mutual belief and understanding of the conflict. The peace making is a discursive process to bring about different discursive objects. These objects, which are created simultaneously, may be tied together or haphazardly scattered. Anyway, they will be labeled, described, analyzed and evaluated. All those actions happen within the social interaction (Srisompob Jitpiromsri, 2013).

Thus, the higher-up, both in policy making or practicing level, should constantly be more involved in the constitution of discourses for fixing the trouble in the south and spread them for the benefit of most people.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This chapter describes the research methodology used in this study. The method of this research for problem solving in the 3 southern border provinces in Thailand is by studying policies, processes of policy implementation and outcomes with phenomenological research. This study uses qualitative analysis, which is to be understood phenomenally to obtain a better understanding of the phenomena as well as to increase specific and accurate knowledge in order to answer research questions and specific hypothesis. Moreover this research aims to portray things phenomenally to get a better picture matching individuals, situations and groups. If it is a traditional qualitative research, researchers have no concepts, hypothesis or theory of the nature of the subjects. They go into the research area with little knowledge of what to study but they come back with specific variables and in-depth. (Schmitt and Klimoski, 1991)

The conflict resolution in the 3 southern border provinces is new in Thailand which has been ongoing and violent until the present (2004-2015), for almost 11 years. The solution of the unrest from the government is still not successful. The method of this research should use qualitative analysis in order to find new issues concerning the particular matter and to understand the meaning or process of action or phenomena (Chai Potisita, 2004) in order to find basic knowledge to present a hypothesis or design a questionnaire for a quantitative study later on. The research methodology for problem solving in the 3 southern border provinces is that I collected the data by writing true stories in a naturalistic and inductive manner by searching formats, varieties and complexities which happen in the society by using less numbers (Glesne, 1999) and ethics from the researcher, myself. (Suphang Chandawanich, 2009)

Furthermore, in this research I believe that I have go to the three southernmost provinces where there is ongoing violence and unrest until now by myself to study the

quality of social life in depth. I defined the specific study which allows me to survey social variables and manageable scope by starting with the social context leading to surveying plans and upcoming focus on the research. I have confidence that upcoming focus and belief in the ability to design the research method will match the situation and nature of the people in the study context. Sometimes there are some secrets which I have to accept and cannot do anything more than interpreting. The qualitative research focuses on the paradigm of qualitative interpretation. (Guba and Lincoln, 1994) However the social reality is different in terms of time, people and places. The method of this research is to collect data by cooperation and trust from interviewees. (Chai Potisita, 2004)

Therefore, I think the process of this research is intriguing and I have to decide which study is interesting or represents the scope of the study by designing research tools e.g. observation or interview (Holliday, 2002).

The qualitative research of conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces is social science research which has some disadvantages. I am aware of this problem so I have to find the method of the study and data collection which is more accurate. This qualitative research utilises descriptions of lived experiences which is in-depth and clear in what is studied. However, the disadvantage is lack of quantity of each context, concept i.e. it cannot be told how many problems there are and lack of clarification of the outcome which cannot be used as generalisability of findings or external validity (Suchat Prasertthasasin, 2008). Therefore, the qualitative research is the in-depth study and studies the whole area although there are few samples. Data collection uses cooperative observation e.g. in-depth interviewing and group discussions. Data analysis utilises mainly logical analysis and with some quantitative analysis (Suchitra Boonyarattapan, 2003).

Nonetheless, to solve the problem of the disadvantage of the qualitative research for conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces is to use the triangulation method which means using different tools to analyse the same phenomena or to gather information from different sources. This is the method to create hypothesis or theory. The triangulation research could be within-method which uses different techniques in the same method. Data collection and interpretation use scales in measuring the same variables or construct or observe from multiple

comparison groups. The triangulation method could be between methods which social scientists use the most and are both qualitative fieldwork and quantitative survey methods which is a different perspective of continuity from qualitative research to quantitative research (Suchat Prasitratsin, 2008).

As I had limitation of time for the study in conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces, I had limited time with a target group but I still focused on the importance of the qualitative research e.g. focus group, in-depth interview (Chai Potisita, 2004). The strategy of enquiry is based on phenomenology which focuses on lived memoirs which everyone accepts without proof. These lived memoirs are produced by and experiences of groups of people which everyone has to accept (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).

The verification of validity for this research includes 2 methods (1) internal verification about data which focuses on quality e.g. checking the source of the information and data collection method (2) external verification which has 2 types 1) simple method which is analysis by peer review and public review by presenting the outcome of the study to the studied groups and asking for their opinion 2) triangulation method i.e. have other researchers analyse it and compare the outcomes, use information from different sources to analyse the same study, use the same information but analyse from different theories, conduct another study related to the same topic but using different data to see if the outcomes are in the same direction (Chai Potisita, 2004).

### **3.1 Population and Sample**

Population and sample selection is based upon purposeful sampling which is unstructured selection in order to get the most appropriate sample. Data collection techniques used in this study are 1) study real life phenomena 2) focus on meaning 3) search for qualitative data 4) emphasise descriptive information 5) focus on interviews 6) be open minded 7) have clear topics in an interview 8) if the answer is not clear, clarify it as soon as possible 9) observe changes in reactions while interviewing 10) be well prepared before the interview 11) create a positive

interaction with the interviewee 12) make an impression with the interviewee (Chai Potisita, 2004).

Moreover, the sample selection of the phenomenological research should be considered in three matters (place, time and the expression of meaning of personal experience of the person being studied) (Steeves, 2000). Therefore, the samples I chose always had the dimensions of time and place which are connected closely and had significance to the meaning or interpretation of the experiences in different times and places. The feeling of people towards the phenomena and the interpretation of the phenomena would be different. This is why time and place should be taken into account in the sample selection at least in terms of when and where. As for the expression of the meaning of personal experience of the person being studied, it is directly related to their cultures of expressing the meaning or the feeling of people in that community. The sample should be considered based on the variety of backgrounds and there should be awareness that the interpretation of the experience of the person being studied involves the culture and language (Chai Potisita, 2004).

I selected the sample of population and target groups according to time, place and the expression of the meaning experienced by following the study of the announcement of the National Council for Peace and Order No. 98/2557, dated 21<sup>th</sup> July 2004, Conflict Resolution in Southern Border Provinces.

Population and sample selection for the qualitative research is collected from the key informant by in-depth interviewing with the leaders of the relevant departments by studying the researches about conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces which includes 6 interesting points in order to separate interviewees in different groups as follows:

- 1) Analyze the development of the unrest from the past to the present.
- 2) Analyze the development of policies to tackle the unrest situations in the three southern border provinces.
- 3) Analyze the policy implementation process by considering the role of the main agencies responsible for the conflict resolution in the 3 southern border provinces
- 4) Analyze the policy implementation outcomes.

5) Analyze the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes.

6) Analyze the remaining problems and obstacles.

The population and samples in 1)-6) who are in-depth interviewed are the Division Director of the Internal Security Region 4, Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut (Fourth Regional Army Commander ) and the SBPAC, the secretary-general of the SBPAC and the vice secretary-general of the SBPAC

The population and samples in 4)-6) that are in-depth interviewed are the chiefs or the directors of the division levels, there being 11 people in total.

Moreover I am interested in interviewing the population and samples to analyse the key factors that have led to the policy outcomes. I selected 4 scholars who are studying conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces: Assistant Professor Dr. Srisompop Jitpiromsri, the director of Centre for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus and Deep South Watch, Associate Professor Dr. Wanchai Kanjanasuwan, the director of Peace Study, Prince of Songkhla University, Mr. Abdulroman Morlor from the Faculty of Political Science, Hatyai University, and Professor Krongchai Hatta, the faculty chief of Geology, and the Humanities and Social Science, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus.

The population and sample from the police department includes Police Lieutenant General Anurut Kritsanakaraket, Commissioner General of the Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Centre. The population and sample from the army sector is Major General Chinawat Mandech, one Division Commanding General in the 4<sup>th</sup> Development Division and one director of Peace Centre. The population and sample from the political sector includes 5 politicians.

The population and sample in the religious sector is the Chief of the Muslims in Thailand, Arsis Pitakkumpol and Abdulromae Jesae, the President of the Islam Committee in Yala and Arhama Tooyong, the Vice President of the Islam Committee in Yala, three governors of the southern border provinces, two leaders from Buddhism, three representatives from the civil society, one person from the Public sector, and one leader of Islam students.

Moreover, I am interested in in-depth interviewing, with a group who have different perspectives from the Thai government and compare the outcome from both samples. These people are Arbuhafis Alhakim, one of the leaders who discussed with the representatives from the Thai government in Mara Patani Hayeesamae Tanam, Ex leader of Pulo, Dr. Wan Kadir who is well-known among Thai journalists as the President of Bersatu and Hassan Toyib, the BRN leader who joined the discussion for peace with the representatives from the Thai government on 13<sup>th</sup> June 2013 at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

### **3.2 Instruments of Research**

Instruments used for collecting data are:

**3.2.1 Documentary Research** that refers to the analysis of documents such as historical documents, researches, online news and analysis, theoretical works and official documentations related to problems in the 3 southern border provinces. The data were analyzed to approach the conflict resolution, listed in the six key areas above.

Therefore, the early preliminary stage of data collection in phenomenological studies is considered as a way that researchers don't have access to the persons who provide information directly (unobtrusive methods) and being observed without intervention (Chai Potisita, 2004). In addition, I want to obtain an overview of the problem-solving in the three southern border provinces by analyzing 6 points listed above for creating rapid policies, processes and results, because this method saves both time and money and I do not need to collect the data by myself. Furthermore I need only search from existing reports and can use them right away. I may literally be able to expand the summary (generalization) even more because it requires much of the same stored data (Pichit Pitaktepsombat, 2008).

**3.2.2 Interviews:** This research is a qualitative research in characteristics of unstructured or semi-structured interviews that they are much more flexible and based on the paradigm (Chai Potisita, 2004). The purpose of the interviews as in-depth

interviews is to study the individual outcomes of a phenomenon for analysing the six key areas; which are 1) An analysis of the development of insurgency in the three southern border provinces from the past to the present; 2) An analysis of the development of unrest policies in the three southern border provinces; 3) The process analysis on bringing policies into practice by considering the role of the main agencies responsible for resolving the southern conflict problems; 4) An analysis of the results in turning policies into practice; 5) An analysis of key factors influencing the results of turning policies into practice; 6) An analysis of the problems and obstacles to their existence;.

Furthermore, I am interested in the focus group interviews to analyse the important factors affecting the results of turning policies into practice.

### **3.3 Data Collection Methods**

Data collection of the historical documents, researches, online news and analysis, theoretical works and official documentations related to the problems in 3 southern border provinces has been summarized and organized into categories that are relevant to the six key areas above; which are: 1) An analysis of the development of insurgency in the three southern border provinces from the past to the present; 2) An analysis of the development of unrest policies in the three southern border provinces; 3) The process analysis on bringing policies into practice by considering the role of the main agencies responsible for resolving the southern conflict problems; 4) An analysis of the results in turning policies into practice; 5) An analysis of key factors influencing the results of turning policies into practice; 6) An analysis of the problems and obstacles to their existence;.

The next phase of the research is in-depth interviews based on population sampling. After the information was gathered, they have been summarized and stored. Furthermore the data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and compared with data obtained from the documentary research method to get results from the analysis.

In addition, when I summarized the substance of my findings, I generated the substance of a focus group discussion as a way to collect and gather information from a specific group in which the group was being organized to chat or discuss with the



aim to find the specific information that is relevant to the correct answer to a research question (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999). Furthermore the data obtained from a focus group as information through the discussion of providers can be trusted to be accurate, credible and diverse. In addition, I use data collection from in-depth interviews, primitive documents and focus groups all together.

I have to collect data for further study on the issue and analyse factors that influence policy performance, which is using a strategy of the use of multiple methods to study the same research topic, known as triangulation. This is the use of multiple methods, varieties of information from multiple sources, many researchers and varieties of concepts to answer any questions or to describe different perspectives on the phenomenon from the same subject (Chai Potisita, 2004).

To define the target population and a design of the sample discussion group, one should acquire a sample group with common and different characteristics, called “control characteristics” and “break characteristics” (Knodel, 1993) by gurus respectively, for the sake of comparison in an analysis. Because the qualitative data analysis uses lots of comparisons of the same story (Chai Potisita, 2004).

Regarding group discussions, the researcher selected a group with 6 people (usually 6-8 works best) to analyze the main factors on outcomes of bringing policies into practice. The group should have a proper size, not too small and not too big. A very small group might result in a limited discussion and limited information, not much variety in ideas, from a few people, but if the group is too large, there may be problems in managing group dynamics. Therefore, their participation in discussions is not evenly distributed as it should be or if an operator tries to let everyone talk, it might take too much time because the group is very big. The selection of group participants should be such that, the number of people should be more than the amount you really need, with one or two people as spares in case some people cannot participate because of some sudden engagements.

### **3.4 Data Analysis Methods**

Once I have already gathered and stored data, I then perform the data analysis. However the process of qualitative data analysis must continue throughout the

research by following the procedures, it should not be done after the data has been collected, at the very least, the analysis should be started while researchers are collecting data in the field. Some methodologists have the opinions that the best data analysis should start before researchers begin their works (Chai Potisita, 2004).

Qualitative data analysis intends to bring their substance from in-depth interviews with people involved and data from the earlier stage leads to explain the policies, processes and results of problem solving in the three southern border provinces. The analysis itself is a content analysis.

Initially, I have analyzed data from data collection in the first step for the research study on problem solving in the three southern provinces. There are 6 key areas, that I am interested in, that are mentioned above.

After that the information gained from the in-depth interviews according to the six key areas above is summarized and interpreted, but this interpretation, I want to tell the readers that what was discovered and concluded is meaningful and important both in theory and practice. That is to say how the substance from the research implies in terms of policy or future investment (LeCompte and Schensul, 1999) and to compare the results from the two-way analysis to verify the validity of the findings.

Furthermore, I am also interested in studying the data analysis of factors that influence an in-depth policy performance by analysing in-depth interview data issues and I also analyse focus group data together with analysing in-depth interview data on such issues as well.

### **3.5 Measurement of Reliability**

Researchers should check to see whether conclusions are accurate and reliable when it comes to analyzing, until the steps of conclusion and preliminary interpretation. There are several verification techniques, examining the reliability of the analytical results, which are strongly divided into 2 types; which are: (Chai Potisita, 2004)

**3.5.1 Internal Reliability**, which is examination of the quality considering the things that already exist in the research, whether it is appropriate and of good quality or not. Another part is about the analysis process.

Whether the data were analyzed with reasonably good quality or not, this question leads to determine sources of information, which are population and places for doing research, whether they suit research stories and questions or not and how much.

In the analysis, researchers have to check the suitability of an analytical method and the implementation of a rigorous analysis based on principle. Moreover, they should try to answer the question whether findings and conclusions from the findings are solid evidences and evoke the amenable and how much. For example, whether in my research, the analysis ignores some evidence from data, that is incidentally opposite to my conclusions or not, and moreover if there are other aspects of explanations or conclusions that are different from my point of view or not (alternative conclusion). Lastly researchers should check to see whether the data analysis methods and procedures are clearly understandable so it can be investigated and others can redo it.

**3.5.2 External Reliability**, which is to determine the accuracy of the results of the analysis from outside by asking opinions on the substance from the other researchers or scholars (peer review) or presenting an article in the conference and being criticized formally. Another way that is similar is listening to the voices of the population being studied (playback method) by letting them listen to the findings and criticize to see how the conclusions and interpretations of the research are correct, or ok for the data providers' opinions.

More effort is required for the external investigation, using a method called triangulation, to verify conclusions and interpretations that can be done in many ways. Some of these are comparing the results of the analysis between the researcher and other researchers to seek confirmation and disconfirmation, comparing the same subject under different data sources to see whether the results match or are a mismatch, using multiple perspectives or theories to interpret the data or comparing two separate studies under the same issue (such as using data from in-depth interviews to identify the results from group discussions etc.) to see whether the results are going in the same direction or not.

The researcher assumes that the researcher had performed one of the methods as mentioned above, and there was no significant difference in results. Then the researcher should ensure that the researcher's conclusions and interpretations in the researcher's research provide high accuracy and reliability.

In the early preliminary stage of checking, I did an internal investigation by checking the sources and the quality of data at initial data collection in order to analyse to pursue a research interest in the problem solving of the three southern border provinces with 6 important issues mentioned above.

Examining multiple sources of information to make sure the data had been correctly referenced was done in order to gain confidence in the analysis process with the method of analysis and action based on analysis rules.

In terms of external monitoring, I got comments from other researchers or scholars who were interested in the subject (peer review) and the presentation of an article in a conference was criticized formally. In addition, the results of the study have been proposed to the population being studied to listen and criticize as well.

In this research, the researcher is interested in problem solving of the three southern border provinces about factors affecting the results of turning policies into practice. Therefore, there are more things related to the subject above to be studied in depth by analyzing the data on such issues in the group conversations, to use the triangulation method to check the outside reliability of the results of the analysis by studying another one on the same topic again, but using different types of information from the initial data collection of in-depth interviews and group discussions.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPING UNREST SITUATIONS IN THE THREE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPING POLICIES TO TACKLE THE UNREST IN THE THREE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES**

In chapter 4, a study of the development of problem-solving for the unrest in the three southern border provinces will be discussed. This will be on analyses of the development of the unrest situations and the policy development in tackling the unrest from past to present in the three southern border provinces.

#### **4.1 An Analysis of the Development of the Unrest Situation in the Three Southern Border Provinces from the Past to the Present**

The unrest in south Thailand, much of it often called “Faitai”, is a catastrophic event that happens in four provinces, namely, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat provinces and 4 districts in Songkhla province which are Jana, Nathawee, Thepa and Sabayoi districts. In 2013, Sadao district was added, and it happened as a result of the conflicts in the southern border provinces. There are many incidents which are still going on until now such as arson attacks, bombings and riots. Although there has been a separatist movement in Pattani for several decades, things began to escalate after 2004.

##### **4.1.1 Factors Associated with the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces.**

There were political and government solutions for handling the unrest or the conflict management in the three southern border provinces. According to the scholars in the field of this research, a sustainable conflict resolution was needed to create

mechanisms that would arise from many local people and parties, and then create a balance of power between the parties. In addition, things to consider were the elements of their sense of ethnic identity and religious belief which were important as drivers of conflict, and caused violence. The parameters of problem solving were the creation of local social and political institutions by combining an important symbol of sense. This was the special characteristic by the combination of religion and culture with administration and management, in order to contribute to an accurate resurgent power in dealing with problems that arose.

There was a lot of research done on problem solving in the three southern border provinces. The official documents, especially from the study of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in 2006, have been studied and described to better understand violence in the three southern border provinces which is caused by the following factors.

- 1) Individual factors that may include the insurgents and violent government actions.

- 2) Structural factors that may include the injustices caused by the justice systems and the current rules, and the economic and natural resource problems which major people experience. The study does not allow citizens to overcome the social challenges of various forms, both secular and religious. Some of these challenges are the population condition, and geopolitical issues that cause a comparison of outcomes resulting from the qualities of life of ethnic Malay Muslims in 2 countries which are the southern border area of Thailand and Malaysia.

- 3) Cultural factors that may include religion and ethnic identity in the region, such as the Islamic religion, Melayu Pattani language and Pattani's history. These are the social conditions which serve to justify the use of violence or make people accept or agree with the parties that use violence. All these lead to the creation of the insurgents in the southern border provinces using the combination of race and religion as an excuse to use the violence during the fight for their goals on behalf of the Malay Muslims.

In addition, there is information from the report of the special working group of Police Lt. Col. Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra's Government, in which Gen. Ekachai Ketudat served as the president of the group. This focuses on detailed information

from various parties in the area, based on the belief that the problem of violence occurs because a group of people who are associated with the various organized crime groups such as the Muslim separatist groups and the terrorist groups see the advantage of the national strategic scenario, and smuggling and trafficking groups (such as weapons and drugs trafficking) (Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2014: 3)

In spite of that, the Senate committee concludes that the situations of violence in the southern border provinces are caused by several reasons such as poverty and injustices, not only criminal groups or movements. It is challenging to resolve difficult conditions because of the social psychology as a result of differences in religion, language and culture. These have caused misunderstandings, misconceptions or paranoias and negative feelings toward state power for a long time, driving social vulnerability, as some opponents seek advantage (Select Committees Senate, 1999: 5-1).

The results of the study of the Thailand National Defence College students were divided into four issue areas which are the following: 1) The social psychology section refers to historical factors and cultural and religious characteristics of the local residents, which are the key to this conflict and violence, and the problem that has been challenging the rules of the country for so long. 2) The political section talks about the state policy that does not meet the local demands, the mechanisms of state inefficiencies, state terrorism being wrongly understood by the government, and the government being a coward to take action against politicians involved in the issue. 3) The economic section refers to the situations of violence that affect the incomes of the people and reduce consumers. 4) The defense section reveals that the core problem is the concept of separatism, as a result of history, politics and government and social factors (Thailand National Defence College, 2004: 22-23). The following sections talk about the economic and educational factors related to the issue of unrest in the southern border provinces.

The economic factors suggest that there have been claims that poverty and economic problems are two of the factors behind the mutiny. The southern border provinces have the lowest median incomes, compared with the other southern provinces, Although the performance of the southern economy improved markedly in the last decade between the years 1983 to 2003, the average per capita income of

Pattani grew from 9,340 baht to 57,621 baht, while that of Yala and Narathiwat increased from 14,987 baht and 10,340 baht to 52,737 baht and 38,553 baht, respectively.

The lack of efficient management of resources for local developments was a factor of disturbance. The private sector often does not participate in the investments because the area is under the authority of the State. The National Reconciliation Commission reported that the structure of the southern economic development had a problem because it had a high percentage of its population living in poverty and that scrambled for resources. Nonetheless, social analysts think poverty itself is not the whole problem but the more specific problem is injustice. And, to solve the violence problem, the state should solve the problem of political motivation.

Some of the educational factors are that, in the Pondok school system of Thailand, it was found that there are some schools that have separatist goals or holy war, to counter the Government of Thailand. This is a belief of Malay Muslims that afflicts them in the area clearly. The school system has been infiltrated by separatists and published idealism. Therefore, the army intelligence unit indicated that seminaries became new members of the various groups, cultivating sources and leaders of separatist groups that graduated from the school huts.

The violence that has occurred since 2004 until now is regarded as a particularly sensitive situation. Although the government and various sectors have tried to resolve the problem within the framework of policies, it is unable to ease the violence and the problem of protracted conflicts. This has happened following the changes in motivation of those behind the violence. Previously, most of the actions belonged to insurgent groups who had different ideologies from the state but right now, a part of the action was from the different motivating groups in increasingly significant proportions. The other areas of motivation included the controversy over the benefits of influence groups, and personal resentments. The violence has also resulted in the expansion of the dark powers and the grey economy, an intensification of opposition to Islam and a slower decline in quality of life. All governments have seen the importance of the issue, in particular, the issue about helping to improve access to justice to the people in the area, to create sustainable solutions and bring peace back to the southern border provinces. Thus policies and strategies at the national and agency levels are set off, to resolve the issue specifically.



#### **4.1.2 Timeline of the Development of the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces.**

The development of the unrest in the three southern border provinces from past to present, which has undergone violent periods of civil unrest, varies according to the causes and factors in that period. The study was divided into 13 time periods which are detailed below.

##### **4.1.2.1 During the Reign of King Rama V (1868 -1910).**

The conflict between the central government and the region was because the rule system changed to the precinct system in the reign of King Rama V. This was the reason of the abolition of the monarchy occurring throughout the country. As a result, the old power groups, that claimed their call and descended from the original Sultan in the area were not satisfied.

##### **4.1.2.2 During the Reign of King Rama VI (1910-1925).**

In the days of the national integration policy, in 1921, the compulsory education act was promulgated by the Thai government. As a result, children throughout the country were required to attend six years of elementary school, which had been approved by the government of Thailand. The government put efforts into promoting the use of Thai language and encouraging everyone to learn to read and write, in order to increase their chances of getting future careers. But it was a pity that some people viewed those efforts as ways to block the Malay Muslims out of the language system and traditional culture of their own. Subsequently, the government ordered the closure of all schools including the Malay Muslim schools. Thai was not taught properly in these Muslim schools, according to the official teaching program, throughout the country in 1923, as a result of severe protests and riots in the area.

However, the Malay-Muslim minority of southern Thailand were concerned that the national integration policy, was aimed to unite the Malay Muslims with the centralization of political power in Bangkok. The challenges of the faith and identity of Malay Muslims communities under the regime that aimed at evolution, led to disgruntled individuals, both inside and outside the country. They did seek to cause harm by using Malaysian Muslims to fight against the government in a variety of ways, including the separatist movements in the area. They didn't look at the fact that Thailand was rich in ethnic diversity, language, religion and culture, and some people

had lived in Thailand longer than the Malay Muslims in the south and not every group of people agreed with the Thai government's policy. For peace and reconciliation of all Thai people, every group of people in the country did everything possible in order to live together in peace. Under the law, if the groups did not agree with the state activities, it would lead to demonstrations.

4.1.2.3 During the First Phase of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's Government (1939– 1944).

In 1939, the Thai cultural regulations were introduced by Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram, as a result of which Thai people had to wear the traditional Thai clothing. If they did a breach of these regulations, they would be penalized and punished severely and this included Thai Muslims. Moreover, the situation got worse, as the dictatorship under Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram defined the heavy use of the Malay language and some religious practices and rituals of Islam as illegal in 1944.

4.1.2.4 During the Second Phase of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's Government (1948 - 1957).

The beginning of bringing race, identity and religion for sedition, aimed to isolate an independent Pattani state like other states on the Malay Peninsula. The violent event happened in 1948 by the Dusun Nyor Rebellion. There were about 400 Malay Muslims who died, and about 6,000 who had to migrate to the states of Malaya. Since then, there has been a call for an independent Pattani.

4.1.2.5 During Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's Government (1959- 1963).

In 1959, Tuanku Abdul Yalan established the Pattani National Liberation Front (BNPP), known as the first Malay rebel group. In addition, the BRN or the National Revolutionary Front was founded by Ustadz Haji Abdul Karim Hassan in 1963 and lastly, the Patani United Liberation Organisation or PULO was established by Kabir Abdul Rahman in 1963 (Daily News 2013, 1 May).

A government policy on education reform was announced towards Malay Muslims in the south in 1961. Since then, the traditional Islamic education schools (Pondok) have been officially recognized by the government and have had to register as private Islamic studies schools. Thailand's education system was revamped

as to conform to Malay customs. These aimed to promote awareness and instill loyalty towards the state, religion (all religions in the country were considered to be respected equally) and the crown.

#### 4.1.2.6 During the Operations of the Insurgent Groups (1968-1979).

After the BNPP was formed, the BNPP along with the BRN and Pulo groups, started operating from 1968 to 1979, which attacked government officials including kidnapping businessmen for ransoms, but did not fulfill requests.

#### 4.1.2.7 During General Prem Tinsulanonda's Government (1980-1988).

By pursuing cultural assimilation policies toward minority groups, it seemed to split the Malay Muslims more than ever before and even lead to extremist violence.

The separatist and aligned movements were still operating on a continuous basis by bombing places, whether they were hotels, police stations, schools or railways. The period of General Prem Tinsulanonda's administration initially tackled separatist movements and terrorism in the South by the establishment of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), to deal with the issues in regard to justice. They were more likely to resolve the killings, to be the stage of oppression for Muslims, to adjust their attitudes, to eliminate all forms of corruption in the government, to establish the 43 mission headquarters with mixed military police - civilian teams (CPM 43) (having authorities to sweep all forms of terrorism), and to apply the prime ministerial order 66/23. This acknowledged the existence of others, decreasing the injustices found in societies, in order to overcome the spread of the efforts of the communist party activities, and former enemies as misguided persons in which to treat enemies like friends (Kritaya Ajavanichakul, Kulapha Vachanasara, and Hatairat Siangdang, 2006).

#### 4.1.2.8 In the Era of the United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) (1991-1992)

Later in 1991, the three groups had agreed to set up their joint enterprise on behalf of the United Front for the Independence of Pattani or Bersatu, and were led by Dr Abdul Cheman, with a clear political and military approach. Bersatu could raise awareness to demand for an independent state of Pattani, and

awaken their souls, to give light and hope to the masses and alignments. Although Dr Abdul Cheman had been appointed chairman of the Bersatu group, he had not been that accepted as chairman of the group because of his ambiguity in many respects.

Dr. Abdul Wadir had an interview with a correspondent of Al Jazeera, which indicated that the Bersatu organisation consisted of three groups :BIPP, PULO and the BRN-Coordinate. Such words made the insurgents of BRN feel angry when they had to pretend and work with him. He also said that a new generation of warriors did not want to negotiate with any parties, which involved indicating Pondok as sources of strategic training units.

4.1.2.9 During the Reign of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005).

A resurgence of violence by Pattani guerrilla groups began in 2001. Back then, most of the identities of militants remained unclear. Local and regional experts implicated that the region's traditional separatist groups, such as PULO, BRN and BNPP, and particularly the BRN-Coordinate (a splinter group of the Coordinate branch of BRN), and Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) (an armed group allegedly linked to BRN) were involved in the violence. Others suggested that the violence occurred under the influence of international Islamic groups, such as Al-Qaeda and Gamaa al-Islamiya, but the role of guerrilla warfare in the south considerably attacked weapon depots and schools, unlike other terrorist groups which attacked western targets which was the view on guerrilla groups associated with international Islamic groups.

The government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra ordered the publication in the Government Gazette no 123/2545 to abolish the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Police-Military Force 43 on 1 May 2002. The former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra also mistrusted it intensely, according to the need for allowing the police to solve the problems in the area.

Two years later, the major impact events occurred in 2004, when the South United Front did undertake some military operations to rob weapons from the 4th Development Battalion (camp pileng), kill 4 soldiers, steal 413 guns and bring back 94 firearms.

Initially, the government's viewpoint was that the situation was created by skilled thieves. And indeed, many outside observers believed that business competitors or rival criminal organizations were involved. In July 2002, after some 14 policemen died in separate attacks over a span of 7 months, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra publicly denied the role of religion in the attacks, and was quoted as saying he did not "think religion was the cause of the problems down there because several of the policemen killed were Muslims".

In the same year, Thaksin said that "there's no separatism, no ideological terrorists, just common bandits". In 2004 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra assumed in a regard of the insurgency as the local front in the national War on Terrorism. On 20 July, 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra submitted the Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation, 2005, that took effect in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani. In September 2006, Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratkalin was granted an extraordinary increase in executive powers to combat the unrest. On September 19, 2006, Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin led a bloodless military coup in Bangkok, ousting Thaksin and declaring martial law.

Lots of Muslims served as members of parliament under Thaksin's first government (2001–2005). In the Malay Muslim provinces in southern Thailand along with northern Malaysia, provincial councils were also predominantly Muslim and several southern municipalities had Muslim mayors. Muslims were able to voice their political grievances more openly and enjoy a much greater degree of religious freedom. However, when Thaksin disbanded the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre and replaced it with the police force, corruption scandals began, which was starting to work against terrorism. Consultation with local community leaders was also abolished. Discontent over the abuses led to growing violence during 2004 and 2005.

4.1.2.10 During the Term of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008).

After Thaksin was removed from power in a 2006 coup, the government tried to pave the way for a more harmonious political environment in this region. This meant that undue influence on government policies and initiating talks

with well-known separatist groups was exercised. However, there was a criticism of having connections to the groups involved in regard to the heavy violent situations and there were few separatist groups that did not have any movements regarding the previous government's change of strategy. In 1996, the number of insurgency-related violence was 42 times than before and it had increased to 83 and 139 times by 1997 and 1998, respectively. Moreover the number of insurgency-related violent situations was rising from 82 to 84 times than in the past, in 2002 and 2003.

Although the military showed few signs of reconciliation, the insurgency escalated further. The death toll, 1,400 at the time of the coup, increased to 2,579 by mid-September 2007.

4.1.2.11 During the Reign of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011).

Despite little progress in curbing the violence, the junta declared that security was improving and that peace would come to the region by 2008. By March 2008, however, the death toll surpassed 3,000. During the Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya noted a "sense of optimism" and said that he was confident of bringing peace into the region within 2010. But by the end of 2010 insurgency-related violence had increased, confounding the government's optimism. Finally in March 2011, the government conceded that violence was increasing and could not be solved in a few months.

4.1.2.12 During the Peace Talks in the Reign of the Government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2004 -2014).

There were 2,475 incidents in 2007, but after that the number of violent incidents had declined from its peak in 2007. After the modification by the Thai government's Southern policies in 2012, the incidents of violence decreased to a significant level. This was done to progress forces for peaceful conflict solutions, to allow those who really did think differently more political space to solve the conflict, to be open to all sectors that contributed to solve the problem, to respect and honor cultural pluralism, to bring justice to the society, and to rehabilitate those affected by the unrest.

The average incidents of violence were 2.97 and 2.42 in 2011 and 2012 respectively, which meant that the number of incidents decreased by 18.51 percent.

When compared with the number of incidents recorded in the six months, particularly shootings, bombings and arson attacks, it was found that the number of incidents decreased from 406 to 172 and 147 to 92 incidents or by 37.41 percent in 2011 and 2012 respectively.

Compared with the number of deaths during the period of January 2011 to June 2011, during the same period in 2012, it had decreased from 234 to 145, a decrease of 38.04%.

Nearly 2 years ago, insurgency leaders were deeply uncomfortable with the government's policy of returning to the houses because there was a high figure of surrenders.

By all means, the separatists committed the serious separatist violence to cope with the expansion of influence. In regard to the situation, for example, there was a major attack by almost 20 villains in the Mayor District of Pattani Province, killing 4 soldiers and injuring the others.

Investigating the psychological warfare, it was found that separatists were from both internal and international areas. They took action with the aim of terrorizing and showing the possibility of deploying similar coercion against the soldiers, in the fact of pushing the villagers under power and terror while many of them were arrested.

4.1.2.13 During the Era of General Prayut Chan-ocha who is Both Prime Minister and Head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) (2014-2015).

Since the Thai military deposed Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, and formed the NCPO - on May 22, 2014, Thai citizens hoped to see a good future for the country related to the expectations of political, social and economic reforms, and solutions for the unrest in the southern border provinces.

Especially, when Thailand's political administration had changed to military administration, both local people and outsiders expected the effectiveness of the security-based strategy and the decrease in insurgency-related violence in Thailand's Deep South even more. This was because of a belief that the military could have greater understanding, information and solutions of conflict than other agencies (Praewseenamghuen (editor), 2014).

One of the religious wars in Thailand's southern provinces during the military-run National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) was the July 25 car explosion in front of Betong Holiday Hill Hotel (Futuna) in Betong district, Yala, which killed three people and wounded 42. The incident was similar to the deadly bombings, as always.

Four people were killed and 22 others were captured at Toh Sud village, in Pattani's Tung Yang Daeng district, during a series of shootouts that lasted into the evening on March 25. The slain men were denied as being militants, and it was an act causing serious damage to the public.

After the researcher did a case study on the development of the unrest in the three southernmost provinces, the study has been divided into 13 phases based on the situation at the time, to be more easily understood as follows.

1) The Earlier Phases of the Conflict that was the beginning of the conflict situation in the three southernmost provinces can be divided into 3 phases:

(1) The unrest in the three southern border provinces in the regime public administration change during the reign of King Rama V (1868 -1910).

(2) The unrest of the period of educational changes during the reign of King Rama VI (1910-1925).

(3) The unrest problems of cultural changes during the first phase of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government (1939– 1944).

2) The Era of Formation of Several Insurgent Groups that were formed in the three southernmost provinces during this period can be divided into 5 phases:

(1) The clash with the Duson Nyor Rebellion during the second phase of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government (1948 - 1957).

(2) The unrest of the formation of rebel groups and education reform during Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963).

(3) The unrest during insurgent groups conducting operations (1968-1979).

(4) The unrest in the period of the formation of the SBPAC during General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988).

(5) The unrest in the era of the United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) (1991-1992).



3) The Formation of Rebel Groups in the Era of Globalization, and the current wave of insurgency in the Thailand's three southernmost provinces which has followed the waves of globalization, can be divided into 5 phases:

(1) A resurgence of violence by Pattani guerrilla groups during the reign of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005).

(2) The unrest during the term of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008).

(3) The unrest problem during the reign of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011).

(4) The unrest during the peace talks in the reign of the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2004 -2014).

(5) The unrest during the era of General Prayuth Chan-o-cha who is both prime minister and head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) (2014-2015).

#### **4.1.3 The Results of the Situation Analysis on Conflict Development in Thailand's Three Southernmost Provinces.**

The case study analysis shows that the unrest in three southern provinces from the past to the present is mostly due to the following.

##### **4.1.3.1 The Government Policies for Local People Who Live in the Three Southern Border Provinces.**

The past and present times of the south Thailand insurgency in southern border provinces is mainly due to the government's drive for policies and the policies are offensive to the public or persons who comply with the government's policy. The analyses of the country's policies at set intervals are the following.

1) Administrative policies and administrative changes in policy took place at the beginning of the unrest in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand. During the reign of King Rama V 1868-1910, the "Monthon thesapiban" administration was established for provincial administration in this period. After that governors were removed from the administrative positions across the country, therefore Pattani governors (the old power group), who were descendants of sultans, were dissatisfied toward the policies, which was consistent with the director of Prince

of Songkla University's Institute for Peace Studies' opinion. The Director's Statement about this story is as follows. (Wanchai Kanjanasuwan, 2015; Interview)

If we apply our sincere hearts to the situation, Pattani province would be strong as before. The military seized not only Pattani province but also Prae, Korat and other provinces before the Chulalongkorn reform, and as a result, there were Prae, Korat and Pattani rebellions against Siamese authority. In fact, it is common that one nation battles against those of another, and in the endeavor to keep them disunited, the other parties will battle against the occupiers.

The Pattani Dutch trading port is the first Dutch trading port in the country. From an in-depth interview with a distinguished scholar of history from Prince of Songkla University Pattani Campus we come to know that. (Krongchai Hatta, 2010; Interview)

Pattani is the oldest city to establish trade and friendship ties with Holland. In 1601, the Pattani Dutch trading post was established in Krue Sae while the Kingdom of Siam had just conquered Pattani.

2) Based on the education policy reforms, in 1921, the Compulsory Elementary Education Act was proclaimed by the Thai government due to the formulation of a new education policy. This had been considered as the second part of the unrest problems in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand. In the reign of Rama VI (1910-1925), there were efforts to promote the use of Thai language and encourage everyone to read and write, which blocked the Malay Muslims out of the language system and traditional culture of their own. Subsequently, the government ordered the closure of all schools including the Malay Muslim schools, where Thai was not taught properly according to the official teaching program, throughout the country in 1923, as a result of severe protests and riots in the area. From in-depth interviews, the Deputy Secretary General of SBPAC said that: (Panu Uthairat, 2015; Interview)

Before the region's Muslims could not speak the Thai language, but later administrative agencies under the Ministry of Interior founded the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) in order to take care of the problem. The problem was solved by teaching the Thai language and culture to Muslims, resulting in severe incidents that occurred. After that, the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Pattani (BIPP) were founded. Separatist militants had planted attacks on teachers and Buddhist Thais. In 1979, the situations were extremely severe.

However, the Prime Minister Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat government (1959-1963) saw the problems of unrest in the Thailand's three southernmost provinces after education reforms during the reign of Rama VI (1910-1925). Furthermore, mistaken policies on an ethnic group of Malay Muslims were promulgated regarding the education reforms during the reign of Rama VI (1910-1925). Therefore the government policy on educational reform was announced towards Malay Muslims in the south. Since then the traditional Islamic education schools (Pondok) have been officially recognized by the government and have had to register as private Islamic studies schools. Thailand's education system was revamped as to conform to Malay customs. Due to the new policy on education reforms, peace had been brought back to the region.

3) As a result of cultural policies during Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government (1939-1944) which is the third part of the unrest, in 1939, the Thai cultural regulations were introduced by him. This led to Thai people wearing the traditional Thai clothing. If they did a breach of these regulations, they would be penalized and punished severely, and this included Thai Muslims. Moreover, the situation got worse, as the dictatorship under Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram defined the heavy use of the Malay language and some religious practices and rituals of Islam as illegal in 1944. From the in-depth interview, the fourth army area commander said that: (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

On historical aspects, Muslim identity came under the pressure of the Government of Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram that created the regulations on the new style of dressing. Thai people had to wear either uniforms or western-style suits according to the mandate on dress codes. Sarongs and hats, popularly worn in the area, were banned. The Malay language of the Deep South was forbidden, only Thai language was allowed. The roles of the nation, culture, and cloth dressing loyalties in the South were dominated.

The results of political, educational and cultural policies were analyzed during the first three parts of the unrest in the three southernmost provinces. The policies were determined by using the elite model, for absolute monarchy ruling which is the policy of a country ruled by absolutism. The direction of policy is a vertical direction (vertical) by the ruling classes to the public. In this case, the policy was not due to public demand (Dye, 1984; Anderson, 1994; Henry, 1995), public policies, focusing on being controlled by the government (regulatory policies), did not get a response from the public. These were to control individual and group behaviors or to rule the detainees, (Totalovich and Daynes, 1988), such as defining the heavy use of the Malay language and some religious practices and rituals of Islam as illegal in 1944, in the reign of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government.

The policies were also to promote the use of Thai language and encourage everyone to read and write in order to increase their chances of getting future careers, and to block the Malay Muslims out of the language system and traditional culture of their own. This policy was called the days of national integration policy, which was promulgated during the reign of King Rama VI, which was viewed as a policy that appeased Thai groups who spoke the Thai language. Then a minority Muslim group, who spoke the Malay language, was disadvantaged in society. Although the policies benefited the groups in the society that had an advantage, the government would try not to make the general public feel like that. It might cause people to feel bad for the government, but at the same time it was something that the government needed to act on (Riple and Franklin, 1976).

Despite cultural assimilation policies being promulgated toward Muslim minority groups in the three southernmost provinces during the formation of the SBPAC in the reign of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), it seemed to split the Malay Muslims more than ever before, even by the use of severe violence. The reason behind this was that Malay-Muslims had strong ethnic, religious and linguistic identities for a long time, and cultural assimilation policies toward them were hard to apply. A scholar from Hatyai University said that: (Abdulroman Morlor, 2015; Interview)

The separatist groups adduced that the natural resources were persecuted by Thai Buddhists in the past, and a national policy drove northern and northeastern people to move to Khok Pho, which led to the cause of violence.

According to Richard M. Burkey (Sirirat Adsakul, 1999: 15), social harmony must be made by the two parties which were the minority and majority groups. Because of that, there had to be acceptance of minority groups by a majority population, in which the minority groups had to adopt the values and norms of the dominant groups. To maintain a harmonious relationship with all aspects, every process had to be consistent. As an example, cultural changes regarding the acceptance of majority of the culture would make social structural, identity and opinion changes. This was due to social harmony, which was difficult to obtain by Muslims in the three southernmost provinces according to the strong differences in ethnic religious, and language backgrounds when compared with the Buddhist culture.

In addition, cultural assimilation, in the reign of Thailand's Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), was defined as a cause of violent conflict. In summary, the impact of these factors, including individuals, people sharing information, having contact with each other and people of different cultures, could lead to the harmonious society or social conflict. (Uthai Hiranto, 1976: 49-51). Since most Thai Muslims in the rural area of the three southernmost provinces were poor, there was a low level of social integration. Especially, both Thai Buddhists and

Muslims in rural areas distinguished themselves clearly, causing social problems (Chaweewan Wannaprasert, 1979).

However, the study explored the cultural assimilation of Buddhists and Muslims in the area of the 3 southern provinces and found that it could succeed with various factors which were terrain, educational, political, ethnic, agricultural, public, social and scientific factors (Sunthon Nawakawin, 1994: 83-85).

The cultural assimilation (Assimilation) could be real, due to interpersonal relationships, participating in the funeral and religious services, mixed marriages, which provide the custom adoption such as Magaepulo (parties) and Magaetae traditions (parties for Masjid donations). Therefore, it was obvious that the religious practices of both Muslims and Buddhists in some areas were similar. The cultural study of their beliefs would make us understand and know how to react toward them. (Amawasri Amphansirirat, et al., 2007: 21).

From the analyses, the policy of cultural assimilation had partially contributed to the unrest in the three southern border provinces. The ongoing ideology of nation-building, focusing on assimilation, was not changed since the reign of King Rama V. The main ideas of race management had not changed. The people, especially in the three southern border provinces refused to practice according to the government's policies on the nation, Buddhism and the monarchy. Therefore race, society, culture and religion of Muslims were ignored. It was apparent that the Muslims of southern Thailand suffered from unjust repression and forced assimilation, therefore, the resistance of the Malay Muslims in the areas has been seen from past to present. Moreover, diversity policies (such as middlemen, granting partial autonomy, regional power distributions and so on) could lead to a better solution.

A management of multicultural policies in the three southern border provinces should be conducted as follows: 1) Political decentralization should be expanded to the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre even more. 2) A shared understanding on the history of the area toward the local people should be conducted. 3) Cultural adaptation was conducted as Thai culture by ignoring ethnic, social and cultural differences. 4) The government should recognize **various** ethnic-oriented, social and cultural differences in the southern border provinces (Suphakan Siripaisan and Adison Saksoong, 2009).

#### 4.1.3.2 The Factors that are not Related to Government Policies.

From the past to the present, there have been many causes of insurgency-related violence in the three southern border provinces, not only the government policies but also the other factors which are not directly related to the government policies.

1) The issue of separatist manifestations in the three southern border provinces in the period of the Dusongyo Rebel during Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government (1948-1957), is the fourth stage of unrest of unrelated government policies. Other factors not related to government policies, were to bring race, identity and religion for sedition, aimed to isolate an independent Patani state. The violent event happened in 1948 by the Dusongyo Rebel. There were about 400 Malay Muslims who died, and about 6,000 who had to migrate to the states of Malaya. Since then, there has been a call for an independent Pattani.

Therefore the facts above are the roots of the insurgent groups in the 5th generation of the unrest during the period of the formation of rebel groups and education reform in the reign of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963). The rebel groups began forming in this period. In 1959, Tuanku Abdul Yalan established the Pattani National Liberation Front (BNPP), known as the first Malay rebel group. In addition, the BRN or the National Revolutionary Front was founded by Ustadz Haji Abdul Karim Hassan in 1963 and lastly, the Patani United Liberation Organisation or PULO was established by Kabir Abdul Rahman in 1963. The BNPP, The BRN and Pulo groups started operating during 1968 to 1979, which attacked government officials including kidnapping businessmen for ransoms but did not fulfill requests. This period of all three group starting movements is called the 6th generation of the unrest (1968-1979).

However, the 8th generation of the unrest is the period of the United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) (1991-1992). The Bersatu organization, consisted of four groups: BIPP, PULO, the BRN-Coordinate and Mujahideen Islamic Pattani, and aimed to create the same propaganda in the sub-units (Isranews Team, 2013). Dr. Abdul Qadir gave an interview that a new generation of warriors did not want to negotiate with any parties, involving indicating Pondok as sources of strategic training units. Such an interview claimed that the groups had the

separatist ideology clearly by practicing and preparing for counter-insurgency. This was consistent with the in-depth interviews of the SBPAC Secretary General. His views on this matter were: (Panu Uthairat, 2015; Interview)

Separatism in the three southern border provinces was the main factor for problems in the three southern border provinces. Religion and ethnicity were often depicted as trigger factors in many conflicts. The history of the conflict and recognition of injustices became additional arenas for conflict. There were racial double standards and feelings of injustice and discrimination which led to separatism. There were many people who dared to not give in to these but we had to accept.

However, the unrest in the three southernmost provinces based on the military confirmation, was caused by the separatist forces with strategy changes in fighting in the towns instead of the forests. According to the in-depth interview, Fourth Regional Army Commander said that: (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

In 2004, the battle fluctuations were the result of dissatisfaction in reaching their goals. The changing strategies of PULO were seen from their assault on the hills to their assault in the cities. They held on to strongholds hidden in the villages and established their own state called 'Aryor', which included villages, sub-districts, districts and governors.

In the view of the national politician on the separatism issue, who had been interviewed about, it he defined it as the issue launching from the separatists who wanted their own government and were needed to be understood. He said that: (Politician, 2015; Interview)

But nowadays we accept the fact that there are armed independence movements that fight for independence, because of their fears of being swallowed. Then nationalism is a major feature of the wars. Separatist



groups may seek control of the political structure. If we accept that these problems are real, we will find the correct way of problem solving.

2) The problems of the role of leadership, during the reign of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra were that the Pattani guerrilla groups were found, which was the 9th generation of the unrest (2001-2005). In 2002, Thaksin stated, "There's no separatism, no ideological terrorists, just common bandits.", which made the unrest go far beyond Mr Thaksin.

Therefore the leader of the country had an inappropriate expression in a public discussion without understanding the situation properly. The in-depth interview with scholars in the university revealed that: (Abdulroman Morlor 2015; Interview)

Despite a governor of Narathiwat asking Thaksin's government to not change its policy in the region because they were facing the separatist problems, Captain Purachai Piumsomboon, Minister of Interior, began to control the region by police forces. As a result, the government could not deal with the issue of stealing guns.

During the reign of Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008), there was a positive attitude towards building relations with separatist groups. In addition, Surayud Chulanont issued an unprecedented public apology to separatists by avoiding the excessive use of power and starting negotiations with well-known separatist groups.

3) In the period of the southern unrest and violence during Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a new resurgence of violence by Pattani guerrilla groups (2001-2005) began in 2001. This was the period of the interest of benefit groups in acquiring the separatist movements. A terrorist organization consisted of separatist groups and groups associated with illegal trade which was confirmed by the report of the special working group of Pol. Lt. Col. Thaksin Shinawatra in which General Chaiyasuk Ketut served as the president. The special working group focused on obtaining detailed information from various parties in the area. This was based on

the belief that separatist violence had occurred due to the different groups (separatist groups, international terror groups, the, groups associated with illegal trade (such as illegal weapons and drugs)) involved in the insurgency against the Thai government (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2004:3). During an in-depth interview with Lt.Gen. Nakrob Buathong (the secretary to the government's panel on the peace talks), he said that: (Lt.Gen. Nakrob Buathong, 2015; Interview)

Terrorist organizations and many forms of underground movement resistance, which were drug-funded rebel groups and other groups, engaged in the riots in the areas and did not want peace because they had benefits from the violent situations.

It conformed to the incidents, in the reign of Thai Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, due to charges against former Central Investigation Bureau (CIB) chief, Police Lieutenant General Pongpat Chayapan on 22 November 2014. He was accused of the crimes of violating His Majesty, receiving money from criminals and doing illegal money transmitting business. Moreover Pongpat Chayapan's criminal network had been arrested too; one of them was Pol Maj Gen Boonsueb Praituen, former commander of the Marine Police Division. He was found guilty of taking bribes of over 147 million baht from oil smugglers in the Thai territorial waters and lese majeste in addition to bribe taking. From the investigation, he said that he was secretly funding separatist groups (Sanook.com, 2014). A national politician exposed that illegal trade in smuggled goods had become deeply embedded in the insurgency of the region. The politician said that: (Politician, 2014; Interview)

In the past, many politicians had been accused of being key supporters of the insurgency in the region because of wanting to maintain their benefits of contraband trade and drug trafficking. These empty accusations had been used by bad groups to attack the politicians.

4) The political section discusses groups of powerful people, local politicians and dishonest officials. The results of the study of the National

Defense College students were divided into four issue areas: seeing that the state policy does not meet the local demands, the mechanisms of state inefficiencies, state terrorism of being wrongly understood by the government, and the government being a coward to take action against politicians involved in the issue (Thailand National Defence College, 2004: 22-23).

There were private enterprises, local politicians, educationists and religious leaders who had the ideas about human rights and identities of local peoples in the three southern border provinces. The resentment was, therefore building up and spilling over into the public sphere and leading to separatism, created by groups of people. The demands of the groups range from the legal requirements to the use of the armed forces to achieve their goals. They were looking forward to seeing a better quality of life for local people according to their own concepts and practices. Their view toward the three southern border provinces was having different rules from the other provinces in general, which could be the special administrative regions or territories (Wichai Choochoet, 2004a).

Members of the Islamic committee said that some politicians were behind the sponsorship of the insurgency (senators, members of the House of Representatives, subdistrict administrative and provincial administration organization, provincial councilors and city council members). Since these politicians had to rely on the militants (terrorist movements) affective influence may help more people vote for them. The analysis of the problem of insurgency in the three southern border provinces showed that the problems were established by the militant Islamist groups which fought to overthrow the government (Islamic committee, 2004). But a scholar in the university noted that sometimes this might bring the relationship between politics and the insurgency to a point which might not be real. From the in-depth interview he said that: (Abdulroman Morlor 2015; Interview)

The president of Sungai Kolok municipality was shot with M16 rifles by his opponents in elections. The problem solving process had to have its details in order to find the best solution.

There had been consistent objectives from supporters of armed conflicts with former Deputy Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth' s speech. In addition, due to the speech, the government had information about strongholds, patterns, and names of leaders, but the separatist groups did not have that much power. However, when combined with the other parties, such as bad officials, powerful groups, contrabandists, drug dealers and politicians, the separatist groups had considerably strengthened in the south. They were embedded in the regions for a long time and the areas had lots of benefits (Nation Weekly, 2005) which was consistent with the opinion of the Fourth Regional Army Commander who in an in-depth interview said that: (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

There were some people who had benefits from violence, drugs, local politics, and influential persons' conflicts.

5) There was unrest during the peace talks during the reign of the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2004 -2014). Despite the peace talks, there was severe violence that happened because not every group was invited to attend the negotiation events. As a result there were conflicts between the groups, especially independent movements, and the peace talks did not succeed. Wan Abdul Kadir Che Man, the president of Bersatu revealed the reasons behind the deadly car bomb attack at a Hat Yai hotel on March 31. They were the wrongdoing of former Prime Minister and former Police Lt-Col., Thaksin Shinawatra who went to Kuala Lumpur to promote the peace talks in March 2012.

Back then, former PM Thaksin Shinawatra invited core members of some separatist groups in Malaysia to the talks. In reality there were 8 separatist groups, uninvolved in the insurgency in the three southern border provinces, that attended and the other 8 separatist groups, involved in the insurgency in the three southern border provinces that did not participate in the talks. That showed what the wrongdoing of PM Thaksin Shinawatra in the subject of inviting the insurgent groups to the talks could cause.

Dr. Abdul Kadir said that because of former Police Lt-Col. Thaksin preventing the other 8 separatist groups to attend the talks, the core members

of the other 8 separatist groups were angry and felt insulted by former Police Lt-Col. Thaksin. One of them said to Dr. Abdul Kadir that "he would take revenge" and not long after that there was an explosion in the basement of Lee Gardens Plaza Hotel.

Lastly, Dr. Abdul Kadir concluded that the government should not make a mistake like before, allowing the insurgent groups to attend the talks and therefore the talks not being a success. And there were new militants, called "Juwear", uninvolved in organizations that had crucial performances and independent movements in the three southern border provinces.

6) The wrongdoing of officials, especially soldiers and policemen with power and weapons ready to commit acts of violence, created damages and violent impacts to people. From the incident at Toh Sud village, in Pattani's Tung Yang Daeng district, it was the fault of the military and police forces and made great losses and impacts to the public, such as 4 casualties. Moreover the officials were warned to not commit the wrong actions again. From an in-depth interview, the commander of the Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center (The commander of SBPPOC) said that: (Police Lieutenant General Anurut Kritsanakaraket, 2015; Interview)

Today, there is no violence and if anyone uses violence for no reason and cannot give answers to the public, he will be eliminated and unable to return to his job and he cannot work with the people. Finally, he has to do something else.

From an in-depth interview, Director of Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), said that first of all, preventing state officials from using violence and trying not to use special laws to solve the problem were important. In addition, he said that: (Major General Chinawat Mandech, 2015; Interview)

Taking measures to punish officials who use violence against the people, especially the Volunteer Defence Corps and village guards who commit crimes, were also significant.

7) According to the economic factors, there have been claims that poverty and economic problems are two of the factors behind the mutiny because the southern border provinces have the lowest median incomes, compared with the other southern provinces.

8) The educational factors reveal that in the Pondok school system of Thailand the seminaries became new members of the various groups, cultivating sources and leaders of separatist groups that graduated from the school huts. That fact was consistent with the interview of the Secretary-general of Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) in which he said that: (Panu Uthairat, 2015; Interview)

His process of religion was to improve their ideological cultivation. Tadika are village-based Koranic elementary schools. Later on some Pondok were used by opposition parties as places to recruit and train (ethnic Malay Muslim) youth to become militants.

There were uses of schools as nurturing places where separatist ideologies were embedded in children's attitudes since they were young. Sometimes the parents and wives did not recognize them as militants because they lived a normal life like villagers. In an in-depth interview, the fourth region commander said that: (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

There were uses of schools and villages as places where sectarian and religious outfits had been nurtured. From news, there were 350 out of 1900 villages that had been set up as bases called Ai Yor, where militant committees were formed. These were their strategies.

#### 4.1.3.3 International Factors

A resurgence of violence by Pattani guerrilla groups during the reign of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005) was the 9th generation of the unrest in which severe violence occurred in 2004. Analysts suggested that the violence occurred under the influence of international Islamic groups, such as Al-Qaeda and


Gamaa al-Islamiya, but the role of guerrilla warfare in the south considerably attacked weapons depots and schools, unlike other terrorist groups which attacked western targets and this was the view on guerrilla groups associated with international Islamic groups.

From the interview with The Former Deputy Democrat Leader and Interior Minister Thaworn Senniam, his proposal on solving problems in the southern border provinces, had been proposed to Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yubamrung. The detail in the proposal was to suggest the Yingluck government to discuss cooperation with the neighboring countries, not just Malaysia but also Indonesia and Arab countries, on the unrest problem in the south. As there were a bunch of people behind the establishment of a separate territory in Germany and Sweden, he had met some of them before (Thairath Online, 2013). That fact showed that the unrest occurred due to international factors.

Wan Abdul Kadir Che Man, head of Bersatu pattani, in his interview noted that he believed that the powerful nations were the only parties that supported separatism. The others (small groups and organizations) did not do their bids. However nowadays powerful nations, especially non-Muslim countries, would like countries in the world to be united more than separated (Zakee Phithakkumpol, Prae Sirisakdamkoeng, Chayanit Phulyarat and Hafis Salae, 2015: 140-142).

From the development of the unrest problems in the three southern border provinces, the study had been divided into 3 eras and 13 intervals, as shown in figure 4.1 (Three eras of the unrest problems in the three southern border provinces from past to present.). In addition, factors that might be causing the problem were shown in figure 4.2 (The cause of the unrest in the three southern provinces from past to present.).

## The Development of the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces



### **1) The Earlier Phases of the Conflict (3 Phases)**

1. The unrest in south border provinces during the public administration reformation in the reign of King Rama V (1868 - 1910)
2. The unrest of the period of educational changes during the reign of King Rama VI (1910-1925)
3. The unrest problems of cultural changes during the first phase of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government (1939– 1944)

### **2) The Era of Formation of Several Insurgent Groups (5 Phases)**


1. The clash with the Dusun Nyor Rebellion during the second phase of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government (1948 - 1957)
2. The unrest of the formation of rebel groups and education reform during Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963)
3. The unrest during insurgent groups conducting operations (1968-1979)
4. The unrest in the period of the formation of the SBPAC during General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988)
5. The unrest in the era of the United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) (1991-1992)

### **3) The Formation of Rebel Groups in the Era of Globalization(5 Phases)**

1. A resurgence of violence by Pattani guerrilla groups during the reign of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005)
2. The unrest during the term of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008)
3. The unrest problem during the reign of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011).
4. The unrest during the peace talks in the reign of the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2004 -2014)
5. The unrest during the era of General Prayuth Chan-o-cha who is both prime minister and chief of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) (2014-2015)

**Figure 4.1** 3 Eras of the Unrest in Three Southern Border Provinces





**Figure 4.2** Roots of the Unrest in Three Southern Border Provinces

#### **4.2 An Analysis of the Development Policies to Tackle the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces**

The unrest in the south stemming from the development of problems has been discussed above. The development of the policy on the issue of the unrest has been examined to see if the policies and the pragmatic projects for relating sectors are suitable for the conditions of the problem at the moment.

The policy on the issue varies due to different circumstances. The details are classified by the chronological order below.

Period 1-4 are periods of the formation of the unrest. Due to the reformation of administration, education, and culture, the government had no clear policy to tackle the unrest. In period 5, during the era of Prime Minister Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963), an education revolution was done to solve the problem. The authority acknowledged the traditional religious school (pondok). The registration of the private Islamic schools was announced and the Thai education system was altered to accommodate the Islamic lifestyle.

During the formation of insurgent groups (1968-1979), the government decided to tackle the issue by the means of special zones. Previously, the policy was made for a specific issue. In 1978, the security policy was finally done holistically and united. (South Border Province Administration Center, 2013a)

Throughout the administration of Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand, the cabinet announced on January 24, 1978, the National Security Policy on South Border Provinces, Edition 1 (1978-1997). It was the first holistic policy, aiming to create co-operation and harmony between different related state agencies in the area. The goal was to establish the peace in the area and the understanding from Islamic countries.

During the administration of Prime Minister General Prem Tinasulanonda (1980 – 1988), the cultural assimilation policy was imposed upon the minority, and the unrest worsened. Thus, the government established South Border Province Administration Center (SBPAC) and the Civilian Police Military Task Force 43 (CPM 43). The purpose was to eliminate all kinds of insurgency by turning ex-foes to friends, thinking of the insurgents to be led astray. The policy was turned into practice in 1981.

The south border areas of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun and Songkhla have long faced the unrest. The trouble also affects the security and peace of the whole nation. The issue in the area is distinct. The government has long been attentive intensively to the issue and made specific policies for the area. The scope includes martial, economic and socio-psychological aspects. The cabinet approved on December 16, 1980, the plan on the modification of the administrative system, the efficiency of state officers, and the economic development of the south border area advised by the National Security Council. Prime Minister General Prem Tinasulanonda emitted the Decree of the Office of the Prime Minister Number 8/1981,

dated January 20 1981, and titled The Solution of Public Administration in South Border Provinces, The Scope of Authorities SBPAC and CPM 43. By its effect, all relating state agencies were demanded to support the work of these newly established agencies. (South Border Province Administration Center, 2013a)

During the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the unrest in the south was greatly worsened during 2001-2005 as a result of the new policy. The South Border Province Administration Center and the Civilian Police Military Task Force 43 were dissolved and their authorities were transferred to the police. On July 20, 2005, Prime Minister Shinawatra announced a state of emergency by the prescription of Emergency Decree on Public Administration in State of Emergency 2005 to cope with the turmoil in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani. Prime Minister Shinawatra changed his attitude and labeled the situation terrorism. This led Prime Minister Surayuth Chulanond (2006-2008) to come up with a softer tone. He avoided the abuse of power and started peace talks with well-known separatist groups. Nevertheless, the severity of the situation did not lessen.

Throughout the brief era of Prime Minister Samak Sundravej (February 6-September 8, 2008), National Economic and Social Advisory Council suggested the cabinet of the model to troubleshoot the unrest in the south. South Border Province Administrative Center (SBPAC) held a meeting with Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public Health, Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Office of the National Security Council and National Intelligence Agency, and discussed the suggestions of National Economic and Social Advisory Council as following.

#### 1) Political and Administrative Aspect

(1) The policy to tackle the issues in the three southern border provinces should be made with the participation of people in the area, to be accepted by every party. It must be taken into action with continuity. The policy and the strategy would be explained via door-knock method by volunteer students. Moreover, the policy should be revised timely with the participation of the locals.

(2) The prime minister should assign a deputy prime minister to supervise the issues in the three southern border provinces to enhance a smooth co-operation of officers of different ministries.

(3) State officers to work in the three southern border provinces should be educated about the local cultures and lifestyles. A measure to prevent and punish the misbehavior of officers should be set.

(4) Local folks and leaders should be encouraged to take part in regional administration and development, and tackle the security issue earnestly.

(5) Special measures to encourage officers working in the area to stay should be created.

(6) Officers working in the area should be provided protection of lives and properties, and privileges.

## 2) Economic Aspect

(1) The development of economy and infrastructures should comply with local cultures and demands, and be on the level of that in the border areas of the neighboring countries to narrow the difference.

(2) The special economic zone status should be better used to attract investors, such as to impose duty-free policy and better design the city plan.

(3) The development of infrastructures should suit the local demands.

(4) The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board should design a specific economic and social development plan for the three southern border provinces with an intensive involvement from local people.

(5) The locals should be provided education in fields needed in the labor market, and more jobs should be created to reduce unemployment. Everyone should be able to use the resources equally.

(6) Short training programs, such as culinary courses for career opportunities in neighboring countries and short industrial skills training for career opportunities in the Middle East, should be provided.

(7) Laws and policies regarding the access to natural resources, such as ones relating to the issues of community forest and coastal fishery, must be revised to extinguish conflict with the locals.

### 3) Social Aspect

(1) The quality of lives of local people and insurgency victims had to be elevated as empowerment.

(2) People of different religions, ethnicities and cultures should be encouraged to learn from each other and live in harmony. Also, they should be encouraged to participate in governmental projects to plant knowledge in the minds of the citizens.

(3) Mutual understanding among peoples of different religions and cultures should be created to reduce the fear toward each other. Diversity must be accepted in order to create a peaceful society.

(4) Officers should visit the locals continuously, maybe in the form of seminars for each side to hear the others, and create a friendly atmosphere.

(5) A private sector committee consisting of religious leaders, spiritual leaders and non-governmental leaders should be set up. Social institutes, families, religion and education, should be promoted to having greater roles in troubleshooting alongside public agencies.

### 4) Education Aspect

(1) Islamic education in the area should be supported and standardized. Learning programs in Pondok, Tadikas and private Islamic schools should be improved with the participation of Tok gurus and local religious leaders to be befitting with local demands.

(2) Bilingual or trilingual learning should be supported for the future careers of students without giving consideration to security issues.

(3) The teachers should be educated about teaching knowledge and Islamic concepts so that students in compulsory education become knowledgeable in general knowledge, vocational knowledge, religion and folk wisdom and are prepared for higher education. Moreover, teachers of private Islamic schools should be given opportunities to gain additional education to increase their level of proficiency and morale.

(4) The awareness and sense of responsibility that academic institutes have and also impart to others could be a key to the solution of unrest among personnel.

(5) The role of non-formal education centers and their officers should be emphasized to support the Pondok.

(6) The education level comparison system for alumni of academic institutes in the Middle East and other Islamic countries should be quickly set up to give them better opportunities for higher domestic education and careers.

#### 5) Judicial Aspect

(1) The peaceful method of mutual participation, faithfulness, respect of diversity and trust should be kept in control. The justice policy should be unified and anything which could lead to injustice must be undermined.

(2) The compensation procedure for the victim must be fast. The mental healing among local people should be promoted as they would be more understanding of the situation.

(3) The government should show sincerity in coping with the problem. The legal prosecution must be transparent; relatives must be quickly notified when the suspect is arrested. This would help create trust toward the authority among citizens.

(4) The legal prosecution on state officers must be transparent, and, if found guilty, the officer must be punished substantially.

(5) Alternative legal procedures, underlining the role of community and religious leaders, should be developed as a compromising mean. The Use of Islamic Law in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satul Act 1946, and Islamic Organization Administration Act 1997 should be amended to be up to date.

#### 6) Security Aspect

(1) The strategies to deal with the problem must be modified as terrorists change their methods. Security and civilian protection plans should also be modified for better efficiency.

(2) To achieve strategic and operative plans, competent personnel are required. Hence, scheduled training is required. The training course should be evaluated and adapted continuously.

(3) Strategic villages for self-defense should be set up within the critical area. The village and community should be reinforced by various sectors so that they were heartened to protect themselves.

(4) Daily terrorism must be ceased fast and permanent peace should be established.

#### 7) Intelligence Aspect

(1) Some movement groups were needed to be inspected and followed. Data should be collected from them and their behavior should be analyzed. Opinion leaders and wire-pullers must be quickly and accurately identified.

(2) Information had to be analyzed quickly and accurately. For a thorough analysis of the situation, and advantages and weaknesses of both the authority and terrorist, security experts were needed.

(3) A working group to create mutual understanding with the terrorism group was needed to be formed to end the trouble in the three southern border provinces.

#### 8) Psychological Aspect

(1) A network should be set in the area to clear misunderstanding and create a friendly relationship between the authority and the folks.

(2) The public should be informed of accurate and complete details, and instructed that villain killing was against Islamic doctrines. Any suspicion must be clarified fast.

(3) Broadcasting stations, to promote anti-terrorism in the area were needed. The television broadcasting one should be regulated by Department of Public Relations. Radio broadcasting ones should be managed by SBPAC.

(4) To correct the attitude of influencers, or free the folk from them would be effective to undermine terrorism movements.

#### 9) Foreign Affairs Aspect

(1) The Thai government should be strictly neutral on international political issues.

(2) Thailand should maintain friendly relationship with Islamic countries, especially neighboring ones, and inform them that Thailand would handle the three southern border provinces' issue in a peaceful way, support Islamic religious activities and treat everyone equally, regardless of ethnicity and religion.

(3) The embassy should be a tool to promulgate the policy and direction of the Thai government on the southern border issue to foreign states and organizations with a possibility to support the terrorism group to discourage them.

#### 10) Public Health Aspect

(1) Standard medical welfare must be provided equally with consideration to local culture.

(2) Local leaders should get bigger roles in public health management in the area.

(3) More psychiatric staff was required.

During the administration of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), the unrest was not lessened. Even though, the government faced political problems from aggressive demonstration and the conflict with the anti-government side, the government was still attentive to the issue of southern border provinces by separating security works from development ones. Thus, the citizens did not feel left out and felt assured. The developmental work was more nimble, efficient and effective. Roles as strategic leaders to operative agencies and proactive developers were stronger. Besides, the government gained trust from the people. The Public Administration of Southern Border Provinces Act 2010, dated December 30, 2010, was issued.

In her speech to the parliament, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) stated that she would abide by the South Border Public Administration Act 2010. Her emergency policy number 1.5 was to quickly bring peace and safety in the lives and properties to the southern border, which complied with the constitution article 77, section 5: Basic State Policy. The policy stated that “The state must protect the royal institute, independence, sovereignty and territory, and provide the military with adequate soldiers, munitions and technology to protect the independence, sovereignty and security of the state and royal institute, public interest and the democracy with the king as the head of the state, and to support the development of the country.” It also conformed with the article on the policy of the decentralized administration in accord with local conditions, but might not have opposed the constitution.

On February 9, 2012, the cabinet approved the Administration and Development of South Border Provinces 2012-2014, designed by National Security



Council and passed public hearing as prescribed by the Public Administration of South Border Provinces Act 2010.

In 2012, the violence lessened due to the peaceful approach of the government. The opposition side was given space to help end the turmoil, the government opened arms to every sector to help solve the problem. Multi-culture friendly mindset was raised. Justice and indemnity were brought to the victims of the unrest. The approach had been shifted “From Violence to Peace” (Pakorn Puengnet, 2012).

In 2014, after the National Council for Peace and Order Council (NCPO) seized the power from Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and her cabinet on May 22, 2014, the junta leader, General Prayuth Chan-ocha still followed the Administration and Development of South Border Provinces 2012-2014. The announcement of National Council for Peace and Order number 98/2014, dated July 21 2014 on the subject of the solution to southern border provinces’ issue, was emitted for the operation to be more effective, integrated and unified. With collaboration from every sector, the turmoil was expected to lessen and the peace and safety to grow. The condition was also expected to be more comfortable for the growth of the economy and the society. The administration was re-organized to 3 levels: policy, policy into practice, and practice levels.

General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the leader of National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) became the prime minister on August 25, 2014, and announced the state policy to the National Legislation Council on September 12, 2014. On the issue of the southern border, he addressed the government would soothe the violence with the peaceful strategy of “Understand, Reach and Develop”. This would work by encouraging peace dialogue with the opposition side, building trust in legal procedures by eliminating discrimination, developing the economy and the society, giving consideration to its multi-cultural nature, and punishing influential cliques and officers taking advantage of the unrest to solve the problem. He added that the government would also raise the level of its interactions with foreign countries and international organizations potentially to help on the issue.

The arson attacks on 6 schools in Pattani on October 12, 2014, initiated the Thungyangdaeng Model. Remote controlled alarm systems were set up in all schools

in the 3 southern border provinces and the volunteer militia was formed in each village. The village guard team was responsible for the school and the sub-district team was responsible for the road to the village. Six measures were applied; 1) night operations were increased, rapid response surveillance and interception teams were formed and equipped with special tools from the army; 2) sub-district communication centers were set up to report the situation 24/7 and random tests were carried out; 3) security protection was reviewed and practiced regularly; 4) after the review, in the areas where the route control had been assigned to militia but had become more risky, border patrol police officers were sent to back up the situation; 5) the search was not to be done randomly, but based on evidences; 6) sabotage was to avoid being repeated and was evaluated quarterly.

The activities for the Thungyangdaeng Model were classified into 13 tasks; 1) anti-violence parade; 2) munition distribution to village guards such as bullet-proof vests, radio-links and guns; 3) encounter practice; 4) refresher training for all 22 village guard teams; 5) refresher training for sub-district guard teams; 6) fund raising activity “Goodwill to Toongyangdaeng”; 7) plans for educational aid and necessary goods support from various organizations; 8) set alarm in all 13 schools; 9) fortify peace villages; 10) plans to set up volunteer self-defense teams in every village; 11) visit village guards at night time; 12) money as a reward to lift the morale of good village guards; 13) military reinforcement.

On November 25, 2013, General Pravit Wongsuwan, deputy prime minister, as the president of the Committee on the Mobilization of Southern Border Provinces Policy and Strategies, presented the operation model. He said that all officers must hold a people-centered mindset, and were obligated to help the folk have a good standard of life, career, earning and safety. He continued that the state had been emphasized on this issue and marked it a national agenda. An agency had been set for integrated and unified troubleshooting via 7 groups of tasks. He also entrusted an additional policy as following. (Internal Security Operation Command, Region 4, Forward 2014, November 26)

1) Every unit must stick to the plan. The province office proceeded with the plan/ project. If any deterrent arose, the Internal Security Operation Command Region 4 Forward Command would report to the Committee on the

Mobilization of Southern Border Provinces Policy and Strategies for quick troubleshooting.

2) Mobilize the district service center and set a plan for the development of efficiency improvement in regard to personnel, budget and tools. A tight co-operation from regional agencies and local peoples was also demanded.

3) Support and expand royal projects and report the outcome timely.

4) Work to make the Thungyangdaeng Model a tangible success with co-operation from the locals. At the village level, reinforce the village guard team systematically and review the sub-district guard team to apply the scheme to other areas. The reward for village guards would be considered.

5) Hold peace talks by emphasizing the involvement of the locals. This would build understanding on every sector, starting from state officers and journalists to non-governmental organizations and rebellious groups. Internal Security Operation Command, Region 4 Forward Command would move in the area to create a nice atmosphere for the peace talks.

6) Solve the problem about the land needed for agriculture by quickly surveying and verifying land document and providing more land to the needy. This should help ruin an ingredient of insurgency.

The peace talks were first done during the administration of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014). On February, 2013, at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the document titled “General Consensus Document to Launch a Dialogue Process for Peace in the Border Provinces of Southern Thailand” was signed. It was the framework for the peace talks between the authoritarian side, led by the general secretary of National Security Council, General Paradorn Pattanathabut, and an opposition group, BRN, represented by Hasan Toib, a co-ordinator of the group. The talks were facilitated by Malaysia state and witnessed by Datuk Muhammad Thajudeen bin Abdul Wahab, general secretary of National Security Council of Malaysia.

The core context of the said document goes as following.

1) The Thai government assigned the general secretary of the National Security Council to be the chief of the south border conflict settlement paving the way for work groups.

2) The Thai government was sincere in the peace talks and counted the insurgent as a stakeholder.

3) Malaysia was the facilitator of the peace talks. Everyone joining the peace talks would be provided protection throughout the whole process.

The BRN primarily unofficially demanded 9 conditions as following.

- 1) The negotiation must be assigned by the Thai government.
- 2) The Malayu identity, language and ethnicity must be acknowledged.
- 3) The military force from the border area in the south should retreat and cease to impose special law.
- 4) The local troop should be allowed to take over military tasks
- 5) South border area should be set as a special administrative region.
- 6) Malaysia should be the mediator and offices of prime ministers of both countries must discuss to prevent the shift of ruling leaders. (It can only be Najib Razak, prime minister of Malaysia or Addullah Badavi, ex- prime minister.)
- 7) The talks must not be influenced by IOC or any European organization.
- 8) The culprit must be amnestied.
- 9) The special administration model of Aceh, Indonesia must be applied to the south border area.

On the subject of the peace talks, Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha signed the Order of Office of the Prime Minister Number 230/2014, titled “The Mechanism to Steer the Process of the Dialogue for the Peace of Southern Border Provinces” on November 26, 2014. As a result of its effect, the Steering Committee for Dialogue was set up. The committee has the prime minister as an advisor, and under-secretary of the Ministry of Justice, director of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army (as the deputy director of Internal Security Operation Command - ISOC), general secretary of Southern Border Province Administration Center (SBPAC), general secretary of ISOC and anyone the prime minister found relevant to the topic as members. The general secretary of National Security Council was also a member and the secretary. The general secretary of the Council of the State and the commissioner of the Special

Branch Bureau were appointed additional members by the Order of the Office of the Prime Minister Number 92/2015, dated March 26, 2015.

The committee was authorized to design the policy, the direction and the scope of the dialogue for the discussion group. It also could set up local co-ordination commissions and, by any means, support the peace talk to continue smoothly and effectively. Besides, it would positively publicize the talk.

The Peace Dialogue Panel was set up as a result of the effect of the Order of the Office of the Prime Minister Number 92/2015, titled The Establishment of the Peace Dialogue Steering Mechanism, dated March 26, 2015. The members of the panel were a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a representative of the Ministry of Justice, a representative of the National Intelligence Agency, a representative of the National Security Council, a representative of the Royal Thai Army, a representative of local co-ordination groups, scholars in the field of peace and any relating fields and the leader assigned by the prime minister. A representative of the Internal Security Operation Command took charge of being the secretary.

The main functions of the Peace Dialogue Panel were as following; to talk with insurgent groups to gauge their attitudes; to communicate and co-ordinate with local organizations to bring dialogue to action; to communicate with stakeholders and relevant persons at domestic and international levels.

It also co-ordinated with the facilitator (Malaysia) and set up a work group to support the dialogue process by advising on a specific issue.

The ISOC was obliged to establish the secretariat for the Peace Dialogue Panel to take the clerical task and co-ordinate with relating agencies and private sectors.

Moreover, the Area-Based Inter-Agency Coordination Working Group was established. Its administrative body consisted of the director of the Internal Security Operation Command Region 4 (ISOC Region 4), who was also the 4<sup>th</sup> Army Area Commander and the leader of the group; vice general secretary of SBPAC; administrative officers, police officers, military officers, private sectors and sages of related fields.

This working group was authorized to create a friendly atmosphere for the peace talks, co-ordinate with relating organizations, follow up the effects of the talks,

set up a communication channel with rebel groups etc. The ISOC Region 4 was responsible for the setting up of the secretariat of the group.

On August 25, 2015, a peace dialogue was held. The representatives of the Thai government, led by Gen. Aksara Goedphol, conversed with the MARA Patani movement, which consisted of 6 groups; 1) Dr. Arif Lukman of PULO MKP; 2) Abu Yasin Abbas of GMIP; 3) Ahmad Cuwo of BRN, 4) Awang Jabat of BRN, the president of MARA Patani; 5) Syukri Haree of BRN, the leader for the dialogue; 6) Abu Hafiz Al-Hakim of BIPP; 7) Abu Akram bin Hasan of PULO DSPP. Malaysia facilitated this dialogue. The MARA Patani requested 3 clauses, which were

- 1) Make the peace talks a national agenda for continuity, despite change in the ruling cabinet.
- 2) Acknowledge MARA Patani as a dialogue party and not a terrorist group.
- 3) Provide legal immunity to 15 dialogue representatives of MARA Patani for the talks to go smoothly.

The Thai governmental representatives also requested 3 clauses which were 1) create a safe zone, 2) raise the quality of lives of the locals, and 3) provide access to the justice system for everyone. The MARA Patani said they would ponder over these requests.

During the era of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the National Security Policy 2015-2021 was made under the suggestion of the National Security Council. The cabinet approved the plan as the framework that all relating agencies must hold to protect the interest and the security of the nation effectively. The Office of the National Security Council was assigned to supervise its performance at the policy level.

Regardless the Office of the National Security Council had incessantly reviewed and assessed the situation and consulted relating agencies in order to improve and design the National Security Policy 2015-2021. The policy was meant to correspond with the National Economic and Social Development Plan Number 12 (2016-2021), which would soon be released.

The National Security Plan 2015-2021 was made in regard of the unrest in the south, viewing it a chronic, delicate and complicated issue whose core was the

Malayu identity, Islam and the history of the Kingdom of Pattani. The long violent insurgency was believed to result from the separatist political idea, based on the emphasized different identity. The violence was the tool to intensify the state of fear and distrust between the authority and the people, and among people. Besides, new problems, such as drugs and secondary threats had arisen significantly. The youth who were discontent with the government were drawn to the insurgent movement. The interference of international organizations complicated the issue.

Thus, the content of the National Security Policy 2015-2021, Part 1: Security Promoting Policy Relating to Prevention and Solution of the Insurgency in South Border Provinces goes as following

- 1) Create a Peaceful Environment The strategy from His Majesty the King “Understand, Reach and Develop” integrated with sufficiency economy and peaceful methods was the core concept of the solution to the unrest. Love, harmony and peace of the people were promoted.

- 2) Restore the Trust and Diminish Suspicion toward the Authority  
Hold onto fairness and the justice system, respect human rights, and develop the scheme to protect the rights and freedom of the people.

- 3) Promote Peace and Sustainable Development with the Participation of Every Sector Build public acceptance, promote multi-cultural society, and quickly elevate the quality of lives of local people in a way that is suited to their potentials, needs and uniqueness.

- 4) Promote the Continuity of the Peace Dialogue to figure a way out from the conflict and the violence, especially the dialogue with the insurgents, either inside or outside the country. Create the peace dialogue to promote a friendly environment and guarantee safety to every participant.

- 5) Educate the Locals and the World about the Truth of the Situation to cool down the propaganda to promote insurgency and to help promote troubleshooting.

- 6) Set up a Measure and Structure to Harmonize Public Administration Collaborate in an integrated manner to tackle the problem using the policy on administration and the development of south border provinces, and prepare the area for the ASEAN community.

#### **4.2.1 The Results of the Analysis of the Development Policies to Tackle the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces**

The study on the evolution of the unrest in the south led the researcher to be interested in the transition of the policies on the insurgency, if each government understood the problem and made a right policy at the right time. Policies over time have been analyzed and organized as following.

4.2.1.1 Education Aspect: The education policy in the educational revolution during the reign of King Rama VI (1910-1925) disregarded the differences among the Islamic Malayu and resulted in frustration among the group. That caused turmoil in the area. Hence, Prime Minister Marshall Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) had to re-reform the education system. The traditional Islamic schools (Pondoks) were acknowledged and registered as private Islamic schools. The education system was modified to conform to the Islamic Malayu lifestyle. The conflict was soothed and the Islamic Malayu was contented. Thus, the uproar cooled down.

4.2.1.2 Security Aspect: Previously, the security policy was designed for a specific incident. During the era of Prime Minister General Kriangsak Chamanand, in the midst of the formation of insurgent groups (1968 -1979), the first national policy on the problems in the south border (1978-1997) was issued. It is the first holistic policy, meant to encourage the co-operation and harmony between different related state agencies. The goal was to create peace in the area and correct the apprehension among Islamic countries.

Through the second term of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2005-2006), the government made great investment, improved the whole administration in accord with the “Understand, Reach and Develop” method, and strictly enforced the law to bring peace, order and safety to the area, due to the greatly intensified violence in his first term. In his first term (2001-2005), the insurgency turned back to its worst state. That led him to announce a state of emergency as prescribed by the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in the State of Emergency 2005 to cope with the uproar in Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani.

The security policy during the era of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra emphasized the strict legal enforcement to discourage the insurgents.



4.2.1.3 Justice Aspect: In the early stages of the SBPAC during the era of Prime Minister General Prem Tinasulanonda (1980 – 1988), the cultural assimilation policy was focused. But, that put a pressure onto Islamic communities and intensified the insurgency. Thus, his government took justice more seriously and made a specific policy for the issue. The policy governed various aspects, political, martial, economic and socio-psychological. Moreover, structures and scopes of the authorities of SPBAC and CPM 43 were modified.

4.2.1.4 Foreign Affairs Aspect: The government of Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand (1977-1980) focused on the promoting of peace and correcting the apprehension among Islamic countries. The rule of Prime Minister Samak Sundravej (Feb 6-Sep 8 2008) was short, but the foreign affairs policy was lucid. Thailand strictly stayed neutral in international matters and promoted correct understanding that the country tackled the southern border issue in peace, supporting Islamic activities and providing justice without discrimination.

During his administration, Thailand also used Thai embassies to clarify the policy and the action of the government over the southern border conflict to foreign countries and organizations which could potentially become supporters of the insurgents.

Throughout the time of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2010), the policy was to tighten the interaction with Islamic countries and organizations for the correct understanding and support of the issues leading to solutions.

From the foreign affairs aspect, the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) aimed for closer relationships with Islamic countries and organizations, making them understand that the south border issue was purely domestic and was being solved using the “Understand, Reach and Develop” method.

Currently, after General Prayuth Chan-ocha became the prime minister on August 25, 2014, the direction was to interact more with foreign states and international organizations having potential to help settle the conflict.

4.2.1.5 Economic Aspect: During the era of General Prem Tinasulanonda (1980-1988), SBPAC was set up to boost economic development in the area. Throughout the rule of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra the unrest

intensified. During 2001– 2005, SBPAC was dissolved and the policy was practiced no more. During the rule of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), the security and the developmental work were still separated, and the proactive strategy was used. The Southern Border Provinces Administration Act 2010 was enacted.

The following government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) issued the Policy on the Administration and Development of South Border Provinces 2012-2014 for the continuity of the economic development. Lastly, in the era of General Prayuth Chan-ocha, chief of National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) and Prime Minister, the settlement of southern border insurgency is emphasized. The “Understand, Reach and Develop” strategy is used in a friendly manner. The economy and society are developed in conformity to local multi-cultural demands.

**4.2.1.6 Peace Dialogue Process Aspect:** The peace dialogue was started in the era of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) on February 28, 2013, at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha acknowledged the policy and the Thai representatives had a talk with the MARA Patani group for the third time on August 25, 2015, at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

According to the analysis the peace dialogues of the 2 governments are different in many ways. Firstly, representatives of both sides were changed. The leader of the Thai representatives in the era of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was Lieutenant General Pharadon Pattanatabut, former general secretary of Nation Security Council (NSC) whereas it was General Aksara Goedpol, president of the Advisory Committee of the Royal Thai Army, and Major General Nakrob Boonbuathong who were designated the secretary. The Thai representatives changed to all being military officers. This resulted in a better image of unity.

The rebel side also changed, from BRN members to MARA Patani members. They wanted to show that MARA Patani was unified, even stronger than before.

Regardless, Malaysia was still the facilitator of the peace dialogue and did its job well. Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra met Prime Minister Najib Razak of Malaysia in a press conference on the Thailand-Malaysia co-operation at Putra Jaya, Malaysia. They released a joint statement as following.

Malaysia is glad to facilitate the peace dialogue and bring peace to our shared border.

The peace dialogue policy has been clearer. The Prime Minister Command number 230/2014, dated November 26, 2014, directed the establishment of The Steering Committee for Dialogue. This committee had the prime minister as the president, and formed the Peace Dialogue Panel and the Area-based inter-agency Coordination Working Group. It had a clear administrative structure, and was responsible for the process of the peace dialogue. The prime minister led this committee to show his earnest desire to tackle the unrest issue. This helped promote the continuity and the advancement of the policy. General Aksara Goedpol, the leader of the Peace Dialogue Panel addressed the following on August 28, 2015. (General Aksara Goedpol, 2015; Interview)

He emphasized that the government sincerely wanted to solve every south border problem like the public. He wanted every group to participate in the dialogue to bring about peace and safety of the people in the area.

The demands from both sides were fairly agreeing. The differences were compromised according to the situation. At least, the demands reflected the sincerity of each side to solve the problem. In the time of Prime Minister Yingluck, the government demanded 3 clauses the dialogue must conform to the constitution, Malaysia was the facilitator, everyone in the panel must be protected throughout the whole process. In the time of Prime Minister General Prayuth, the 3 clauses were – safety in the area, the development would be done according to the order of emergency, and legal justice was provided without discrimination.

The demands of General Prayuth emphasized interest in the public. General Aksara Goedpol, the leader of the Peace Dialogue Panel, addressed the following on August 28, 2015 : (General Prayuth Chan-ocha, 2015; Interview)

We need the co-operation from the insurgents. Please tell us what you want. They always claim themselves to be the representatives of the locals. If they truly are, they have to co-operate with us. Tell the public what they will do, so the public can express if they agree.

The demands from the insurgents in the time of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra were up to 9 clauses. Shared clauses were the participants must be the representatives of the government and Malaysia was the facilitator. A very different clause was to set the southern border area as a special administrative zone, similar to Aceh of Indonesia. The government found it to be a hard decision.

Thus, in the time of General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the MARA Patani demanded a mere 3 clauses, which they deemed possible. Those clauses were – acknowledge MARA Patani Organization; put up the issue as a national agenda for its continuity; and provide legal immunity, as members of the group had been legally charged. The governmental panel responded by coming to talk and said that they already acknowledged MARA Patani and they appreciated that the group joined this peace dialogue; on the national agenda clause for the fear of discontinuity, the peace dialogue policy had been addressed in National Security Policy 2015-2021. All governmental representatives were high ranking officers, many strategies and policies had been emitted, and great investment into the area had been done yearly. All this showed that the Thai government already viewed this issue as a national agenda.

For the clause on legal immunity, as it was a justice issue and involved numerous agencies, it had to be considered thoroughly or it would affect the justice system. A joint working group would be set up to consider this demand, and would be supported by the prime minister.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS BY CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE MAIN AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR RESOLVING THE UNREST IN THE THREE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES AND ANALYZING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OUTCOMES**

The study of the unrest in the three southern border provinces in Chapter 5 will discuss an analysis of the policy implementation process by considering the role of the main agencies responsible for tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces and an analysis of the outcomes of the policy implementation.

#### **5.1 An Analysis of Policy Implementation Process by Considering the Role of the Main Agencies Responsible for Resolving the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces**

Each of the Thai Government during the different periods had appointed different agency to be the primary agency in charge of tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces and have roles in the policy implementation. At the start of the problems it was found that during the different periods the roles of the primary agencies solving the unrest in the southern border provinces are not clear enough.

It has however become increasingly clear. When the unrest during the reign of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988) had established the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), a department of the local government, which is assigned to the Ministry of the Interior was established since 1981. It was developed by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Coordination Center

(SBPACC) of the existing Department, which serves courses, supervises, coordinates, assembles and evaluates the performance of the agency's civil department and police in the area for achieving the objectives and goals of the Internal Security Policy on the southern border provinces. It emphasized social work, psychology, politics, administration, development of effective civil and socio-economic development, strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation at the local level and neighboring countries as well as to coordinate operations with the government, military and Civilian Police and military Command 43 (CPM-43), which is an agency that was established simultaneously, but with the primary mission of preventing and combating terrorism form all under the supervision of the Region 4's Army Commander. Meanwhile, the Committee on Solving Security Problems in the Southern Border Provinces consisted of the Secretary General of the National Security Council (NSC) as chairman, director of the Southern Border Provinces administrative Centre and the Region 4's Army Commander was as Vice Chairman and the relevant agencies were as Committee.

During the rule of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, tackling the problems in the three southern border provinces had changed the management structure. In 2002, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's government ordered the dissolution of the SBPAC and CPM-43, and then transferred the mission of solving the unrest in the three southern border provinces to the normal agency. In 2004, the order of the Prime Minister No. 69/2004 dated 24 March 2004 established the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) as the agency directly to the Prime Minister. The state of unrest during the period of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008) required greater policy harmonization by avoiding the use of undue influence and initiating talks with separatist groups that are well known. In 2006, it revived the SBPAC and CPM-43 in accordance with the order of the Prime Minister No. 207/2006 dated 30 October 2006 under the auspices of ISOC. In 2008, the SBPAC and the CPM-43 had become the unit according to ISOC's work under the Internal Security Act 2008.

The three southern border provinces problem during the rule of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), on December 30, 2008, led to the government's policy statement to Parliament to define solutions and develop a policy for the southern

border provinces area and urgency to start operations in 2009. It will be a permanent organization governance solution and develop the southern border provinces, which should adhere to the principle of reconciliation and the approach of "Understandable Accessible Development" with the judicial process against the perpetrators strictly and fairly. In addition, the southern border provinces are designated as a special development zone with the support of low interest loans, tax benefits and the halal industry as well as encourage the development of a flexible and diverse religious and cultural environment.

On January 13, 2009 the Cabinet has approved the appointment of the Ministerial Committee on Areas 5 southern border provinces with Prime Minister (Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva) as chairman, Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Suthep Thaugsuban) as Vice Chairman, Ministers involved as the Committee, and the Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board (NESDB) as the Secretary that had the authority to set the policy and consider measures to approve projects and the establishment of a budget to support the development of the five southern border provinces special zone (Songkhla, Satun, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat).

In addition, on March 25, 2009, the Ministerial Committee on Areas 5 southern border provinces had appointed the Sub-Committee for Development Plan in Special Areas - five southern border provinces with Deputy Prime Minister (Mr. Suthep Thaugsuban) as chairman, permanent secretary involved and Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army of NESDB & BB joined the Sub-Committee and the SBPAC as Secretary, with the primary responsibility to coordinate, expedite, and track the development of the agency according to the Development Plan for the Special Area-5 Southern Border Provinces 2009-2012.

On December 30, 2009, the Ministerial Committee on Areas 5 southern border provinces had approved the appointment of the Sub-Committee on Releases to the recommendations in the five southern border provinces area with Prime Minister's Office Minister (Sathit Wongnongtoey) as chairman, representative agencies involved were as a Sub-Committee and the Public Relations Department as Secretary. Then later a Royal Command had appointed Mr. Ong-art Khlāmpaibūn to be the Prime Minister's Office Minister on June 6, 2010. On June 8, 2010, the cabinet had resolved to delegate and empower the Prime Minister's Office Minister discharging the Prime

Minister. On June 22, Ministerial Committee on Areas 5 southern border provinces had approved the appointment of Prime Minister's Office Minister Ong-art Khlāmpaibūn as chairman of the Sub-Committee Tambon Training Unit instead of Mr. Sathit Wongnongtoey.

The Tambon Training Unit has the authority to determine the policy, strategy, program / project, measures and guidelines to promote the solution on Areas 5 southern border provinces, including the director and coordinator for integrated programs and projects of the authorities concerned with public relations.

During the reign of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014), there was an attempt to establish new departments, namely the Center of integrated solutions in the southern border provinces, in order to solve the problem without the unity of both policy and practice in the area. On September 22, 2014, the structure had been offered a two-level board that consisted of the National Board (the Administrative Committee for Problems and Solutions in the Southernmost Provinces) and the Local Board (the committee of integrated solutions in the southern border provinces), and during the ISOC hosted a workshop with all agencies during October 18-19, 2014. On 1 May 2012, Cabinet appointed Gen. Yuthasak Sasiprapha incumbent chairman of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces and to integrate solutions from 17 Ministries and 66 Agencies. Later, it was renamed as the new center to be the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center.

In 2014, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, announced the National Council for Peace and Order No. 98/2014 dated 21 July 2014 regarding the solutions to the problems in the southern border provinces. The solutions to the problems were divided into three administrative levels: the policy level, the conversion of policy into practice level, and practice level. In terms of the conversion of policy into practice, the primary agency involved and responsible is the Administrative Committee for Problems and Solutions in the Southernmost Provinces consisting of the chairman of the Committee, Secretary and Assistant Secretary. According to the National Council for Peace and Order appointed by the acting in the integration of solutions in the southern border provinces of the



government, state agencies, the Committee for Strategic Development in the southern border provinces under the administration and the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to solve problems in the Southern Border Provinces by order of Prime Minister's Office Minister No.307/2012 regarding the appointment of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to solve problems in the Southern Border Provinces dated November 21, 2012, and the additional solutions.

In addition, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) is the primary agency of joint integration plans, programs and projects of officials and government agencies on security and development on tackling the unrest in the southern border provinces, as well as create harmony in all dimensions.

The Internal Security Operations Command joint with the Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, National Police Bureau and Security agencies were to work together to empower the capacity and efficiency of the security target area, accelerate the implementation of disaster prevention and solution of complications, reduce the influence of the group that carried out the violence and ensure protection or surveillance and public safety of vulnerable targets to reduce the risk of the violence, which must obtain support from all sectors to strengthen the community and village.

The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and other Government agencies, which are responsible for the quality of life and well-being of citizens, accelerate the development of quality of life and well-being of citizens in the southern border provinces area in all dimensions and areas accessible to the public and truly focus on the participation of the public as well as meet the needs of the people and the characteristics of each area.

The duty of the Committee to Mobilize Solutions in the Southern Border Provinces in the integration of the solutions in the southern border provinces has the authority to do the following:

- 1) To consider and approve strategies, plans, programs, projects, and the establishment of a budget solution for the southern border provinces, including guidelines and measures related to operations after a scrutiny of the agencies or organizations that are required by law to comply with the policy, the administration

and development of the southern border provinces which are then offered to the head of the National Council for Peace and Order for approval.

2) To consider and approve the designated Special Areas, the special development zone, the needs in Special Areas, and the management and development in the special development zone after a consideration of the organization, according to the law, and then presented to the head of National Council for Peace and order for approval.

3) To set the framework and guidelines for the preparation of plans, projects, and budgets to solve the stability and development of the southern border provinces, including the integration of the operations of ministries, departments, and agencies involved in accordance with the Administration and Development in the southern border provinces policy, strategy and related action plan set up.

4) To direct, intensive, monitoring and integration to mobilize efforts to solve problems in the southern border provinces in accordance with the Administration and Development in the southern border provinces policy, strategy and related action plan set up by the need to comply with the official administration and statutory authority of the agency as well as provide a system of monitoring and evaluation at all levels continuously.

5) To provide guidance and resolve barriers to action on the southern border provinces to the head of National Council for Peace and Order.

6) To nominate the consultant, Sub-Committee or a working group to work on the problems the Committee to Mobilize Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces has assigned.

7) To work or perform other duties as assigned by the Head of National Council for Peace and Order.

In the event of an emergency or an urgent need to solve the problems in the southern border provinces effectively and timely, the chairman of the Committee to Mobilize Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces may be considered in conjunction with the Committee concerning at least three people to a resolution of the Committee to Mobilize Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces on the matter. When meeting with the Committee to Mobilize

Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces as a normal case, the chairman of the Committee to Mobilize Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces informed that meeting.

The Secretary Office of the Committee to Mobilize Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces in the Office of the National Security Council has the authority below

(1) To perform the administrative work of the committee to mobilize efforts to solve problems in the southern border provinces, the consultants, the Sub-Committee and the Working Group.

(2) To coordinate with government agencies, enterprises and other organizations involved in order to obtain information and to support the work of the Committee to Mobilize Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces.

(3) To perform other duties to the Committee to Mobilize Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces entrusted to the Secretary General of the National Security Council as the director of the Secretary Office of the Committee to Mobilize Efforts to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces

On 9 October 2014, Lt. Gen. Prakarn Chonlayuth, the Region 4's Army Commander and the director of the Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 Forward (New Director of ISOC Region 4 Forward), was the chairman of the meeting about task force in order to understand and continue to mobilize the policy to solve problems in the southern border provinces as well as Peace-Building by the strategic plan that had a three-step process set up (Patani News,2014) ;

1) Clearing & holding is to make the region free from the influence of the insurgency by taking proactive measures to detect suspicious sources and the terrorists that had fled from the area. Then, the officials also took control of the area. The primary use of the military was to scout and later transfer to the Security Unit in the village and Volunteers maintain the village so that people can take care of themselves. Over the past months, the Commander of the 4th Army Region, General Walit Rochanapakdee, operating according to plan could be strict and well integrated with the police, having cordoned off the raids and arrests targeting high-level multiple times. At present, the situation can be controlled down to the village level officers which is important everywhere, despite not being 100%, but better than many areas in

the past. When the control area has more Soldiers, it will transfer its mission to scout, and the Security Unit in the village and Volunteers maintain the village by withdrawing from the 1st - 3rd Army Corps issuing the 4th Army Corps and 4th corps responsible for all missions, in which the police and justice, as well as government agencies can perform their duties properly.

2) Winning heart and mind by bringing development into the area. Although in the past, it has been found that the problem is the project plan and budget integration, which featured that people are not in stable situations, but at present, ISOC Region 4 Forward was an open forum to hear comments and from all of the people in the area that have concluded public needs to send the ISOC central government a document that has thickness up to eight books! Progress now is being made in organizing the project and the budget to meet the needs of the people and truly make government agencies to map powered by security forces in the area, guided by the ISOC Region 4 Forward that was the hub for the union.

3) Winning the forces, which is endemic in the area to control the village, has made the insurgents not be able to return to the village where it stood less. Each village has a development program to meet the needs of the people. From this point began Peace Dialogues in which party violence cannot control the area, the disaster was more difficult, it will not use violence as a bargain like before and the talk will be more successful.

However, sensitive issues of this strategy were the need to monitor the conduct of the armed forces and local militia, the Security Unit in village and Volunteers to maintain the village to stay within the law. If you commit human rights violations, they will support the insurgents soon.

The authorities responsible for policy on peace dialogue that in the past Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha had appointed had General Aksara Kerdphol, chairman of the army's advisory board, as the head of the working group of southern border provinces peace talks with Lt. Gen. Nakrob Boonbuathong, deputy director of Coordinating Operations Center 5th, the Secretary of the working Group talked to the southern border provinces, with the peace movement speaking peace to the southern border provinces driven by three stages: 1. Creating Trust 2. To ratify the agreement on the solution and 3. The road map for bringing the issue to expand and

achieve the peace that would come in each subject. It is expected to enter the second stage of the dialogue in early 2016.

#### **5.1.1 The Results of an Analysis of the Policy Implementation Process by Considering the Role of the Main Agencies Responsible for Resolving the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces**

The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was established as an agency director in the area during the unrest. The SBPAC agency established during the reign of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), which is responsible for courses, supervision, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the forces of the civil and police authorities in the region to achieve the objectives and goals of the policy national security on the southern border provinces by stressing social work, psychology, politics, administration, development of effective civil, socio-economic development, strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation at the local level with its neighbors as well as to coordinate the work with the government, military and Civilian Police and military Command 43 (CPM-43), the director of the agency that was set at the same time.

We can see that the process of policy implementation by considering the role of the agency in charge of tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces contemporary to General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988) having the SBPAC Agency with a clear separation between the military and operational coordination between the Agency CPM-43 on preventing and combating terrorism in all its forms under the supervision of the Commander of the 4th Army Region of the SBPAC agency. The emphasis was on social and economic development in the area by local people taking part to share a conceptual approach to education policy implementation from a top-down approach which is the policy-central approach based on policies defined and translated into practice in order to practice the basic implements (Barret and Fudge, 1981: 12). In addition, there are the terms of the possibility to supply external resources and the adoption of political unification with the administration to determine policy. The complete implementation happening means that system administrators need to have a unified army under the command of Captains sole (Hood, 1976: 6).

Later, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's government (2002) had ordered and dissolved the SBPAC and CPM-43 mission to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, the agency being in the initial stage to the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) in charge of the establishment of the Internal Security operations Command Forward's control center and core synchronization performance problems in the southern border provinces, namely Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC). In 2004, they had the authority to order the planning, direct, coordinate, expedite, supervise, monitor, track and evaluate the performance of government agencies and organizations involved in solving the problems in the three southern border provinces to integrate and unify, consolidate, filter suggestions, plan a project and establish a budget of government agencies and organizations to provide integrated solutions in the three southern border provinces (The Nation, 2004).

The collapse of the SBPAC Agency and CPM-43 during Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has analyzed data from the area that is believed to be a mistake. In the past, both units could solve the problems in the three southern border provinces effectively. From the in-depth interviews the SBPAC's secretary said. (Panu Uthairat, 2015; Interview)

It turns out that the scout troops worked well during the years 2002-2003 and were removed by Muslims in the area by creating a flow of the offensive scouts who were in the area, making it a great solution for the collapse of the SBPAC.

However, after the collapse SBPAC Agency and CPM-43, the situation of violence in the three southern border provinces intensifies so much, that they could not control the situation. It was understood that there was a conflict of interest between the police and the rangers themselves, which corresponds to an in-depth interview of the Deputy Secretary of the SBPAC who said.(Suphanaut Siruntavineti, 2015; Interview)

In late 2001, police shooting incidents were reported at four checkpoints on the Prime Minister as a scrub. The contradiction

between military and police officials in the area was of interest. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was believed to be the reason for the fear of the militia and a disbanded unit would be created to address the crime situation. The Prime Minister's meeting resolved to cancel the order that dissolved the SBPAC and it turns out that the events were more intense.

The SBPPC was established during the reign of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's government when the authority was not different from CPM-43 duty in terms of civilian police officers with the Commander of the 4th Army Region as director and Deputy Secretary Ministry of Interior security forces, the Commander of Provincial Police Region 9 and deputy director of the National Intelligence Agency's deputy director in charge of the primary mission to end the insurgency and public defenders. It also provides the SBPPC at Provincial level, District level, Sub-District level, and to strengthen the regional and local levels. Then, the chain of command will be shorter.

Structures that report directly to the Prime Minister and directly to the office of the National Security Council (NSC) established the Forward National Security Council's office (NSC Forward), a local agency that is responsible for monitoring and coordinating the implementation of all the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC), local and relevant government agencies, strategic guidelines and suggestions to adjust the performance report directly to the Prime Minister and the National Security Council and provide the Committee of the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Policy directly to Prime Minister Pol.Gen.Chitchai Wannasathit as chairman, that served as a strategic, integrated approach to combat and command units to operate properly.

In addition, the Office of Strategic Peacebuilding Commission is an agency within the Prime Minister's Office Minister, General Sirichai Tanyasiri as director who acts on suggested strategies to create peace in the southern border provinces, similar to agencies like the SBPAC that Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had ordered to be dissolved.

Analysis of the structure of policy implementation and restructuring of the agencies involved with the procedure policy implementation was done by considering the role of the agency in charge of tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces.

During Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's government, the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) reported directly to the Prime Minister and the National Security Council of the Committee of the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Policy's Office was an agency within the Prime Minister's Office, which caused the Complexity of administration. If the number of agencies and organizations to get involved in policy implementation were too many, it would make the process of policy implementation more complicated (Greenwood, Anderson, Fleck, and Schmidt, 1976). The policy implementation in terms of coordination between the various organizations that could represent each organization may be added with the objectives and goals, but the policy is likely to deviate much from the original, and it could become a major obstacle to the policy implementation of the decision-making process and be disrupted by agency practices (Levine, 1980). Thus, the agency tasked with unity and without the complexity of management will be a key factor in promoting policy implementation to achieve the objectives efficiently (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 442).

In addition to the restructuring mentioned above, there are individuals in the area of adaptation such as Maj. Gen. Pichate Wisaijorn, 6th Infantry Brigade Commander and Suranaree Command Commissioner, who was appointed Deputy commander of the 4th Army Region, and Pol. Lt. Gen. Adul Saengsingkaew, Commissioner of the Provincial Police Region 3, that was moved to Pol.Lt.Gen. Manoch Kraiwong, Commissioner of the Provincial Police Region 9.

With regards to the restructuring and the people in the southern hemisphere, Prof. Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, who worked in the Faculty of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University, said there were restrictions on the defense and on offense with structural problems and mechanisms. Due to the nature of the forces moving the large numbers, it could become slow-moving if it had not always been the practice to continue and keep moving. The Thai Army having distanced itself from this situation for a long time, made things late. In the past, the person skilled in the area would be



able to solve immediate problems first, even while the administration is not yet complete, such as General Prem Tinsulanonda's prestige and experience, even before the formation of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC). These people have been through trial and error. Many grew by bailiff or lieutenant, which had good relations with each other and everyone understood that it was always coordinated. It so happened that there was the growth of 'virtual infrastructure' which is using the same imagination and can help in the steps to be quick (Nation Weekend, 2005).

In addition to modifying the structure then, it has also modified its personnel, which is a very important factor of resource allocation and because of which responsible policy implementation considerations are always important for the selection of personnel qualified to perform the work, and they need a person who is committed to working for success, disciplined and highly responsible (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 445). For example, Maj.Gen.Pichate Wisaijorn and Pol.Lt.Gen. Adul Saengsingkaew are considered as qualified personnel above. Maj.Gen.Pichate Wisaijorn has a history of working in the Red Zone from a platoon up to the 6th Infantry Regiment 3th Infantry Battalion Commander and Officers during the end of the Cold War. Pol. Lt. Gen. Adul Saengsingkaew worked on the growth of the government, and among communists he had fought side by side with 'NAKAE Hero' Pol. Gen. Sereepisuth Taameeyaves called by the military and intelligence. He also received the Royal Medal Guard Yeoman (Nation Weekend, 2005).

The change in personnel in tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces, especially those responsible for policy implementation, in addition to the ones already highly disciplined and responsible, should have a good understanding of local issues and the needs of the Muslim population. From the in-depth interviews of the commander of the 4th Army Region, he said. (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

Our officers have both good people and bad people. In the past, people who are from somewhere else will be delivered and this is not only in the three border provinces.

The views of scholars are based on the discussions about the changes in personnel adjustment that reflects that the police that were punished will be sent to the border area and create problems for the people in the area. From an interview with the Director of Peace Education Bureau, he said. (Wanchai Kanjanasuwan, 2015; Interview)

When the police have been punished, they are sent to the area. Why should we send good police to the area in order to impress the public?

In terms of quality personnel to perform their duties in the area, they should take lessons or experience in conflict resolution, and this was developed to solve the problem in the case of providing the solutions in the three southern border provinces. The Personnel Development Bureau officer has provided details in the in-depth interviews, and said: (Officer, 2015; Interview)

It's like a UK lesson that defeat Melayu in the conflict, the Chief of Amy, Sir Robert Thompson, who said that the success of the UK is not sending more troops into the jungle, but the military has the best quality to work to overcome the mental and emotional people. That is the answer.

However, the violence caused by the insurgency in the three southern border provinces was not less but more violent. It made the unrest during the period of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008) develop the need to harmonize policies more by avoiding the use of undue influence and initiate talks with separatist groups that are known well. In 2006, it the SBPAC and CPM-43 were revived under the auspices of ISOC and in 2008, SBPAC and CPM-43 were moved to be the agencies under the ISOC according to the Internal Security Act 2008. It makes the work of the two agencies to be more coordinated, which is the primary agency in the policy implementation process responsible for the unrest in the three southern border provinces.

The process of policy implementation was considered from the role of the main agencies responsible for tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces. During the problems in the three southern border provinces during the term of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2010), the Ministerial Committee on Areas 5 southern border provinces had Prime Minister (Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva) as chairman, who approved the appointment of the Special Area Development Plan Sub-Committee, Deputy Prime Minister Minister (Mr. Suthep Thaugsuban) as chairman, the Secretary of State, Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army, NESDB, and BB who joined as the Sub-Committee and SBPAC as Secretary. They had the primary authority to coordinate, accelerate and monitor the implementation of the development agency, according to the development Plan for the Special Area-5 Southern Border Provinces 2009-2012 and the Sub-Committee on Releases to the recommendations in the five southern border provinces area. The Tambon Training Unit has the authority to determine the policies, strategies, programs/projects, measures and guidelines to promote solutions to the five southern border provinces area, including the coordination and integration of the plans of the agency involved publicly.

From an analysis of adding the Committee Tambon Training Unit of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, it was found that the factors that have an impact on policy implementation include information policy, which should be clear and consistent with the objectives of the various agencies responsible for policy implementation (Hambleton, 1983) and the perfect communication, which is a complete coordination between the administration involved as a concept model of perfect administration, in line with the guidelines determined by the Top-Down (Hood, 1976).

SBPAC, is the primary agency involved in the policy implementation process, which is responsible for tackling the problems in the three southern border provinces. It has more authorities in the Sub-Committee to Mobilize volunteers in the Southern Border Provinces that make integration with other agencies involved. However, it turns out that the problem of unity is devoid of both Policy and Practice level in the area, thus resulting in Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's Government (2011-2014) having established the Board structure at the Local level (the committee of integrated solutions in the southern border provinces) to the work of the various

agencies integrating solutions in the southern border provinces. On May 1, 2012, Cabinet had appointed Gen.Yuthasak Sasiprapha to serve as chairman of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces to integrate solutions in the southern border provinces under 17 Ministries and 66 Agencies. Later, it was renamed as the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center by the Police General Pracha Promnok, which had the Deputy Prime Minister as the director of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center.

The Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center discussed with the relevant authorities to integrate work and appoint responsibilities to be clear, consistent with the three sides by the structure of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces operations Center. It is a developer of security and justice to the action plan to be driven into the area more effectively. In terms of development, it has appointed the Secretary General of the Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board to be central to the integration of the Ministry that joined to harmonize with the plan and the overall budget of the Ministry.

Therefore, the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Centre during the period of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) was analyzed so that the management must have the same unified army under the command of the Commander only, which is a concept model of perfect administration and in accordance with the guidelines determined by the Top-Down (Hood, 1976).

The Order of the Prime Minister No.178/2013 on improving the composition of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces dated 19 July 2013 to a high-level mechanism, which acts on command, directing and monitoring coordination driven to the unity and integration of the collaboration of all parties to resolve the problems in the southern border provinces. It is the result of an edict on June 30, 2013 to the Cabinet cleared from the Minister and appointed the Minister and Prime Minister. It is appropriate in terms of

improving the composition of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces to provide appropriate strategies and be more effective by the cancellation of the original composition of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces and by the Order of the Prime Minister's Office No. 307/2012.

The first meeting, held on Thursday 17 May 2012 at Santi Maitri Building, Government House, had released a Strategic Plan 9 section, 29 goals and 5 mobilized approaches, which has elements of New Committee, Prime Minister as chairman, Police. General Pracha Promnong (Deputy Prime Minister), Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister of Commerce, Phongthep Thepkanjana (Deputy Prime Minister) and Police captain Chalerm Yubamrung Minister of Labour, as Vice Chairman, Committee of Minister office and head of the government agency involved as Committee, Secretary General of the National Security Council as Committee and Secretary General of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre and the Secretary General of the Internal Security Operations Command as Committee and Assistant Secretary.

An analysis was also observed to Modify the New Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces that could make the Prime Minister have absolute power to control, direct, order, as well as the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Additionally, the assigned responsibilities are more clearly in areas designated by the Commerce Minister Niwatthamrong Bunsongphaisan (Deputy Prime Minister) in charge of the information, Mr. Charupong Ruangsuan as Interior minister, overseeing the development of a holistic approach, Gen.Yuthasak Sasiprapha as Minister of Defence, Mr. Chaikasem Nitisiri as Minister of Justice, Mr. Chaturon Chaisang as Minister of Education. Meanwhile, they have added the Public Health that appointed Dr. Pradit as Minister of Public Health. They also assigned the National Economics and Social development Board or NESDB to be the coordinator to integrate with various ministries and budget to develop the area.

ISOC, is the primary agency of the policy implementation process that is responsible for solving the problems in the three southern border provinces, and

summarized progress in maintaining stability in the region under 7 sections, as follows (Government House, 2013)

1) Navigation system or CCTV cameras to monitor the area by integrating and linking the network of organizations with legacy systems and the newly installed system. Currently, a total of 8,309 CCTV cameras were also added to read license plates as well.

2) Strengthening the police force local volunteers to be the main armament and for military operations to proactively increase.

3) Focusing on security in seven major cities by economic planning of security with military police who volunteered in network sectors.

4) The supply of military equipment, special equipment, such as X-rays, the signal jammer. It would be delivered from November onwards.

5) Improve the route to ensure safety in use as a cynical side to avoid placing of the tube barricades, etc.

6) Integrated with the central government, such as the Ministry of Education to help the education system in the area and coordinated by the Ministry of Health to help people in areas such as the health care.

7) Focusing on the security of life and property of citizens.

ISOC made the action plan with timelines for implementation in order to track the progress and ongoing development.

The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre or SBPAC, is the primary agency for the policy implementation process that is responsible for solving the unrest in the three southern border provinces. Another agency reported that now they have started to explore confidence index in trade and investment in the southern border provinces. It has been found that confidence improved. The structure of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center, is connected to the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces. The integration of the 17 Ministries and 66 Agencies involved with missions under solutions took place with the Local Operations Unit (ISOC Region 4 Forward) and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC).

An analysis of the establishment of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center was done to avoid obstacles on the law because the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act 2010 or SBPAC Act was enacted in the Democratic Party that has organized management structure and strategy development to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces extensively. It also has a corporate responsibility led by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) already connected to the strategic security responsibility by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). The National Security Council (NSC) control and interface strategy worked in 2 ways (stability and development) as a whole.

The meeting of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces, on 8 August 2012 found that the structure of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center that the NSC recently presented to the Prime Minister as a director, was divided into three main groups, including the security sector, with Air Chief Marshal Sukampol Suwannathat being responsible for the development of work with Pol. Capt. Chalerm Yubamrung and the Interior minister Charupong Ruangsuan being responsible for the legal and justice sector with Mr.Pongthep Thepkanchana.

The third group was broken down into five missions and the agencies responsible for being the host, included (Law Reform Commission, 2012)

- 1) The mission of caring for the safety of life and property, the Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 Forward (ISOC Region 4 Forward) as host
- 2) The mission of developing and facilitating a fair, SBPAC as host
- 3) The mission of Law and Justice, Ministry of Justice as host together with its agencies
- 4) The mission of understanding, Ministry of Foreign Affairs as host
- 5) The mission of cooperation, NSC as host

Units in the area would have two units, which work together, the ISOC Region 4 Forward and the SBPAC. Meanwhile, the 17 Ministries and 66 Agencies would be integrated through the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems

in the Southern Border Provinces, which is connected with the mobilization of units operating in the area.

Therefore, the analysis of the structure of the layout is such that the Prime Minister would be responsible for problems that go to the southern border directly that would be overseen by the Deputy Prime Minister and relevant Ministers. It is not necessary to set up a responsible Minister or a Minister specifically to work full-time as in the previous government. The Justice Ministry deputy permanent secretary, Chanchao Chaiyanukij, who structured the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces, in parts of the Sub-Committee, law enforcement and justice administration, said that if the final structure of the management came out this way, it is the job of the political parties to the regulatory work on a practical level and deeper down in greater detail, including Target and the Minister being directly responsible. This may be a new approach and it eliminates the union, including the problem of coordination.

However, this structure by the NSC has been hard and it requires the agency to coordinate "Backward", which means the 17 Ministries and 66 Agencies, and "Forward" which is the ISOC SBPAC.

The mechanism is to keep the agency in the public is not bad and it is connected to both levels of policy and practice through the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center, with NSC as the coordinator.

The primary agency in charge of the policy implementation process to resolve the problems in the three southern border provinces during General Prayuth Chan-ocha (2014-2015), head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), found that part of the conversion of policy into practice had the major agencies involved and responsible, which is the Administrative Committee for Problems and Solutions in the Southernmost Provinces. In addition, they were assigned to the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), which is the primary agency for joint integration plans and programs of government agencies and public authorities on security and development in the southern border provinces, as well as solutions to create harmony in all dimensions.



The Administrative Committee for Problems and Solutions in Southernmost Provinces consisted of Deputy Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army, as chairman of the Committee, the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Defence, the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Interior, the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Justice, the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Education, the Secretary General of the Civil Service Committee, the Secretary General of the National Economics and Social Development Board Secretary General of the Committee of Public Sector Development, the director of the National Intelligence Agency, the director of the Budget Bureau, the Commissioner of Police, the Secretary General of the Internal Security Operations Command, the Comptroller General, and the director of the Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 as the Committee, the Secretary General of the NSC as the Committee, and the Secretary, the Secretary General of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre, the Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council. The Secretary General of the NSC appointed the director of the 5th ISOC Coordinating Operations Center to the Committee and Assistant Secretary, appointed by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, head of the National Council for Peace and Order announced by the National Council for Peace and Order No. 98/2014 regarding the solutions to the problems in the southern border provinces dated 21 July 2014.

An analysis of restructuring management solutions in the South by Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, revealed structured management problems under the government's ongoing administration under the NCPO that was divided into three levels: Policy level with the NSC Consulting Management, Conversion of the policy into practice level with the Administrative Committee for Problems Solution in Southernmost Provinces mobilized under the ISOC and SBPAC, and Practice level with the ISOC Region 4 Forward being primarily responsible. It was determined that the recipient likes the dimensional role clearly at all three levels.

Also, those who have a role to convert the policy into practice truly is General Udomdej Sitabutr, Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army as Vice Chairman of the Administrative Committee for Problems and Solutions in the Southernmost Provinces with General Prawit Wongsuwan as chairman and the deputy director of the ISOC or

Deputy Director General of the Prime Minister's Office with the Prime Minister as the Director General of the Prime Minister's Office.

General Prayuth Chan-ocha, as Prime Minister, focused on the work of the ISOC, which is in charge of security, and the SBPAC, which oversees developments in the southern hemisphere clearly. He assigned General Prawit Wongsuwan to be the special supervisor of the SBPAC in addition to being the chairman of the Administrative Committee for Problems and Solutions in the Southernmost Provinces.

The ISOC was held for personnel management centralized the ISOC personnel from the Army, primarily to manage resources and security driven into the same direction in accordance with the restructured army with Gen. Chat Chalermsook, as the Secretary General of the ISOC, overseeing the work of the ISOC and having direct access to the monthly meeting, and General Udomdej Sitabutr ISOC who would follow up every three months.

An analysis of the Peace Dialogue, during the term of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014), consisted of the National Security Council (NSC), with the Secretary General Lt-Gen Paradorn Pattanatabut as the leader in the negotiations of peace dialogues with the BRN. It is reported that the officials started talking three times, including no formal ongoing talks. Currently, the group BRN is awaiting an answer from Thailand to continue. However, to claim the ninth, Mr. Hassan Taib is still the leader of the BRN.

During the final days of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014), Deputy Prime Minister Police Captain Chalerm Yubamrung served as the director of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces Operations Center, and had a guide on how to negotiate with vocals abroad. It also had the village chief, headmen, religious leaders and local leaders to find solutions to problems by focusing on integrated development. We can see that the 'strategic' solutions would focus on the main subject of the talks and focused on solving the problems by negotiations that would come from outside the country. This approach was believed to make the situation better, which is counter to the facts of the events that occurred in the area because the majority was formed by 'the chain of within command' (Public posts 2013, January 15).

The Peace Dialogue during the period of General Prayuth Chan-ocha was on 14 October 2014 and the Cabinet had also appointed the National Security Council chief of Cabinet Tawin Pleansri, the former Secretary General of the NSC, remarked Mr. Tawin Pleansri, who is the important personnel to coordinate talks with Malaysia to ascertain the attitude of Thailand to go ahead and put the Peace Dialogue framework already in preliminary talks early last September.

While the Peace Dialogue facilitator was supposed to be Malaysia, and despite it never happening in the Government of Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra, during the NCPO, the transitional government changed and was managed well. The NSC has a unit responsible for coordinating (Thai PBS, 2014). On June 26, 2015, they had appointed General Aksara Kerdphol, chairman of the army's advisory board, as chief working towards peace talks with the southern border provinces and Lt. Gen. Nakrob Boonbuathong, the deputy director of the operations coordination center 5th, as Secretary of the working group to discuss the peace process in the southern border provinces. The Peace Dialogue is driven by three stages: 1. Creating Trust 2. To ratify the agreement on the solutions and 3. The road map for bringing the issue to expand and achieve the peace that would come in each subject. It is expected to enter the second stage of the dialogue in early 2016 (Bangkokbiznews Online, 2015).

An Analysis of the Personnel changes in the peace dialogue by the Secretary General of the NSC as chairman of the army's advisory board suggests that the Prime Minister had let the military be responsible for such a process and clearly just renamed the movement speak for peace in the southern border provinces. It was emphasized on building trust before the ratification of the agreement on the solutions. The Secretary General of the NSC had appointed a talk on the Peace Dialogue. However, the new Secretary General Anusit Kunakorn still had not joined the negotiations. This compares with the NSC, Secretary General Lt-Gen Paradorn Pattanabutra, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's reign through peace talks, and the leader of the peace dialogue in Thailand may delay or lack continuity in the talks. However, the changing leaders in Thailand as chairman of the Advisory will show the trust that they were certified by the Thai Government.

In addition, the Peace Dialogue during General Prayuth Chan-ocha, has the authority, especially the Steering Committee for Dialogue, where the Committee has

set Prime Minister as the chairman. The Peace Dialogue Panel and the Area-based inter-agency Coordination Working Group of the Committee responsible for the structure and role of authority in the peace dialogue in the Order of Prime Minister No. 230/2014 was based on the establishment of the drive mechanism of the Peace Dialogue of southern border provinces on 26 Nov, 14. The analysis shows that the establishment of a structure in charge of peace dialogues above would lead to continuation in the upcoming dialogue. From the in-depth interviews of the commander of the 4th Army Region, who is the head of the Area-based inter-agency Coordination Working Group, he has said. (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

Peace Dialogue would have to proceed without conflict, to peace and compromise. At the same time, they should create an environment, supportive of talks, take care of the house constantly, understand the Concept, Understand, access and develop. They should use the budget to solve the unrest in the south, not use the budget to meet strategies.

## **5.2 An Analysis of Policy Implementation Outcomes**

Tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces of the past governments, problems have occurred as a result of the outcome of policy implementation, which will be concluded that the solutions in the three southern border provinces, would lead to success or failure of policies or projects. It can measure the success or failure of policy implementation that comes in various dimensions, including output, outcome, and the final outcome (Voradej Chandrasorn, 2005: 110).

The first phase of the outcome of the policy led to implementation that found that the change of regime in Rama 5, which abolished the ruler and the ruler of the country, resulted in the old power clique that calls claiming descent from the Sultan an old offense in the area. However, they became more upset when a change in education took place, where Rama 6 ordered the closure of all schools that do not teach in Thailand in the proper course of state all over the country in 2003, which

include the Malay Muslims Schools. That resulted in a rise in violent protests since the adoption of the regulation culture of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram that the Thai people putting the costumes and traditions of Thailand and the Malay language were illegal.

However, the situation turned into a good outcome from the policy implementation in education, with the education reform during Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963). The Thai Government had adopted the policy of educational reform in the area of Malay Muslims and the government recognized original religious schools (Pondok), which are registered as Islamic private schools, including the application of a comprehensive system of education and in accordance with Thailand's Malay Muslim way of life.

However, the days of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988) had a policy of cultural assimilation on minorities that continued. The establishment of the SBPAC and the CPM-43 were understood to have accepted the existence of the other and reduce the conditions that created injustice in the society in order to support the communist forces that spread out. It is treated as a hostile enemy. The outcome of the policy implementation of those agencies making up the rest led to Muslims who started living together peacefully with Buddhists.

The violent insurgency in the three southern border provinces had increased in the days of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra during 2001-2005 due to policy changes by the government who wanted the police to solve the problems in the area. The collapse of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre and the Civilian Police and the Military Command 43 (CPM-43) and the assessment of the violence situation was wrongly done, which was not thought to be causing the bad situation in the country. This made the policy outcome implementation completely fail and caused a lot of the police, soldiers and citizens to die.

During the days of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2009) it required greater policy harmonization by avoiding the use of undue influence and initiating talks with separatist groups were well known. In 2006, they revived the SBPAC and the CPM back, but the outcome of the policy implementation still was not effective, which caused violence continuously.

During the term of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), the policy had been changed by adhering to the principle of reconciliation and the guideline "Understandable Accessible and Develop". Additionally, the justice system had been used towards offenders strictly and fairly. He set the Southern border provinces to be a special development zone with the support of low interest loans, tax benefits, and the halal industry, as well as encourage the development of a flexible and diverse religious and cultural environment. Although the Performance Development Agency saw improvements, according to the Development Plan for the Special Area-5 Southern Border Provinces 2010 - 2012, violence still occurred.

During the Government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) the negotiation of talking about the Great Depression peace with insurgent leaders by modifying the National Security Council (NSC) was attempted, which had a resolution of the cabinet on 26 June 2012, moved Mr. Somkiat Boonchu, Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC, who pushed policy management and development of the southern border provinces, to be the consultant of the Prime Minister Department officials. She also moved Lt-Gen Paradorn Pattanatabut, an adviser to the prime minister Department officials, who had the predisposition to the guidelines of the ISOC (the commander of the 4th Army Region prison in total), to be the Deputy Secretary-General of the NSC. The highlight of the policy was to open the space for "Talking with different opinions group". The government also agreed with this approach because the SBPAC secretary-general Pol. Col. Tawee Sodsong had continuously discussed with the various groups in both Thailand and Malaysia.

Thus, the outcome of the policy implementation agency SBPAC led to the talks of peaceful methods and provided for the opening of talks with the parties to the insurgents, Lt-Gen Paradorn Pattanatabut was a mainstay in the negotiations of the National Security Council. Even the way of the solution policy is quite a problem, but the result of the practice with Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army of the region 4's Army Commander and Secretary General of the SBPAC were important. It maintained the statistical data that the situation in the area improved, despite the violence causing massive ongoing destruction.

Statistical summary reports from the area indicated that compared to the incidents that occurred in the year 1932, the number of events in 2007, declined

steadily. Current trends in the year 2002 decreased due to the disaster, the government had used the peace process. The focus was on the areas that are seen as a solution to the conflict together by giving opportunity for all involved to resolve them, and respecting and showing dignity in multicultural environments. Upholding justice and taking remedial measures to rehabilitate victims who have been affected by the unrest as a transition point "From Violence to Peace", made the average accident severity decrease from 2.97 events per day in 2001 to 2.42 events per day in 2002, or a decrease of 18.51 percent compared to statistics over the past six months, and especially the grenade and arson during January until July 2001, with January until July 2002 showing that the events reduced from 406 to 172 times, and the bomb explosions also decreased from 147 times to 92 times, or decreased 37.41 deaths than during January until July 2001 to 2002, which found that the deaths decreased from 234 people to 145 people, which was 38.04 percent.

Throughout almost two years ago led the insurgency movement to not be satisfied with the policy "Take them back home" of the commander of the 4th Army Region that caused the people to repent, disarm and leave the movement. This policy of the Commander was achieved with hundreds of people, but that rarely appeared due to the news having no legal support for the reprieve so that the process of administrative support unified out from the movement and there was security to live peacefully.

In 2014, after the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) having seized power by Yingluck's Government on 22 May 2014, General Prayuth Chan-ocha also brought the Administrative and Development of the southern border provinces policy 2012 - 2014, which are prepared in accordance with the law, public administration, the southern border provinces, used in the performance of government agencies. Government agencies and other relevant announcement by the National Council for Peace and Order No. 98/2014 dated 21 July 2014 on tackling the unrest in the southern border provinces to solve problems could operate more efficiently, the operational integration and unity, and all sectors needed to be involved in the action, which would make it possible to achieve the effect of reducing the problem, for peace in the area, the safety of life and well-being of citizens, born of faith to the public, as well as creating an environment favorable to the development of the economy and the

society. It was restructured and a new management solution in the southern border provinces was formed by dividing the administration into three levels: Policy level, Policy to Practice level and Practice level.

The outcome of policy implementation after General Prayuth Chan-ocha, Head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) was appointed as Prime Minister on August 25, 2014 led to General Udomdej Sitabutr, Minister of Defense Ministry and Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army stating that within one year, they must be able to control the situation in the area, at least to reduce the violence down to 50%. After we looked back at the performance of all time after four months which the NCPO had controlled on 22 May 2014 until the end of September 2014, the statistics showed that violence and loss decreased sequentially (Patani News Online, October 10, 2014).

The outcome of policy implementation based on the annual report of the SBPAC provides the executive summary of the 2014 results of operations that are detailed below.

The SBPAC has followed the policy of the government and the NCPO. The performance of the civil defense, military, police had more unity, the SBPAC powered civilians achieved coordination of Ministries, at Provincial and Sub-District and local levels. The Citizens and civil society took more part in development. It could reduce the conditions to a point of no good claim. It also contributed to a better environment, strengthened the strategic proactive government policy. In addition, we have also seen the changes that occurred in the village, which people believed to have involved security in their own village to provincial Districts and the ISOC's multidimensional approach causes unrest to be decreased by almost half, compared with the same period last year. We can have confidence that maintains the unity of working people in the village and community involvement continued through 2015 and next year. It could be an opportunity to reassure the cause of peace, in which around the year 2014, there were many positive situations as following;

#### 1) Reduction of the Unrest Situation and the Amount of Loss

For the fiscal year 2014, the number of unrest situations deceased slightly by 1.60 percent, the number of deaths decreased by 13.19 percent and the number of injured decreased by 10.60 percent compared to the same period last year. However,



after the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) took place on May 22, 2014, in a duration of four months of the fiscal year 2014 (June-September 2014) situations caused by unresolved problems dropped clearly, which is 40.10 percent lower than the number of deaths decreased by 24.14 percent and the number of injuries decreased by 21.89 percent, a major factor affecting the decline of the situation was the operation of the military, police and civilians having greater autonomy. Besides, people took part in safe custody, and more reports were sent to the government as well as the implementation of policies to tackle the situation in the southern provinces of the NCPO and the government is still continuing to talk about peace, and resolve conflicts through peaceful means by avoiding violence.

2) The Performance of the Military, Police and Civilian Having more Unity The SBPAC was integrated with the management level, the Sheriff, the Task Force in the area No.2, the Superintendent of Police, Prime Minister alderman urban core, the chief bailiff of the Sub-District, the village chief, the headman enhancing the safety and strength of the area at village, community and Sub-District level by targeting the “safe area to save people and the Sub-District overcoming drugs”. It had a village chief and the village headman was responsible for the autonomous region in the three southern border provinces (Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani) and 4 Districts of Songkhla (Chana, Nathawi and Saba Yoi) that totaled 37 Districts 282 Sub-Districts 1,975 villages. They worked with the clubs of justice in the Sub-District to conduct repairs at Fort checkpoints, and operational support packages covered village, relationships, love, and harmony within villages and inter villages, including the Sub-District, which was under the mechanism of the District Operations Center (DOC) as the unit was powered. They took the role of government, especially the village headman and the practitioners in the region to contribute to restoring happiness to the southern border and sustainable peace.

In addition, the city had established a Volunteer Escort (VE) and Thailand National Defense Volunteer (TNDV) of 966 people to oversee and monitor the violence in nine major economies areas supported by Security forces, to install lighting in the 8 of 34 urban points in the critical path of the traffic flow, which are the main routes of trade and investment, as well as maintenance and repair of 400

CCTV cameras to be used effectively, and to reassure the public and staff to feel more secure.

To unify the operation of the military, police and civilian, the SBPAC had revised the project plan to resolve the unrest situations of the south Border provinces by following NCPO policies, which are 10 cases with an approximately 102.7366 million Baht budget to support projects such as the Security Sub to overcome drugs in 37 districts, 265 villages. It was also to promote the profession to be arrested under the Emergency Decree and Criminal Procedure Code where 817 people had not been helped by the government, and support accelerating the documents surrounding of Budo-Sungai Padi National Park, with an area of 225 acres, involving supporting the operation of the District Operations Center (DOC) for 37 districts to have unity.

### 3) Public Participation in Solving Problems and Developing the Southern Border Provinces more Systematically

From the concept to solve problems and develop the southern border provinces by the public to play their role and participation in the development of all dimensions based on the development of the village and community level under the slogan "Victory depends on Village and Sub-District", the SBPAC was to be integrated with government agencies to support the civil security field to move to unity. The public took part in the development of useful information via the hotline 1880 which was 24 hours. This could block the scene in several cases. Damrongtham Center of the SBPAC support the operations center working against unfair policies and the NCPO put effective practice in a concrete way so that people have easy access via the network in areas such as BOSS, legal districts, officials healed, the justice community ,service prisons, and lawyers of the office of the Provincial Islamic Committee. It would make the public be able to file complaints as a result of suffering from their problems through as many channels as per their convenience. These networks would provide advice or refer the matter to the Damrongtham Center of the SBPAC into a source of solutions in a timely manner, as well as help heal those affected, both monetary, psychological and quality of life immediately, providing fair and equal public trust, and confidence and cooperation with authorities was increasing.

In addition, citizens took part in a systematic way under the Sub-District Justice, to strengthen the village and Sub-district, targeting non-events, the safety in the districts overcoming drugs in 37 districts, 282 sub-districts and 1,970 villages, for which the village chief and village headman was responsible. The improvement of quality of life to people at the village level in 1,970 villages, which is to be observed over a seven-year period, has been accepted by the public as a model for public participation through a real platform for village people. This year, it has added goals to reduce the incidence of unrest within the village as well, which is the strategy of participation of citizens in the security and development of their own village and community development to support other levels of security. The participation of the public, which operates continuously, including communication, understanding via all forms of media, education, and enhancing education expands opportunities through the participation of teachers, the organized religious leaders, cultures and all religions to live together in peace, to facilitate the Hajj - Umrah of Muslims, to extend the project due to the initiative and promote economic philosophy as well. The solution for fruit decay and that for space arable area of Budo-Sungai Padi National Park is important, and the key is to allow people to leave a comment on a forum to jointly seek a way out of the conflict based on the peace talks for peace and support the government to achieve reconciliation, harmony within the village and community.

#### 4) People Understand and Believe more in the Solutions and Improvement of the Government

According the survey of public opinions by Yala Rajabhat University in four months (June-September 2014), the management of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in 37 districts, which are 1,850 cases, had the following outcomes;

(1) People feel that unresolved situations fell by 78 percent saying that confirmed events actually dropped

(2) People are confident about the way of government policies having real peace-creating by 72 percent confident that the government made the right choice

(3) The role of the District Operations Center, which includes the military, police and civilians, working together to build unity and to resolve the issues as well as develop particular areas. In particular, the security of life and property of citizens found that the public has confidence in the role of the District Operations

Center by 86 percent and they believe in the role of village leaders and the headman by 68 percent.

However, the outcome of the policy implementation based on the annual report of the SBPAC, leading to the executive summary for 2015 shows that the outcome is better than 11 years ago.

The development and solving of the problems in the southern border provinces of the SBPAC in the fiscal year 2015 (October 1, 2014 - September 30, 2015) focused on the implementation of the policies of the government and the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in driving the work of the Secretary General of the SBPAC and every officer bursting with strength, seriousness and sincerity, efficient under the National Strategy "Understandable Accessible Develop" and the philosophy of sufficiency economy, respect, honor differences in a multicultural society to live together in peace. It is powered by the guidelines of the Administrative Committee for Problems and Solutions in the Southernmost Provinces, covering seven groups of mission work.

As per the outcomes, in recent years, the performance of the military, police and the civilian unity plan are introduced to the public (Book 8 volumes) into practice. Additionally, there are integrating developments with stability by supporting materials for the village headman and local people together that helped secure support for the security plan by following the Tongyangdeang model under the District Operations Center of 37 Districts with the utmost fairness relieving the suffering of origin. Not only, creating a better understanding through all forms of media, but also supporting the development of education, religion, culture and economic development, and creating potential and quality of life. Besides, creating an environment that is conducive to chatting with the ISOC minimized the unrest over the past year. Public reassurance and more confidence in the government can be seen from the index that shows that there is increase in trade as well as investment. The evidence from surveys of public opinion in the area of educational institutions indicates that the public has more confidence and expecting peace would happen soon.

### **5.2.1 The Results of the Analysis of Policy Implementation Outcomes**

Tackling unrest in the three southern border provinces of policy implementation that agencies are involved in will make outcome-based goals and objectives of the policy. The outcome may reflect the success or failure of the policy itself. Outcome is the result of the output, which can be measured by considering benefits that the target got from the policy (Voradej Chandrasorn, 2005: 111-112).

The rule change system Monthon Etsapibal in the reign of Rama5 abolished the ruler and the ruler of the country. It makes the outcome of policy implementation lose benefits of the policy goals of the regime change, and it makes the old power group of the Sultan not satisfied.

Changes in education in the reign of Rama6, were that he ordered to close those schools that were not correctly teaching the Thai course of state all over the country in the year 1923, including Malay Muslim Schools. This caused school owners and the public to attend the school losing benefit from this issue.

Adopting of the cultural regulation in the days of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram ordered that Thais must dress according to Thai costumes and Thai traditions. Besides, it stated that the use of the Malay language was illegal. People, who have been affected by the outcome of policy implementation, were involved in protests and riots that occurred in areas strongly.

The policy implementation in the areas of administration, education and culture, were mentioned above, policy-oriented regulatory policies, which mainly focused on the restrictions on the behavior of individuals and groups of individuals, reducing freedom or discretion for the actions of those who are governed (Totalovich and Daynes, 1988). This led to beginning of creating resentment among the Malay Muslims, as the government suppressed identity, language and culture of their own. As per the outcomes, it made the particular group lose their benefits, and led to protests and rioting continued violence. Later, the Thai government had modified the new education policy, aimed to reduce violence in that area as well as the reform of education in the days of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963). Thai government had adopted this policy in the province of Malay Muslims. Besides, the government recognized traditional religious schools (Pondok), to be registered as a private school

teaching Islam, and reformed Thai education system to reflect the lifestyle of the Malay Muslims.

During the days of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), there was a policy of diversity, culture of local people, including both Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims who could live together in peace with different culture in that society. People in the southern provinces, mainly Malay Muslims are proud of the pious Islamic life and Malay cultures (Suthiras Choochuen, 2012). However, developments in cultural diverse areas are needed to focus equally. As it is seen from the past it focused on the development of the policy, object-oriented development as well as the concerned economic matters. But, there was lack of social development and cooperation of the local people, which led to solving problems with difficulty.

In today's society, the education policy as a means of cultural diversity in the southern border provinces is affected by the current external local culture. Additionally, the government policy in the years 1977-1987 were making changes to local education, namely the expansion of educational opportunities in primary, secondary and higher education created no restricted education, and became a place of learning as well as a place of various cultures. While most schools teach courses under the government standards, there particularly are a group of Thai Buddhists and Thai Chinese enrolled in the new education system. Among Thai Muslims, a large group of people in the southern provinces that have characteristics of identity and followed Malay culture have adjusted to the education system by Tadika School and Pondok institution. Later, they were developed into the Islamic Private schools by educating both religious and more general or global programs of the state. As per the outcomes, Thai Muslims have more educational opportunities and opportunities to build their careers (Banjong Faroongsawang, Kaimook Uthayawalee and Ekarin Sangthong, 2007) that was the outcome of policy implementation.

The Thai education system was thought from the perspective of cultural majority groups. This sometimes caused ongoing conflict with ethnic groups with different cultures as samples in the three southern provinces of Thailand according to Policy uniting diverse cultures into one. In the present, there is more awareness of the multicultural society. Even the education has been performed in accordance with the culture of the students, but the students do not yet understand cultural diversity, as

they studied only for exams and did not take the culture of the students as a medium of learning (Thitimadee Apatthananon, 2011).

Therefore, the Thai education system, especially in the execution ignored the importance of teaching multicultural education, and seen as abstract and unclear change, affected the government budgets and led to new and increased workload. Thus, this idea would make a lack of opportunity to get to know the development of education. The problem is therefore more likely about management and operation. However, when considering the management and operations, many were able to operate education to meet both national and local levels. Therefore, it would be due to the performance of administrators and teachers only partially. Finally, if there was any policy or standard that supported things clearly, it would be available to push the relevant personnel and management by studying the multicultural education, possibly (Wattana Prohmpetch, 2014).

Furthermore, during the period of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988) he established the SBPAC and the CPM-43, which were the main departments of policy implementation defining clear roles and it was the support for policy from the operators and those who are affected by the practice according to that policy. Besides, it depends on how much policy initiators were interested in the power of policymakers, policy unity and the willing of the practitioner. This is a main factor to advocate the policy implementation to be successful (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 439).

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra during 2001-2005 made the outcome of the policy implementation to be completely failed by police, soldiers and a lot of citizens died. The collapse of the SBPAC Agency and the CPM-43 by establishing the agency Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC) made it the sole agency responsible for solutions in the three southern border provinces, which were analyzed and showed that Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had units operating such that only one can be responsible to achieve policy implementation without having to rely on other agencies. If other agencies will be involved, the relationships will rely on other agencies to require only small and unimportant things. This was seen as an authority to command and to be treated as complete (Gun, 1980),

a concept model of perfect administration, which is in line with the guidelines determined by the Top-Down (Hood, 1976).

During the days of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008), there was a need to use the reconciliation policies to avoid undue power and begun negotiations with the separatists. Moreover, he revived the authorities of the SBPAC and the Civilian Police Military Command-43 to be used once again. It was indicated that according to the policy implementation guidelines from the Bottom-Up, the problem will be solved by operators, who are close to the problem, and the role of policy will affect the interests of those directly responsible for operating the public depending on the skill and judgment of the operators (Elmore, 1979: 605). Thus, the SBPAC and the Civilian Police Military Command-43 will take policy implementation by means of the accuracy of the relationship between the organizations that intend to alter the outcomes.

The outcomes of policy implementation during Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011), led to the policy being changed by adhering to the principle of reconciliation and the guideline “Understandable Accessible Develop”. Additionally, the justice system had been used towards offenders strictly and fairly. He set the Southern border provinces to be a special development zone.

Giving priority to justice and treating the perpetrators strictly and fair from the outcome of policy implementation shows the sincerity that make people in the target areas get benefit from the policy directly. However, most investors gain the benefits from the policy of setting Southern border provinces to be a special development zone, like the benefit in supporting low interest loan, special tax as well as benefit from supporting Halal industry. It indicated that the policies aim to be Distributive Policies and management services policy or it is more benefits to some specific groups such as individual, organization or society. From the concept of the allocation of subsidies from the government to beneficial groups, the benefits may be different in each case (Anderson, 1994; Ripley and Franklin, 1976).

The outcomes of policy implementation during the term of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) was regarding the outcome of the policy implementation of the SBPAC about the peace talks and open talks with the terrorists. Lt-Gen. Paradorn Pattanatabut was a mainstay in the negotiations of the National




Security Council. Although the policy direction was under quite a problem, the results of the compliance with the Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army of the Region 4's Army Commander and the Secretary General of the SBPAC maintained through statistical data that the situation in the area improved despite massive violence occurring or continuing. This shows that the lessons from China, Indonesia and Philippines in experience of Peace Talks, can be used by Thailand to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces.

The outcome of the policy implementation after General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the Head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), became Prime Minister on August 25, 2014 was reorganizing the new structure and the new administration to resolve the situations in the southern border areas which are divided into 3 levels; policy level, converting the policy into practice level and practice level. This leads to increasing numbers of unrest situations and deaths apparently.

From May 22, 2014 till now, in the last four months of the year 2014 (June – September 2014), the number of unrest situations decreased obviously by 40.1 percent; number of deaths were decreased by 24.14 percent and the number of injured people decreased by 21.89 percent. This is because of the unity of soldiers, police and the people. People took more part in security as well as policy troubleshooting of southern border areas of the NCPO and the government and there is still ongoing discourse about resolving the problem by peace and avoiding violence.

In the fiscal year 2014, the unrest situations decreased approximately by 1.6 percent and the number of deaths decreased by 13.19 percent as well as the number of injured people decreased by 10.60 percent compared to the past year. From the report summarized, the number of unrest situations in the year 2014 (from January 1-December 24), compared to number of unrest situation in the past 11 years, which begins with 2004 and got more and more serious, according to figure 1.1, the interesting fact is that the number of unrest situations in the present year is the least when compared with the past 11 years. In year 2014, there were 793 unrest situations with the average 66 situations monthly, and there were 330 deaths with the average 28 deaths monthly and there were 135 injured people.

A number of situations that occurred in December were the lowest which was 44 situations; 7 deaths and 16 injured people (Deep South watch on 27th December 2014).



**Figure 5.1** Number of Dead Persons in 2014 Categorized by their Background

**Source:** Deep South Watch, 2014

Therefore, there were 6,286 deaths (the average is 571 cases died annually), and it caused people to be injured, having about 11,366 cases (the average is 1033 cases) according to figure 1.2. Besides, the figures of deaths in 2014 are categorized by their background according to figure 5.1.

The policy implementation outcome of the SBPAC in 2014 minimized unrest situations and no deaths happened because of the unity of soldiers, police and people. Moreover, the main key is that people are being involved in solving the problem and improving the situation in the southern areas. People do believe more in the government.

As per the policy implementation outcome of the SBPAC in 2015, it showed the outcomes clearly. In the past one year, it made the unresolved situation get better and people truly trust in the government's plan followed by the decreasing number of the unrest situations, index of reliance on trade, increasing number of investments, and outcomes of surveys which people commented to institutions in the area that showed that they now are more confident in the safety and expect peace in recent times.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OUTCOMES AND AN ANALYSIS THE REMAINING PROBLEMS AND OBSTACLES**

A study of the problem of unrest in the three southern border provinces in Chapter 6 describes an analysis of the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes and an analysis of the remaining problems and obstacles.

#### **6.1 An Analysis of the Key Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation Outcomes**

There was a need to resolve the unrest in the three southern border provinces and make it free of the existing problems. The policies to tackle the unrest in the three southern border provinces were according to the procedure of policy implementation that was based on the role of the principal factors. The responsibility for the results caused by factors which the policy implementation was based on, along with the outcomes is explained below.

The role of the primary agency responsible for policy implementation was to see that SBPAC has a major role in the policy implementation, since 1981, when the state of unrest during the period of Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988) led to the establishment of SBPAC. At the same time, the main role of the policy implementation of SBPAC takes place in a concrete way in Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's reign (2011-2014), as detailed below.

From the performance of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre under the priority of the government and by the basic policy of the second stage (during August 3, 2012-August 3, 2013) the factors involved can be

summarized. The analysis of the various policies and objectives of the project by the indicator targets can be determined by factors affecting the policy implementation of SBPAC below.

Projects were carried out under the priority of the government and focus on promoting the participation of all citizens by analyzing the results of the operations of the SBPAC, which operates under a defined strategy. Some example of these projects were a project on the Tambon peace building club , a project on the establishment of Volunteer Rescuers, a project on the establishment of volunteer city stewardship, a project on the establishment of drug treatment permanently in Satun and to encourage Ponor schools to be the hub of the drug problem in the community, a project on the economic development to focus on sustainable communities and tackle unemployment, and a project on the development of the people's quality of lives at the village level in the southern border provinces.

From the above, the SBPAC focused on the involvement of the public in solving the problem of peace in the three southern border provinces, which is necessary to create a budget and have enough personnel. Projects that were carried out with the identity policy are based on a policy in the area that must be clear on the purpose (Akorn Chaikaw, 1990). Moreover, the nature of the project with clear objectives and sufficient resources (Itthichai Seedam, 2010) should comply with the policy implementation of the performance, the personnel and finance (Voradej Chandrasorn, 1997). SBPAC was an important factor in the participation of the public and had been allocated the capital budget and sufficient personnel to perform achieving the objectives of the policy.

However, most people did not truly participate in joint thinking, joint decision making and joint action that made the performance not meet the real needs of the people. In addition, according to a study by the evaluation plan developed for the southern border provinces area in 2012, it was found that the project that was implemented in the area did not meet the needs of real people. Moreover, the people in the three southern border provinces that got to offer public participation in the various stages of the project were because the selection of the target group did not contain representatives of those who were treated unfairly. The implementation of the civilian government showed a lack of recognition and trust of the public.

Although the SBPAC were operating based on strategy, the public sector and civil society also tried to engage the public in the process of modifying and developing the concrete areas in the southern border provinces area, as well as involve them in several projects mentioned above.

The cooperation of the relevant agencies factor: the synthesis of the results of the operations by the SBPAC from projects such as the expansion of the electric system to Ban Mueng La Bu project, resolving the suffering of the people affected by the unrest and unable to work or live on their land and property in Pattani, the Yala and Narathiwat projects, the reunification of the SBPAC morale & South to track courses for the evaluation project, a project of the SBPAC, and projects of the government.

The cooperation of the relevant authorities is one of the elements of the factors that affect the application of policies. The projects above are projects with the cooperation of the agencies and individuals involved, whether it is governed by the PEA or the Cooperation of Graduate Volunteers.

The resolution of conflict of the objectives of the project could be done by synthesizing the results of the operations of the SBPAC from project preparation activities. This could be done to solve the problem of the land area of the Budo-Sungai Padi National Park over arable public land in the three southern border provinces area, consisting of 9 Districts, 25 Sub-districts and 89 villages and to try and expedite the issue. This could cause conditions that lead to misunderstandings between the government and the people in the target area, which further aims to provide the public with the same arable areas, generating income for the local people and being able to have a solid career.

According to this project, the SBPAC paid attention to the conflict that would occur, and tried to take corrective action immediately, which can be considered as key factors in the complex coordination of the various units of study of Pressman & Wildavsky.

The synthesis of the results of the operations of the SBPAC as government policy objectives could result in the people in the area of the southern border provinces having safety in their lives and property, as well as being free from the

problems with drugs. The government can prevent and eliminate factors supporting the insurgency in the region.

There were organization competency problems according to the urgency of acting to comply with the law, based on an interview with the Director of Policy and Planning Office about the matter. The Chief Justice and officials from the Advisory Council on the economy and society had not given the authority to perform the work of the Sub district Administrative Organization (SAO). The research suggests management integration in the southern border provinces area of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre on Regulation Administration. The integrating of state of civilian operations in the southern border provinces area had not been authorized under section 18 of the Public Administration southern border provinces Act 2010. However, over a period of time, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre was integrated with the State Agency Civil Board, but it led to inefficiency in the public administration, budget, control, supervision and care, according to the Director. The coordination of government agencies to comply with government policies and development strategies in the southern border provinces was to have the ability to coordinate between different departments to work together. This was a key factor in its complexity in coordinating the implementation of the various departments. Currently, the SBPAC resolves such issues by providing staff to perform such functions in the area on their own without the need of a centralized authority.

The analysis shows that due to the climate of insecurity arising from the unrest that continues, the government works in a way to accelerate solutions to defuse the situation that changes quickly. However, bottlenecks in government regulations could cause problems with the situation that occurred in the area. There would be a necessity to strengthen the civilian security forces with the strengthening of the community in particular and greatly enhance the public to cover all areas, in tackling the unrest. The personnel belonging to the agencies would be required to comply with various projects to help the Security Forces.

The factors related to the ability of the coordination between the various departments of government agencies, were primarily civil driven development strategies in southern border provinces areas, and by clinging to the mission of the

agencies, there was a major lack of holistic integration, especially in areas where there was no monitoring system in public areas.

In addition, it is also consistent with the in-depth interviews of the Director and the policy agencies still lack the capacity to coordinate between different departments to work together.

There was a need to support job creation in the three southern border provinces area, related to a study by Pressman & Wildavsky, which is the study of the failure of policies to create jobs for minorities in the city of Oakland, California, in order to solve the unemployment problem and the cause of employment in the community. This is the main problem facing the Southern border provinces Administrative Centre, and the problems in the areas of the southern border provinces can be improved by a process of development, from using data on related research, to staging public hearings and workshops, according to the data that emerged in the fiscal year 2012.

A survey at the Prince of Songkla University Pattani Campus of public attitude towards the south, based on the current research, in terms of conflict and cultural diversity, found the following problems in the order of 1-5: 1) drug problems, 2) unemployment, 3) unrest issue, 4) poverty and 5) arable land. The main problems that people want the government to take action urgently on, are: 1) employment and career youth, 2) combating drugs, 3) increasing income and household income 4) the development of agriculture and livestock, and 5) the problem of education. The above information reflects the national importance of the issue of economic and social concerns over the unrest.

As a whole, the SBPAC has strengthened the occupation opportunities for income groups earning less on natural resources, with biodiversity and balance of the environment. It has also provided response to treatment and sustainable development. The SBPAC is encouraging people in the southern border provinces area to live by the philosophy of sufficiency economy by promoting the profession to the public. This is in accordance with the potential of the area and the lifestyle to strengthen occupations of income groups, so that they have enough to have a decent life, by integrating operations with related agencies to implement the strategy. People have developed the

potential to be self-reliant, earning just enough to survive and have a fair distribution of income, as well as a better quality of life, as mentioned above.

The SBPAC has driven education reforms in line with the identity and way of life of the people in the area thoroughly and covered with quality prospects. The unrest in the southern border provinces area since 2004 onwards, in line with the research of Akom Chaikaw (1990) shows that the Community is committed to the culture. Policies are determined to resolve the issue at the local level and will have to be consistent to be successful for the culture. The policy must be set up in keeping with the area and truly not contradict the beliefs, culture and local traditions.

The political factors are that the problem of the support and commitment of the organization or individuals is the main problem on the other side of policy implementation. Such problems may spread to the result of the failure of policies. Influential groups, interest groups, politicians, senior government officials, as well as the media do not provide support, both in terms of politics, finance, the budget that includes the creation of barriers in terms of resistance, and retard or oppose such policies. (Voradej Chandrasorn, 1997). Moreover, the role of political parties is very important in the process of policy implementation. Policies that have been approved need care and attention, and have to be followed by the ongoing political authorities who should be paying attention to priorities in its implementation, which will result in them being a success. Bureaucracy often tends to choose to practice a policy of state policy, but only to benefit itself. Therefore, the cooperation of the bureaucracy is crucial to success, especially the civil servants with true intentions, adaptability, and a profession which is crucial to the success of the policy as well (Akom Chaikaw, 1990).

The research by DeGroff and Cargo (2009) evaluated the success of the policy implementation. There are three political factors that should be considered to evaluate the policy implementation. The factors include networked governance, politics and government in a democratic system, and new public management.

The SBPAC has been administered by the strategic southern border provinces area that has been decentralized to the local government. This is in a way that corresponds to the area and is not contrary to the Constitution, which is a factor in politics and governance in a democratic system, and the decentralization to local



authorities. The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre has a budget of 15.15 million baht subsidy of 303 local governments in order to carry out activities according to the needs and initiatives of the people in accordance with the development of the potential of each area.

There is the problem of unequal justice in law enforcement leading to inequality. Injustice is considered a high priority, and strategic to help solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces. People have faith and confidence in the justice system and strategies to improve laws and regulations to comply with the conditions of the project area, which has been defined above. However, from the public hearing organized by local leaders, it was found that the government has to enforce the law equally. The support for education is not even, distributing the budget to the Tambon Administrative the least, the issue of quality of life is predominant, especially the drug problem, and the economic development is uneven, particularly critical infrastructure. So, to resolve the problems in the southern border provinces area requires an understanding of honor and mutual respect. Parents must model specifically for people in the area that are involved in the administration over this, and should reduce the role of security forces, particularly the announced Royal Decree, including the need to take religious principles with the family to resolve all kinds of problems.

Staging a participatory dialogue to get the opinions of people from all sectors to solve problems and develop southern border provinces areas 7 stages concluded the barriers which still remain as follows. 1) The insecurity of life and property of the people from the main six areas: government officials, influential gangsters, powerful dark forces, a review of the state, the media, and interest groups, 2) The quality of education and both of the state and private sectors is still low and the study did not respond to reality in terms of religion, language, identity in Tadika school and Ponor institutions, 3) Conflict and violence caused by being treated unjustly, the different languages, identities, ethnicities, interests of influential groups, government officials and local influence, prejudice against the rulers of the people, issues, conflicts, drugs, and people in the region lack better education and 4) Issues of injustice has been caused by the arrest of people without evidence and there was discrimination in regard to their religious dress, and those who graduated from overseas were paranoid by the government, Malay identity was suppressed, and the allocation of state land delayed.

**6.1.1 An analysis of the Key Factors that Affected the Policy  
Implementation Outcomes from the Projects were Planned by  
Priority and Government Policies on the Basis of State, Interval 2  
between 23 August 2012 - 23 August 2013 of the SBPAC**

The researcher concluded that the analysis of key factors of the outcomes of policy implementation to resolve the unrest in the three southern border provinces were based on projects by priority and government policies on the basis of state interval 2, between 23 August 2012 and 23 August 2013 of the SBPAC. It is the primary agency responsible for the state's role in the policy implementation for solving the unrest in the three southern border provinces, with the following key factors.

1) The Factors that Affected the Policy Making are:

(1) The Appropriateness of the Population in the Target Area: Although SBPAC has followed the plans and programs, the selection of the target population focuses on the relatives or close people and the public were not treated fairly. The implementation of the civil sector is the lack of recognition and trust of the public.

(2) The Social Features and Regional Cooperation: Social features in the three southern border provinces area are family problems and a poor quality of life. The drug problem, the problem of unemployment, educational problems (a low level of education), uneven economic development, and particularly critical infrastructure are evident. The SBPAC operations are carried out, according to strategy. Citizens and civil society were to engage with the government in the development process of the southern border provinces area so as to achieve tangible cooperation from the local authorities. The SBPAC aims to promote the participation of all citizens in a concrete manner, which is critical to solving social problems in the three southern border provinces.

(3) The Cooperation of the Relevant Agencies: There are several projects with other agencies involving SBPAC cooperation, such as the PEA, in order to provide solutions in the three southern border provinces easily and quickly and this made the public in the target group collaborate to solve the problem.

(4) The Changes that Occurred in the Supportive Agencies or are involved: Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra had changed its personnel policy leader in the three southern border provinces to resolve the problem by modifying the Secretary General of NSC from Mr. Tawin Pleansri to Lt. Gen. Paradorn Pattanabutr. NSC, which is an organization that supports making changes for developing the three southern border provinces. According to The Secretary General of the NSC, it is regarded that stakeholders early in the policy cause a discontinuity in regulatory policy.

2) The Complexity of Coordinating the Implementation of the Various Departments Factors or Complexity of Joint Action Factors, include:

(1) The Ability to Coordinate between Different Departments to Work Together: The SBPAC had problems in the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, formed by the state agencies civilians, the execution units, such as the Department of Justice and officials from the Advisory Council on the economy and society. It had not been authorized according to section 18 of the Public Administration southern border provinces areas Act 2010, making coordination between various departments inefficient.

(2) The Complexity of the Decision-making Process: The SBPAC was faced with problems in the implementation of the government to enforce law equality. The support for education was not even, distributing the budget to the SAO less, having quality of life issues, particularly drug problems, career issues, economic development not being thorough, and critical infrastructure, thus enabling a wide range of issues in the target area and leading to the complexity of the decision-making process even more.

(3) The Goal of the Project Conflicts or Inconsistencies of the Main Target, with more than One Goal, with accelerating the troubleshooting conditions may lead to a misunderstanding between the government and the people in the target area. The SBPAC thus accelerated the implementation of project activities, such as problems regarding the land of Budo - Su-ngai Padi National Park over arable land and so on.

(4) The Ability to Address the Issue of the Delay Projects that Occurred:

The policy implementation of the SBPAC causing project delays was caused by problems with the performance of compliance. The personnel were not enough to make the personnel of the agency to comply with various projects to help the security forces. Even the budget allocation was inadequate and delayed. The SBPAC encouraged people in the southern border provinces area to live by the philosophy of sufficiency economy. This corresponds to the potential of the area and the lifestyle to strengthen the occupations of income groups earning less and integrated operations with relevant agencies to implement the strategy. People have developed the potential to be self-reliant, earning just enough to survive and have a fair distribution of income, and quality of life has improved.

3) The Linkage of the Factors that Affected the Policy Making and Policy Implementation to Practice together, including:

(1) The Ability to Develop and Learn from the Experiences to Solve the Problems: The outcome of plans and projects by the SBPAC can be used to assess the effects of the policy. Search implementation and impact, including taking lessons from countries as lessons for solving problems, especially negotiations with insurgent groups several times in the past, could be improved on negotiations the next time.

(2) The Effectiveness of the Policy Process to Understand and Accept the Importance of Continuity and the Relations between Ends and Means:

The units and support units need to understand the policy effectively. Agency leaders must recognize the importance of continuity in the governance, control, and coordination of policy implementation throughout the duration of the project. Even the relationship between ends and means have to be assessed. The effects of a project have to be reversed to bring a change of ends and means in order to achieve maximum efficiency. The change in the Secretary-General of the SBPAC from Mr. Panu Uthairat in the time of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to Pol. Col. Thawee Sodsong in the time of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra makes the policy makers not understand the continuity of the policy implementation as a key outcome. The government session during Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has moved Mr. Panu Uthairat back into the position of the Secretary-General of the SBPAC until now.

(3) The Appropriate Theoretical for Explaining the Policy Characteristics of the SBPAC were to be given by implementing agencies. They had to describe the policy that each project had already carried out based on an appropriate theoretical description. Such an outcome occurred during the policy implementation in the period of Thaksin Shinawatra, who had collapsed the SBPAC and Civilian Police and Military Command 43. This was seen as the establishment of the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command unit to perform only one responsible policy implementation and to achieve their goals, without having to rely on other agencies. If there were relevant agencies, relationships that relied on those agencies required only a small amount were not critical. The authorities had the right to send out orders and had been followed completely (Gun, 1980), a concept based on the Model of Perfect Administration in accordance with the Top-Down (Hood, 1976) and given the nature of the policy, this is reasonable in theory. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanon (2006-2008) required greater policy harmonization by avoiding undue power and started talks with the separatists that continued until the reign of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha had negotiations with the insurgents and as a result of the peace process, talked to them several times. The number of incidents of violence decreased based on policy implementation guidelines from the bottom up key (Elmore, 1978: 605).

### **6.1.2 An Analysis of the Key Factors that Affected the Policy**

#### **Implementation Outcomes from the In-depth Interviews of the SBPAC**

This section analyzes critical factors that affect the outcomes of policy implementation in order to tackle the unrest in the three southern border provinces, from the in-depth interviews of the SBPAC (academicians, civil society workers, religious leaders, politicians who see the state, military, and police), during the months of September to December 2015. The details are as follows based on the analysis of the researcher.

1) Factors that affect the policy making process are:

(1) The appropriateness of the population in target areas: The functional analysis of the SBPAC projects show a focus on the population in target

areas where there are problems that have been affected by the identity, language, religion, traditions, and culture, focusing on the needs of real people. Most projects in the domain of economy and society has to take into account the rights of the population in target areas that have a need or a goal. However, the audience took part in the projects such as the Cattle Market which was created in the area, leading to income distribution across the target area, and adding more revenue. Phnom projects and programs that contribute to the public were caused by the demands of clear public opinions. However, there was a lack of skills or knowledge for professional development. This is consistent with the opinion of the Director of Finance Division, who said that, although the project is going according to the population in the target area, residents still lack the skills to work. The occupation of the villagers is a seasonal occupation is a further obstacle. However, the budget is not an obstacle in the implementation of various projects.

The project worth undertaking is the Hajj. The introduction of halal products to be offered or sold in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj is to bring together the identity, language, religion and cultural appropriateness of the population in the target area, and to create value.

Personnel development includes bringing the principles of Rama 6, and putting Public Administration policies into practice based on the concept, and working on understanding, access and development of those policies. Senior officials must be understood in the context of the new adjustment process to the population in the target area and apply the same standards of Thailand, as the Thailand Buddhist in Thailand and the United Arab Malaga. Authorities have not created a behavioral condition with Muslims decisively and without double standards, in line with the opinion of the Director. According to Bureau policy coordination, social psychologists argue that the practice of sending personnel to the pins fit the target demographic. To understand the culture, tradition and coexistence in a multicultural environment, the attitude should follow the new concept based on the principles of Rama 6.

The Information and Public Relations: Media Relations aims to make the population in the target areas and disseminate information around to communicate to the people the most.

Thus, the policies to tackle the unrest in the three southern border provinces should consider appropriate demographic target areas mentioned above, such as the identity, language, religion, traditions and culture of the people of Thailand. Malay Muslims should get involved in the multicultural environment, and in projects based on the needs of real people. Profession should be supported and strengthened, and the knowledge and skills of professionals should be enhanced, to cover communities in the target area. A thorough public relations communications program for the personnel working in the area must be understood in the context of the area. The concept of taking initiative to understand, access, and develop policies, and bringing identity together to create value from the pilgrimage have developed along with the SBPAC, the context being the target demographic. The outcomes of the conditions based on the management by the SBPAC in the atmosphere are better. Villagers in the area have a greater understanding of the situation by bringing the development of a tool to solve problems in the three southern border provinces.

(2) The social features and regional cooperation in three southern border provinces were important as the families were poor, there were problems with the quality of life, particularly drug problems, career issues, no jobs, the problems of education (children with low levels of education or no education), and the impact of politics on the national level and at local schools. Policy makers need to understand the social structure and social context which the in-depth interviews of the Director of the Central Office have confirmed. (Director, 2015; Interview)

The project plans to be in line with the social problems of education, the less educated, the poor, which would make the quality of life better. Promoting career can make money for the community and the local context, such as in a friendly village, causing part of the development. Infrastructure such as roads and water supply to the village should be improved.

Moreover, Phanom project is a project for the public to participate. The project was born from the desire of the people. The social nature of the local people's quality of life improved. The participation of local community in the project was by

the village committee, village elders, religious leaders and spiritual leaders. This is consistent with what The Director of the Bureau of the Treasury has said. (Director1, 2015; Interview)

These three southern border provinces need sustainable solutions. To focus on the development, public participation and providing the public with reater freedom and social equity is needed. This is to prevent the different groups from having a chance to get into a unified mass civil disorder.

The cooperation of local authorities in making plans and projects is essential. There is a lack of diversification in projects across all segments because of inequality in society and conflicts in communities. Based on the nature of the project, similar projects should be combined into the same project, with the collaboration of local authorities and the community. The public hearings would have comments from the village, the sector organizations, both local and 44 international organizations, the civil society and the private sectors. Based on good collaboration, the villagers would have the knowledge to express themselves on stage more.

The Information and Public Relations sector aims to provide the most targeted media and disseminate information to convey to the people around as much as possible by the cooperation of a local network of our graduates volunteering in every district of the village. These graduates were trained to play the role of a radio broadcaster and villagers conducted a seminar on these networks, including folk artists, the singers, Ma-Young, shadow plays, music, group life, Manora groups, a group of religious leaders, youth groups such as Beechwood Thailand, sports networks and the FA Cup too.

The proactive PR team must be complete with publicists, journalists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers who were among the leaders in the area. Prime PAO, developed jointly by the Village Headmen would cover the target area by educating the families to be much stronger and be able to protect themselves.

There was a need to bring value to a partnership formed by the cooperation of the local people who had come to the pilgrimage. They were training



Muslim brothers to be understanding towards the people who travel to Hajj and relatives who came to join the public, to gain more and more trust from them. There were many solutions in the three southern border provinces that were to be unraveled. The agency in charge of Hajj affairs should be understood in the way the agency works, in terms of general understanding, access and development of policies. The SBPAC has taken the initiative to establish such relations by understanding Hajj affairs.

The cooperation of local personnel development with course personnel development to cover the village, and the village headman, president of SAO, and religious leaders, which are stakeholders, have contributed significantly to the development, which can be considered the cooperation of local factors. From the interview of the Director of Personnel development on how to build a partnership together, they have interacted well together to understand the strategy of the Government. They have also cooperated in a project that is common in the area, which is regarded as a dimensional network in the public sector, of religious leaders, village heads and headmen.

Thus, policies to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces are to understand the social nature of the area and with the cooperation of a local youth group, which would have created a strategy to build support for them. They are to be encouraged and it is to be seen that Thailand's government is sympathetic to them and tries to help them.

(3) The Cooperation of the Relevant Agencies: These factors include the development of the personnel. Currently, the work of civil servants, both military and civilian police following the process of the government, shows no unity, which is a key issue in the cooperation of the relevant authorities. Since unity in the administration, is a feel of the area and the military police, civilians being the same or different, could cause problem with alignment and lead to a terrorist movement and make it difficult to solve more problems. So, everyone should change their way of thinking by thinking profoundly and carefully. However, the cooperation of the relevant authorities leads to greater unity. From the interview, the Director of the Personnel Development Office said. (Director2, 2015; Interview)

The NSC has set a policy to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces, and is regarded as the best policy. The problem occurs when policy is put into practice, but there is more unity in the organization of the evaluation process and there is a need to pull the trigger to engage in problem solving.

The drug problem is a problem to be solved in the three southern border provinces and there are major obstacles that must be taken extremely seriously. Youth in the three southern border provinces areas with problems of addiction could become a tool of the insurgents. The issue of drugs is required to obtain the cooperation of the relevant authorities, seriously. In an interview with the Director of the Central Bureau, she said. (Director, 2015; Interview)

The problem of drugs requires cooperation to resolve the issue by all of the relevant authorities working seriously. The SBPAC and ISOC Region 4's Forward Command should be integrated to work together to lead to greater unity.

Moreover, the obstacles to solving the unrest in the three southern border provinces, are that villagers lack the skills to work because people have a seasonal career, making a further career requirement as an obstacle. Therefore, raising the income and quality of life requires continued support from the relevant authorities.

To solve the problem of fairness, the center held a fair in southern border provinces areas where every village's Justice Network, a graduate of the rule of law, community volunteer coordinators, a Malay interpreter in prison, and lawyers were involved to facilitate both the court and the police station. However, the cooperation of the relevant agencies sometimes still lack an understanding of the role that responsible agencies cooperate, as a lack of understanding of the pilgrimage blinding dimensional value of hajj affairs.

There were policies set to help heal both physically and the assets in the unit of the SBPAC, district and town hall. The remedies were that the property will be assessed naturally that have been damaged, and to get cooperation from the

relevant authorities, such as Portage County, Commerce City, or the Treasury. In addition, a project to repair homes affected by the problems in the three southern border provinces, together with the Thai Red Cross, is a great success that is consistent with the opinion of the staff of the Office. (Officer1, 2015; Interview)

Success requires the ongoing projects and the remedies to get cooperation from all agencies that support it such as the Public Health Office, and Visits Department, and to trust the authorities, resulting in the activities to be done willingly, and not in opposition. These are all key factors.

The Information and the Public Relations sectors focus on proactive public relations. The team has five teams to adhere to the SBPAC schools in the area that will be spread out over the Channel 5 Kooper and the Thai PBS Public Relations Department, which is regarded as the cooperation of the relevant authorities. From in-depth interviews, the Director of Information and Public Relations Office said. (Director3, 2015; Interview)

Proactive publicity has to be an integrated team of publicists, journalists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers among the leaders in the area, including the Prime PAO and Village Headman. There is a need to continue to develop the area and the goal is to educate area residents, as well as the families to be much stronger and to be able to protect themselves.

So, in a policy to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, the SBPAC and all agencies must give priority to the cooperation of the relevant authorities to focus on the unity of all parties, including the police, military and civilian. All the relevant authorities have to adjust the way they think and understand the feelings of people in the area. Drug addiction is a major problem and a barrier to solving the problems in the three southern border provinces. It requires relevant agencies to cooperate in resolving the serious issue. Moreover, the issue of

fairness to help promote healing or curb aggressive conquests requires the cooperation of the relevant authorities and an effort to continue achieving maximum efficiency.

(4) The Changes that Occurred in Supportive Agencies or are Involved: The analysis shows that officials at the agency had been sent for executing the plan and sent to needy people in the work area, or to send civil servants to receive benefits when they return. There were changes resulting from the migration of the concerned officials of the conquests. The factors that compromise the continuity of policy implementation are consistent with an interview with the Director of the Central Bureau who said. (Director, 2015; Interview)

The structure of the SBPAC would be to send personnel from various departments of the agency's routine and perform contextual tasks each time and sometimes when the mission is completed, to return to the ministry of the same.

Moreover, the lack of promotion of officials working poorly is still a problem related to performance incentives.

The SBPAC personnel promoted within the higher level, such as the Head of the SBPAC, the deputy secretary was not there. Most of the personnel sent a deputy governor of the Interior Ministry who lack a practical level of policy implementation affecting the morale of the workers. This is another reason for the changes that occur from the relevant authorities, and do not support the continuation of the policy implementation.

Therefore, the policy of administrative development in the three southern border provinces related to the change of government in each generation affect the application of policies to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces. The agency puts the policy into practice, and the SBPAC and ISOC Region 4's Forward Command must have unity. Moreover, the participation of the public is an important factor. The policy implementation must be achieved even without the Top-down, and must be combined with the Bottom-up approaches and Strategic Development Initiative for understanding, access and development of policies. Moreover if the monitoring, evaluation, control from top to bottom, the information in

the facts and data from the research is accurate, it will affect the policy of the state to meet the goals and the solutions in the three southern border provinces.

The problem stems from a lack of monitoring and evaluation skills to use processing tools, lack of information or inaccurate information and a lack of results. The problem is that the personnel staffing is minimal compared to the number of strategic projects and personnel require diverse expertise and therefore, there is a need to focus on the increase in management.

2) The Factors of Complexity in Coordinating the Implementation of the Various Departments or Complexity of Joint Action, including

(1) The Ability to Coordinate between different Departments to Work together : From the analysis, it can be seen that there is an opportunity for economic and social development by the sale of OTOP products to the villagers, by providing a platform to distribute. Product integration has been ongoing. Coordination with other agencies in the area will be an important factor in providing substantial outcomes. These would cause the country to be strong and the quality of life to improve significantly, in line with the project. The Southern areas would have useful income groups with residents, owners and merchants.

Personnel development with three companions course to adjust the way of handling the issues of civilian, military and police resulted in the recognition of information simultaneously and greater integration and unity in the area by the Center district. In addition, the curriculum also provides stakeholders a committee in the curriculum, such as the Bureau Sheikhul Islam, religious leaders, village headmen and which is regarded to be involved from the start of the project. The cooperation of the relevant authorities and cooperation from the local inmates leads to the ability to coordinate between different departments, to work together.

In addition, preparation of personnel from the SBPAC to adjust in a new context in the three southern border provinces area requires all officials and civil servants to go through an orientation course. Officers in various units must have the same concept in the context of the three southern border provinces area, in order to have the ability to coordinate between different departments, to work together. This is a key factor in the complexity of coordinating the work of various departments.

The ability to coordinate between different departments, to work together during the SBPAC and ISOC Region 4's Forward Command would require them to complete the work in a more unified manner, consistent with the idea from the in-depth interviews of the Director of policy coordination, and social psychology Bureau, who said. “ There should be a restructuring of the SBPAC to complete the work with ISOC Region 4's Forward Command in the development of the area, but must have the culture of both sides to work together.” (Director7, 2015; Interview)

Thus, there is the complexity of coordinating the implementation of the various departments. The ability to coordinate between different departments, to work together to make policy implementations of the project was achieved by putting the policy into practice. The military, police and civilian personnel had to understand the work perfectly together as a unified team by coordinating well and changing the culture in the organization to work together.

(2) The Complexity of the Decision-making Process: The analysis of factors showed that for the preparation of SBPAC personnel to adjust to the concept in a new context in the three southern border provinces area, the officials and civil servants all had to go through an orientation course. Officers in various units must have a concept in the context of the three southern border provinces area in the same way. In addition, the course three companions can help to unify the military, police and civilians in order to achieve integration of all dimensions to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces. This was also essential in order to have the ability to coordinate between different departments, to be able to work together, resulting in a unified operation, which was a more important factor in the complexity of coordinating the work of various departments. The concept can be adapted in the same way; it will not cause the complexity of the decision-making process.

(3) The Goal of Project Conflicts or Inconsistencies of the Main Target, with more than One Goal Factors were analyzed as a function of all the parties, whether civilian, police and military. The main target must be the same and should not have the primary focus of many agencies, there should be unity in working together, and there can be no conflict arises in policy implementation. Personnel development has focused on this issue very seriously, so there are courses for personnel development such as an orientation curriculum for officials, three

companions course etc. This reflects the adjustment of the concept of the operation, leading all parties to unity and in the same direction. From the in-depth interviews, the Director of the Personnel Development Bureau said that. (Director2, 2015; Interview)

If a solution is to succeed, unity should be unity in a major way in the field. The feelings of people in the area need to be given importance, and therefore, the military, civilian and the police need to think the same.

However, the policy set to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces must meet the goals and objectives very well. To insist on this, in an in-depth interview, the Director of the Personnel Development Bureau said. “I think today, the unity of all the good that both ways of thinking and policy. Since writing the NSC policy on tackling three southern border provinces is the best policy at the heart of the problem is exhausted.” (Director7, 2015; Interview)

The policy implementation must understand the real problems of the region, and should develop an understanding and sincerity. If it does not improve the performance of the organization, it is a waste of budget. Even the staff has to be determined, dedicated, not lazy, and without prejudice which would be the cause of conflict, and would lead to being distorted from the main goal. More importantly, the audit, evaluation and control from top to bottom should be derived from the information in the facts and determine whether more studies are accurate or not, which can affect the policy state to meet the main goal. In an in-depth interview, the Director of policy coordination, education, religion, culture and sport Bureau, said. (Director4, 2015; Interview)

The problems with sincerity, understanding, access and development of policies will not lead to the policies being implemented. Without the check, it will be a failure. The problem will be solved, if personnel are not lazy. Solving a problem should not be by disgusted and dispassionate people. This means that staff is lazy and biased when it comes to a conflict being caused.

However, the agency's programs and projects were implemented in response to the political parties. The purpose of the policy which is the main goal could be distorted. From in-depth interviews, the Director of Finance Division, said. “If the SBPAC political parties take over, the operation may cause a reaction. The political and policy objectives could be distorted to some extent.” (Director1, 2015; Interview)

Most projects in the domain of economy and society have to take into account the rights of the target population in areas that have nothing to do with the target. The audience took part in a joint venture to think, for example, The Cattle Market project resulted in the creation of jobs in the area that has spread over the target area and increased the revenue. The public understanding of the main goals of the three southern border provinces make the solution a success. From in-depth interviews, the Director coordinating the economic and social policy, said. (Director5, 2015; Interview)

In order to understand problems in areas closely linked to the public, and in order to solve them, let them know what to do and what the goals are. Projects that would not make them contemplate failure will be mostly successful if they know what to do.

Thus, the conflicts and inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one goal, scored all staff. To understand the context of the three southern border provinces area with the same objectives and goals, the same concept is needed to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, without prejudice to their duties. Target people took part in the project, since the project began to contemplate the project goals and must not come to dominate the political process in policy implementation, which will cause conflict and a lack of unity in working together again.

(4) The Ability to Address the Issue of the Delay Projects that Occurred: the key factors that occur in the process of policy implementation were analyzed. These are the use of factors of performance, organization and budget, to solve problems such as economic and social, to solve the problem of land estate by



settlements, land, to use the pending budget to be invested into an area to build infrastructure, including electricity, roads and irrigation, and the industrial park.

Amendments to the delay of the project has been defined within the framework of the project, such as Onet and Pre-Onet project seen as being able to contribute to the delays. This is consistent with feedback from the in-depth interviews of the Director of policy coordination, education, religion, culture and sport, who said. (Director4, 2015; Interview)

Each project will be done in a reasonable time period, such as holidays or on Saturdays and Sundays. Programs will have clear deadlines. Each project has a clear understanding that there are no delays with children and parents, which will be a global benefit together. The maximum focus should be on developing clear, but legal practice under the Act of the SBPAC, focusing on the area. There are three main areas to strengthen and accelerate the development and enhance the development of the area. We use the seven strategic goals.

Also, in terms of bringing justice to the accused, the forensic DNA with the security process is very fast and does not delay the criminal trial.

Thus, the complexity of coordinating the implementation of the various departments was formed, including the ability to coordinate between different departments, to work together, with emphasis on the participation from the start of the project to make the cooperation of the relevant authorities easier. The participation of local residents in targeted areas was integrated together. In order to create unity in every department a new concept was deployed to the context in order to solve the problem. By avoiding the complexity of the decision-making process, it will not cause delays in the projects of the agency.

3) The Linkage of the Factors that Affected the Policy Making and Policy Implementation to Practice together, including:

(1) The Ability to Develop and Learn from the Experiences to Solve the Problems. It can be seen that solutions are being found in the three southern border provinces by taking the lessons and experience from abroad by focusing on the

development and reducing the use of military force, to reduce violence and bring the lessons of Thailand to solve each government's problems. For the Organization competence about quality personnel, the courses taught Malay. The course orientation commissioner added changes in the context of the learning process, and the struggle of the Islamic world, which is connected with the fight in the three southern border provinces by applying lessons learned from the experience of fighting terrorism.

For the peace process, talks will be about lessons from experiences in the past, how to make things better in the future. It should assist citizens in understanding the benefits to be gained from the talks in the peace process. From the interview of the Director of policy coordination and social psychology, he said. (Director7, 2015; Interview)

Talks during the peace process, should involve the public as well, in the recognition that it has. It will certainly be useful and should continue to further peace talks. It will educate the people to take lessons from experiences to solve problems, and also to consider the legal aspects of the peace process leading to a resolution.

From the in-depth interviews of the Director of the Personnel Development Bureau, the view is that the new commissioner had to learn to talk during the peace process, and discuss the role of government officials in the area to get involved. Lessons include bringing the conflict to a lesson in foreign policy by the authorities to provide information to better understand the course and learn to discuss the peace process.

Thus, the ability to develop guidelines for the education and experience to contribute to solving the problems in the three southern border provinces, the policy makers must understand the lessons and experiences from different countries and the lessons of the past to solve the problems of conflict and violence. This would focus on the development, reduced use of military force and violence, with the development of human resources in the learning process of managing conflict and the talks for peace, and talks about lessons from past

experiences. There should be understanding to help local citizens understand the benefits to be gained from talks during the peace process.

(2) The Effectiveness of the Policy Process to Understand and Accept the Importance of Continuity and the Relations between Ends and Means: The importance of continuity and the relationship between ends and means must be understood and accepted. The analysis of the effectiveness of the policy of education in the area will be conducted according to the requirements of people in the area. This is focused on religious or academic course content that must be adjusted to be suitable by the performance of the policy, which must be evaluated continuously. The audit evaluated from top to bottom in the control has to have real storage space. Research has to be accurate and reliable; otherwise it will affect the policy. From the in-depth interviews the Director of policy coordination, education, religion, culture and sport, said. "Whether information in the area comes from the fact or not and whether the data from the research is accurate or not, will affect the policy of the state to resolve the problems in the three southern border provinces." (Director6, 2015; Interview)

The development of personnel is an important part of the solution that must take into account the three southern border provinces because of process efficiency policy. In linking policy and policy implementation of programs and projects effectively, there is a need to understand and accept the importance of continuity and the relationship between ends and means. Personnel development have to adjust to a new concept to understand the context of the area, and the course orientation Commissioner would need to firmly establish the objectives, to complete the work of the civilian, military and police, and a third companion course. To understand how the practices have to be accepted, clear targets need to continue to be made to reduce violence and achieve peace in the three southern border provinces. It also takes into account the continuation of the good servants that were sent for operations in the area, which corresponds to the in-depth interview of the Director of Personnel Development Bureau. He said. (Director2, 2015; Interview)

Officials at the agency sent aid workers in the area that made good servant to the agency, resulting in a lack of good people working in the area or even sent their servants to receive benefits when they return.

The changes made by the concerned officials of migration are factors that compromise the continuity of policy implementation.

Moreover, the lack of promotion of officials working poorly is still a problem of incentives for performance.

Talking during the peace process is another thing that is most important to understand the process of efficiency of the policies to resolve the problems in three southern border provinces. Talks during the peace process should be conducted openly and systematically and there must be continuous talks to the people that they will benefit from it. To understand the effectiveness of the policy process, acceptance and continuation of these practices should be related to the goal, which is a key factor to link policy to policy implementation and to make the conditions in the three southern border provinces sustainable.

(3) The Appropriate Theoretical for Explaining the Policy Characteristics of SBPAC: The analysis shows that SBPAC is a practice that can characterize the policy of individual projects that have already been carried out. It provides a reasonable theory of such a process regarding the educational, religious, cultural, economic, and social factors. The development of personnel and the justice are in a cognitive academic and in a more practical way, and at the orientation program officials are adjusting the way to rethink their role in the area. There is also a body of knowledge on conflict management, peace talk process, and the use of forensic science in the field of justice.

Other factors that influence the policy implementation were found more in the in-depth interviews of SBPAC's officers as follows.

1) Communication: The study found that the message is a very important factor and must take into account the proper context, in particular in the context of three southern border provinces areas where violent incidents continue, including a pressing identity, language, religion, traditions and culture.

Thus, both at the policy level and the conversion of policy into practice, policy implementation will be communicated with understanding. At the policy level, even though the policy is standard, it must have clear goals and objectives. The methods

and procedures must be communicated to the understanding of leadership as well as policy implementation that would lead to its further effectiveness.

The communication factor that researchers have discovered from in-depth interviews has provided insight on communication between clients and public policy leaders to abide by the policy of the state. The people in the conflict area must be focused on, to communicate, and to understand clearly. The problem of violence in the three southern border provinces formed the majority. Problems caused by the error message in the grasp of the people in the target area were fueled in part by a language not understood by Thailand's Muslim youth in the area. From the interview of the Director of policy coordination, education, religion, culture and sport, he said. (Director6, 2015; Interview)

Children, young people and people who are outside the education system to gain knowledge and skills should focus on the language used to communicate, to build academic skills. If a child becomes sick in the media, people did not understand that the technical part of the children having to leave school was due to terrorism or drug addiction.

In addition, the media messages should be communicated either way. Each step in the work to understand the communication practice in the area, to understand and listen to the sound, bounces back. Moreover, the cooperation of local authorities such as village councils, with students from the Graduate School should be for understanding the local people in order to communicate an understanding prior to project implementation, according to the in-depth interviews of the Director of policy coordination, and social psychology.

The dimension of the Information and Public Relations was seen as a communication medium to better understand the problem, because today, most problems come from communication. If target groups can understand each other, other problems can be solved to make it possible to report the incident in the area of network and enhance security as well, such as The Lie Ahead for Talks project, which makes the people feel closer to each other. By building a network of joint activities and contributing to the development needs of the people in the community, it shows

that they are cared for. This aspect will not be a problem anymore because the religion of Islam would promote the issue of peace in order to make more peace with the people.

The dimension of PR will focus on communication to help strengthen it. Also in the area people are chosen to take part in the share-out of both radio and television. The interview with the Director of Information and Public Relations Office has confirmed. (Director3, 2015; Interview)

We provide radio and television shows in Malay and featuring Malays, along with the Institute of Malay in Thailand in the SBPAC. The promotion via YouTube builds pride in their participation, for both the family and the community, which can result in improvements in psychology, language, identity, morality and encourage people to send officers to do the pilgrimage every year.

It is also important to take into account the behavior of the target area, with emphasis on radio communication, so that communication with the press spreads over more areas. In addition, the information was provided in the website's database, which the SBPAC can communicate online with 24 hour access to the house at any time.

Even in assisting healing it was seen that the success of that policy needs to be ongoing and must have cooperation from all agencies to support confidence and trust those officers affected quickly.

The Justice department has recognized that the communication process should be carried out properly by providing proper assistance and facilities. There must be an interpreter of Islam to the Muslim people and for the forensic process to prove the truth in criminal cases, to avoid communication errors and prevent omissions that may have accused the authorities of how they treat the Muslims.

Problems caused by the remedies are most often due to a case of misconduct of government officials. The disparity in compensation remedies vary with the offense because of the state policy leaders and policy implementation, which requires communication to be better understand the people who are affected.

The peace dialogue process should be disclosed to all parties and communicated to the public in the areas that had been informed during the process of the peace talks. Personnel development courses had been developed by staff and officials to further discuss the peace process in the same direction. From the in-depth interviews, the Director of Personnel Development Bureau said. “Another thing that must be learned by the talks during the peace process is to talk peace. We need to learn a new step in the process, according to the observation of the officials.” (Director2, 2015; Interview)

One of the communication factors to understand in the future, will be for the agency to have several more parties come together to make social communication and understanding each other more diverse. Especially in a multicultural society, it is essential that all parties need to learn to make exchanges with each other, because everyone will respect each other. If affected in any way, it should be made public to live together in peace and sustainable conditions forever.

Regarding the Communication factor, Van Meter and Van Horn (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975) have argued that the policy implementation requires communication of goals and objectives to the authorities and all those involved in the organization's hierarchy. Due to communication being a process that is complex in itself, it was a major obstacle in the creation of the purpose of such distortion. Therefore, communication is built on the success of policy implementation and must include clarity, accuracy and consistency in the communication process (Voradej Chandrasorn, 2005).

However, the research has focused on factors of media messages, which must communicate with insight into the level of service to the public. This is because of the security policy, which is the context in the three southern border provinces, and is different from general policies. . Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) have not studied the issue by studying the issue of communication between organizations only.

Therefore, the communication factor must take into account the variables that need to communicate, understand the variable factors that affect the application of policies, the complexity of coordinating the implementation of the various departments and associated factors influencing the policymakers and policy implementation together.

2) Organization competency: The study found that resolving the problems in the three southern border provinces problem will have to factor the Organization competence. The success of the policy implementation depends on the ability of practitioners to work just as expected. Such ability depends on the sub plots below.

(1) The quality of the personnel: The way to resolve the problems in the three southern border provinces problem needs to be sustainable, and there has to be a quality officer. Thus, personnel development is important and essential personnel of the SBPAC are preparing to deploy a new concept in the context of the three southern border provinces areas of all officers and civil servants. They must go through an orientation program and officials of the various agencies must comply with the concept in the context of the three southern border provinces areas alike, and in the same way.

Program personnel also include the village headman, the president of SAO, and religious leaders because they are the key people who have an interest and contribute significantly to the development. They interact better for all parties, to determine the strategic policies of the government, and provide cooperation in joint development projects in that area. This may be a dimensional network in the public sector, religious leaders, and the village because they are the people who need to be the quality personnel.

To optimize the quality of civil service personnel and civil servants to help the SBPAC, the government includes courses such as heart beat and understanding people, processes, conflict management, peace talks, having produced textbooks, the cultural dimension in space, and how to develop their ideas and provide better performance. So, this is a focus on the quality of the personnel staff. In addition, they will have a good sense of decency, morality and ethics, which is consistent with the concept of the Director of the Personnel Development Bureau. From the in-depth interviews, he said. (Director2, 2015; Interview)

The most important indicators are that the southern border provinces have peaceful civil servants with integrity and understanding and work more efficiently. So the preparation was good in sending servants to



the area by the Public Administration policy of Rama6, a factor that is critical to solving problems in the area.

Organizational competency factors, such as quality personnel are developed by the training course. To adjust the attitude towards the new work in the contextually targeted area more efficiently selected personnel were needed to come down to perform in areas, as bailiffs and so on. In an interview with the Director of Policy coordination and Social psychology he said. (Director7, 2015; Interview)

The personnel need training to develop their skills, and be ready to work with an attitude adjustment to suit the local context. At present, the Department is manned by selected personnel as bailiffs to run operations in the three southern border provinces.

The dimension in education is that teachers who are highly qualified personnel should be considered. Although, teachers are developed to a high standard of profession, technical instructions still show a lack of awareness, intention, commitment, sincerity, and dedication. There is a need for teaching students morals and ethics.

The results from several studies on the issue found that the most important indicators are that the southern border provinces have peaceful civil servants with integrity, understanding and functioning effectively. Thus, the preparation of a good public servant working in the area of Public Administration under the policies of Rama 6 is a factor that will help to solve problems in the area even more. Officers must be committed, dedicated, not lazy, and without bias which can be a cause of conflict. The personnel should have a sense of consciousness of their practice, and the system should pave the way for all parties to raise awareness and emphasize transparency.

(2) Leadership: Among Organizational competency factors, another important aspect is that the organization has a staff leader who has a strong mind, makes courageous decisions, promotes volunteerism and public morality. The SBPAC and the relevant authorities must have plans and programs to contribute to the

solutions in the three southern border provinces, so it is necessary to use personnel leadership in promoting joint thinking, joint decision-making and participation. To develop projects that might otherwise make the project fail and have the allotted budget go to waste is in line with the concept of the Director of Monitoring and Evaluation, at the Office of Policy and Planning. According to the in-depth interviews, he said. (Director4, 2015; Interview)

The key to project success is to be a community leader with a strong virtue, and work towards volunteerism, showing dedication to the public interest and not for their benefits. The area will be developed and things are going to be successful if there are very devout residents to cooperate as well.

In addition to leadership, the staff must show good examples by demonstrating responsibility, and paying attention to the activities of Muslims in the southern border. Acts such as showing respect to the culture and the Hajj have made Muslims understand and trust the government more. This is consistent with the opinion of the Acting Assistant Director of Haj Affairs, who said. (Assistant Director, 2015; Interview)

The leader, Mr. Phanu, is a good example. To send pilgrims to Saudi Arabia reflects a good example of understanding, and leads to accessing and developing policies that clearly show a concrete example of cooperation.

(3) The adequacy of the resources: By tackling the problems in the three southern border provinces it was found that the adequacy of resources such as personnel, budget, materials and equipment as well as related technologies is very important. The SBPAC stated that there are not enough personnel based on the number of projects that are in excess of the available personnel. However, budgetary resources are not a problem in the preparation of projects. This is consistent with the

in-depth interview of the Director of Treasury Bureau, who said. (Director1, 2015; Interview)

Problems with performance organization such as the number of personnel are not sufficient and there is a need to adjust to the idea. Understand the context in which the personnel must understand, leading to access and development. At the same time, the budget is not an obstacle to the implementation of the project.

However, to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces by policy implementation, there is a need to understand the real problems of the area so that the performance of the organization does not result in a wasteful budget, and the set target is met. The intention is to have staff that is dedicated, not lazy and without prejudice as to the causes of conflict and to have the monitoring, evaluation, and control done from top to bottom. The accuracy of information drawn from facts, and data from related research would affect the state of the policy. From the in-depth interviews the director of policy coordination, education, religion, culture and sport, said. (Director6, 2015; Interview)

In a matter of policy, considering the target institutions, both the public and the private sector has been improving the quality of public policy, and leading to finding sincere solutions to serious problems. We need to understand the real problems in the community before they make policy recommendations to be implemented without any wastage.

The perspective of the Director of Monitoring and Evaluation, and Policy and Planning Office is. (Director4, 2015; Interview)

The problem is the lack of monitoring and evaluation skills to use processing tools, lack of information or inaccurate information, and reporting of outcomes. Problems with the personnel rate are low

compared to the number of strategic projects requiring personnel with expertise. The needs are diverse, requiring a focus on enhanced management.

The information and publicity has solved the problem of resource materials and tools. The number of technologies related to the problem of adequacy and the use of shared resources and relationships with related organizations has also improved. The interaction that occurs is considered as the interaction that occurs under conditions of political confrontation. The focus on pursuit, support, negotiations on the allocation of resources or benefits between agencies or organizations in the process of policy implementation (Voradej Chandrasorn, 1984: 545-546) is done by the authority on behalf of the Department of Press and Public Relations Department as assistant secretary of potential common cause. The media used for publicity are the SBPAC TV Channel 11 and Yala's Public Relations Department. The efficiency and effectiveness has been confirmed by the in-depth interviews of the director of the Office of Information and Public Relations. (Director3, 2015; Interview)

In the past we got the news gradually. But in fact, we like to have our own TV station now. I think, we, as representatives of the Public Relations and assistant secretary of the Public Relations Department, are here, and have our media which is the Public Relations Department. The Television stability in Channel 11 in Yala was noted. We use this channel to benefit us as much as possible, to share resources.

The success of the policy implementation depends a lot on the decision of the lower-level officials, to use the limited resources. Even lower-level officials will be faced with situations where they are under pressure, but would still have to take the decision to try and use limited resources to achieve maximum benefits (Lipsky, 1980).

(4) Motivation: In addition to good quality and sufficient personnel, officials and staff have to be motivated to perform well. In the SBPAC there is a lack of promotion of civil servants working well, which is the one of the main performance indicators and important for motivation. From an interview, the director of the Central Office has said. (Director, 2015; Interview)

Organization Performance incentives for workers to achieve promotion within the SBPAC to a higher level, such as the Head of the SBPAC deputy secretary were not there. Most of the personnel reported to the Deputy Governor, the Interior Ministry who made the policy implementation a practice, and tried to boost the morale of the workers.

This is consistent with the concept of the Director of Policy Coordination, from the Social Psychology Office, who in his in-depth interviews confirmed. (Director5, 2015; Interview)

Motivation should be promoted in practice for personnel in the area to build morale. In addition, the senior personnel should be supported for their dedication and hard work.

Additionally, in the in-depth interview, the Director of Justice Office said. (Director8, 2015; Interview)

In performing the duties, the lack of incentives in the promotion, will cause panic and being discouraged by the lack of progress in the work. Justice needs to be provided to the personnel, who show a good quality of work.

In addition, the researchers presented the performance factors that organizations must support the policy factors, such as the various agencies involved to work together. The factors include the complexity of coordinating the work of various

agencies and the media messages in order to enhance the communication process of the policy implementation.

A key factor in tackling the three southern border provinces sustainability is a new process that the study found, that will make policy implementation of the SBPAC to succeed. It includes the following factors.

3) Popularity: As a result of the in-depth interviews of the operational staff of the SBPAC, the researchers found that the factors that lead to the cause of the unrest, are the values of the local community in the three southern border provinces. The problems in the educational dimension that can be seen in a clearly visible manner are society, parents and the local community, and religious leaders who also have values on the transmission side of the children. In the population studied in the target area, the focus is essentially more religious than academic. From the interview, the Director of the Office of Policy Coordination on education, religion, culture and sport, said. (Director6, 2015; Interview)

In society, the problem is that children cannot read and write because of the school administrators and teachers. Additionally, we need to see the values of the parents in the community, along with local and religious leaders. In terms of motivation, the school must have values that are combined to meet religion and academics.

Therefore, it should be a restructuring of the ordinary and religious subjects done appropriately to consider the needs of the profession. Students who want to pursue a career in the future should be educated accordingly. Religious leaders also stressed the need to study the religion fully.

Parents want to send their children to religious schools to know the values of the community, such as values that generate ideas to the youth from the religious teachers, funded by the government.

4) Value: It is an important factor and the researchers found that the factors of value creation and other related factors will guide and help solve the problems in the three southern border provinces. Due to the value creation resulting from its adoption, project implementation of Street Level Bureaucrats cause benefits

to the community. It leads to a better quality of life and let people have enough income to make a living, which will not be made public through the process incendiary example, of goods sold in the period. Hajj leads to economic development and poverty reduction, increases revenue and creates jobs in the community, in line with the concept of the Acting Director of Haj Affairs, who said. (Assistant Director, 2015; Interview)

Hajj can help developing countries, particularly developing economies because of the Hajj pilgrimage of Muslims worldwide. We are able to offer products of Thailand such as offering halal food of Thailand.

The factors of value creation must have cooperation from all parties; the SBPAC, Sheikhul Islam Office and relevant agencies must understand that creating value for the projects of the state ease the problems in the three southern border provinces, allowing people to understand the government more. The in-depth interview of the Acting Director of Haj Affairs confirmed. (Assistant Director, 2015; Interview)

We want to take care of the Muslims on the pilgrimage to not feel cheated. What we need really is to have strong values which can be quite difficult because it requires cooperation between the SBPAC, court sports vizier and government agencies, to work together. Seriously, I think it could be capable of leading the way for religion to plays a role in bringing about creation of values. However, in Saudi Arabia, there are also problems with the country having old ideas and still not cooperating fully.

But the past did not bring about success because of the cooperation of the relevant authorities who still lack an understanding of the Hajj, which represents the performance of the organization in terms of personnel to cooperate in such activities. It also includes the lack of the sincerity of the various agencies involved.

Bringing the value of the pilgrimage is taking place in cooperation with the local authorities, for example, the cooperation of those who had already come for the pilgrimage, including the Muslim brothers who had not been there. In order to prepare, understand, show empathy, and care for people who travel to Hajj and also their relatives, there will be a need to increase trust in the public that could lead to recommendations from the public for resolving the problems in the southern border provinces.

5) Feeling Management: Conflict and violence in the three southern border provinces arises in the field of media messages that communicate understanding of Muslim communities. During the operations, the military officers, police and civilians should treat everyone equally and reduce the pressure of some people seeing others as second-class citizens, thus leading to the same feelings among everyone. From the in-depth interviews, the Director of Personnel development said. (Director2, 2015; Interview)

Behavior is the condition that creates this area. I think this is an act of the Government of Thailand to the people in the three southern border provinces. Everyone in Thailand has to be at the same standard and in the raids as well. A double standard in the treatment of people in this area makes the difference to the conditions in this area. If there is no cooperation from the government, they are going to find an angry group of people.

In addition, the administration feels it must not make the Malay Muslims feel as second-class citizens and must treat people in the three southern border provinces equally. As a Buddhist it is essential to understand that duties are basic for everyone, regardless of religion. From the in-depth interviews the Director of Personnel Development has confirmed that. (Director2, 2015; Interview)

The problems center on the idea that Thailand Malay Muslims are second class citizens in a sense, and there is pressure on the economy to improve education in those seas and make an impact in every aspect.



The feelings of the people of Malaga have not been maintained in a positive sense, in spite of the budget being spent down. As long as we feel it made even a small impact, we don't mind that we paid a hundred thousand million Baht. Money is not a factor to win the good feelings of the people in the three southern border provinces, and to resolve the existing problems there.

So the policy to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces must have an understanding of the dimensions of the security work in that area. This can be considered as a factor in the management sense, to the people of Thailand and United Arab Malaga. Compliance officers should have the same feeling and reduce the pressure of people being seen as second-class citizens.

The solutions to the unrest in the three southern border provinces are based on the factors that influence policy, the implementation of the SBPAC, the messaging factors, the performance of the organization, and there are still factors of value creation, the management sense, and the factor of values as described above. This has been found by the researcher who has studied related research and also from his findings from the in-depth interviews of operational staff.

Therefore, the solutions to the problems in the three southern border provinces are based on the factors found from the further in-depth interviews of the SBPAC staff, affecting policy implementation. The researchers therefore had to adjust the policy implementation of SBPAC (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL) followed at Figure 6.1, which is divided into five groups of variables, as follows.

Variable Group 1: factors that affected the policy making include: 1) the appropriateness of the population in the target area 2) the social features and regional cooperation 3) the cooperation of the relevant agencies, and 4) the changes that occurred in supportive agencies or are involved.

Variable Group 2: the variable factor of complexity of joint action consists of: 1) the ability to coordinate between different departments that be able to work together 2) the complexity of the decision-making process (multiplicity of decisions) 3) the goal of the project conflicts or inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one goal 4) the ability to address the issue of delay projects that occurred.

Variable Group 3: the linkage of the factors that affected the policy making and policy implementation to practice together include: 1) the ability to develop and learn from the experiences to solve the problems 2) the effectiveness of the policy process which must understand and accept the importance of continuity and the relations between ends and means 3) the appropriate theoretical for explaining the policy characteristics.

Variable Group 4: the variable factors in communication of policy making and policy implementation. To focus on all levels of policy processes and appropriate to the local context.

Variable Group 5: a variable factor of organization competency for the policy implementation include: 1) the adequacy of resources, 2) the quality of the personnel 3) leadership 4) motivation.



**Figure 6.1** The Key Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation Outcomes of the SBPAC ( NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL )

### **6.1.3 An Analysis of the Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation from the In-depth Interviews ISOC Region 4's Forward Command**

The analysis of the key factors on the outcomes of the policy implementation to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces from the in-depth interviews of ISOC Region 4's Forward Command during July-November 2015, after the investigators analyzed, is detailed below.

The interview by the Director of ISOC Region 4's Forward Command focuses on the problem of the three southern border provinces by peaceful means, taking lessons on the weaknesses of the negotiation before use. This is regarded as the ability to work towards the development of education and experience to contribute to the solution.

It is also important to communicate with the public so that people can participate in solving problems in areas such as the stage, talking to people, and not less than 300 stages. This will take into account the suitability of the population in target areas as to what they want including the priority and urgency of the problem, and implement the solutions.

Communication is a key factor that will promote the government to accelerate the creation of infrastructure and cooperation in education, such as the creation of the 37 routes, which cost more than 800 million baht, and to get grade 6 students from Thailand to graduate at Al-Azhar University, Egypt. In addition, the military also needs to communicate. To understand the meaning of peace is significant in bringing peace together. Peace is an indication of the peaceful coexistence of the key that will allow us to have peace and the basis of the entire development process of the society whether it is developing cultural and ethical needs to operate in tandem or creating a balanced sustainable development.

Peace Dialogue Process is a process of major policies of the Government of Thailand to solve the problems of the three southern border provinces. This can be done by understanding the Communication Factor that will make all parties to communicate, understand and not detract from the purposes and goals of the policy. General Prayuth Chan-ocha (used to be the Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army) has said. (General Prayuth Chan-ocha, 2015; Interview)

The last words do not match. Lest they understand that it does not match with the outside world with the OIC and UN, this would lead to an internal problem of Thailand. We are not at war with anyone, but just as effective with the Law to achieve peace.

Another important aspect of the Communication Factor is to ask the media to cooperate with the news truthfully and accurately, without bias and without siding up with any party to communicate to citizens in the area to understand. General Prayuth Chan-ocha (used to be the Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army) has focused on this a great deal and has confirmed that. (General Prayuth Chan-ocha, 2015; Interview)

Today, therefore, the true and correct picture will be presented to the media, and not in the form of conflict. Do not tell the media what to write in the wrong way. Those who offer to create conflict should be asked to think before offering. Country is developing into Changing for the better.

Moreover, the military called on the society to support Thailand in a peaceful way and give the team a chance to talk. The two sides have worked together and explained that Peace Talks take time and effort. Both sides also need to build a lot more trust with each other. From an interview with Lt. Gen. Nakrob Boonbuathong, deputy director-general of the Internal Security Operations Command (Isoc)'s 5th Operations Co-ordination Centre, who is also secretary to a Thai peace talks team on Kom Chad Luek TV about the Peace Dialogue on the night of 31 August 2015 he said. (Lt.Gen. Nakrob Buathong, 2015; Interview)

For the third time seeing the true identity of the people who sit and talk about their principles is therefore a peaceful means of solving the problems. Six groups confirmed that the use of force was not known.

In addition, the Peace Dialogue Process still needs to continue using peaceful means. From an interview, the Region 4's Army Commander, Lt. General Prakan Cholayuth said. (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

As Peace Dialogue Process would have to proceed without any conflicts, and lead to Peace and harmony by not using force at the same time, it should create a supportive environment for villagers to continue their talks. This led to the Development of a concept to understand and develop a budget to solve the unrest in the south. There was no budget to meet the strategic issues.

ISOC Region 4's Forward Command has also focused on driving the Peace Dialogue Process in the southern border provinces and has set the stage for more than 40 times from 14 community groups, including the media. Governance would be done as much as possible. In the talks using three steps, ISOC could practice only one step, creating trust. Step 2, the signing and ratification of the Road Map, was a function of the government.

For Policy discussions with groups that differ from the government, the government has set the framework and policies clearly in ISOC Region 4's Forward Command. They have divided the budget, goals, and practices while the SBPAC and police will work together. All will be given individual targets and determine the responsibilities, including doing community forums to hear the opinion of residents on peace talks. ISOC Region 4's Forward Command has collected data from all sectors to the government to use the information to continue talking for the connection between Malaysia and Thailand at a federal, and not a local level.

In view of the military that is tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces, the concept to understand, access, and develop politics and the military, it is important to take into account the performance of the organization, the quality of personnel in the operation, and the personnel that work in the target group. These are appropriate in the context of space and also grant support work regardless of the Communication Factor. This is important in order to focus on communication with the public service, plans and projects that contemplate the needs of local people

with understanding, which corresponds to an in-depth interview of the Lt. General Prakan Cholayuth who wanted to communicate with the villagers in the area, and said. (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

There is a tearoom to sleep with the locals in the village. Creating intimacy, exploring the needs of the villagers, confiding in them, and befriending them, are examples of starting in a small way. These are solutions that are important to the village. Give yourself enough time to make up your mind, and sit down to adjust to the ideological struggle.

The cooperation of the relevant authorities resulted in the government officials taking measures to control the use of public space to be together to reduce violence in each agency and not try to use a special law to solve the problem. They should take measures to punish government officials who use force against the people, especially the relevant agencies such as the Volunteer Guard. Security and village law should be taken seriously, in addition to the besieged government officials who had rights to the use of special powers and might have misused them. With regard to the use of martial law as necessary to build confidence, the duty of the public officials, including emphasis on the practice of force must be conditions that are laid out. The administration of justice has led to the forensic examination of the accused, which that are precise and measures things clearly.

The performance of the government agencies will focus on integrating all the sectors together by converting the policy into action to achieve its objectives by strengthening peace and sustainable development. Apart from this, Thung Yang Daeng Model policy is a policy that takes into account the cooperation of local authorities. It is important to empower citizens to be strengthened by the care areas, the roads, and the route of the main staff of the army forces, as well as creating awareness for the people to participate in both security and development to meet the needs of the community itself. The main unit is a District Operation Center and the public sectors are 1970 villages in 37 districts to be powered up and work together in community care. This is a collaboration of local authorities which is an important

factor in determining the Thung Yang Daeng Model policy. From an in-depth interview, the Region 4's Army Commander, Lt. General Prakan Cholayuth, said. (Lieutenant General Pragarn Cholayut, 2015; Interview)

The heart of the Thung Yang Daeng Model is integrated into four sectors including the military, police, government and citizens and is split according to custody arrangement for the care of any one group, one company or one façade. In any serious situation, the checkpoints would be upgraded following the arrest by the law. There is a village headman in charge of home care. The system alerts the school health center to help each incident and there are notification systems to the military, and the police are laying down the system. Communication of the breakdown of the political structures must be established. Build stronger communities, focus on retraining and various support measures.

Moreover, the military ISOC Region 4's Forward Command, responsible for tackling the three southern border provinces, essentially the government officials and workers in the southern border provinces area, emphasizing that all departments work and plan solutions. The policy developed for the southern border provinces by Region 4's Army Commander and Director of ISOC Region 4, Lt Gen Wiwat Pathompak, is to reduce violence, to accelerate the development of the quality of life of citizens, enhancing the multicultural society and to build an understanding with people both inside and outside the country to support the recommendations of the government.

We can see that the policy of Region 4's Army Commander-oriented non-violence among the population of the target area in a multicultural society, focusing on improving the quality of life of citizens, and particularly improving the quality of life is required. The real needs of the people are a key factor in the social characteristics of the target area. The cooperation of the agencies involved in the project must be coordinated well. There is also the need to define the target areas to coordinate the project for approval by the ISOC Region 4's Forward Command. The



policy of Region 4's Army Commander, Lt Gen Wiwat Pathompak, said. (Lt Gen Wiwat Pathompak, 2015; Interview)

The main focus of the project is in six phases. Preparation of program, project implementation and project coordination practices with ISOC Region 4's Forward Command closely and if changes are planned, the project is scheduled to seek approval from the ISOC Region 4's Forward Command.

In the case of projects which are redundant and there are many agencies doing the same, they are to be integrated to provide maximum benefits to the population in the target area. Planning every project should be a program that can create mass psychology as well.

The proposal to modify any project has to be approved by the Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army Region 4's Army Commander. Making policy recommendations to modify the three southern border provinces has to involve the coordination of all the agencies involved. From an interview, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, who used to be the Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army, said. (General Prayuth Chan-ocha, 2015; Interview)

The solution to the situation in the south, is the duty of the army Region 4 Ready for the nine strategies - the fifth approach being sustainable. We have performed well, do not worry about what will happen when replacing Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army or Region 4's Army Commander, if it works as a good Strategy The Army has already placed.

Therefore, factors affecting the policy implementation, from the in-depth interviews of the Operational Officer ISOC Region 4's Forward Command, the ISOC Region 4's Forward Command has focused on tackling the three southern border provinces, which is the performance of the organization. The qualities of personnel in the operations, which should send personnel that work in the target areas, are

appropriate in the context. The performance of the government will focus on integrating all the sectors together to transform policy into action to achieve its objectives, including the strengthening of peace and sustainable development.

The cooperation of the relevant authorities leads to the government controlling the use of public space to be together. In case of violence by state officials, they should try not to use a special law to solve problems or else take punitive measures against public officials, particularly by relevant agencies such as the Volunteer Guard, and take the security village law seriously.

The policy is clear that there is cooperation from the public, and it is the Thung Yang Daeng Model policy. This policy is used to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, which takes into account the cooperation of local authorities. The key is to create the potential for people to be strong and able to take care of the area, the roads, and the route of the staff strength of the military, as well as creating awareness for the people to be involved in both security and development, and to meet the needs of the community itself.

Meanwhile, the Peace Dialogue Process still needs to continue to be held by peaceful means. ISOC Region 4's Forward Command has also focused on driving the Peace Dialogue Process in the southern border provinces to stage more than 40 times from 14 community groups, including the media, too. They have divided the budget, goals and practices. The SBPAC and the police will cooperate with all parties to define the target, and assign responsibilities.

The military of ISOC Region 4's Forward Command, responsible for tackling the problems in the three southern border provinces, essentially make the designated civil servants and workers in the southern border provinces area to abide by the plan, solve problems and develop the southern border provinces. The projects are redundant and there are many agencies doing the same. They need to be integrated to provide maximum benefits to the population in the target area. Planning every project should be a program that can create mass psychology as well.

Moreover, the military said modifying the Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Army and Region 4's Army Commander does not lead to modifying the policies to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces because of the coordination of the strategically designed agencies involving all ministries accordingly.

#### **6.1.4 An Analysis of the Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation, from In-depth Interviews of Southern Border Province Police Bureau (SPB)**

The factors critical to the outcomes of the policy implementation, to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, from the in-depth interviews of the Southern Border Province Police Bureau (SPB) in the period from September to November 2015, as analyzed by the researchers are detailed below.

Police in view of the problems at the community level, Local, Sub-District, and District levels must allow people at all levels to contribute comments. The real needs are in terms of criminal proceedings, security of life and property as well as public service as a factor of cooperation from locals to induce cooperation in order to resolve the unrest in the three southern border provinces.

More importantly, they should focus on tackling the issue of equality and fairness by talking peace with the government, which is seen as the best solution. More than this, respect for identity and way of life of local people, to honor, and to love each other can make the three southern border provinces beautiful and the people living there have proper manners.

The organization competency, regardless of the quality of personnel that perform their duties to the public, is seen by the justice fairly, that shows mercy, and provides power to the people. From the in-depth interviews, the SPB Commissioner said. (Police Lieutenant General Anurut Kritsanakaraket, 2015; Interview)

If anyone uses violence for no reason, and society does not answer the question, they will be eliminated and duties will be adjusted. They will not be able to work with people, to do something else. The problem of the shortage of troops in the border areas of South, according to Lt. General Prakan Cholayuth, Region 4's Army Commander, as the Director of ISOC Region 4, has been supported fully and the issue resolved without delay.

Urgent work to be done is to seek cooperation from the public through the Thung Yang Daeng Model policy by the political front, to stop the wrongful arrests, a duty to be done politely, and to focus on building understanding as a top priority.

Therefore, the police have realized the importance of the cooperation of the locals with the recommendations at the local community level, Sub-District, and District levels and must allow people at all levels to comment on their needs. On the subject of criminal proceedings, there is a need to consider the security of life and property as well as public service, aimed at tackling the issue of equality and fairness, and also to respect the identity and ways of the life of local people, to honor and love each other. This should be the nature of the population in the target area.

Organization competency must take into account the quality of personnel that perform their duties to the public and are seen fairly by the justice, showing mercy and giving power to the people.

In addition, the police believe that it is important to have peace talks with a group of people who see the state as the solution to the problem.

#### **6.1.5 An analysis of factors affecting the policy implementation from the in-depth interviews of the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC).**

Tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces is aimed at establishing peace and security of life and giving the property of the people rightfully back to the southern border provinces area, and tackling poverty and drug problems. Pol.Gen.Wichean Potephosree, Secretary General of the National Security Council (NSC), has said. (Pol.Gen.Wichean Potephosree, 2010; Interview)

The solution to the problems in the southern border provinces operated under the policy framework in two key government policy frameworks, which is presented to the Parliament. The Government policy is to focus on the urgent need to complete the action plan in the first year, which has been brought forward to the Government Administration. By providing a project budget plan, which supports a solution within the framework of government policy, is aimed at

establishing peace and security in life. It also supports giving Public property back to the southern border provinces area, coupled with the elimination of poverty and Drugs Power and Influence the people with the King's philosophy of peaceful approach.

They focus on the promotion of cooperation in all sectors of the public, in the administration of thorough justice, increase educational opportunities and quality of life, provide opportunity and equality, improve social and economic development in the region, respecting the identity, traditions of locals, and promote decentralization of the local government in a way that is consistent with the character of the area. This should not be contrary to the Constitution, focusing on the integrated management of all sectors to provide a unified result, both in policy and in practice, as well as updates. They also give importance to developing relevant legislation in line with modern conditions and treat those affected by the unrest fairly.

In the second framework of the Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Policy 2012-2014, the Office of the National Security Council has been prepared using both intensive and extensive processes. This policy was first implemented by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Act 2010 which came into force in December 2010. This Policy shall be presented to the parliament and government representatives have acknowledged that. It takes nearly two days in a 15-hour debate, in which most agree with such policies.

Solving the major problems would involve firstly, adhering to the strategy given to understand, access and develop the policy. Following the philosophy of sufficiency economy, politics and military should use peaceful means. The next priority is to focus on the root causes of violence. Violence has three levels: 1) the use of violence to the person of the parties 2) the severity level of the structure that is not justified by cultural conditions 3) the severity of the related feelings of local people, who are not recognized and are not part of Thailand. Moreover, there are significant problems arising in areas such as economic issues, land issues, and drug issues.

These are used to solve the three southern border provinces problem by creating security for the people, development in all its dimensions corresponding to the needs and lifestyles of the people along peaceful lines and healing those affected,

thoroughly and fairly. The fairness and transparency of the justice system should be based on decentralization in accordance with the Constitution of Thailand, and it should be open to the public. They should be truly engaged in the process of deciding on policies that affect the public. The stakeholders should be promoted to discuss the issues that arise at various levels and to find a way out of the conflict by peaceful means instead of violence.

Finally, the strengthening of cooperation from other countries, especially neighboring countries, and international organizations such as the OIC (the Organization of Islamic Council), based on the OIC's policy of cooperation to solve the problem is essential.

The problem of the policy implementation have led to the establishment of the Administrative Committee for Problems Solution in Southern Border Provinces to monitor and follow up the implementation of solutions in the area making sure they're in the same direction, with emphasis on related government integrated collaboration. The SBPAC, ISOC and other relevant agencies' security plans are released into the government policy. It also has an integrated operation, together with the Office Committee of the National Security Council and the relevant departments to solve the economic problems in the south and provides feasible solutions. The economy of neighboring countries is also comparable related to similar problems in the southern border provinces.

The economic policy is to maintain and promote the profession to the public in the area to help people who have problems with arable land. Additionally, a big problem is the problem of drugs that has accelerated, and there is a need to solve this problem in the area. The frontier provides a concrete track and expedites the healing process for victims in the border area.

The Communication Factor is to release to the public understanding and work practices of staff at all levels of security policy, in line with the opinion of Pol.Gen.Wichean Potephosree, Secretary General of National Security Council, who said (Pol.Gen.Wichean Potephosree, 2010; Interview)

The operating policy will be effective only when it is explained to the authorities. This is relevant to understanding the purpose and goals of

the policy in its entirety, and not to be construed otherwise. It may affect the performance of those with non-compliance, and may lead them in the opposite direction.

During communication in the Peace Dialogue Process, Mr. Anusit Kunakorn, Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC) was of the opinion that they must be more careful in the interview because the interviews in the past that caused confusion. Peace talks were both revealing and in secret ways, planning policies. There is a need to create a clear process, talk, build trust, and the media to provide true information from the government, but in a subtle way. The acts of communication to the public should be without distortions which correspond to the speech of Mr. Anusit Kunakorn, Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), who has said. (Anusit Kunakorn, 2015; Interview)

If the press can take the peace process in the right direction and have Informative and substantial talks that would lead to the development of the Peace Process. We believe that the media help, but the point is sometimes translated as deviant. News should be able to be interpreted, as otherwise it would not be good.

The cooperation of the relevant agencies and local authorities on tackling unrest in the three southern border provinces, are based on the view that a solution would require the cooperation of the relevant authorities and agencies, local soldiers, police and civilians by the military focused on security. Mr. Thawin Pliensri, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), has said. (Thawin Pliensri, 2014; Interview)

For the unrest in the region that would allow either party to solve the problem, all parties must work together, the soldiers had to carry out operations in the security sector, along with other parties in the field of development. After this, you have to meet with the parties in the following order.

It is also consistent with the concept of Pol.Gen.Wichean Potephosree, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), who has said that the South has many related sectors. The seizure of the government alone is not the main mechanical work that may achieve the policy so easily. There is a need to contemplate making co-decisions for the various sectors involved in the partner networks, both at the policy and the strategy levels and the practice should be widespread and varied. It must comply with the problems and needs of the target audience of each issue and all sectors. Stakeholders on the issue should be involved directly in the acceptability of these sectors and contribute to the problems as well.

Mr. Thawin Pliensri, Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), said that the Policy of the Peace Dialogue Process was already identified in the security policies of the southern border provinces. There is a need to create an environment that is clearly complementary to the quest for a solution in a peaceful way in order to preserve the life of the people, so it must follow the policy course. There is also a message to the people of the area that the public sector is important to lead the talks to find a solution to this problem.

Based on the Peace Dialogue Process, the government has set a national agenda for a long time, which is regarded as the policy of security in southern border provinces. Mr. Anusit Kunakorn, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), has said. (Anusit Kunakorn, 2015; Interview)

The fact that the government of Thailand has put it forward is a national agenda for a long time. There are committee-driven Peace Talks steering the committee, which is chaired by the Prime Minister in person. The country's main policy is to solve the three southern border provinces' problems, where the talk is not just another staple of the policy, the talk is now a national priority.

The Policy Peace Dialogue Process in the Government of General Prayuth Chan-ocha, Prime Minister and leader of National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), is very important because it is the best solution to solve the problem of



violence in the three southern border provinces, to reduce violence and build peace in the area.

In the case of the Secretary General of NSC who was to head the peace talks in the southern border provinces and the General Aksra Kerdphol, Chairman of the Advisory Army being assigned this mission instead, it is seen as a decision of the Prime Minister to fit the situation and time. Mr. Anusit Kunakorn, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), confirmed that “This is up to the Prime Minister; he will have to decide for the best. This depends on the situation and the need for each time, which I think the prime minister will choose what's best for the country.” (Anusit Kunakorn, 2015; Interview)

There were negotiations to talk to people from the state, and since there were many groups, it made it difficult at first to pull all the groups participating in the talks. However, the beginnings of the talks were good, because the goal was to address the needs of the people of the state. Tackling unrest in the three southern border provinces may take time because the problem is complex and cumulative. Lt-Gen Paradorn Patthanathabut, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), has said. (Lt-Gen Paradorn Patthanathabut, 2013; Interview)

It's a complex issue, the South has tried long to solve it. It must go section by section. To solve a problem that has existed for more than 20 years, in less than 10 years is challenging. Ultimately, if asked, “Can it be solved? I think it can be solved.”

In addition, Mr. Anusit Kunakorn, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC) said that all parties and all segments present at the talks were provided opportunities to give their opinions, which were diverse. It needed the people present to think beyond themselves. It was not specific to any one group, but all different groups, thus leading to a strong need for the talks.

Mr. Thawin Pliensri, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), said that the policies for resolving the issues in the southern border provinces were given a period of three years to be implemented and solutions to be applied under the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Act 2010 and is now there was

the need to review the policies that were made, which is based on the cycles of work. However, this has been followed by official inquiries related to this field, whether an old policy can still continue. So, now, it's taken the sectors of agencies working together to contribute to a solution to the southern border provinces.

The structure of management has provided south-powered solutions and has proposed the policy guidelines into three levels.

1) The policy of the Director of ISOC, together with the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC) established the Management and development Policy for the southern border provinces during 2015 - 2017.

2) Convert the policy into practice by establishing a working group to solve southern border provinces' issues, driven by the Deputy Commander in Chief, the Royal Thai Army's Chief Secretary and the Secretary of the NSC, and a need to spread to other units.

3) The execution of the ISOC Region4 care of security by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) oversees the development.

The plan to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces during the execution of Mr. Anusit Kunakorn, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), has a policy to resolve the unrest in the three years from 2015 to 2017 , and it is 1) To maintain order 2) To maintain the Justice process 3) Create a better understanding between nations and countries 4) Develop Education and Culture 5)Expedite the Development process and 6) Oversee the development of the performance of government agencies. However, since that has been the role of the Administrative Committee for Problems Solution in Southern Border Provinces, which has General Prawit Wongsuwon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, as president, it makes the outcomes from the implementation of programs or projects more driven and substantial.

Issuing a unified agency of collaboration between the government, military, police and civil defense found that in the past there was no operational coordination. The cooperation has thus been characterized by the people from government agencies, 20 central ministries, 55 units, the ISOC Region4 and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC). Mr. Thawin Pliensri, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), has confirmed. (Thawin Pliensri, 2014; Interview)

The problems of the South have been found in the origins of the 55 units of 20 ministries working in the South. They were working under the policy of the ministry itself. The power to solve all of the problems in the South is not in the hands of the ISOC and SBPAC or it could be that the 20th Secretary of the ISOC and the SBPAC did not go together.

The solution to the lack of unity in the contemporary work is that Lt-Gen Paradorn Patthanathabut, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC) has set the Operation Centre of the Administrative Committee for Problems Solution in Southern Border Provinces and perceived relevant problems. The unrest in the three southern border provinces is a matter of demands created by the secessions of the secessionist movement, and has transformed from the ideology to study abroad and a worldwide network. From an interview, Lt-Gen Paradorn Patthanathabut, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), said. (Lt-Gen Paradorn Patthanathabut, 2013; Interview)

It is typical of the secessionist movement. It is a Movement of the faith The violence has a global network and even those who go abroad get it that way. This is the Siam state ideology that took the Pattani state. These movements were covering it.

The development process in the three southern border provinces to solve the problems was sustainable. Mr. Anusit Kunakorn, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), was said to have drawn the relevant authorities in the three southern border provinces and ministries to develop it into an area to recognize the needs of the people. In addition, we will revise the budget plan for 2015 and 2016 to meet the needs of the people and has confirmed. (Anusit Kunakorn, 2015; Interview)

This year it aims to achieve sustainable peace and justice during the development talks. The results are evident. The situation is less severe because of a solution-oriented development. I believe that the

work has never been carried out by the government in such an integrated manner, and this project has reached out to all the people. All ministries are intended to be given more space.

In the part of the solution to the unrest in the three southern border provinces area, during the work of the General Taweep Netniyom, the current Secretary General of NSC, he said he had to persevere from Mr. Anusit Kunakorn who used to be Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC). He had implemented the guidelines based on the government, who had set a defined policy. However, he must act accordingly. There is a need to further continue to ensure that the guidelines set by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, Prime Minister, are followed, given the intense action, and make peace in the area as soon as possible.

Moreover, the focus on the Communication Factor in the data communication between commanders and subordinate agencies must be accurate and complete. He insisted that. (General Taweep Netniyom, 2015; Interview)

The task of the NSC is about the stability of the country and its people. So the work we do is based on the importance of the information that we need to carry out in the right way. The Commander should not be partial and make timely decisions so that nothing goes wrong.

The Security policy has been planned to provide information about national security from the NSC to all departments and agencies to prioritize the access of data by the security forces. Meanwhile, the Pentagon has proposed a defense plan to marshal resources to meet the strategic development of the National Security Council (NSC) issue. Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha updated the plan and instructed to work with security, to be able to build trust with the public.

In addition, General Taweep Netniyom, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC) said that a policy that is important is the urgent need to develop education. He also agreed with the economic development policies in the three southern border provinces that the southern border provinces area that can be developed as a special economic zone of the ASEAN Economic Community or AEC

is open. If achieved, it would be useful to the country. He said, (General Taweep Netniyom, 2015; Interview)

Continuing to develop the South cannot be stopped, despite the unrest that has occurred. Even after we successfully develop this area, development opportunities in other areas will follow. From the above statistics it can be seen that security incidents fell steadily and this proves the start of the success of the policy.

Tackling unrest in the three southern border provinces is to continue effectively. The government has set an action plan to solve the problem and develop the southern border provinces in the years 2015-2017. The responsible agencies, such as the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), have joined forces to perform and look forward to tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces in a clear and concrete way.

The agencies involved work on converting policy into practice by establishing the Administrative Committee for Problems Solution in Southern Border Provinces and the Secretariat of the Administrative Committee for Problems Solution in Southern Border Provinces of the Office of National Security Council (NSC), more specifically.

General Taweep Netniyom, the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), has said that everything is under the supervision of General Prayuth Chan-ocha, chief NCPO, and NSC as a consultant. The four main objectives are to 1) Reduce the violence in the area and seek a way out of the conflict by peaceful means 2) To provide area residents with a better quality of life and existence in society peacefully 3) To provide social strength to the southern border provinces, which is a multicultural society that should be strengthened and 4) To have the public, both in Thailand and the southern border provinces area as well as the international community understand and support the implementation of the Government.

The key is to establish a mechanism to propel the Peace Dialogue Process with General Aksra Kerdphol, Chairman of the Advisory Army, the Chief of peace talks in the southern border provinces as the main channel to talk to the group in the area, such as MARAPATANI, to find a different solution.

Thus, the policy makers have to set policies to be followed by all parties, for tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces. From the in-depth interviews of officers and the Secretary General of National Security Council (NSC), there was an idea formed that was aimed at establishing peace and security in life. Public property was to be given back to the southern border provinces area, coupled with the elimination of poverty and drug abuse and influenced by the His Majesty the King's sufficiency economy philosophy (to understand, access, and develop). The political and military approach led the way in the peace process and agreed on a policy of economic development in the three southern border provinces area that it can be developed as a special economic zone.

The cooperation of local authorities and relevant departments have focused on promoting cooperation in all sectors of the public in the thorough administration of justice, increasing educational opportunities and improving the quality of life, providing opportunities and equality, promoting economic development and social space, and having respect for identities and traditions of the local population in the target area. The problems with the policy implementation, led to the setup of the Administrative Committee for Problems Solution in Southern Border Provinces during Prime Yingluck Shinawatra. This Committee in the reign of General Prayuth Chan-ocha is monitoring things carefully to ensure that the implementation of the recommendations in the area is in the same direction by focusing on the integration of the related government work together with ISOC and SBPAC and other agencies involved. The problem with the unity of the coalition of government agencies, the military, police and civilians in the past have not worked together to coordinate.

The decentralization of the local government is promoted in a way that is consistent with the character of the area, is not contrary to the Constitution and is integrated to provide a unified management of all sectors and at all levels of the policy. At the practical level it involved improving the relevant legislation in line with modern conditions and the actual remedies as well as those affected by the unrest

fairly followed by the Southern Border Provinces Administration and Development Policy 2012-2014 under the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Act 2010. The solutions required the cooperation of the relevant authorities, and the local authorities, the military, police and civilians by the military focused on Security.

At the policy level, the emphasis has been on communication, by data communication between commanders and subordinate agencies. These must be accurate and complete, which focused on communications to public relations in the work practices, and understanding to staff at all levels of the security policy. Communication in the Peace Dialogue Process, Department of Policy, asked the media to present the news about the Peace Dialogue Process clearly, without any distortion, and without interference from the government.

Peace Dialogue Process is the best solution to solve the problem of violence in the three southern border provinces to reduce violence and build peace in the area. The government has set a national agenda during talks with a group of people who speak about it as a foreign government that still has many of the major causes of conflict, and with more than one goal.

The policy that has been implemented to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces is continually effective. The government has set an action plan to solve the problem and developed the southern border provinces during 2015-2017 under the responsible agencies, such as the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). They have partnered operation and look forward to tackling the unrest in the southern provinces clearly and concretely in the same way.

#### **6.1.6 An Analysis of the Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation in the View of the Various Groups**

From the interviews conducted by the researchers with the population and study group, for example, a group of scholars, religious leaders, and politicians, about their opinion of the Government of Thailand and the civil society, the following problems and the factors that influence the policy implementation were found.

6.1.6.1 Views of politicians that the solution to the three southern border provinces will be solved by the political parties, resulted in them taking part in the peace talks as a major factor. Some of these politicians are seen as a problem, as they might be politicians behind the unrest in the southern border provinces, allegedly involved in smuggling or drug trafficking and encouraging additional cause to maintain interest. In addition, it is also true that the movement's armed forces struggle for independence.

Moreover, religious organizations, such as only the Islamic Council, are still not enough. All the parties should come to help and support with the cooperation of the relevant authorities and the cooperation of local authorities, and should take into account the lessons learned from the experience.

The nature of the local society and the cooperation, in the policy should be such that the society should have the development of health and education, and standards should rise. In addition, they should have the cooperation of local authorities. Government agencies should have taken various initiatives to accelerate poverty reduction, including the community to create a better life and security of life and property.

Moreover, the MARA PATANI group still has no unity. Some politicians present a special form of local governance in a multicultural way but must first ask the people in the area about their needs from the government, which are their rights.

So, to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces a political solution involved being led by the military and for all parties to participate in the peace talks, which was a major factor. All the parties should come to the aid and show support because this is the collaboration of the relevant authorities and of local authorities, which should take into account the lessons and experience.

During the Peace Dialogue Process, the politicians commented that MARA PATANI group still has no unity and present a local specialty in a multicultural environment.

6.1.6.2 The perspective of historians points out that history has deep-seated issues and the media when communicating was hiding an underlying factor in the conflict in the southern border provinces and tried to distort it, as was the case in



2001, After 400 years, Holland had coordinated the Delegation for relations and celebrated the 400th anniversary of the first Delegation by Pattani. Holland and Thailand (Meaning the current government of Thailand, of which Pattani had been part) were synonymous with old documents, but the government would choose to go back to 2004, which reached 400 years of non-Pattani, Thailand. This was the case and in that way, there may be a link to a story about the history and causes related to the incidents of violence.

Education was a way to solve social problems, obviously, with the use of education to instruct the public about a sense of civic government, that discrimination is wrong and establish a good conscience. The disclosure of the fact that history is better concealed was important because the public had become more accepting of government. If the government would not soon try to explain the concept of concealing it, it would be hard to stop the memories of conflicts.

Thus it is better that the historical truth is concealed, rather than the media distorting history, which could be a cause of further conflict in the area. Furthermore, the issue of education, such as low levels of education as a social space, is one cause of the insurgency in the three southern border provinces. Thus, it requires a study to hone to instruct the public a sense of civic government, that discrimination is not right and establish a good moral sense.

#### 6.1.6.3 The views of scholars

Some scholars' views on the issue in the three southern border provinces are that it is caused by pressure on the identity and the scramble for resources in the area. A mix of the Culture and Communication policies are important to communicate to the population in the targeted areas, so that they have more understanding of the bureaucratic development, openness, and allowing the use of the Malay government. In addition, communicating messages to the public is important, who need know to facts about the local politics. However, the media's going to be a problem when reporting about violent cases. An example of this is about the Executive of the Municipality, Mr. Sungai Kolok, who was indiscriminately fired by the M16 by the opponent who lost the elections, and luckily did not die.

The solution then is to first push forward the peace talks and to disclose the news to the public, which is important for Communication to make

lower-level officials and local people understand the process and the benefits they will receive in the target area. A good policy will have to try to get people to participate in the process to open up the political space.

During the Peace Dialogue Process, there is the perspective that this is an example of good development that would clear the group's insurgency and address the needs of people with roles in groups based on patience and sincerity.

The Peace Dialogue Process must take lessons or experience from abroad to meet with movements and organize appointments, systematically and on a continuous basis. The group came together to talk to people in the organization to bring in a foreign country and have them in operation only in terms of the movement, such as the BRN group. Some structures, however, were not distributed, and had a centralized control. According to the Police Operations Center in the area, many of them did not accept the deal, which suggests that the opponent has talked with many groups, leading to them having conflicting goals and more than one target, causing no unity in the process too.

Opening the Asean Economic Community (AEC) leads to political pressure and the government of Malaysia or ASEAN needs to push for a solution by way of peace in the southern border provinces.

This was seen as the cause of social nature in the three southern border provinces, and the poverty of the Muslim population could lead to their secession and going against the religious principles. Lessons for developing solutions could be taken from the SAR in China that was designed for solving issues in Hong Kong, based on 'one country two systems'.

The issues of the importance of the power units, both civilian and military, are seen as the dominant one, and the equality of power between military units such as the Police Operations Center is seen as a prestige that is superior. When restructuring the organization, the agency put into practice policies that led the SBPAC under the ISOC in development with a view that the military might seize the operating stability.

The use of legal measures to resolve the unrest in three southern border provinces by using Section 24 provided in the movement, generating reports without charges is a good measure. However, the wanted outcomes are more concrete by

disclosure, to be accepted in public. The tracking of staff should be made with a pure heart in order to avoid suspicion.

Failure to understand the real problems could be the cause of the problem. The policymakers not believed to be separatists fact, changed the policy mistakes, and lack of screening data received from the person is involved. The approach should be Bottom-up, regardless of the mix in the policy.

The civilian, military or police, having a different culture, can become a variable that affects the solution to the problems in the three southern border provinces.

Moreover, the problem that is obvious is the lack of knowledge on conflict management. Stakeholders need to come together and accept each other and the government requires openness. The opportunities for solving the conflict should be on the basis of knowledge, and people achieving unity by working well with each other.

Some scholars are of the opinion that Feeling management is vital in tackling the three southern border provinces. The magistrate, police and soldiers, when interacting with the locals in the areas, have to realize that people have needs for communicating in different languages.

The military operations come into the area with special care, which requires the ability to manage feelings of the people as well. Moreover, the regime is still afraid of the impact of international politics especially in southern areas.

Scholars' views from outside the area are that the solution to the issues in three southern border provinces was not achieved due to the budget allocated to the area being too much. Some people do not want to end the situation of insurgency, and there is corruption, even among the insurgents who remain.

The Motivation Factor should be that the Ministry of Public Administration carries out tasks, based on moral principles and considers the chosen position. The meritorious issues or bureaucratic patronage is seen as a move to get welfare and commissioner positions in the three southern border provinces causing panic in the morale of workers and lack of motivation to perform their duties.

Therefore, scholars have commented that the problem in the three southern border provinces is because of the pressure on different identities and the

scramble for resources in the area by using a policy mix of the culture of the government, which are appropriate for the population in the target area in the three southern border provinces. In addition, they have commented on the nature of the society in which the poor which deals with individual rights are contrary to religious principles.

The Communication Factor is that the message is important to communicate to the population in the target area. The message out to the public needs to be made and communicated to conflict areas in particular, the policies must be disclosed to the public talks of peace that must acknowledge and continue talking systematically. It is necessary to take lessons or experience from abroad used to resolve conflicts. Although, the opponents say there are many groups that have conflicting goals, there is more than one target, causing no unity in the process of talking too much. Also the lessons of experience in developing solutions can be taken from the presentation of the SAR model, in the case of China, that is based on “one country two systems”.

Scholars also commented on the causes of unrest in the three southern border provinces being the issues of giving importance to the power of execution units, both civilian and military, which are different. The Reorganization agency policy to be put into practice was improper. The use of legal measures to resolve the three southern border provinces’ problems by Section 24 must be matched with the Communication Factor by exposing them to a greater public acceptance and understanding of the real issues causing the problems. The officials, policymakers and Operational Officer with a different culture, should be able to work well together.

In addition, the Operational Officer must have the ability to manage feelings of the people as well. Performance issues and motivation to work are some of the factors that influence the policy implementation as well.

#### 6.1.6.4 The viewpoint of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) of Thailand

Abu Hafez AL Hakim, one of the members talking for peace in MARA PATANI, the member of the BIPP, said that there is no need for the Government of Thailand policy makers in tackling the three southern border provinces through the peace process and set the national agenda as having continuity in the peace talks. The

movement has gathered strength in MARA PATANI, that make talks with all the main results, and we can see the unity of the movement. On the other hand, Haji Sama-ae Thanam, who used to be a leader of the PULO, a group of the Thailand government, thought that there is still no unity and there is still no confidence in the government of Thailand. Dr. Wan Kadir Che Man, who used to be a head of Bersatu, refused to join peace talks with the critical view that for the Peace Dialogue Process to succeed, it must come from the agents who should talk to the Prime Minister, and must be very reliable. Moreover, the concept of Haji Sama-ae Thanam Abu Hafez in terms of not letting the people of MARA PATANI participate in the decisions of the Peace Dialogue Process, is seen by the local authorities.

Dr. Wan Kadir, who used to be the head of Bersatu, claims that the present environment in the three southern border provinces is causing significant issues MARA PATANI. However, due to external factors not happening because the group does not support the separation of powers, the country is stable and wants to include more countries, especially non-Muslim powers.

In terms of support from people or groups in the country, Wan Kadir sees it as possible because there were many groups that did like and did not like the government. The people who did not like the government did not have to be a group of Muslims, because they already had power struggles within their own parties. In the talks with the junta, General Prayuth Chan-ocha said that these were talks with people who have the real power. He also said to continue the discussions started in the government of Yingluck and to prevent disruptions, which corresponds to the performance of the policy process to understand and accept the importance of continuity and the relationship between ends and means.

He affirmed that the struggle for freedom and sovereignty of the Malay Muslims in the three southern border provinces has been ongoing since the annexation of the Kingdom MARA PATANI to Siam in 1902. The annexation of the party or a movement called 'Seizing colonies' was a condition of unrest in the three southern border provinces during the regime change of Rama 5 (1868-1910).

The Thai Government should formulate policies to solve the issues in the three southern border provinces, taking into account the characteristics of social fairness first by dissolving the image that people would always be oppressed, that was

held onto by parents and people he people in the area a long time ago. There was a need to treat people with respect who had the traditional identity, language and culture of the Muslims They were in the majority, and had to be considered as appropriate demographic factors in the target area. Wan Kadir said it is not necessary to divide the land, if the government handles them well. Most people do not want independence but want social peace, the oversight of their lives and the development of local economic prosperity has replaced the use of military weapons.

Perspectives on Communication Factor of agencies involved in tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces include appointing a Muslim in the position of the relevant authorities in order to communicate with people in the area. Wan Kadir said that even the three southern border provinces needs to have a Peace Dialogue Process, but it does not match the needs of each group.

Each group's effort still resulted in no unity. The major problem is the lack of accurate information to the people in the area and do not understand the actual situation, like the Muslims in the three southern border provinces to Malaysia, are not a promoter but go to work in Malaysia. This can make us aware that Thailand still lacks effective governance in the field of communication clearly, and even though Thaksin said 'petty thief', it does not reflect the correct information.

Therefore, the Non-Government Organizations want the Thai government's policy makers tackle the unrest in the three southern border provinces by the Peace Dialogue Process, and to define a national agenda to achieve continuity in the Process. The Peace Dialogue Process will be successful, if it is represented well, and the Prime Minister talks with the most trusted. People in the MARA PATANI area did not participate in the decision of the Peace Dialogue Process and this is seen by the cooperation of the local needs of each group, although they do not match. Although, in the process, there is no unity, it has created a group MARA PATANI to achieve a greater unity.

People whose opinions differ from the government of Thailand have seen that the solutions need to understand the causes of the real problems of the region, which takes into account the factors of social features that give fairness the priority. This would affect the people, who were oppressed by the regime that exists in the minds of people in the past. In addition, they should treat people with respect,

who have the traditional identity, language and culture of the Muslims, and who are the majority. Demographic groups in the target area and the state of Thailand have suggested that there is no need to divide the land if the government handles them well because most people do not want independence. Most social peace requires the oversight of life and the development of the area in terms of economic prosperity instead of armed soldiers.

An approach to tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces in terms of the Communication Factor is that the agencies involved should appoint a local Muslim. They should have the duty of the relevant authorities in the area to talk and communicate with the local people and deliver government information to the public that must be accurate and clear.

#### 6.1.6.5 The views of Islamic leaders

Tackling the three southern border provinces in the past has made one thing clear and that is organizations and religious leaders still have to cooperate in the field of peace. At present, the Central Islamic Council sees the importance of being an intermediary in resolving the conflict and collaborating with Sheikhu Islam Office and Chairman of the Islamic Committee in 5 southern border provinces as a link or intermediary between the state and party dissent. This is a partnership of organizations, where religious leaders are involved. In addition, they are also creating a partnership of local cooperation from organizations such as religious schools, Islamic Foundation Coordination Center TADEEKA in 5 southern border provinces, Pondok Institute in 5 southern border provinces, and other organizations, to come together to propel the peace. From an in-depth interview, Sub.Lt. Abdul Hafiz, Ph.D., Islamic Committee, Yala, has said. (Abdul Hafiz, 2015; Interview)

The Provincial Islamic Council in the past never thought to be a mediator to solve the unrest in the area yet. You may have to talk at some stage. He then returned to develop the people's skills to be intact. But we went back to the organization of things in such a way that religious leaders should also be invited to host and all. Organizations come together to solve problems together anyway.

The solution to the conflict in the three southern border provinces has the need for people to work together as a network all sectors. In addition, the cooperation of related organizations needs to be adjusted to change the culture of the organization and for the creation of peace, and not quarrel. The Islamic Council, Yala, has said. (The Islamic Council, Yala, 2015; Interview)

The creation of peace, is not of any one person, and has to work as a network. The common goal is peace, but there may be ways in which the Deep South Watch is different to others, but it is aiming for peace. MARA PATANI might have its own ways, which is not like us, but the goal is peace as well.

The discourse on tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces focuses on communicating to the public, and is aware of the important factors that could cause the driving force to build peace together, like a billboard campaign about peace, such as the case of the written word DAMAI ITU INDAH (Peace is a beautiful thing) and the Aceh, Indonesia after Tsunami, which is bringing the lessons of experience from abroad or used to resolve conflicts. The government, the Islamic Councils, Ponor schools, TADIKA or even the local administrative organizations both PAO and the Municipality, and the SAO need to cooperate or build a discourse of peace together.

The analysis of the factors must be supported by the organization's leadership competencies that leaders need to understand the target mass empowerment, initiative, understanding, and cooperation driven solutions. They should share and create a discourse for solutions in the three southern border provinces.

Tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces, in view of the religious leaders was from an interview of Mr. Abdullohmae Josae, president of the Islamic Council, Yala, who seemed to have the following opinion. If a conflict arises, people are even more troubled about Muslim religious leaders, who were seen as potentially implicating the insurgents, and made the State Department of Thailand not to have trust. When presenting suggestions for solutions together, not everyone



will give priority to the religious leaders and the issue is not resolved on the spot. However, the field of communication and understanding in the Government of the Islamic Council does not have problems and are well understood.

The analysis of the government policy from the perspective of Sheikhul Islam shows that the ruling was based on a fair and impartial guidance to the public in solving the issues in the three southern border provinces. This was done using the lessons of history and experience in bringing a solution to the conflict in the area. The case in the days of the Mongol, for Genghis Khan's troops to seize Baghdad, then, is against the rule because of the Mongol non-Muslims. Muslim parents in Baghdad were to be treated with justice, and the golden age of Islam in those days made thousands against the government, but justice made against the state power declined, which is consistent with the concept of Mr. Ahama Tuyong, Vice Chairman of the Islamic Council, Yala, who has said. (Ahama Tuyong, 2015; Interview)

It requires mutual understanding among all religions, Emphasizing Communication Factor for all parties to understand each religion by letting religious leaders explain. Communication to the public is key to the understanding of coexistence in a plural society.

Moreover, it should be pretty good to create a society that is more understanding of Islam to prevent a wave of hatred of Islam in Thailand and is regarded as communication to everyone in society to understand Islam. Thailand. From an interview with Mr. Arsit Pitakkumpon, Sheikhul Islam, he said. "Morbidity of hatred of Islam in Europe will spread in our country. Therefore, Muslims are required to solve the problem. The image given is pretty good and society has to understand Islam." (Arsit Pitakkumpon, 2015; Interview)

The hospitality of the Muslims is the key to understanding the people of Thailand. Therefore, we must show goodwill towards others because Islam teaches us to be more compassionate toward others, as religious leaders. We need to cultivate the goodwill of others, so that more people understand Islam.

Policies tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces need to focus on improving the quality of education and the economic community. The

Islamic Council has improved the quality of education by a campaign to boost academic studies more as the technology changes.

The cooperation of the relevant authorities, such as the Islamic Council was involved in tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces, with the SBPAC project focusing on the needs of the people to truly lessen the violence, and bring about the well-being of the people in a professional way. There is also collaboration with the SBPAC, to solve problems together, for example, training young people before marriage, to strengthen the understanding to the public before the marriage is supported by the SBPAC, and the Imam Project and training. The Imam Masjid care needs to understand the duties properly supported by the Ministry of Culture.

The issue of drugs is regarded as a major problem and will need major solutions in the three southern border provinces. The following opinion is by Sheikhul Islam in relation to it. (Arsit Pitakkumpon, 2015; Interview)

Drugs are a big deal for most of us today, and our mission is to help take care of people, because drugs destroy humanity. We are human because they we have the power to think. But drugs make people not think and this is the destruction of humanity. The destruction is greatest if Drugs are not mentioned among other problems.

Solving the drug problem needs to be raised to Masjid, which is an organization that has the potential to improve the quality of life of the community, especially the problem of drugs. Mr. Abdullohmae Josae, the Chairman of the Islamic Council, Yala, said. (Abdullohmae Josae, 2015; Interview)

The problem of drugs is a serious problem that the government has taken measures to solve for a very long time. But why is there a generic drug epidemic in the three southern border provinces? I want to solve the problem very seriously and help only from people would not be enough to succeed, but the authorities must jointly solve problems and intend to crackdown on drugs.

In addition, the drug problem in the area must have authorities take it seriously. The Vice Chairman of the Islamic Council, Yala, said the issue of drugs is a major problem and is affecting tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces and departments. The police must take action to combat the serious situation.

The Peace Dialogue Process is seen as a Process that should continue its talks, and talk openly without too much delay. If anything can be done, it should be done gradually, lead to further negotiations and should not be too hasty, which corresponds to an in-depth interview with Mr. Ahama Tuyong, Vice Chairman of the Islamic Council, Yala, who said. "Talking is good for peace in the exchange of ideas, but they should agreed to abide by the talks and show sincere trust in each other." (Ahama Tuyong, 2015; Interview)

Therefore, religious leaders must make a conscious effort to serve the community, not the imam leading prayers alone, but need to raise awareness to the community and to contribute to improving the quality of life of people in the community. Religious leaders should cooperate in the development of the local community that has also shown cooperation. When local people have a better life and goodwill towards others, inevitably the cause of problems in the three southern border provinces diminishes. More than this, the religious dimension in tackling the three southern border provinces must adhere to the principle of mutual understanding and coexistence and understanding between all parties should have sincerity.

So, the party leader Islam by the Central Islamic Council of Thailand has seen the importance of being an intermediary in resolving conflicts by working with Sheikhul Islam Office and the Islamic Council President in the five southern border provinces as a connector or mediator between the government and party dissent. It is a partnership of organizations, religious leaders and with the cooperation of local authorities. The coordinating organizations such as religious schools, the Islamic Foundation Coordination Center TADEEKA and Ponor institutions in five southern border provinces, and other organizations need to come together to propel the peace and work on modifying the culture of the organization as peace and not war.

Muslim religious leaders were seen as potentially implicating civil disorder. Thailand does not trust the government to make an impact on the

organization and the important religious leaders in solving problems. On the issue of the Government of Thailand, from the perspective of Sheikhul Islam that ruled the seizure of fairness and justice to the people as a guide to solve the issues in the three southern border provinces, the lessons of history and experience help in resolving conflicts in the area.

Muslim religious leaders should focus on the social aspects of all religions to understand each other and live together in areas highlighted by the means of communication, to understand each other in all religions. Religious leaders must explain and communicate to the public an understanding of coexistence in a plural society, creating a good society and a greater understanding of Islam.

Policy solutions in the three southern border provinces should focus on improving the quality of education and the community's economic growth. The cooperation of the relevant authorities and the provincial Islamic Council were involved in tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces along with the SBPA. They have focused on plans with the true needs of the people to make the violence less. In terms of solving the drug problem, it needs to be addressed at the mosque and sent up to the organization that has the potential to improve the quality of life of the community. It is affecting the solving of the problems in the three southern border provinces, and religious leaders must participate in improving the quality of life of people in the community.

The Peace Dialogue Process should be seen as a continuous and open Process.

#### 6.1.6.6 The View of the Buddhist Leaders

The Buddhist view is that the violence in the southern border provinces are not the caused by the belief, whether the teachings and practices are similar or different. It is because there should be a common theory in the teachings and practices of religions about peace, to be shared between congregations that believe differently. Identities have a grace and are different in different cultures and religions, based on the interviews with the Royal Primate, Co-chair of the Religions for Peace, the Inter-religious Council of Thailand, and the Justice Primate of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, who jointly agreed.”There should be joint congregations of every

religion. Do not be fooled by mistakes, that would result in no good, and increases the suspicion and antagonism that results in the fall.”

The cooperation of the relevant authorities to exchange ideas for collaboration to bring peace back was a key factor in tackling unrest in the three southern border provinces. This would involve collaboration between the five leaders of different religions and religious congregations. In addition, it also has other divisions such as the Religions for Peace, the Inter-religious Council of Thailand (RfP-IRC Thailand), Thai Muslim, Buddhist and Chinese Association of Pattani, the SBPAC, Fatoni University, and the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP), Mahidol University, including the governor and ISOC Region 4's Commander.

In addition, they offer the teachings of the Buddha to solve the issues in the three southern border provinces. The principles coexist with love and unity. Mr. Somkiat Thongsri, Director of The Secretariat of the Sangha Supreme Council, has said that in the midst of a situation of political conflict, different opinions, schisms, there is a party going on right now (including a brawl with each other until the big stories). Many times, people have dynasties in the suffering and lives are very difficult. Therefore, in Buddhism there are six principles of unity that apply to humans and animals to be living together happily. That is an ‘Sa-Ra-Nee-Ya-Dham’, that consists of the following aspects.

- 1) Mettâmanokamma (mental loving kindness)
- 2) Mettâvacîkamma (verbal loving kindness)
- 3) Mettâkâyakamma (bodily loving kindness)
- 4) Sâdhâraóabhogitâ (the sharing of any lawful gains with virtuous fellows)
- 5) Sîlasâmaññatâ (the keeping of the precepts without blemishing the rules of conduct along with one's fellows)
- 6) Diöôhisâmaññatâ (being endowed with right views along with one's fellows)

The sixth principle anchors the mind of the nation towards unity and harmony, and being affectionate towards each other, which is what brought peace and prosperity to the society and the nation.

The party leader of Buddhism presents the teachings of the Buddha to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces. This is by principles of coexisting with love, unity and collaboration in the doctrines and practices of the religion, which will work towards peace that is shared gracefully between congregations and believers of different identities.

#### 6.1.6.7 The Perspective of the Civil Society

The information is from a statement of the network PATANI 14 organizations nominated for the Peace Dialogue Process, "Agenda damai dari rakyat" in the media day peace. This is the Southern/PATANI No. 2: Visible/Visionary Peace at Meeting Room 2 Faculty of Communication Sciences, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus on February 28, 2015 (DSJ (DSJ) 2015, 3 January).

In summary, there are many demands on the current issues, such as the twin paradox, reducing the lead to violence, sexual attacks on soft targets and public space, and to open space safe for the public. The public in the peace process will be coordinating the understanding between the oppositions. The public awareness to support the Peace process for the demands of each organization is summarized below.

##### 1) Civil Society Council of southernmost provinces of Thailand.

Mr. Abdul-Aziz Tade-in, serves as a statement reader about 'declared intention to support the Peace process in the southern border provinces' which is by the Prime Minister, who agrees with the statement 230/2014 dated November 26, 2014 to implement a mechanism of Peace dialogue to proceed further. It is seen as the most important part of Peace. The overall process, which calls for all parties to make a significant contribution to the cause of the conflict is based on the issue of justice, administration, and culture, and calls for a need to reinforce democracy in the region. So, it has to call on the direction of solving these problems and to eliminate the processes that did not work out.

##### 2) Community Faith Networks "Kumpong tukwa"

Mr. Aeromlee read a statement from the damage that the violence has taken root to the public generally. The solution requires the public to participate in the Peace dialogue, which will be subject to the satisfaction of the political, economic, and social factors, education and public health, which must comply with the religion and honor ethnic differences. It requires the participation of civil society and cooperation to curb violence.

The driving force of the civil society and the public is extremely important and should reinforce their full potential. Communities should encourage faith, bridging disputes by peaceful means. This should be in accordance with accurate development and the readiness to cooperate fully, with all parties concerned, with the pure intention of the Peace dialogue.

### 3) Foundation for Child Development, Pattani

Mr. Humdee Kaosa-ard read a statement to end the violence in the region and show sincerity to solve the problem through negotiations, and to deal with the impact of violence and issues of the local people by mainly coming to talk with them. The development of a common identity together by people can end the distortion of history, as a condition of further violence. During the negotiations each party should be given the opportunity to present their opinions or desires equally. The government should provide immediate help to the families and relatives of inmates, in case the violence in the southern border provinces reaches them. Both sides must put an end to violence on all sides, not just arrest religious leader and people from Ponor institutions. We want to take into account the quality of life for people in areas such as education, well-being and economy coupled with reducing inequality, unequal treatment and public mistrust, with no suspects arrested repeatedly. We do not want weapons training to be provided to the children, because the two sides should end the use of children in armed conflict and to create a safe space for the public.

### 4) Hearty Support Group

Ms. Subaida and Ms. Koreeyoh read a statement about the safety of all children. The drugs affected people, both directly and indirectly, and they have the right to be protected. The talks should take into account the rights of citizens and civil rights without discrimination based on race and religion. We ask that everyone consider and discuss with the citizens of both sides.

### 5) WePeace

Ms. Patimoh, Association Chairman of WePeace, read a statement. Violence has claimed the lives of 32 women and injured 60 people. Cremation action which is done irreverently as cut-throat cremation is a reduction of human dignity, and contrary to the universal principles and religious principles. The Association therefore calls on for the following measures.

(1) All parties to respect and protect the lives of women and children who are weak targets.

(2) Request to set up a special commission to find the truth and take measures to protect the fairness and healing.

(3) A dialogue between people of different religions to live together in peace.

(4) Have the ICRC to protect these people, including medical personnel.

(5) Increase the proportion of women's roles in solving problems in the south, including the Peace process. Give condolences to the families affected long ago, strongly condemn all acts of violence against soft targets and call for bringing the perpetrators to justice which is truly urgent to build confidence in the lives of normal people.

#### 6) Peace of Southern Boundary's Organization (POSBO).

Mr. Thaweesak read a statement that the severe loss in quality of life affects the educational, economic, and social and other comparable regions. The Peace dialogue process should focus on the issues that are agreed upon most important and guide the conversation towards solving those issues. This can happen when they are accepted by all parties, as to end attacks on soft targets, the use of explosives in the community, breaking the system and more. The legal issues will have to create a better atmosphere. It is a sensitive issue to the Peace process.

We urge all parties to reinforce the Peace process simultaneously. Advocates for people across the country were aware of the developments in the Peace dialogue process and should ensure that the event occurred during the talks. We urge all parties to be patient and tolerant in the Peace process, as there are arguments and criticism against the Peace dialogue process that is undermining the Peace dialogue process down.

#### 7) The Association of Southern Political Science and Public Administration (ASPSPA)

Mr. Suwit read a statement that he wanted to help the parties come together to make everything better again. We call out 1) to respect and believe in human dignity and equality 2) to support the society, government and civil society by



all parties to achieve peace in the area, 3) to secure the party communication to further Peace dialogue in the future.

#### 8) Buddhists Network for Peace (B4P)

Mrs.Unchalee Kongsrichalern read a statement that the government of Thailand should carry out peace talks clearly and effectively. A conflict must allow a civil society in Thailand, having Buddhist and Muslim participants or observers to be able to share an open space and connect and talk freely at the table.” I want to have a different opinion to cease attacks on vulnerable targets to enhance the ambience of the Peace dialogue and to continue with the opening of a safe space to speak of.”

#### 9) Deep South Women’s Association for Peace

A joint statement of the Women's Network 6 Network include the Deep South Women’s Association for Peace, Zauquna, Network of Buddhist Women, Yala, and women who have been affected by the situation in the southern border provinces, which issued a statement on International Women's Day on 8 March 2015

We urge women to participate in the decision-making processes and mechanisms in the public issue process, taking into account all dimensions, such that proportions are balanced, there is male-female equality and the dignity of the human person is respected. In the past, very few women were involved in decision-making mechanisms. Their participation in the Constitution demanded a safe space for soft targets such as women and children, and the cease of acts of violence against those areas as well.

We support the Peace dialogue, but would also include dialogues with communities of different religions and cultures in order to reduce conflicts that occur in those communities. Women's potential is to be a focal Seminar media and contribute to the remedies to protect human rights and reinforce the Peace process. We call on the government to allow women to use their potential and promote the role offered.

We want to give women the opportunity to communicate and present the news in the media when it is actually happening around, not to extend the conflict but to understand that it happens in the society as well.

## 10) Public Health Network, Yarung.

Ms. Ropeeah read a statement that a decade ago the people, through a network of public health, had urged the government for safe spaces for the public and places of worship that would be fair to treat and help those affected.

## 11) Dream South

The Representative read a statement that the Peace dialogue will be subject to the principles and the benefit of all citizens in the southern border/PATANI and must not conflict with the expressed threat of civilians. There should be adoption of open space for political expression for the citizens in the southern border/PATANI. For political activists, there should be an opportunity for movements or political activities in the southern order area/PATANI. Thailand's government must admit the existence of the different opinions and to identify popular keywords, or the word "PATANI" that means for who, and it should be said clearly.

## 12) Youth Voluntary Heart

Ms. Romeeara read a statement that 11 years ago, there were many things that caused distrust in peace such as injustice, caused to Mr. Muhumhud, who did not believe in the justice system. There is no doubt that the Peace dialogue has to take place. The issues of distrust and injustice were only talked about but no major opposition parties ever asked the people their wants and needs, and what kind of security was needed.

## 13) DBPMT (Dewan Bahasa Pustaka Melayu Thailand)

Mr. Hamiding read a statement that the institution supporting the Malay Jawi script is unique to Indonesia and remains the most forgotten. Especially in Thailand, the development of writing Malay in the region is linked to the prosperity of the other kingdoms in the region. Starting from links with Sanskrit, English or Arabic that is associated with Islam that came with it today are used by Malay writers who have more room to use the Jawi script, which people were oblivious to. We tried to still revive Malay Jawi script even further.

## 14) Photo Peace of South (PPS).

Mr. Fuaud read a statement that gives us a chance to view the 'vision of peace' bloom, with the proposal of the public asking all parties to cease violence and

to reject incitement to violence, that will create a negative atmosphere for the society as a whole. The photographers are ready to cooperate and work together to display visions of Peace with the networking process at all levels, inside and outside the region as well as internationally.

An analysis of the views of the civil society, and its role in tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces, is given below.

The Peace Dialogue Process will be an opportunity for the civil society in Thailand, Buddhist and Muslim participants or observers to connect with the public and provide solutions. Public participation in the Peace dialogue is open and a safe space to talk of an end to the violence in the region and show sincerity to solve the problem through negotiations. The talks should take into account the rights of the people and civil rights without discrimination of race and religion. Please keep in mind that everyone could face conflict, and that is the people of both sides.

The Peace dialogue process should focus on the common issues that will be discussed such as the creative issues and the acceptance of all parties to cease such attacks that target the weak, the use of explosives in the community, the destruction of the education system, and more.

The Peace dialogue will be subject to the principles and the benefit of all citizens in the southern border/PATANI. There is no doubt that in the civil society Peace dialogue takes place as there are people only talking about a couple of issues, but no major opposition parties asking the people what they want.

The view of the civil society is that the cause of conflict in the three southern border provinces is the problem of justice.

The solution should be a policy on the management culture and reinforce democracy in the region. The solution should take into account the quality of life for people in the areas such as education, well-being, the economy, coupled with the reduction of inequality and mistrust, and without arresting suspects repeatedly who might have been through the ordeal already.

The Communication Factor should put an end to the distortion of history, as a condition of further violence. The civil society participation in the talks should be initiated by the Peace process, to be communicated by intermediaries. Understanding the people and the promotion of the public across the country should

take into account the developments in the Peace dialogue process and should review the incident during talks with the parties to secure communication to contribute to Peace dialogue in the future.

In addition, women should be given the opportunity to communicate and present the news. The media should not only focus on the facts of conflict and violence only, but should understand and show the real happenings in society as well.

In the view of the Civil Society Council of the southernmost provinces of Thailand on the cooperation of the agencies from the locals to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces, the peace process in the region will focus on partnerships with various groups, such as women or religious leaders of all faiths. Also, to highlight the issues of justice, decentralization and the Peace process, in an interview with Mr. Muhumhadayup Patan, Senior Editor of DWS Organization and Chairman of the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Provinces of Thailand, he said. (Muhumhadayup Patan, 2015; Interview)

Council members will have to increase the Civil Society Council of southernmost provinces of Thailand, to be more and more diverse. It also seeks to open space to work with a more diverse group of people, whether women or religious leaders of all faiths. Meanwhile, the Council also needs to focus on justice issues, decentralization and the Peace process.

Moreover, it should establish partnerships with academic institutions with the view of cooperation in the country. It should work together with the AEC when using the lessons and experience in tackling violence.

The Civil Society Council of the southernmost provinces of Thailand was set up on August 20, 2011 by the civil society organizations in the southern border provinces consisting of 20 organizations. It is a founding member, that brings synergies to contribute to the direction and measures to solve issues seriously by the forces of peace, knowledge, wisdom and power of virtue, the exchange of learning, coordination and mutual support between the organizations, both government and

private sector, as well as communication, and creates a public space for change and society.

The analysis was found that the Civil Society Council of the southernmost provinces of Thailand is an organization created in collaboration with the relevant agencies, both government agencies and the private sector, by creating a network of civil society organizations. It has a role to mediate in the Communication Factor in order to communicate with the public in understanding the target area as a central public space to reduce conflict and build peace in the area.

The Civil Society Council of the southernmost provinces of Thailand has proposed maps to peace by the civil society bordering PATANI as well. The result of the mobilization of the Civil Society Council of the southernmost provinces Network, known as the Road Map peace, deals with the government parties on both sides. The Peace Dialogue Process of the Government of Thailand involved the BRN, civil society, media and the Malaysian government as facilitator of the Peace dialogue Presentation Road Map that took place during the month of June 2013. This was after the Peace dialogue process between the Government of Thailand with a representative of the BRN began on February 28 of the same year. Several proposals from the Road Map this has been driven to the present day, such as creating a safe space, peace, communication, participation of citizens, including the creation of an atmosphere conducive to talks in the area, etc. (Deep South School of Journalism, 2015).

Communication with the peace border to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces is essential, in the viewpoint of the institution's role in the communications center. The Faculty of Communication Sciences, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, believe that peace will only happen if the process involves performing communication to ensure the safety of use of that freedom. The important goal of the operation is to create communication and mutual understanding. The values of life include the creation of a society of peace and the agency that created the space for a safe space for communication. This takes into account the cooperation of the local authorities to carry out welding activities, technical cooperation and communication between the peace Corps with the relevant authorities both within and outside the university as well as educational institutions, civil society and the private sector as the public forum in conjunction with the people's college and

Deep South Watch Center (DSWC) (Communication Science Faculty, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, 2015).

Thus, the Peace Dialogue Process must allow the civil society, academics, local leaders and religious leaders in the target area to be involved and the public must have the space to co-present a solution for peace which contains a message that is important at all degrees of communication solutions, in the three southern border provinces.

The People's College is a part of the civil society organizations and its mission is to be a center of training courses/programs, workshops, both short-term and long-term for the public on the issue. The political and peace process in PATANI/southern border area would provide a space to talk about peace.

The Deep South Watch Center is a public sector organization to create the space needed to communicate to the public about peace and how to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces through the blog Deep South Watch ([www.deepsouthwatch.org](http://www.deepsouthwatch.org)). They are using the media more and as more people use the medium to communicate to more diverse groups. The social media is a media used by the religious leaders, the government, the civil society, the private sector and citizens to take part in the presentation of opinions widely. In the past, there was only the mainstream media and some space for people to express their opinions on how to solve the issues in the three southern border provinces, and it happened unilaterally to communicate with local people (Faculty of Communication Science Faculty, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, 2015).

These are the views of the civil society on their role in tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces.

The Peace Dialogue Process will be an opportunity for civil society participation in the Peace dialogue. It will be an open and safe space to talk of an end to the violence in the region and show sincerity in negotiations to resolve the issue. They should consider the rights of citizens, civil rights without discrimination as to race and religion. The arguments should be heard with regard to all the citizens of both sides.

The Peace dialogue process should focus on the issues agreed to guide the conversation towards the issues creatively and should be accepted by all parties as

means to end attacks on soft targets, the use of explosives in the community, breaking the system and more. The Peace dialogue will be subject to the principles and the benefit of all citizens in the southern border and PATANI areas.

The cause of conflict in the civil society in the three southern border provinces of is the problem of justice. The solution should be a policy on the management culture and reinforce democracy in the region, regardless of the quality of life of people in those areas, and focus on education, well-being, the economy, coupled with the reduction of inequality and public mistrust by not arresting the suspect repeatedly who has already been through the whole ordeal.

The Communication Factor should stop distorting history, as a condition of using violence to civil society participation in the talks. The Peace process communication should be shared by the intermediary to understand the people, and the promotion of the public. They were aware of the developments in the Peace dialogue process and should review the incidents during talks with the parties in order to secure the communication. This will lead to Peace dialogues in the future, provide women with the opportunity to communicate and present the news accurately through media, about the violence and conflict, so that people should understand that it happens in the society as well.

In view of the Civil Society Council of the southernmost provinces of Thailand, and the cooperation of the agencies from the locals to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, as well as develop the peace process in the region, it is important to focus on partnerships with various groups, like women's groups and religious leaders of all faiths. In addition, there are issues of justice, decentralization and Peace process. The collaboration with educational institutions is to review cooperation from international countries and AEC together. From the AEC, they should take the lessons and experiences and use it for solving the violence problems.

. The view of the institution's role on the communications center is to improve communication and peace. The Faculty of Communication Sciences, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, is the agency that created the space for a safe space for communication, taking into account the cooperation of the local authorities to carry out activities to coordinate technical cooperation and communication between the peace Corps with the relevant authorities both inside and outside the university.

This includes educational institutions, the civil society and the private sector, and the public forum in conjunction with the People's College and Deep South Watch Center.

#### 6.1.6.8 The View of the Governor, the Three Southern Border Provinces.

The solution to problems in the three southern border provinces of Thailand is the mission of the government that is relieving the suffering and the dissolution of Parliament. The governor considers the participation of citizens in the area and the cooperation of local factors, whether it is the government, religious leaders or community leaders. He recorded an agreement or MOU on cooperation in building peace in the region, during the administration of Mr. Nipon Narpitakkul, who used to be the governor of Pattani.

The strategy of Pattani in tackling the three southern border provinces are looking at the cooperation of all parties involved, from the people of Pattani to everyone together, cooperating and jointly developing equally with an urgent agenda of Pattani, called agenda 12 contains PATANI.

- 1) Pride Tania is to create a common pride in being a citizen and a native of Thailand, Pattani. It is the land of Pattani civilization and a cultural treasure
- 2) Brittany is a way to create common values of the people of Pattani by stressing the Unity Volunteerism and culture of peace
- 3) To solve the economy, Tania focused on professional fishing banks, savings and social welfare systems that comply with religious principles and the establishment of the Council of Economic locals
- 4) 'Pattani: a city to visit' is held by the Historical and Cultural Center and is the third event in the southern border provinces.
- 5) Pattani town sports- Using sport as a medium to create a harmonious space to the youth to take advantage and create professional athletes.
- 6) Brittany focused on building the brand image of Pattani. This is a quality product and has marketing strategies to promote sales.
- 7) Holds the kitchen of Tania as the source of cereal crops, having the Halal Hub Full kitchen culture (Thailand - China - Muslims) and seafood warehouse.



8) Smiles Tania focused on smiles for the people who received services and impressed the tourists visiting.

9) Stanislas news on the dissemination of information to encourage investment tourism and selling products during the Pattani Campaign to value cultural diversity.

10) Stanislas Rak Focus on the management of natural resources and the environment, from the mountains to the sea.

11) Strong Pattani Focus on health care creates a strong family and community System, providing security in life, property and the fight against drugs seriously.

12) Stanislas children are the future. Develop education and languages along with promoting ethical doctrines and creating opportunities for youth employment. If there is no hope, there is no future in Thailand.

The Analysts have said that the strategies in the provinces featured solutions to issues covering all aspects The Pattani people were involved to suit the local context and social characteristics. From an interview, the former governor of Pattani confirmed that. (Nipon Narpitakkul, 2011; Interview)

The strategy of the government "Good day to our Pattani", with a focus on proactive adoption of good ideas, plans, projects and say it's all integrated begin to see tangible results in a short time based on "Pattani people" as the center and goal of development. Pattani is considered the "home" of the Pattani people of all races, all religions are involved as owners are responsible for developing and maintaining the place equally.

In addition, the view of the governor of Narathiwat in tackling the three southern border provinces is to highlight the cooperation with the relevant authorities as well. The province will work with governments, the private sector and the public sector in the form of a network coordinated by the clock. It is the policy of the provincial government to the King's Majesty with the strategic insight, access and solutions to guide the southern border provinces, including the provincial government,

according to government policy. In addition, he also takes into account justice to all citizens. From the in-depth interviews of Mr.Nattapong Sirichana, who used to be the former governor of Narathiwat, he said. (Nattapong Sirichana, 2013; Interview)

The emphasis on working to create fairness for all citizens equally confirmed with working with the public sector, private sector and civil society partners in the network to provide synchronization with each other. I believe that working in the area should not be a problem at all since I served as Deputy Governor of Narathiwat before.

Mr. Kritsada Boonrat claims that problems in the southern border provinces are not specific. They are not only because of the insurgents having separatist ideology, but are subject to various interest groups. The losers in the policy of the government led them to falsely create violent situations.

During the administration of Mr. Kritsada Boonrat, the policy plans and projects of the province of Yala, include

- 1) Subsidies paid to the descendants of Yala are for both religious and educational causes, such as 7000-14000 baht each to the private schools, for a total of 64 schools, including eight districts, and the total annual budget being 531 million baht.
- 2) The construction of a Rubber Development Factory, Betong and Garment Factories, and Raman to increase revenue to the people of Yala, with the total budget of 40 million baht.
- 3) Support and Help Occupation by distributing agricultural inputs and professional training as well as build and repair homes of the needy 96 villages, in 8 districts.
- 4) Red Cross Bureau Scholarship to help 4,538 disabled people with a budget of 4 million baht.

The analysts have said that the projects above led to the development in the target demographic that looks at the social and educational opportunities, and monetizes the society professionally to reduce the disparity in Thailand's Buddhist

and Muslim communities. This causes a great problem to unravel in the three southern border provinces.

So, the governor said solving the disputes should take into account the participation of local people, especially the cooperation of local authorities, whether government, religious leaders or community leaders (cooperation and common development equally) to fit the local context and social characteristics. They should focus on cooperation with the relevant authorities as well. Provincial agencies will cooperate with the government, private sector, and civil society on the nature of the network, which has coordinated all the time by following the policy of government of the province under His Majesty the King, with a strategic understanding reached and led to development.

Problems in the southern border provinces are not only the insurgency with ideological separatism alone, but also the interest groups that are disadvantaged in the policy of the government which led falsely to create violent situations.

#### 6.1.6.9 The Views of the Public Sector

In the views of the public sector, for tackling unrest in the three southern border provinces, the government should have policies in developed areas in the three southern border provinces to prosper economically and be competitive with its neighbors, Malaysia in particular. The focus should be on the development of the basic infrastructure, professional development, generating revenue for the public and making the quality of life of local people better by developing a special economic area.

We found that the need for knowledge management and to solve more problems, and for the concept to work (access, understand and develop), the government must be open-minded.

#### 6.1.6.10 The Views of Muslim Students' Leaders

The role of students in the three southern border provinces, in addition to representing the residents, youth, and people in demanding freedom and fairness, is that they are the parties directly interacting with the government and security forces in forming joint solutions to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces. Many years ago, a student was shot and killed by unknown forces and parties, and students were arrested and detained during litigation and pressure variations, which

had the government officials gather. Persekutuan Mahasiswa Anak muda dan Siswa Patani or PerMAS was established on March 8, 2008 (formerly known as Student federation of southern border province) and it is an organization whose role is to make peace and to fight for their human rights, which broadcasts to the public to serve as a central base and a central organization supporting political students and the youth of PATANI.

In addition, there are also organizations that are engaged in tackling the unrest in the southern border provinces by taking a role as an interface between the organizations and as a spokesperson to present the facts to one side so as to provide options. The society has to understand the problems surrounding those areas.

From an interview with Suhaimee Dulasa, a faculty of education student at the Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus and chairman of PerMAS at present, we come to know that they have seen PerMAS with the government. "The military brings political" solutions to the conflict in PATANI. At times, the government is trying to develop a solution, but at the same time refuses to open the political space to the PATANI yet. Although there are activists or human rights, they have also been threatened by the authorities, both directly and indirectly, including enclosed halls, or Dis-credit-based social media.

The Peace Dialogue Process is supported by the PerMAS in all its forms and guidelines and does not support violence. There are many ways to approach peace such as the talks, discussions and open forums and the right to self determination is one way to combat violence. Whatever the final outcome of the Peace or through the referendum process would be, it would just be the most satisfying way to peace. PerMAS was pleased as well and the Chairman said "We insist that the answer would be yes if people work towards peace, and PerMAS would be pleased to peace with it." (Suhaimee Dulasa, 2015; Interview)

Thus, the views of Muslim students' leader is that they were involved in tackling the southern border provinces by taking a role as an interface between various broadcasts presenting factual information on the other side so as to provide options. The society has to understand the problems surrounding the areas. The Government of Thailand continues to lead the military in the political solutions to the conflict in PATANI. Many times, the government is trying to develop a solution,

but refused to open the political space to the PATANI yet. Also, several people were threatened by the authorities, both directly and indirectly.

PerMAS support the peace process in all its forms and guidelines and do not support violence. They just want people to appreciate the peace.

The researchers proposed that to make the policy implementation of SBPA (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL) driven powerfully and effectively to impact more quickly and concretely, there should be a discourse created on the problem in the three southern border provinces. The authority should have a role in shaping the discourse.

At the policy level, policy makers need to understand the benefits to be gained from creating discourse that the public interest in the target area will receive. Such discourse has to be communicated to the media, whether mainstream media, social media, the civil society or the media from the government and anti-government groups.

Many years ago, in the Peace dialogue process, the parties established a policy of the Thai Government that has changed the discourse to Peace dialogue process for peace. Due to the uniqueness of the Peace dialogue process for peace, it is seen that peace will follow only on having created the peace first.

At the level of policy implementation, which is putting the leading programs and projects into practice in the target area, they must play a role in shaping the discourse to strengthen to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, in each incident (such discourse Thung Yang Daeng Model, a discourse that is unique, which is planned by the security policy of sharing both the state and region consisting of the people and comprising 13 steps). The Thung Yang Daeng Model is used in the case of troublemakers who used arson attacks in 6 schools. In order to show pictures of taking responsibility for the mistake committed by authorities operating at the lower levels, is the Special operation Officer, who is in charge. In an incident involving clashes, 4 dead bodies were found and 22 arrested at Ban Tochut, Thung Yang Daeng District, Pattani.

The discourse lies ahead for further talks to be made to the people so that they feel that the authorities are closer to them, which is affiliated to the activities and needs of the people in the development of the community.

Moreover, the discourse of bombs in the three southern border provinces displays a unique signal communication out of sight from the symbolic areas to show that violence occurred in the three southern border provinces. It reflects that the formation of peace in the region still remains a potential and Thailand wants to see the government play a major role in the society during that time.

Therefore, the authorities in both policy and policy implementation will require more plays to define or create a discourse in tackling the unrest in the three southern border provinces, and continuously to achieve outcomes that benefit the people in the target area and spread to cover as many areas as possible.

## **6.2 An Analysis of the Remaining Problems and Obstacles**

Although the government has to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces along the route of policy implementation by considering the role of the agency in charge then, the outcomes of the policy show that even though it was implemented effectively into the area, the insurgencies still occurred constantly, and some events were extremely violent too. Therefore, it is necessary to conclude what are the problems and the obstacles that remain? What is the cause? This would be in order to analyze the recommendations and proposed solutions to the problems effectively.

The main problem of the southern provinces had gathered that the SBPAC faces barriers in the development of the southern border provinces by processing from the research stage to public hearings and workshops in the fiscal year 2012, as it appeared.

A survey of public attitudes towards the south of the current research, conflict and cultural diversity, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, have found that the problems are in the sequence 1-5: 1) Drugs 2) Unemployment 3) Unrest 4) Poverty and 5) Lack of arable land.

The main problem is that the people want the government to implement the solutions quickly, including the first five.

1) Youth employment and occupation 2) Drug problems and solutions 3) Increase of household income and revenue 4) Development of agriculture and livestock and 5) Education issues.

The above information reflects the national importance of the issue of economic and social concerns over the unrest.

In analyzing the problems and the obstacles that remain, they still happen to people in the three southern border provinces, which have been affected by the rising unrest of the terrorists directly. However, the primary agency responsible for the policy implementation of the SBPAC faces the problems of the lack of integration with government agencies and civil defense, the lack of efficiency in the public administration, budget, control, supervision and intensive care problems, that need directing and coordinating the government to adhere to the policy of government strategic development of the southern border provinces.

The problems of the policy implementation's leader are that they are a civilian government agency. Due to the climate of insecurity from violence that happens constantly, the function of the government needs to be in a manner that requires intensive solutions to resolve the problems by changing rapidly and not remaining stuck in a traditional and strict Government Policy. The problem behind the situation that occurred in the area is that tackling the unrest must be civil to enhance security by strengthening the community. This is especially to enhance public to cover all areas and make the personnel of the agency perform by complying with the various projects, and come back to work in the security forces.

Problems and difficulties still arise with local people because most people are not truly engaged in the process of joint thinking, joint decision and joint action. This makes the performance not meet the real needs of the people who appear according to the research report of the Evaluation Plan developed by the southern border provinces 2012. It was found that the roadmap project, implemented in the area do not meet the real needs of the people.

Moreover, people in the three southern border provinces found that citizen participation in the process of a project was based on selected target groups that focus on relatives or close personal leadership. This results in the lack of recognition and trust of the public.

The problems and obstacles encountered with the implementation of such policies, requires the government to have a policy to enforce the law equally. The Education Policy found that support for education is not widely disseminated. Policy budget allocation has found that the distribution of the budget to the SAO is less. The Policy of Governance and Security Policy found that the style of governance is to the effect that local people are involved in the region and this should reduce the role of security forces, especially the announcement of the decree and must lead the way of religion with family to solve problems of all kinds.

From the stage of the dialogues, engaged to get the opinions of people from all sectors to solve problems and develop the southern border provinces, 7 stages were concluded. The barriers include 1) The problem of insecurity in their lives and public property caused by six factors of the state officials, influential gangster, power and darkness, the opinion of the government, and the media and interest groups, 2) The quality of education, provided by both the government and private sectors is still low, the study also did not respond to reality in terms of religion, language, identity, TADEEKA schools, and Ponor institutions 3) Conflict and violence caused by being treated unjustly due to differences in language, identity, ethnicity, interests of influential groups, government officials and local influence, prejudice against the rulers of the people, controversial drug issue and residents in the area lacking a good education, and 4) Issues cannot be justified by the arrest of citizens without evidence and showing discrimination in regard to dress, their religion, when they worked, and those who graduated from overseas were paranoid about their identity and language, and the fear of Malay being crushed and the rightful ownership of government land delayed.

So, to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, using government policies, with the beginning of the national security policy on the southern border provinces, No. 1 (1978-1997) cover the shortfalls and all the problems and the need to achieve coordination among government agencies to implement solutions to the region in the same direction. The key objective is to strengthen peace in the region and create a better understanding with the Muslim countries. It is also the beginning of the SBPAC established in 1981 to convert the policy into concrete action.



The researcher believes that from an analysis of problems and obstacles that remain, the government must act fast and make its policy consistent with the state of the problem by carrying out various projects which is the agency's primary responsibility in accordance with the strategy set out to get the outcomes and an overview of the factors that influence policy implementation.

There are also problems with the quality of life, particularly drug problems, career issues, uneven economic development, particularly critical infrastructure. So, to solve the problems in the southern border provinces, there is a need to understand and be understood, to honor and respect each other.

### **6.2.1 The Result of the Analysis of the Remaining Problems and Obstacles**

Although the SBPAC has organized various programs and projects in order to solve the problems, each project has both succeeded and failed, according to the factors that influence policy implementation, but the problems still exists. Researchers have broken down barriers that have existed into three parts: The first part is the policy, the second part is the operation, and the last part is the people in the target area of three southern border provinces, as detailed below.

1) In terms of the policy: The government has a policy to enforce the law equally. The Education Policy found that the support for education is not widely disseminated. The Policy budget allocation was found to have distributed fewer funds to the SAO. The policy of the government and security policy was found to form a ruling to the effect that local people are involved in the administration over this and should reduce the security forces, especially the declaration decree, including the need to take religious principles with the family to solve all kinds of problems.

2) In terms of the operation: The problems and obstacles that existed as of the work of the SBPAC, were the lack of integration with government agencies, civil defense, the lack of efficiency in the public administration, budgeting, controlling, directing, intensive care, and coordination of government agencies to comply with government policies and strategies to develop the southern border provinces. In addition, the performance of personnel who are continually making the

personnel of the agency must be abided by the project and must come back to work in the security forces.

3) In terms of people in target area: Most people do not truly participate in the joint thinking, joint decision and joint action and this makes the performance not meet the real needs of the people. The problems that still exist are: 1) the insecurity of life and property in the six main areas: government officials, influential gangster, powerful dark force, the opinion of the government, media and interest groups, 2) the quality of education by both government and private sectors is still low (management studies do not respond to the truth in all religious, language and identity aspects) in TADEEKA schools, and Ponor Institutions, 3) conflict and violence caused by being treated unjustly, differences in language, identity, ethnicity, interests of influential groups, state officials and local influence, prejudice against the rulers of the people, controversial drugs and residents in the area lacking a good education, and 4) issues not justified by the cause of the seizure of evidence and discrimination being in regard to dress, their religion and when they worked, and those who graduated from overseas being paranoid about their identity of being Malay and the delay over the allocation of the arable land of the government .

The main problems that the three southern border provinces are still experiencing include quality of life, particularly drug issues, career issues, and uneven economic development, particularly critical infrastructure. So, to solve these problems there is a need to understand, honor and respect each other.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

To study and research the issue of the unrest in the three southern border provinces, the policy process and outcomes, with the outcomes of the analysis of qualitative data. It can be summarized as the following analysis. The content is divided into six sections according to Chapter 7.

#### **7.1 Conclusion**

The study was conducted based on papers of Thai and foreign researchers, lessons from documents and articles abroad, online analysts, online newspapers, interviews and document summary of the operational outcomes of the SBPAC, stakeholders and related agencies; which can be concluded and summarized as below.

##### **7.1.1 Development of the Unrest Situation from the Past to the Present in the Three Southern Border Provinces.**

The study found that from the development of the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces from the past to the present, the issue can divide the state into 13 times since the beginning. It was begun during Rama 5 (1868 to 1910) until during the session of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) (2014-2015), being a 147-year period of the analysis, it can be concluded that the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces began early due to changes in the country, policy and governance, and education as well as modifications to the local culture in the southern border provinces. This causes resentment of the anti-government insurgents and protests continued. It began with the integration of the incendiary. The formation of an insurgency was by various

groups (1968-1979) such as BNPP , BRN , and PULO until the rebel united front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) (1991-1992).

The unrest situation in the last 10 years since the beginning of the 2004-2014, created violence by insurgent groups from various groups. Especially during the Thaksin Shinawatra period (2001-2005) without believing that such a scenario is a war against terrorism in the country. He modified the management structure to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces, revamped and had a bad attitude towards the insurgents as a petty thief who made terrorists express frustration and create a more intense atmosphere. Until the period of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008), he had issued an apology to the insurgents, and the need for a policy stance that is more harmonious to the situation by avoiding the use of overpower. Initial talks were made with separatist groups who were well known, but it did not make the bad situation get better.

When it came to the problems of Abhisit Vejjajiva's period (2008-2010) and Prime Minister of Modern Yingluck Shinawatra's period (2011-2014) with the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act 2010, and the Administration & Development policy 2012 - 2014, on 9 May 2009 respectively, the policy was to be carried out by the primary agency responsible for resolving the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces, such as the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), director of Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), and in the period of Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha an, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) (2014 -2015), was the powered The Steering Committee to Resolve the Issues of the Southern Border Provinces (Khor. Por. Tor. ); to be authorized by the integration of the issue of the southern government and the government sector strategy board to develop the southern border provinces under the government in the south. Besides, commission-driven policies and strategies to resolve the issues in the South such agencies are adopting policies to practice until today.

The researcher studied the development of the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces by dividing three periods into the third period as the situation during that time to be more easily understood by Figure 4.1 and the details as follows.

1) The Earlier Phases of the Conflict that was the beginning of the conflict situation in the three southernmost provinces can be divided into 3 phases:

(1) The unrest in the three southern border provinces during the public administration reformation in the reign of King Rama V (1868 -1910).

(2) The unrest of the period of educational changes during the reign of King Rama VI (1910-1925).

(3) The unrest problems of cultural changes during the first phase of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government (1939– 1944).

2) The Era of Formation of Several Insurgent Groups that were formed in the three southernmost provinces during this period can be divided into 5 phases:

(1) The clash with the Dusun Nyor Rebellion during the second phase of Field Marshal P. Pibulsongkram's government (1948 - 1957).

(2) The unrest of the formation of rebel groups and education reform during Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963).

(3) The unrest during insurgent groups conducting operations (1968-1979).

(4) The unrest in the period of the formation of the SBPAC during General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988).

(5) The unrest in the era of the United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) (1991-1992).

3) The Formation of Rebel Groups in the Era of Globalization, and the current wave of insurgency in the Thailand's three southernmost provinces which has followed the waves of globalization, can be divided into 5 phases:

(1) A resurgence of violence by Pattani guerrilla groups during the reign of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005).

(2) The unrest during the term of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008).

(3) The unrest problem during the reign of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011).

(4) The unrest during the peace talks in the reign of the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2004 -2014).

(5) The unrest during the era of General Prayuth Chan-ocha who is both prime minister and chief of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) (2014-2015).

The unrest situation in the three southern border provinces from the past to the present as figure 4.2 is mainly due to the following.

1) The Government Policies for Local People Who Live in the Three Southern Border Provinces.

Policy regime had to cancel the city of Pattani to be a Monthon system during the reign of five; educational policy reformed to close Malay Muslim schools which are not taught in Thai. In the year 1923, ChomPhon P. Phibulsongkram (1939-1944) had adopted Thai cultural policies and regulations which was that Thai Buddhists and Muslims had to put Thai customs and traditions into practice in 1939, and it defended the policy using the traditional elite (elite model), which was the policy of a country ruled by absolutism. The direction of policy is a vertical direction (vertical) by the ruling classes to the public. In this case, the policy was not due to public demand (Dye, 1984; Anderson, 1994; Henry, 1995), even the mixed cultural policy (assimilation policy) to minority Muslims in the three southern border provinces continued in the old days, in the period of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), which in practice was very difficult for the Muslims in the three southern border provinces because of the identity of the majority of the Muslims with different ethnicity, religion and language. It was to be clearly in harmony with the Buddhist culture.

2) The Factors that are not Related to Government Policies.

Factors of leadership race, identity and religious sedition was aimed at a separate Pattani state independence in 1948, and caused the dramatic art song. Contemporary issues in the South during the period of ChomPhon P. Phibulsongkram (1948-1957) was seen as a problem of separatism causing the formation of insurgent groups such as the BNPP group, BRN group and PULO were grouped together. This was on behalf of the Alliance of Independent of Pattani (Bersatu) (1991-1992) composed of the BRN group, PULO, BIPP and Mujahideen Islam Pattani, with the aim to fight the union through energetic and consistent direction. The problem of leadership was another factor that was not associated with state policy, but the country

leader was not appropriate to convey the message to the public through comments without understanding the situation correctly on behalf of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2005) on the civil disorder and violence in the three southern border provinces of the insurgent group. The government during the period of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008) had come out to apologize to the terrorism by avoiding the use of undue influence and initiate talks with separatist groups who were well known. According to a working group of the special police lieutenant colonel's report during Thaksin Shinawatra's government, it was confirmed that there were interest groups, and illegal trade groups such as oil smuggling, illegal arms and drugs were associated with the secessionist movement and a terrorist group aimed to create violence. The facts are consistent with the confession of Police Major General (Pol.Maj.Gen.) Bunseb Prituan who was the ex Marine Police Commander of the Thai Marine Police Division after being arrested for taking benefits during duty and being wrongful.

However, supporters of the insurgency in the country were considered to be the root cause of a movement that was much stronger in the southern areas. Because it was embedded long ago that it was a group of influential local politicians and bureaucrats' misconduct. This was consistent with the findings of the Thailand National Defence College's students, and the Islamic Committee. The issue of the unrest in the three southern border provinces in terms of politics, was that the state did not take action against politicians involved with the issue and that was national politicians, and at the local level. Some residential movement militants, who were influential in the election campaign and leaders of political parties / political canvassers, were needed in the area to be able to win the election or some local politicians were established to overthrow the government.

The problems arising from the peace talks during the period of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) was born from a group of insurgents who came to speak to discuss peace talks, but not every group, when the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was behind the negotiations. It led to the issue of conflicts among themselves; being offensive against leaders, who did not participate in the discussions.

### 3) International Factors

It was claimed to generate support for the separatists and for insurgents, who lived abroad in the camp, and not pulling power was instrumental in

creating the separatists. Wan Kadir, Former Chairman Curt Bersatu had an interview and confirmed that "Now that separatism was the most difficult that I did not support the separation of other countries. But I would like the country to be stable and wanted to include more countries, Specially major powers, they were not Muslim (Zakee Phitakkhumpol, Prae Sirisakdamkoeng, Chayanit Phulyarat, and Hafis Salae, 2015: 140-142).

In the case that public officials were offensive and were causing damage and serious impact on the public, state officials, particularly the military and the police had the powers and weapons and were ready to commit to the public if there was the analysis and conclusions in the event of a mistake causing damage and serious effects on people's lives, such as the police who found four bodies at Tongyangdang on March 25, 2014.

\The reason was the economic factor in the three southern border provinces as the neediest families were misled into working with the insurgency. The remuneration of the violence in the three southern border provinces also factors in education. Due to the school system, Paul Wagner as religious schools became breeding new members of the various factions of the separatist leader and then graduated from the Pondok schools.

### **7.1.2 The Development of Policies to Tackle the Unrest Situation in the Three Southern Border Provinces**

The researchers have discovered that the development of the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces from the past to the present was from part of the policy of the government to apply to local people. The researchers have analyzed the development of policies to tackle the unrest in the three southern border provinces to see if the policy is set up to do to resolve the problem.

Starting from the education policy, the reconstruction of a new era in Chom Phon Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) by recognizing traditional religious schools (Pondok) and registering as an Islamic private school for application of the Thai education system was revamped to include and reflect the lifestyle of the Malay Muslims. Security policy had set a national policy on the South No. 1 (1978-1997 BC) during the reign of Prime Minister General Kriangsak Manan in a state of unrest



situation during the formation of the insurgency by various groups (1968-1979) in order to strengthen peace in the region and create a better understanding with the Muslim countries. During the Thaksin government's second session (2005-2006), a state of emergency was declared under the Emergency Decree BE 2005, to cope with the unrest in the three southern border provinces where there would be more violence.

The outcomes of Justice Policy ideas were to create cultural harmony between Buddhists and Muslims during the unrest situation in the period of the formation of the modern SBPAC under Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988). A problem in the area was taking things into account more fairly and restructuring with the scope and authority of the SBPAC and CPM-43. It involved foreign policy in the days of Prime Minister General Kriangsak Manan (1977-1980) and the period of Prime Minister Sundaravej (6 May -8 Sep 2008) to create a better understanding with the Muslim countries and maintain good relationships with all countries, especially Muslim countries and neighboring countries. It remains politically neutral on international regulations and Foreign Policy in the period of Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2010) to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. It aimed to foster a closer cooperation with Muslim countries and Muslim organizations internationally. The government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) recognized the importance of promoting close cooperation with Muslim countries and international Islamic organizations. In the current days of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, there is a policy of increasing the level of interaction with foreign countries and international organizations that might help in solving the problem.

For economic policy at the time of the unrest situation during the formation of the SBPAC during Prem Tinsulanonda's period (1980-1988) the SBPAC had been set up, and focused especially on serving the economic development in the region. But later on during the days of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the entities of the SBPAC had been dissolved. However, in the days of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011) the separate policies had been highlighted; security and development worked apart by developing a more proactive role. Moreover, the government had issued the Government Act 2010, and during the days of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014), managed the development of the southern border provinces in the year 2012-2014, to focus on economic development continuously. Then coming

to the days of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha today, he has taken a strategic approach to the development of understanding and goodwill to reach a peaceful way; the economic and social development, consistent with the needs of local people, which is a plural society.

### **7.1.3 The Policy Implementation Process by Considering the Role of Primary Agency Responsible for Resolving the Unrest in the Three Southern Border Provinces**

The policy to action by the role of the primary agency responsible for resolving the unrest situation in the three southernmost provinces with the formation of the SBPAC and CPM-43 in the days of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1979-1988) as a conceptual framework and approach to education policy to practice, guided from top to bottom (top-down approach) is the central policy (policy-central approach) and policy themes established from the top is converted into action so that they perform the basic functions (Barret and Fudge, 1981: 12). However, the two agencies were abolished during the reign of Thaksin Shinawatra and the Division Director of the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building (SBPPB), which was in charge of the Directorate of Internal Security Operations Command Region 4's Forward Command to provide integrated solutions in the three south border provinces. These were only reported directly to the prime minister and there was the Office of Strategic Policy Committee to strengthen peace in the provinces. It was an agency within the Prime Minister's Office, which caused complexity of management (complexity of administration) due to policy implementation to achieve a very close relationship with the management structure of the organization. It had a number of agencies and organizations to get involved in policy implementation pretty much. It made the process of policy practices become more complex as well (Greenwood, et al, 1976), and modified its personnel. This is an extremely important factor in the allocation of resources (resource allocation) because of what responsible policy to practical considerations always will be to elect personnel qualified to perform the work and as a person's commitment to work for success as a discipline, and a sense of responsibility (Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, 2009: 445).

To revive the SBPAC and 43<sup>rd</sup> to be under the auspices of the Internal Security Operations Command in the days of prime minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008), and in the year 2008, the SBPAC and CPM-43 agency were under the Internal Security Operations Command under the Internal Security Act 2008, making the two agencies work together more as a coordinating agency in the process of policy, and execution of the responsibility to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces.

During the days of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011) a special ministerial committee was developed in five southern border provinces, and it was committee-driven. It was planned to develop a special space in five southern border provinces, and subcommittee as well as a public relations operation to resolve the problem in five provinces. It made the point that the person appointed was responsible for acting clearly in coordination to expedite and monitor the development of the agency. According to the development plan for the five southern border provinces from 2009 to 2012, the relevant authorities regarding the release pressed the space of the five southern border provinces problem. This could be considered as information policy, which should be clear and consistent with the objectives of the various agencies responsible for implementing the policy to treat (Hambleton, 1983), but it was a problem without the unity of both policy and practice in the area.

The Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Operations Center in the days of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) analyzed that management must have unity as troops under the command of a single commander, which was the concept of a complete administration (model of perfect administration) in accordance with guidelines from top to bottom (Hood, 1976) and a modification of the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Provinces. It made the Prime Minister have power and control, and command as well as the premiership. Besides, the Minister of Defense has also been assigned the responsibility to be more clearly established.

Therefore, the structure of The Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border Operations Center was jointed between the Committee to Mobilize Policy and Strategy to Solve Problems in the Southern Border

Provinces, which was the integration of the 17 ministries and 66 departments related to missions under fire. Regular practice areas were by the Director of ISOC Region4 (Internal Security Operations Command Region4) and Executive Director of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC).

The main unit in the process of policy execution is to be responsible for the problem in the three southern border provinces in the days of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-o-cha (2014-2015), Head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) in terms of the conversion policy into action as. Major agencies are involved and responsible as well, which are The Steering Committee to Resolve The Issues of the Southern Border Provinces (Khor. Por. Tor), and the driving force for resolving the problems in the South. In addition, the Division Director for Internal Security Kingdom Act (Internal Security Operations Command) and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) is the primary agency in integrating joint action plans, programs and projects of the government and state agencies, and the stability and development of the provinces as well as creating harmony in all dimensions.

When Chief General Prayuth Chan-o-cha was the Prime Minister, he restructured the structure by following the management of the southern government under the continued management of HIV. These are divided into three levels: NSC consults management, convert the policy into practice is under the ISOC and the SBPAC, and compliance with Internal Security Operations Command 4 is the primary responsibility. Moreover, Chief General Prayuth Chan-o-cha as prime minister focuses on jobs of Internal Security Operations Command, which oversees security and the SBPAC is to oversee development in the southern hemisphere which is clearly given. General Prawit Wongsuwan supervises the SBPAC besides sitting as a chairman of the Steering Committee to Resolve the Issues of the Southern Border Provinces (Khor. Por. Tor).

#### **7.1.4 The Policy Implementation Outcomes**

Policy to treat all aspects of government, education and culture in the reign of five and six, and in the days of ChomPhon P. Phibulsongkram respectively is regarded as a policy-oriented supervision by the State (regulatory policies), focusing

on the imposition of restrictions on the behavior of individuals and groups which reduced freedom or judgments to commit any of those detainees (Totalovich and Daynes, 1988), and made the start of the offense of the Malay Muslims. Additionally, the government suppressed identity, language and culture of their outcomes in policy implementation, causing the target demographic colors with their own interests. This led to protests, and rioting continued violence.

Cultural policy of cultural assimilation aimed to target people in both Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims, who can live together with the society with cultural diversity. During the days of General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), local people, especially Malay Muslims were proud of their way of life to pious Islamic and Malay Culture (Suthiras Choochuen, 2012) developed in areas with a cultural diversity, and a need to focus equally. It is focused on the development of the policy, object-oriented development as well as economic, but a lack of social development, and a lack of cooperation of the local people. It led to make the problem more difficult to resolve

During the days of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in the years 2011-2015, the policy was a complete failure; police officers and a large number of people died, the SBPAC agencies collapsed, and Thaksin 43<sup>rd</sup> Establishment Directorate for the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building was the only agency that served to tackle the issues in the three southern border provinces, that had units operating only one responsible policy to practice to achieve without having to rely on other agencies. If other agencies had to be involved, relationships required only small amounts and not by that authority to command and had been operating as a whole (Gun, 1980). This was the model of perfect administration in accordance with guidelines from Top-down (Hood, 1976) compared to the days of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008) that required more harmonious policy to avoid excessive use of power and started talks with the separatists as the policy guidelines to operate from the Bottom-up. The problem will be solved by operating near to the point of contact with the most problems, and the role of policy will affect the interests of those directly responsible for operating the public. However, it depended on whether the skill and judgment of the turnout was significant (Elmore, 1978: 605).

A focus on the process strictly and fairly, leads to outcomes in policy execution that are represented in a sincere and straightforward way. Moreover, target

people have beneficiaries of the policy directly as outcomes of implementation of policy to practice in the days of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2001), but the policy of the southern border provinces was a special development zone; it was beneficial to most investors who supported low interest loans, special tax and had been supporting the halal industry as the policy aimed to Distributive policies, policies related to the allocation of services or benefited to some people specifically. The beneficiaries may be individuals, groups of individuals, organizations or social segments. The mechanism for the allocation of government grants to beneficiaries may vary depending on the case (Anderson, 1994; Ripley and Franklin, 1976).

The policy implementation outcomes in the process of talking peace by peaceful means, is to provide the opening talks with the parties to the insurgency by Maj. Pardon Patnatabut as directly in the negotiations with the Council for National Security. During the days of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2013) the situation in the area improved. Despite the massive violence occurring or continuing, it can be seen that the lessons from China, Indonesia and the Philippines to negotiate the peace talks and the experience can be used to resolve the problems in the three southern border provinces.

Thus, Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha restructured the new administration to resolve the unrest in the provinces. The administration is divided into three levels: at the policy level to convert the policy into practice as well as the level of compliance. Regarding the outcomes, the unrest situations reduced satisfactorily according to statistics unrest.

It is clear from the outcomes of the policy of the agency to perform in the SBPAC, that in the year 2013, violence was reduced, and the amount of loss due to the operations of military, police and civilian unity was getting better. The important factor is that the people are involved in the issue, and the public understands more systematically and is ensured by government solutions.

In addition, the outcomes of the policy to treat the SBPAC in 2013, saw a substantial continuous improvement over one year, causing unrest to be better than the last year. Public reassurance and confidence in the government statistics confirmed that the unrest situation was reduced. Besides, there was more confidence in trade as well as increase in investment. Finally, surveys of public opinion in the

area of educational institutions in the area indicated that public confidence was more secure and expected the peace to happen.

#### **7.1.5 The Key Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation Outcomes**

The key to the outcomes in policy execution aims to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces, according to document data from Thai and foreign researchers as well as lessons from abroad from the effect of the work of the SBPAC. According to the government's urgent policy and policy on the basis of state interval 2 during the period 23 August 2012 - 23 August 2013, and interviews of officials from operations of agencies and departments involving the SBPAC, the researchers analyzed and the details are shown as follows

##### **1) Factors that affected the policy making are**

##### **(1) The appropriateness of the population in the target area**

The work of the SBPAC in projects which emphasizes local people in the target area, deal with the problems that are affected by the action, identity, language, religion, traditions and culture. This is consistent with the scholar Akom Jaikaew (2010) found that policies are set to address the issue at the local level and will have to be consistent with the culture to be successful as is consistent with the lessons from overseas Chinese, who are minorities in the Philippines population, similar to Thailand. Muslims are a people with a unique culture, identity, language, religion, unlike the people of Aceh, Indonesia, with the National Federation of Muslims as a majority of Indonesians.

The policy plans and urgent projects of the government, was on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012-August 23, 2013, and the SBPAC found that plans and projects had selected demographic target group oriented on pedigree or closer people. According to the outcomes, the people were not treated fairly. Besides, the implementation of the civilian government involved a lack of recognition and trust of the public. Especially, since the policy was not regardless to not getting justice in the world, the process of justice worsened as outcomes. It led to more violence in the area, according to the scholars Pipitpun and Pumpipit (2014).

Therefore, to resolve the problems within the three southern border provinces, the SBPAC had to focus on the needs of the people. The projects

are mainly in the economic and social dimensions. It is appropriate to take into account the demographics of the target area, based on what the goal is. However, the audience took part in the project and contemplate making like a cattle market. This creates the jobs in the area and distributes income over the target area, creates the values in the affairs of Hajj Import halal products to be offered or sold in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj. The project is for the public to participate and for the needs of the people.

Policies to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces, needs to consider the appropriate demographic target areas mentioned above, which is the identity of language, religion, traditions and culture of Thai Muslims. They need to take part in a pluralist culture and has prepared a project to meet the needs of the people by supporting and strengthening the profession as well as enhancing professional knowledge and skills to cover communities in the target area. Besides, public relations program communicates thoroughly by personnel operating in the area and must be understood in the context area, understand the concept of identity, bringing the value of the pilgrimage and make the situation develop along with the development of the SBPAC at different times to suit the target population. The outcome of the administrative SBPAC made in the context of the area is that the atmosphere is better. Villagers have a greater understanding of the situation by bringing the development of a tool to solve the unrest in the three southern border provinces.

## (2) Social features and the regional cooperation

In order to resolve the unrest situation in three southern border provinces, the policy must take into account factors and social features in the three southern border provinces. The families are poor and have quality life issues, especially drug issues, no career, have low levels of education, lack of money to support education which was impacted by the failure of local politics and local schools cannot provide education.

It shows that policy makers need to understand the nature and structure of the society. This is consistent with data from the project on priority, and government policies on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013 of the SBPAC. In addition, economic development has not only



been thorough, there are several major infrastructure projects to achieve cooperation. Besides, the local SBPAC needs to focus on promoting the participation of citizens at all levels, which is substantial. But social lessons from Thailand and abroad by nature, whether it is China, Indonesia, or the Philippines, are beneficial. Thailand had a conflict with the government as they do not get justice from the poor state of education, no jobs and no respect for Muslim traditions. Hijacked arable area and natural resources of Thailand have some of the benefits of trade and smuggled the drugs involved.

In addition, the cooperation of the local factors would cause more cooperation and participation of local people in the three southern border provinces to solve it. Currently, the SBPAC with the public communities are hearing to receive comments from the village, and the sector organizations, both local and 44 international organizations, civil society and the private sector are all well in collaboration. The villagers have the knowledge to express themselves on stage more. The scholars Kularb and Phansasiri (2014) have proposed that perspective, especially in local journalism, local media or within the southern border provinces that they should be involved in resolving the conflict. This could make the SBPAC's information and public relations agencies see the importance of the cooperation of the locals as well. The objective is to make as many media groups and disseminate information around in order to convey to the people and get the most comprehensive coverage. The local cooperation is making up a network of local journalism and conducting seminars, networking these graduates as village volunteers everywhere. These graduates were trained as advocates for the radio, and also spokesmen for the locals, the group of artists, singers, folk music groups, uncle Ma who was to film the life of Nora's religious leaders, Thai Youth Beachwood as well as The Sports Network and the FA Cup.

Proactive PR must emphasize the participation of locals more and Integration with the team as publicists, journalists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers, and the public together with leaders in the SAO, the SAO Prime Minister, the PAO Prime Minister, Village chief and the village headman. It aims to develop the target area to educate local people. It does not make them waste time to do it, and helps until the family is much stronger and society is able to help itself.

Attainable values should be introduced to get good cooperation, such as the cooperation of the local people who had come to the pilgrimage. The training is given to Muslims who have not been there, to prepare the comprehensive care and take care of people who travel to Hajj and relatives come forward. People in the area have more trust and confidence. Therefore, the issue in the three southern border provinces is now more unwound.

The course of development also covers the development of the village headman, Prime SAOs and religious leaders are considered key personnel. The stakeholders contributed significantly to the development which is regarded as the cooperation of local authorities and how to get cooperation to work together, be interactive and to be aware of the strategic policy of the government. Collaboration of a joint development project in the area is regarded as a dimensional network of religious leaders and the village headman.

The economic and social situations have created jobs in the area and distributed income over the target area like a cattle market. This can be considered consistent with the social area. Poverty is not a cause of local cooperation as well as the issue in the three southern border provinces. The villagers are now sustainable and have a solid career, earning a better quality of life. The villagers were not involved in the process anymore.

Therefore, to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces, society must understand the nature of the area and requires the cooperation of local authorities. Especially the youth needs to create a strategy to build support. Besides, it needs to build the will of the youth in the area that they should be encouraged and think that the authorities act with compassion and try to help them all the time. The cooperation of civil servants in basic practice is so that officials should have a willingness to adapt and professionals are vital to the success of the policy (Akom Jaikaew, 1990).

(3) The Cooperation of the Relevant Agencies is regarded as a key factor in the formulation of policies to tackle violence. The process of civil servants, both military and civilian police has a process of working with the public sector where there is no unity. This is a major problem to factor in the cooperation of the relevant authorities. Since the way of their thinking and management of feeling, of the people

in the area, is different and civilian police officers also do not think in the same direction. Otherwise, it will cause problems, alignment aspect made into a movement and making it difficult to resolve the problem. There is a need to change the way of thinking more deeply.

Lessons can be taken from abroad in resolving conflicts with the cooperation of the relevant authorities as well as international organizations, the international community, voluntary organizations, including civil society organizations and the media. However, in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, a central organization or facilitator in the peace talks could be considered. The process of policy for peace talks to resolve the issues in the three southern border provinces, however, should not involve a representative of the agency, such as the Foreign Ministry, Office of the Attorney General (Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is an interpreter of Thai-the corona-English) (Roongravi Chaloemssripinyoraj, 2015).

However, data from the outcomes of the priority project under government policies, was on the basis of the state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013, and the SBPAC found that there are several projects with other agencies involved to cooperate with the SBPAC. This causes target people to have partnered with the problem. According to in-depth interviews of officials operating in the SBPAC, it was found that the issue of fairness to help remedy proactive PR cynics has the cooperation of the relevant authorities and is continuing to achieve maximum efficiency. But some projects still lack to cooperate with the authorities and lack understanding of strategic planning as well as blind dimensions of value creation, such as the pilgrimage affairs.

Therefore in the policy to tackle three southern border provinces, all departments of the SBPAC must give priority to the cooperation to the relevant authorities and focus on the unity of all parties. Both military and civilian agencies are needed to be adjusted and to understand how to manage the feelings of the people in the area, and must take into account the cooperation of the locals. Besides, they also need to consider the factors of the cooperation of the relevant authorities. They need to support and cooperate with various groups (Itthichai Seedam, 2010). Importantly, the problem of drugs is a major problem and a barrier to resolve the problems in the

three southern border provinces, so it requires relevant agencies to cooperate in resolving this problem.

#### (4) Changes that Occurred in the Supportive Agencies or the People Involved

The in-depth interviews of officers operating have shown that the officials were sent to execute in the area. When there is a switch position that occurred, they sent good officials back to the agency. This gives the lack of good people working in the area, or sends them to receive benefits when they return. The changes lead to the lack of continuity in policy execution. In addition, the lack of promotion of the officials with good performance is issued in the way of motivation to perform the task.

In addition, there is a change in the policy leader to resolve the unrest in the three southern border provinces that was involved from the beginning in the policy, as the policy process to talk peace had caused discontinuities in regulatory policy. During the project, according to government policies on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013 of the SBPAC, which corresponds to the wheel with the presentation of academic Apasara Fuangfu (2012), the following was proposed; those who attended the talk meaning as an intermediary or facilitator must have the ability or the skills to talk. Peace talks are willing to sacrifice high reliability and trust. Confidentiality is in the ongoing work and not to replace them. This can be seen from clear Thai and abroad lessons. Changes are responsible for the peace talk process often causing delays in the peace talks because there is a change in the person's responsibility of policy to practice.

Therefore promotion within the SBPAC of higher levels should be done instead of sending senior staff from the Ministry of the operating SBPAC and the continuation of the peace dialogue process and the responsibility to talk peace. The changes made to the relevant authority for support leads to continuity in policy implementation to operation. It has quality staff and personnel of good practice. When the time comes to send people back to the agency, it could cause the lack of continuity in policy implementation to operation.

2) The Complexity of Coordinating the Implementation of the Various Departments or Complexity of Joint Action, including:

(1) The Ability to Coordinate between Different Departments to Work together

During the first practice of the SBPAC mandates under section 18 of the Act, the government of the South in 2010 was making coordination between various agencies, and there was still a lack of performance by evaluating projects based on priority and government policies on the basis of state, interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013 of the SBPAC.

However, in depth interviews with senior officials from the operation found that the current policy implementation had more improvement. Policy performers, both military and civilian police have to understand the complete working together in unity by modifying the culture of the organization to work together, and adjusting the new context in the three southern border provinces with government officials in various departments and related agencies working as the local coordinator. The human resource development program has three companions to adjust the way of thinking. The issue of civilian, military and police create the perception of information simultaneously and make it have more unity. There is integrity of the district center operations and the curriculum. It provides stakeholders a committee in the curriculum, such as religious leaders, village headmen Bureau Sheikhul Islam, which is regarded to participate since the program began, such as the cooperation of related agencies and the participation of locals are able to coordinate between different departments to work together.

(2) The Complexity of the Decision-making Process

The priority project plan was under the government policies on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013 through the SBPAC and the SBPAC was faced with the government process, to enforce the law equally. Educational support was not universal, distributed budgeting to the Sub-district Administrative was less, there were quality of life issues, particularly drug issues, professional issues, economic development was uneven, particularly critical infrastructure. This led to problems for various target groups in the area and made more complexity in the decision making process respectively.

In order to resolve it, they prepared to adjust the SBPAC personnel agency in a new context in the three southern border provinces. All Officials and civil

servants have to go through an orientation course. This makes each level of officials and agencies have ideas for operating in a context in the three southern provinces to be in the same direction in order to have the ability to coordinate between different departments to work together as a key element. The concept adjusted in the same way will not cause the complexity of the decision-making process.

### (3) The Goal of the Project Conflicts or Inconsistencies of the Main Target, with more than One Goal

According to a study from China, Indonesia and the Philippines it was found that in the lessons of the Muslim separatist group, there is not much and the main goal is clear. Unlike in Thailand Apasara Fuangfu(2013) found that, in talking during the peace process with dialogue partners there are many insurgent groups and some independent, so they did not know who the leader is. This causes inconsistencies in each main group and make the complexity of the decision-making process of insurgents in Thailand. In each group of the insurgents there is no coherence. In the Philippines, China and Indonesia, terrorist groups have a leader with clear authority and leaders make decisions and there is no complexity.

From in-depth interviews of staff performance it shows that factor of conflicts and inconsistencies of the main target have more than one goal, and the authorities treat all parties to understand the context in three southern border provinces. The purpose and idea must be in the same way to resolve the issues in the three southern border provinces without prejudice to the duties, as well as target people who took part in the project from the beginning as a joint venture project goal and must not allow political parties to take over in the process of policy implementation which shows a lack of unity in working together. This will cause a conflict. The outcomes are consistent with the assessment of projects by priority and government policies on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013 of SBPAC it was found that the intensive problems could lead to a misunderstanding between the governor and people in the target area. The SBPAC thus accelerated to implement projects such as land preparation activities to solve the problems regarding the Budo Sungai Padi National Park land and so on.

### (4) The Ability to Address the Issue of the Delay Projects that Occurred

The ability to resolve problems caused by the delay of plans and projects that do not get participation from the people in the target area, sometimes delays the project, such as the economy and society. It has solved the problem of industrial land by paying outstanding amounts by allocating budget to build infrastructure, roads, electricity and irrigation and are ready to invest in the industrial park. This is able to contribute to the delays. All education projects were in time frame projects such as Onet tutors and the Pre-Onet project. The justice was a leading forensic use, which is making the process quicker and no delays in the criminal trial.

Peace dialogue process lessons from abroad or Thailand are beneficial. The changes responsible for the peace talk process often cause delays in the peace talks. This was caused by taking responsibilities in policy implementation. There was a change in the person caused by the new government.

Problems in policy execution of the SBPAC caused project delays, according to evaluating projects based on priority and government policies on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012- August 23, 2013 of the SBPAC. This was caused by the performance of the operating unit and lack of personnel to make the staff perform in various projects and instead they were needed to assist the department of homeland security. Even the budget allocation is inadequate and delayed. The SBPAC encouraged people in the southern border provinces to live by the philosophy of sufficiency economy as one example of the great outcomes.

### 3) The Linkage of the Factors that Affected the Policy Making and Policy implementation to Practice together

#### (1) The Ability to Develop and Learn from the Experiences to Solve Problems

The lessons from abroad can be adapted to be an experience on how to resolve the unrest situation following the guidelines of each country by focusing on the development and reducing the use of military force and reducing violence.

The peace dialogue process must take the past experience as a lesson for the next time and have to make the local people understand the benefits to be gained from talking for the peace process.

The programs and projects of the SBPAC can take the outcomes of the projects by evaluating policy and practice for the impact occurred in order to experience the preparation of plans and projects to resolve the unrest in the three southern border provinces. This could be from evaluating projects based on priority and government policies on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013 of the SBPAC.

(2) The Effectiveness of the Policy to Understand and Accept the Importance of Continuity and Relations between Ends and Means.

According to in-depth interviews of operating officials, it was found that the field of education must be continuing to meet the needs of local people, which will focus on religion or academics and will have to adapt the course content to be appropriate. It will be evaluated continuously. The audit evaluated from top to bottom in control and analyzed whether information and data are accurate and from the facts or not. This will affect the policy of the state and efficiency of the policy.

The development of good officials has been sent to execute in this area, and when there was a switch in position, they have been sent back to the agency. It caused the lack of good people working in the area, sending them to receive benefits when they return. The changes caused the lack of continuity in policy execution and will affect the policy performance.

Peace dialogue process should be conducted continuously, openly and systematically. Moreover, it needs to make people understand that public will benefit from the process of peace talks by taking lessons from China, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand to create importance of peace talks between insurgent groups and the government. Besides, there was a process of formal negotiations which is effective for the peace talk policy.

By evaluating priority projects under government policies on the basis of state interval 2 during the period August 23, 2012 - August 23, 2013 of the SBPAC, it was found that supportive departments and operation agencies are necessary to understand the policy effectively. The leader of the agencies has recognized the importance of continuity in the governance, control and coordination of policy implementation throughout the duration of the project. Even the relationship between ends and means will need to be evaluated from the factors or the effects of



the project reversed to bring changes in targets and perform a reconfiguration in order to achieve maximum effectiveness of the policy.

### (3) The Appropriate Theoretical Description for Explaining the Policy Characteristics

The SBPAC is an operating unit which is able to describe the policy, whether each project has already been carried out and is appropriate in theory or not. There are progresses in the religious, cultural, economic and social development, information and public relations to use academic knowledge to operate a personal development course at the official inauguration has adapted to new ideas to adjust with the area by providing the knowledge of the conflict and discuss a peace process.

In addition, the dissolution of the SBPAC and CPM-43 agency happened in the days of Thaksin Shinawatra, said the agency division director of the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building. There is only one unit that can be responsible to perform policy implementation successfully without having to rely on other agencies. If other agencies will be involved, relationships acquire only small amounts and not important which the authority commander has the full right to operate and order (Gun, 1980) as the concept of complete self-management (model of perfect administration) in accordance with guidelines from Top-down (Hood, 1976), which is the defining characteristic of this policy and is not properly theoretical.

Other factors that affect the policy implementation of the SBPAC were findings from in-depth interviews of the officers operating the SBPAC.

#### 4) Communication Factor

The study found that it should give high priority to the policy process at all levels, from the policy level, converting the policy into practice, degree in policy and practice. The level has been public service delivery to clients, which will be considered to be appropriate in the context of the three southern border provinces. The violence has continued. There is pressure on the identity, language, religion, traditions and culture. It has started to focus on communication since the days of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011) with the subcommittee in the public relations problem in the five southern border provinces and factors of communication is key in supporting groups. There are groups of three variable factors that affect the

application of policies, the complexity of the operation and work. These factors are associated with the practice. This increases the policy to perform effectively and efficiently.

Thus, both the policy and the policy to treat with understanding the need to communicate at the policy level itself, is important although it is a standard policy. Clear goals and objectives are clearly defined, but it is needed in a way to process and communicate properly in order to gain an understanding of the policy as well as to treat them to make the effectiveness of policy implementation.

Factors of communication in the field of public relations and communications can enhance security policies, such as sleeping on the job ahead would make the people feel that we are closer to the people; a network to join the activities would lead to the development needs of the people in the community. It needed them to acknowledge that our media is truly his media, and talking in the communication processes is very important. The talks and the two sides should facilitate agreement on the operating line of communication and work with the media in addition to the table to talk peace with the implementation of close secrets such as the statement about the outcomes of the meeting must be cleared together and assigned a facilitator who has published a statement in Thai, Malay and English, and so on. The work of building peace in the region, in 2013, and local and national media should play a key role in reporting about moving the peace process ahead and serious to join the push for the issue of a national agenda.

There needs to be a message to raise awareness in the future, and the agency will have to complete many parties to come together and make social communication understanding more diverse. Even in a multicultural society, it requires everyone to learn all exchanges. Then everyone will respect each other and avoid the effect. This will enable people to live together in peace and sustainable conditions forever. Moreover, in the open forum for peace in the civil society in the peace process, Srisompob Jitpiromsri said that the civil society sector has to drive proposals or solutions to political solutions, as well as pushing power through the communication process. The media relayed all this information out to the public to the peaceful reintegration of the PPP or Pattani Peace Process (Sermsuk Kasitipradit, 2013: 131).

However, researchers have discovered that factors of communication to communicate with the understanding down to the level of public service delivery clients, is the root of the problem which the operating unit is unable to assist citizens in the area with, by the use of different languages in a deeper level of communication. This causes barriers to contribute to the understanding and reach to the level that will lead to the development truly deep down to the level of the thinking system (Suwilai Premsrirat, 2008) because the security policy in the context of the three southern border provinces is different from the common policy, which is that Van Metor and Van Horn have not yet studied the issue. They only studied points of communication between organizations.

Therefore, factors of communication must take into account the varied understanding of the need for communication, the group variable factors that affect the application of policies, complex factors to coordinate the operations of the various departments, and the link of the factors influencing the policy formulation and policy implementation to perform together.

5) The Organization Competency is the successful implementation of policy to practice, depending on the capabilities of the organization competency that will work just as expected. However, the ability depends on the sideline.

#### (1) Quality Personnel

There is a need to prepare personnel the SBPAC to adjust in the new context in the three southern border provinces, and officials and civil servants all have to go through an orientation course. The view is that officials and the agencies must have the same ideas for operating in a context in the three southern border provinces as well as the same morals to understand and work effectively. Therefore, to prepare good civil servants working in the area under the policies of the Rama 6 is factored that will help to solve problems in the area increasingly. Officials must have the intention to dedicate themselves to hard work and without prejudice, which would be a cause of conflict. The awareness of the practice and morals are very significant. It needs to create awareness to all parties.

(2) Leadership is a key factor to make the project successful. A community which has a leader who has a strong moral commitment to volunteer for

real public benefits and non-self-profit would lead to the area developing very fast. Villagers should also have good faith in cooperation.

(3) Resource Adequacy: The Staffs are not enough with strategies and the number of projects is numerous. There is using of shared resources by using the power and relationships with related organizations such as acting as a representative from the Public Relations Department and as assistant secretary of the Public Relations cause potential together.

(4) Motivation is essential and the lack of promotion of well working civil servants causes lack of motivation to perform the task.

Therefore, policy implementation to achieve is more or less depending on the decision of the lower-level officials and use of resources are limited, however, even lower-level officials are under strong pressure and faced with a situation, but they are also trying to take a decision on the use of limited resources to achieve maximum benefit (Lipsky, 1980).

Besides, the management of the organization must consider the structural characteristics and dimensional functions, style of organization that serves to resolve the unrest in the three southern border provinces, in which each agency has different dimensions and obligations based on the situation at that time. Besides, organization structure is according to the government.

The factors above are among the factors that the study has found as well as Peter van Horne, who studied the process of policy approach based on three main factors, which is the process of communication and the performance of the organization, leading to policy and practical cooperation.

But the research that presented the factors in the performance of the organization must support policy factors such as related organizations that work together, which is a complex factor to coordinate the operations of the various departments and the media message in order to enhance the communication process of policy implementation.

In addition to the key factor which is vital to sustainable resolution of the three southern border provinces, the study found that there are additional factors that make the process of policy implementations SBPAC to be of more successful value, and the feeling of management and value factor in popularity of urban areas.

The policy implementation to solve the problems in the three southern border provinces by the SBPAC, according to the interviewer, has the depth to perform critical functions to analyze the factors that affect the implementation of policy. Researchers are also interested in the latest interview by the Chief Operating Agency Internal Security Operations Command. The four front-agency Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center needed to get data synthesized, and supported the concept of a policy to treat the problems faced by the SBPAC (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL) as shown in figure 6.1 by synthesizing a view of the military and police which is in the same direction with civil as shown below.

#### 1) A Military Perspective

Factors that affect policy implementation from in-depth interviews, operation agency, Security Operations Command and the four front-agencies Internal Security Operations Command Region4 have been featured to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. They used the concept of understanding the development of a politically leading military by considering quality of personnel in organization performance. The good working officials were sent to perform the job to work in the target areas which were appropriate to them. The government performance will focus on integrating all the sectors together by converting the policy into action in order to achieve goals and strengthening peace and sustainable development.

The cooperation of the relevant authorities has measures to control state officials in the way of using power to local people to cooperate and reduce violence by state officials, and try not to use a special law to solve the problem. But, they will take measures to punish officials who use state power to the people, especially the relevant agencies such as the Volunteer Guard, village security.

Tongyangdang policy is the policy used to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. A policy aims to cooperate with local authorities, and the key is to create the potential people to be able to supervise the area, lead and school instead of using military staff as well as creating awareness for the people to participate in both the security and development to meet the needs of the community itself.

The process of peace talks is still continuing based on using peaceful way. The Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 has also focused on driving the peace talks in the southern border provinces. Besides, they have presented a community forum for more than 40 times from 14 groups, including the media by using a budget, targets and practitioners while the SBPAC and the police also cooperate as well. Moreover, they have set targets and assign each responsibility.

The military authorities, Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 is mainly responsible to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. They provide civil servants and workers in the area operate based on policy implementation. The complex projects and agencies need to do the same in order to be completed to achieve the maximum benefit of the population in target areas. Besides, every project plan should create mass psychology.

The military said by repositioning, the four captains were not changed by the policy, because there is the coordination of all the agencies involved, according to a defined strategy.

## 2) A Police Perspective

Police concerns over the importance of the cooperation of locals and solving the local community level, and district level issues, are that they must be open to the public in order to listen to their comments on the subject of criminal proceedings, security of life and property as well as public service. It is aimed to resolve the equality issue, fairness and respect their identity and way of their life, so that they could live in peace, which is the characteristic of the population in the target area.

Besides, organization performance has to be concerned about the quality of personnel by using good men to do their duty to in public by using the principles of justice and not using power to the public.

The police believe that the peace talks with a group of people would be the best way to solve the problem.

The policy was set to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces, and researchers are also interested in the latest interview of the secretary of the National Security Council (NSC) for the information to be synthesized in order to support the concept of a policy to treat the policy

implementation of the SBPAC (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL) as in figure 6.1, as the outcomes is in the same direction with civil departments as shown below.

### 3) A Policy Level Perspective, Secretary of National Security Council (NSC)

At the policy level, the person who sets the policy to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces from interviewing officials from the National Security Council (NSC), aims to establish peace and security in life, and put public property back to the provinces together with the elimination of poverty, drugs and bad power by using the king's speech to understand the King's sufficiency economy to develop, leading political and military approach to peace. He also agreed with the economic development policies in the three southern border provinces that are able to develop into a special economic zone.

The cooperation of local authorities and relevant agencies are focused on promoting cooperation in all sectors of the public in the administration of justice thoroughly, increase educational opportunities and quality of life, opportunities and equality, economic and social development in the area as well as respect identity and traditions of the local population in the target area. They had set up a commission-driven strategy to resolve the unrest situation in the southern border provinces, in the days of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and a committee to resolve the unrest situation, in the days of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-o-cha to monitor that the operation in the area is in the same direction, especially with the government focused on the integration of collaboration, and the SBPAC. The Internal Security Operations Command and other entities got involved by saying that the problem with the unity of the coalition of government agencies, the military, police and civilian in the past were not well cooperating.

There is a need to support the decentralization of local government in the form corresponding to the area style without contrary to the constitution. There is integrated management of all sectors to unify both the policy and operational levels, including the development of laws and in line with modern conditions as well as treat those affected by the unrest fairly based on the management and development of the South policy in the years 2012-2014 conducted by the Public Administration Act, the South 2010. Solving the problem will require the cooperation of authorities, related

work as well as from local authorities, the military, police and civilians by the military focused on security.

The Policy department had concerns about important factors of communication. The data communication between commanders and subordinate agencies must be accurate, complete communication on relations with the local people in work practices and communications with officials at all levels understand the policy, security and messaging in discussing the peace process. They wanted the media to present the news in a matter of talking at the peace process which is the factual information from government departments without distortions.

The peace dialogue process is the best solution to the violence problem in the three southern border provinces by reducing violence and creating peace in the area. Besides, the government has set national negotiations to talk with those that have the conflict ideas to start, and there are also many groups that would lead the situation to conflict with the main goals that have more than one goal.

At the policy level, they have undertaken to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces which is continually effective. The government has set plans to develop the south provinces in the years 2015-2017. So that, the agencies responsible like the Division Director for the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the Budget Office and the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) could collaborate in practice to resolve the unrest situation in the southern border provinces clearly as well as concrete in the same direction.

In-depth interviews with senior managers who are mainly undertaking policy implementation outcomes can conclude how serious the unrest situation is in the three southern border provinces. This makes the analysis of policy implementation firm and clearer.

A problem of secessionist movement has long nurtured by using strategic battles in the city such as the conflicts, religion, identity and history of the Colony of Thailand with persecution being the main factors driving to pull people into battle. Separatists have the first idea to make things clearly different in the historical, racial, and religious affairs and the second is a method of operation which is primarily used for religious purposes. This shows that the unrest situation in the three southern



border provinces is not a religious issue, but it is only religion that strengthens ideological indoctrination increase.

The issue of tradition, culture and costume in the days of Jompon P. was that Muslims were not allowed to dress their way and use Thai language. This causes conflict and Muslim discontent.

They did not understand the unfairness issue and were anxious. Officials need to accept that there are good people and bad people and people who are from somewhere else will be sent to provinces not only in the three provinces in the past.

An issue of interest groups, drugs, local politics and power people had been involved in the process. It certainly would be devastating to a large extent (Roongravi Chaloeemssripinyoraj, 2013).

The peace dialogue process still needs to be continued according to the words of Lt. Gen. Prakarn Chonlayuth who battled the four captains, that there was no conflict of any truce, and would agree with the use of force. In the meantime, they will create an environment that supports talking, take care of local people continuously and understand the concept of development as well as use the budget to solve the unrest situation in the south border provinces, which is not using budget to meet strategy. Resolving the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces should look in terms of development and not a single one-dimensional solution.

Therefore, to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces from other factors besides in-depth interviews, operations officer, and the SBPAC, we would like to present the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes of the SBPAC (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL) in figure 6.1 as follows.

Besides, the synthesis of a key concept for the outcomes to policy execution of the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes of the SBPAC (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL) to be more accurate and reliable, we need to bring the views of various groups in the target area such as politicians, historians, urging people, Islamic leaders, Buddhist leaders, civil society, state leaders, public and Muslim student leaders to participate in a synthesis of the above. The details are as follows.

### 1) Politicians Perspective

Unrest situation in the three southern border provinces needs to be solved by politics which is, "This is a political problem that needs a political solution" (McCargo, 2013) by all parties to engage in the peace talks process as a key factor and all public parties should be assisted and supported as the cooperation of the relevant authorities and the cooperation of local authorities, and they should be concerned about the lessons and experience in the past. Hence the quest for a political solution through negotiation in the stage of talking peace is one method that is most effective in reducing or ending violence driven by political ideology (Roongravi Chaloemssripinyoraj, 2015).

Society should get the development of health and education standards to rise. Government agencies should accelerate the implementation of projects to solve the problem of poverty monetizing communities in order to make them have a better quality of life as well as the safety of life and property.

The politicians viewed the discussions during the peace process with MaraPatani as not having much unity. Besides, they also presented a special form of local government in the form of multiculturalism.

### 2) A Historian Perspective

Historians focus on the factors of communication rather than the medium, because the media could distort history. Moreover, it can be a cause of conflict in the area and reveal the facts of history than cover it. Besides, the issue of low education is a social area that causes conflicts in the three southern border provinces. So, it needs education to educate citizens to make them know right and wrong things.

### 3) Scholars Perspective

They view that problems are caused by the pressure of identities, the scramble for resources in the area. Using the cultural policy of the government is an appropriate way for the population in the three southern border provinces. Additionally, they think society is poverty and the right to privacy is contrary to religious principles.

Communication factor is important to communicate to the local people and release to the public. But, it must consider the fact and should not communicate to

increase conflict in the area, especially the policy of peace talks must be disclosed to the public's knowledge, and need to talk to in the system. Besides, the government has to taken lessons or experience from abroad used to resolve the conflict, although there are still many opposition groups who aim different goals more than one target, causing no unity in the process of talking.

There is a proposed model of autonomy, which is the lessons and experience in developing solutions like the case of the Chinese state (one state two systems), and the government needs to open its mind so that the peace process would happen. Even now the National Security Council issued a clear policy regarding the open areas (Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, 2013). Besides, the forms part of the local government is a major focus on decentralization which is a special form, which may be (1) focus on the religious power structure; which has been very active in politics, and tend to reject the election form which is really a form of government special and they have never been in a legal precedent by (2) the adoption of the two which forms a sub; there is a mix of elected leaders to improve the system better. Simultaneously, it was the administration that has the role of navigator whose religion involved with the two formats will feature a cross-Matrix Forms or enterprise switches and is a combination of the two leaders of the election. Besides, leaders from recruiting agencies have to come together. Advisory Council or City Council will come to take part in the local level instead of the Supreme Council. As the outcomes, other religions could join as well without the need to amend the law too much (Srisompob Jitpiromsri, 2008).

However, considering the political regime in the public policy arena "Southern self-determination" approach by the SBPAC is the choice that has been selected by the management as always. The advantage of it was the outcomes that are tangible and can be widely criticized. The voice of those who chose the SBPAC views that it is a government agency that provides benefits to people in the area, especially support for development in various fields. Besides, they are also concerned that if the SBPAC is ended and changed in the form of governance in the area to guide others, it will lose the opportunity to reach them. It is also uncertain whether the administration at the country level in the area is congruent or not (Ramadan Panjor, 2013) and found

that there was a proposal to modify the SBPAC that has anchored the local people even more.

The proposal, which is the most prominent, is recommended for the election of the Secretary General of the SBPAC through local people directly, and must have a council with members from various professions in the area to serve check and balance the executive. However, parties often interpreted it as the creation of a stable new regime may be a violence to a single state (RoongraviChaloemssripinyoraj, 2015).

The scholars view is that the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces caused by the issue of jurisdiction and execution in both civilian and military are different. Reorganizing agency policy led to abusive practices, and the use of legal measures was necessary to resolve the problem by using the three southern border provinces to be in line with Article 24 and communication factors through more announcement in public and they did not understand the real problems that causes the issue of senior officials, policy makers and operational staff with different cultures.

Besides, operation, officials must have the ability to manage feelings in public and, the motivation issue to perform the task is also one of the factors that affect the policy implementation as well.

As a peace researcher and theorist of non-violence need to understand the dynamics of the struggle without violence, this will enable the peace process to take place effectively; useful and social is less destructive (Chaiwat Satha-anand, 2013).

#### 4) Insurgent Groups Perspective

They want the government to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces through a process of peace talks and set the national agenda in order to ensure continuity in the process of peace talks. The process would be successful if the talkers are the Prime Minister's most trusted people and people in Patani were involved in the decision making process. They viewed these as factors considered by the cooperation of local authorities. Although, the need of each group is not matched and it has no unity, but it has created a group Mara Patani to achieve a greater unity.

The conflict group vowed that in order to solve the problem the government needs to understand the root causes of the real problems in the area by firstly considering social factors, and erasing the picture themes that they were oppressed by the regime in the minds of people in the past, and to treat people with traditional Muslim culture, identity, and language respectfully is the most appropriate for the population as a factor in the target group.

Some conflict group suggests that there is no need to divide the land, if the government has a good management system. Because most people do not want to be independent, but just want society to be in peace. Besides, they want the local area to be more developed in terms of economic prosperity instead of using armed soldiers.

The solution to solve the problem in the three southern border provinces in terms of communication factor, is that related agencies must be involved in solving problems as well as appoint a local Muslim to be positioned in the relevant authorities in order to communicate with the local people and the present the government's fact to the public.

##### 5) Islamic Region Leader's Perspective

Islamic leader, especially the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (CICT) has seen the media as the important key to resolve conflict. It is driven with the Bureau Sheikhul Islam and chairman of the Islamic Council in five southern border provinces as a link or intermediary between the state and party dissent. It is a partnership of organizations or relevant religious leaders and cooperates with local authorities by coordinating other organizations such as Islamic religious schools, foundation coordinator Tadika in five southern border provinces, institute of Pondok in five southern border provinces and other organizations to come together to propel the peace and modify the organizational culture in the creation of peace without a fight.

Muslim religious leaders were seen as potentially implicating civil disorder which made the state less trusted. This causes an impact on synergies and they do not cooperate with the government in order to resolve the situation. In view of Sheikhul Islam that rule is based on justice and to be fair to the people, the rule guides to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces by using the

lessons of history as the lessons and experience of bringing history to resolve conflict in the area.

Muslim religious leaders focus on social aspects in which there is a need to understand each other and every religion in the area with coexistence by focusing on the means of communication to understand each other in all religions. Moreover, the religious leaders have to explain to the public to make them understand about living together in a pluralist society to create a classy society. This will lead society to get to understand Islam more.

The policy to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces should focus on improving the quality of education, economy and community and create the cooperation of the relevant authorities. The Provincial Islamic Committee has participated in solving the problem with the SBPAC. The agency has focused on projects with the needs of real people. This makes the situation get better. Besides the drug problem needs to be elevated up with the mosques to be the party that has the potential to improve the lives of the community. Because, it is a problem that affects the policy which will solve the situation and religious leaders must be involved in improving the quality of life of people in the community as well.

During the peace dialogue process, they have agreed to this process and want this to be continued. However, the talk needs to be opened.

#### 6) Buddhist Leader's Perspective

The Buddhist leader presents the teachings of the Buddha in order to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. The main key is to hold and live together in harmony and learn principles together. Besides, the practice of each religion will make peace between the congregations who believe differently, have different identities and differ gracefully.

#### 7) Civil Society Perspective

The view of society is the main role in resolving the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. The peace dialogue process must be open to the civil society to participate in peace talks and be an open safe space for their talks. And the violence in the area needs to be ended and should show sincerity to solve the problem through negotiations. The talks should consider the civil rights of the people without discrimination based on race and religion by considering everyone to be the

citizens of both sides. In addition, individual network, civil society groups and all organizations must accelerate cooperation activities and open political space through educating the public about political reforms that are consistent with the context of the border area. The peace dialogue process at all levels need to create a platform that makes the suggestion of a weight sufficient to determine the direction of the peace process in the future or in other words, to make the people reflect the real needs on the one hand to weave a network in this way just to be a network that will reinforce the peace process to be sustainable (Ramadan Panjor, 2013).

In the talks, the process should focus on issues that are common guidelines to be discussed which are the main issues and the acceptance of all parties such as attacks on soft targets, the use of explosives in the community, the destruction of the education system and more. Peace talks should be within the framework and uses principles that benefit all citizens in the southern border provinces/Patani and importantly the civil society needs to act as an extension of the peace process deeply in the community as much as possible and extended to larger social networks to get people to support the peace process (Ropers, 2015).

Civil society views the problems in the three southern border provinces to be from the root of the conflict, justice problem, the use of policy-oriented management culture and reinforcement of democracy in the region. The resolution of the problem needs to consider the quality of life of the people living in those areas such as education, economic well-being, coupled with the reduction of inequality and treated equally as well as reduce public mistrust and no suspects arrested repeatedly.

Communications factors need to put an end to a distortion of history in terms of violence by giving civil society the right to participate in the peace dialogue process in order to be communicated by intermediaries and get the public to understand. The promotion goes to people across the country, so that they were aware of the development of peace talks. Besides, it should examine the events that will occur during the talks to provide secure communication to the parties in the future. Moreover, women should have the opportunity to communicate and media should present facts in the news not to extend the conflict. Media should not present only violence news, but they should create their understanding of happenings in the society.

In view of the southern civil society, the cooperation of the local authorities to resolve the situation in the three southern border provinces as well as the peace process in the area emphasizes cooperation with various groups, such as women's groups and religious leaders. Besides, it needs to focus on issues of justice, decentralization and the peace process as well as establishing partnerships with educational institutions. They view that the international level and ASEAN must cooperate together when the ASEAN Economic Community is opened by using the lessons and experience to tackle violence. Besides, the government needs to collaborate with educational institutions as well.

The communication with the peace to solve the issues in the three southern border provinces in the view of an institution such as the Center for Peace and Development Communication, Faculty of Communication University Pattani Campus is that the agencies created the space safe space for communication. They were concerned about the cooperation of the local authorities in carrying out technical cooperation activities to coordinate communication between the Peace Corps with the relevant authorities both within and outside the university as well as educational institutions, civil society and the public as a public forum held in conjunction with the college and the South Centre.

In summary, there are generally three aspects of civil society which are extremely important when dealing with the conflict. The first aspect is how we could offer choices. The following is the role in strengthening the capacity to work for peace, and the third is research and policies in the short term in which the civil society is the approach to change through conflict. It also provides education in peace and creates support among the masses as well as raising awareness about the conflict situation, the permitting process understanding conformity and coordination between NGOs, individuals and groups who are the members of the civil society organizations and sometimes they serve to compare and learn from the experiences of other countries in the long term. Besides, evaluation on the basis of what is needed as well as bringing such schemes that are more effective (Nurkaliz Hidayat, 2013).

#### 8) A Three Southern Border Provinces Governor's View

The governor views on the solution to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces, is his concern about the participation of citizens in



the area, especially the local government, religious leaders and community leaders together to collaborate and co-develop equally to suit the local context and social characteristics. It should highlight the cooperation with the relevant authorities like the provincial government cooperates with the private sector and the public nature of the network. This will be coordinated at all times. Moreover, it will implement the provincial government policy based on the diplomatic mission of the King, whose speech and strategy is about insight and access to development.

Problems in the southern border provinces are not about the separatist ideology by insurgents alone, but there are various interest groups who lose their benefits by the state policy solving the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces, and they use this situation and create a violent situation.

#### 9) A Public Sector View

In the public sector view of resolving the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces the government should expedite the development of the area in the three southern border provinces in order to make the economic level same with the neighboring countries such as Malaysia, and especially in the development of the basic structure, development of individual incomes as well as improvement of their living standards by developing a special economic area.

People's views are that there is the need for knowledge management to improve the resolution and take the initiative to understand the concepts and develop as government needs to have an open mind.

#### 10) A Muslim Student Leader's View

A Muslim student leader participates in solving the problem by playing the role of the interface between different organizations as a spokesperson and presenting the facts to the other side to provide alternatives to the social sectors, so that they would understand the overall situation and problems.

The state still continues using state military leading politics in resolving the conflict in Patani. Sometimes the state has tried to take development solutions in solving problem, and meanwhile the state refused to open the political space to Patani people. Besides, there are many people who were harassed by the authorities, in both direct and indirect ways.

Permus supports the peace process in all its forms and does not support the violence. He only wants people to be satisfied with the peace.

The researchers propose that in order to get the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes of the SBPAC (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL) to be driven powerfully and effectively, and have the ability to effect rapid and continuous growth, the discourse should be to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. The authority should have a role in shaping the discourse as well.

At the policy level, for example, the discourse being about talks during the peace process, the policy maker needs to understand the benefits to be gained from creating a discourse as well as public interest. The discourse has to be communicated to the media, whether the mainstream media, civil society, media or anti-state media.

The leader, who leads plans and projects into practice in the target area, must play a role in shaping the discourse to strengthen the resolution in the three southern border provinces in each incident, such as the Tongyangdang model discourse.

Thus, both policy and practice leaders must play a greater role to define or create a discourse on the issue in the three southernmost provinces continually to achieve outcomes that benefit the people in the target area as well as spread to cover other areas as much as possible.

#### **7.1.6 The Remaining Problems and Obstacles**

Researchers have broken down barriers that have existed into three parts: the first part is the policy itself, the second is its operation, and the final part is local people in target provinces. The details are shown as below.

In the policy part, the government also has a policy of not enforcing the law equally. The education policy does not support things universally. The budget allocation policy distributed to the Sub-district Administrative distributed is still less. The governance policy and security policy must be specifically for people in the area who are more involved in the administration, and should reduce the role of security

forces, particularly the publication of the decree, including the need to take religious principles with the family to solve all kinds of problems.

The operational policy, situation and barriers still exist. As a matter of running the agency the SBPAC has lack of integration with the civilian government agencies, inefficiency in the public administration, budget allocation, supervisory control and coordination of government agencies to comply with government policies as well as strategies to develop the target area. In addition, the problem of personnel performance, makes the operation officials to various projects to be sent back to assist the Department of Homeland Security.

Most of the people in the target area do not truly participate in the decision making process and operation. As the outcomes, operations do not meet the real needs of the people and problems do still exist: 1) the insecurity of life and property is caused by six main factors which are state officials, racketeer, power, influence, the anti-state group, media and the beneficial interest group, 2) the quality of education problems, both public and private sectors are still low. The education does not meet the reality in the field of religion, language, identity, Tadika school and Pondok institutions, and 3) Conflict and violence caused by being treated unjustly. Differences in language, identity, ethnic interest groups, powerful government officials and local influence, the prejudice against the ruler of the people, a controversial drug problem, lack of good education, and the 4) Injustice issue caused by excusing people without evidence and discrimination based on religion, such when dressing for work and graduates of a foreign state being paranoid, Malay identity being crushed as well as the allocation of state land delayed.

In summary, the problems and policy has set the primary agency in charge of implementing the policy so that every government showed the understanding of the policy implementation process clearly. Especially, the integration of the relevant authorities issue is still inefficient. Although the outcomes are arising and getting them in the way that local people need it, it made people aware of the importance of the three main factors that will affect the outcomes of the above shown such as factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes, complexity of coordination in operations of the various departments and the linkage of the factors influencing the policy making and policy implementation to perform together, and additional factors

such as communication factors that need to more focus on giving importance to all levels of the policy process from policy level, converting the policy into practice to policy implementation level, public service delivery clients which will be considered to be appropriate context in the three southern border provinces where violence has continued. There is pressure on the identity, language, religion, traditions and culture and a need to communicate to get understanding of the three main variable groups as shown above. And the organization competency factor must be capable of supporting and relevant to policy making factors such as related organizations that work together and complexity of coordination in operations of the various departments, including the communication factor in order to enhance the communication process of policy implementation. Besides, the most important factors to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces are sustainable, and the study found that the new factors that make the process of policy implementation of the SBPAC successful are the creation of a value factor, feeling management factor and the popularity factor of local communities based on the key idea affecting the policy implementation of the SBPAC (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL).

The researchers propose that in order to get outcomes in the policy implementation of the SBPAC (NIDA DEEP SOUTH MODEL) to be driven powerfully and effectively, and have the ability to effect rapid and continuous growth, the discourse should be to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. The authority should have a role in shaping the discourse.

However, the outcomes of policy implementation to solve the unrest situation in the three south border provinces are likely to improve in 2014 and 2015 which would have its outcomes in the reduction of violence and loss due to the operations of military, police and civilian having more unity. Besides, an important factor is that the people are being involved in the issue. And the development of the area is more systematic and people have understood and ensured solutions and government development, confidence in trade and investment have increased as well, and the survey of local person's opinion of educational institutions in the area shows that the public is more confident and more secure and they expect peace would happen, but it is still violent and incendiary is intermittent. So due to the barriers that still exist, the government must act to define security policies to resolve the problem in order to be

consistent by implementing various projects of the agency based on a strategy that has defined it to be more concentrated. Giving the people the chance to participate in the issue seriously at all levels and allowing the insurgents and all parties to join the peace talks, makes the outcome and an overview of the factors that affect the implementation of policy implementation successful as well as the resolution of the situation sustainable.

Therefore, it should use the concept of understanding to develop military leading politics in solving the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. The blockade was widely used, but it should avoid using special powers to take account of the martial law and only use it when needed such as the forensic science accurately determines the accused. Meanwhile building the environment in talking peace, supporting home care continuously, understanding the concept of using the budget to solve the unrest situation in the south and not using the budget to meet strategic needs is essential.

Besides, it is viewed that basic characteristics of civil servants must be focused on work rather than on policy. And adopting policies to treat belongs to basic civil servants in order to serve the targeted under the pressure of uncertainty which is the concept of using the policy to perform in the manner of Bottom-Up (Lipsky, 1980).

Basic characteristics of civil servants must be focused on work policies such as sleeping on the job ahead to make the people feel that we are closer to the people such as building networks to join the activities, leading the needs of local people to the development community, getting to locals to create intimacy and explore the needs of residents as well as cooperate in work, and starting with small solutions to major problems. Getting into a village should be done many times until they open their mind and sit down to adjust to the ideological struggle.

The key starting point from which the operation of the service projects has interacted with the service can solve the problem and let us look at the issue of adopting a policy to perform correctly matching the reality of the service and define strategies to resolve the problem more completely and effectively than policy to practice in the Top-Down (Elmore, 1979).

Therefore, regarding factors of policy execution and other factors and problems, the analysis of the problems in the implementation of policy implementation by the Top-Down is derived from the fundamental belief that policymakers significantly have the ability to control various factors that may influence the success and failure of the policy.

But the study believed that the study of the Top-Down approach and the analytical framework have been created, and they cannot explain some policy types. The concept of Top-Down approach is not as perfect as it should be, the study suggests that the combination of Top-Down and Bottom-Up analysis from the bottom up to the execution of the SBPAC needs to be closely related to the policy and understand and know problems as well as having a strategy that is used to perform a task.

## **7.2 Recommendations**

As the outcomes from the research data analysis mentioned above, the researchers have discovered interpretation and meaning clearly by offering both policy recommendations and action-oriented or related to the government as follows.

### **7.2.1 Policy Recommendations**

The researcher recommends suggestions for the policy that would help to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces successfully and they are that

- 1) The policy set to solve the problem in the three southern border provinces needs to consider the appropriateness of the population in the target area and must comply with the conditions in the area and truly do not contradict the beliefs, cultural identities and traditions. And it needs to understand the social features, local cooperation and cooperation from various groups.

- 2) Local and international academic work, including the lessons from abroad learned in solving the problem in the three southern border provinces are the main lessons of each country, whether China, Indonesia and the Philippines, or a

country with a similar context. The synthesis is to be used to resolve with appropriate theoretical descriptions.

3) The study of the government policy in the comparative period would help to understand the important lessons in order to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces.

4) Thai lessons would help to understand the evolution of the unrest in the three southern border provinces from the past to the present, and the Thai government needs to understand the causes of the problems caused by the policy to apply to local people in the area.

5) The Thai government needs to use policy guidelines of Public Administration policies Rama 6 and the initiative to understand and develop the integration and joint policy with the philosophy of sufficiency in solving the problem.

6) The main relevant department in policy implementation must operate according to Management and Development of the South policy Year 2012-2013 efficiently by The Steering Committee to Resolve the Issues of the Southern Border Provinces (Khor. Por. Tor.) which is in charge of converting the policy to implement.

7) The concept of policy implementation focused on Bottom-Up approach by emphasizing the plans and projects in developed areas. Local people are participating in such programs and projects throughout the project by offering the combination of Top-Down and Bottom-Up.

8) The solving of the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces has focused on the process of communication at all levels since the policy level, policy implementation level, practice level and the public service clients level to suit the local context and was supported by organization competency adequately.

9) The creation of a discourse to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces to drive the concept of policy performance, offering both a policy and policy implementation continuously in order to solve the situation effectively.

### **7.2.2 Operational Recommendations**

The researcher suggested operational recommendations that would help to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces successfully by

adopting the line with the relevant authorities to solve the unrest situation and are governed by the following.

#### 7.2.2.1 National Security Council (NSC)

1) Policies are set to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. Moreover, the government needs to define a national policy, especially for the peace dialogue process and have all relevant government agencies to be aware of the policy implementation in order to cooperate in the implementation of the policy to practice as well as to create the trust with the anti-state. Besides, the Thai government needs to prove its commitment and willingness to solving the problem seriously.

2) The Thai government has to set conversion policy into action with the plan or projects in order to reduce conflicts in the area which realize the appropriateness of the population in the target area an social features which is being exploited and do not get justice from the state, and the problems of lack of education, no jobs and no respect of Muslim traditions, hijacked areas and natural resources. Besides, local Thais have some of the benefits of smuggled and drug issues.

3) The Thai government has to set a policy to resolve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces in a way of cooperation with the local people based on their potential ability and prioritize urgent problems. Additionally, they have to perform an operation with the cooperation of the relevant authorities as well as civil society organizations, political groups and the media to discuss the peace process and should have a central organization or facilitator in the peace talks.

4) The Thai government should focus on the policies leading military by focusing on the development and reduce the use of military force as well as reduce violence, which is a lesson to be learned from experiences abroad associated with factors influencing the policy making and policy implementation to perform together.

5) The Thai government has to build cooperation with the Army to focus more on community development rather than rallying to suppress the insurgency by the force of weapons and violence. The locals could build a stage in the



seminar discussions in public areas to express the purpose of each area. So that the Thai army will be able to get information to set work plans for the projects reflecting the needs of the community effectively.

6) The development of an economic policy in the three southern border provinces has been assigned to the provinces to develop a special economic zone according to the king's guidance to understand the development and the sufficiency economy philosophy.

7) The peace dialogue process needs to be regardless of the controversy or the anti-state group to cover all the relevant groups as the complexity of joint action factors which are conflicts or inconsistencies of the main target, with more than one goal leading to complexity in the decision making process. It affects the delay in the process of policy implementation.

8) The government should establish a permanent peace dialogue process department to coordinate the ongoing peace dialogue process. And it should have the agencies involved, with high-level official holding peace talks, such as the NSC, SBPAC and ISOC representative from the Foreign Ministry and Department of Justice. In addition, the agent should multi-track from civil society organizations, politicians, academics and religious leaders as well.

9) The peace dialogue process is the key procedure to end the conflict with the anti - state group, which must continue between both parties by starting to build trust together with the development of the peace dialogue process as soon as possible and form formal negotiations.

10) Talks of both parties and the facilitator should consider extending the duration of the peace talks at a time in order to have a chance to talk and spend more time with each other. And they should be agreed in advance on the agenda of the talks in detail as well as planned to build a roadmap for peace together and talks of each party have to include communications (Intra-dialogue) to share opinions and get ready to talk. The work of building peace in the region, in 2014 sets the period of the talks clearly.

11) National Security Council (NSC) expedited the creation of the discourse problem in the three southern border provinces such discourses to talk during the peace process to force a solution rapidly and continuously and

cooperate with the military, police and civil defense. The message is for the public to get involved in recognition and its benefits at all stages of the peace dialogue process.

12) The Steering Committee to Resolve the Issues of the Southern Border Provinces (Khor. Por. Tor.) has to accelerate resolving policy implementation to make them more effective in order to monitor that the implementation of recommendations in the areas is in line with the relevant officials and focused on the integration of collaboration, the SBPAC and other related entities.

13) National Security Council (NSC) has provided the agency responsible for the message at policy level to convert the policy into implementation level as well as policy implementation level. The data is communicated between commanders and subordinate agencies. And it must be accurate, complete and focused on promotional communication with the local people in the area about guidelines of practices and communications with officials at all levels to understand the security policy.

14) National Security Council (NSC) should establish an academic advisor to provide alternative proposals and research on issues related to the peace talks, especially in conflict between disagreeing groups (Roongravi Chaloeemssripinyoraj, 2015).

#### 7.2.2.2 The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC)

1) The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre has prepared plans and projects to meet the needs of the public and let the public participate in the project by supporting and enhancing jobs. Besides, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre enhances professional knowledge and skills of communities in the target area continuously. It focuses rights on the rights of the target population that has the identity, language, religion, cultural traditions of Thai Muslims.

2) The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre has established halal products for export in Hajj affairs to promote pilgrimage to generate value by supporting Thai Muslims to export more halal products to Saudi Arabia in order to increase revenue and create jobs for the community.

3) All agencies must be concerned about the characteristics of society and context of society in determining the programs and projects in

communities in the target area. Besides, they must be concerned about the cooperation of local authorities in all aspects such as economic, social, educational, religious, culture, sports, development of personnel, justice, assisting healing, PR as well as social psychology.

4) Operations to solve the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces should have project plans which support more communication of media with organizational competency continuously as well as other latest important factors such as the feeling management, values and popularity.

5) The government should encourage promotions within the SBPAC at higher levels, such as deputy secretary of the SBPAC to solve the problem caused by changes of supportive, relevant authority to continue with the policy implementation as the capacity of organization competency to encourage practical work.

6) The Sub-district Administration Organization Centre needs to focus and accelerate the implementation of cooperation with the police and military to solve the drug issue. Because, it is a major problem and a barrier to solving the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces. It requires relevant agencies to cooperate in resolving the situation seriously by preparing plans and projects of the agency responsible for the concrete continuously.

7) All units of the SBPAC must give priority to the cooperation of the relevant authorities and local cooperation factor by focusing on the unity of all parties, police, military and civilian and established network cooperation organization that all parties have a role to adjust to the same way of thinking and approach to being in the same direction and understand the feeling management of people in the area by communicating media messages between agencies and the public service delivery clients clearly and accurately.

8) Monitoring and evaluating agencies should take the outcomes of the projects to evaluate policy implementation and look for the impact occurred in order to experience the preparation of next plans and projects in solving the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces.

9) The peace dialogue process must take past experiences as a lesson and experience in the talks next time as well as lessons learned from aboard.

Sub-district Administrative Organization (SAO) should have agencies and organizations that communicate the message to get people understanding the benefits gained from the peace dialogue process.

10) The leader of the SBPAC must accept the importance of continuity in the governance, control and coordination of policy implementation throughout the duration of the project. Even the relations between ends and means will need to be evaluated and look at feedback factors that have effects on the project to bring changes of targets and perform the reconfiguration to achieve maximum effectiveness of the policy.

11) The SBPAC is the operation unit that is able to describe the nature of that policy of each project that has already been carried out whether it is appropriate in theory or not, development process of education, religion, culture, economy and society, personal development, information and public relations to use more academic knowledge into practice.

12) The SBPAC has accelerated discourse solutions in the three southern border provinces such as the Tongyangdang model discourse to create the force in solving problems rapidly and continuously by partnering with the military and police and getting people to be participating in both the security and development to meet the needs of the community itself.

#### 7.2.2.3 Internal Security Operations Command Region 4

1) The solving of the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces needs to use the concept of understanding the development and politics leading military by focusing on the ability of personnel in the way of performance and sending good people to work in the target areas that are appropriate in the context to support the work that is concerned with communication being an important factor. And it focused on communication with the public service based on plans and projects that contemplate doing to meet the needs of local people with understanding them.

2) It was implemented to get people to participate in solving problems in the area together with relevant agencies and local authorities. Besides, it presents the stage for the talks to people by considering the rights of the local people in the target area that what they do is really needed and prioritize the urgency of the problem as well as resolve the issue.

3) Using control measures with officials who had used their power to people in the target area in order to cooperate and reduce violence by state officials and the authorities. And government should try not to use a special law to solve the problem and use control policy to punish officials who use state power to the people, especially the relevant agencies such as the volunteer guard and village security who adopts a serious defense. In addition, to the besieged officials widely, to not use special powers with regard to the use of martial laws as long as it is needed to build confidence of official operations in public. Besides, it needs to emphasize the practice of force that must not create conditions.

4) The Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center expedites the creation of a Tongyangdang model of discourse continuously to cover every province and every district to create the potential people to strengthen and supervise the area, road, school path instead of military staff as well as creating awareness of the people to be in charge in both the security and development to meet the needs of the community itself.

5) The peace dialogue process is still continuing by using a peaceful way. The Thai government has to use talks by previously taking lessons and lessons from abroad by understanding the message of communicating to make all parties understand without changing the objectives and goals of the policy. And it needs the news media to present factual, and accurate news, without prejudice to any party favor and make local people in the area understand.

#### 7.2.2.4 Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Centre (SBPPOC)

1) The operations officer has to understand the problems in the local community district and should allow people at all levels to contribute comments of their real needs. The operations officer has to focus on equality, fairness and respect of the identity and the local people live as well as respect and love each other.

2) The operations officer should establish a facility Centre to the Thai Muslims in the area such as the Criminal Justice faculty, and a Malay translator in every police station to convey the message from the recipient to the policy taker.

3) The performance of the organization should happen regardless of the quality of personnel by taking good officials working for the public

and using the principles of justice, compassion is not a public authority as well as training all the staff so that they would understand the context and be able to manage their feelings with people effectively.

4) The Police needs to accelerate the Tongyangdang discourse model to seek cooperation from the public through the ongoing Tongyangdang model policy to secure their lives and property at every local community level.

5) The solving of the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces needs to use politics leading military to stop the wrongful arrest and make the operation politely by focusing on creating the understanding which is a top priority.

6) The peace dialogue process with the anti-state group should continue as the best solution. The police should cooperate with the military and civilians to convey messages to the public in understanding the process and the benefits derived from this process.

#### 7.2.2.5 Provincial Administration Organization (PAO) and Sub-district Administrative Organization (SAO)

1) Provincial Administration Organization Department (PAO) and Sub-district Administrative Organization (SAO) cooperate with the religious leader, military, police, and the SBPAC to build the stage of exchanging views and building a network of cooperation seriously to establish the involvement of local people and the needs of people in the local community literally.

2) Provincial Administration Organization (PAO) and Sub-district Administrative Organization (SAO) together create a Tongyangdang discourse model to ensure the security of people's lives and property at every local community level.

3) The peace dialogue process of Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) and Sub-district Administrative Organization (SAO) should cooperate with the military to get the public understanding of all stages of the process.

4) Provincial Administration Organization (PAO) and Sub-district Administrative Organization (SAO) must cooperate with religious leaders and the police to resolve the drug issue seriously which is the responsibility of particular agencies.

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## **APPENDICES**

## **APPENDIX A**

### **Letter of Inquiry for Data Collection**



10 Soi 3 Prachayindee Road

Hatyai, Songkhla

September, 2015

To: Whom It May Concern

**Sub:** Permission to conduct in-depth interview for the research study on conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces: policy, process and outcomes.

My name is Mr. Suchart Monkongpitukkul, a doctoral student in the doctoral program in Public Administration (Thai program) of the Graduate School of Public Administration (GSPA), National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA). My student **identification** number is 5220142020.

I am currently working on the thesis topic of conflict resolution in the 3 southern border provinces: policy, process and outcomes, which is part of the doctoral study. The research questions are as following:

1. Analyze the development of the unrest from the past to the present.
2. Analyze the development of policies to tackle the unrest situations in the three southern border provinces.
3. Analyze the policy implementation process, by considering the role of the primary agencies that respond with resolving the unrest in the three southern border provinces.
4. Analyze the policy implementation outcomes.
5. Analyze the key factors that affected the policy implementation outcomes.
6. Analyze the remaining problems and obstacles.

I request you to kindly permit me to conduct the interview on September\_\_\_\_, 2015 at the Southern Border Province Administration Center (SBPAC). The purposes of the research interview involved in data collection, analysis, conclusions and suggestions are for the government and related agencies.

Sincerely,

Suchart Monkongpitukkul

A Doctoral Student

## **APPENDIX B**

### **In-Depth Interview Guidelines, Conflict Resolution in the 3 Southern Border Provinces of Thailand : Policy, Process and Outcomes**

## **In-Depth Interview Guidelines, Conflict Resolution in the 3 Southern Border Provinces of Thailand : Policy, Process and Outcomes**

1) **Study Issue**, Analyze the Development of the Unrest Situations in the Three Southern Border Provinces from Past to Present.

### **Questions/Continuous Interviewing**

(1) Could you please tell me about your experiences on the unrest situation in the three southern border provinces from past to present?

(2) Could you please tell me about the past experiences of the local people in the three southern border provinces on the issue of the educational dimension?

(3) Could you please tell me about your experiences toward problem solving in the three southern border provinces in the aspect of personnel development?

2) **Study Issue**, Analyze the Developing of the Policies for Conflict Resolution in the Three Southern Border Provinces.

### **Questions/Continuous Interviewing**

(1) Have there been any aspects of policy-making in the three southern border provinces since you took the position?

(2) Can you tell me about the authorities of the Hajj affairs office of the SBPAC?

(3) Do you have guidelines dealing with a new personnel development policy for pushing street level bureaucrats to devote to problem solving or having any proactive projects to get more outcomes?

(4) Could you please share your experiences about characteristics of past projects and plans on conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces?

(5) Which of the plans and projects, objective benefits for local people, are you impressed by? How have the projects proceeded?

(6) Could you please tell me about your expectations regarding each work plan and the overall project?

(7) What is your view of bringing experiences or lessons to apply to the problem solving to get the effective outcomes?

**3) Study Issue,** Analyze the Policy Implementation Process by Considering the Role of Primary Agencies Responsible for Conflict Resolution in the Three Southern Border Provinces.

**Questions/Continuous Interviewing**

(1) How does your agency, which is considered the main role, act upon the policy implementation process to deal with the southern violence?

(2) Are there any other agencies that are the main authorities in the policy implementation process? Is there an integrity management process, and how is it?

(3) Do you think that the implementing units are united or not, and how?

(4) Do you think that there is unity now or the upper levels of bureaucrats realize that there is no unity?

(5) SBPAC is the primary agency in the policy implementation process for conflict resolution in the three southern border provinces, what is their main role or authorities?

(6) Which roles and authorities do you think the SBPAC should add more?

(7) Have you ever faced troubles in administrative management in your agencies and in what areas are they?

**4) Study Issue,** Analyzing the Policy Implementation Outcomes.

**Questions/Continuous Interviewing**

(1) Could you tell me the concrete policy implementation outcomes and how do they affect the local population in the three southern border provinces?

(2) Which educational plans and projects have concrete outcomes, and how do they affect target groups?

**5) Study Issue,** Analyze the Key Factors that Affected the Policy Implementation Outcomes.

### **Question/ Continuous Interviewing**

- (1) What are the key factors influencing the success and failure of the policy implementation outcomes from the experiences of making plans and projects as a strategic plan?
- (2) Have you found the problems and outcomes of the projects from the dimension of education and whether projects delays occurred or not?
- (3) Why do you think the policy implementation process in the plans and projects of agencies succeed or fail?
- (4) Is the target population covered or not and how should it be?
- (5) How do we follow up on the plans, especially social features in obstacles and sensitive areas?
- (6) Could you tell me how to solve the problems in delaying plans and projects?
- (7) How important is the local cooperation in regard to solving problems?

### **6) Study Issue, Analyze the Remaining Problems and Obstacles.**

#### **Question/Continuous Interviewing**

- (1) Are there any problems and obstacles that exist after working on plans and projects and are there any new problems and obstacles that occurred, and what are they?
- (2) Do you have difficulty working in the educational dimension and what are they?
- (3) What were the problems or obstacles in Hajj activities in the past?
- (4) Are there any problems or obstacles in human resources development currently?
- (5) Do any projects related to human resource development not succeed and do they create a new problem?

## **BIOGRAPHY**

<b>NAME</b>	Suchart Monkongpitukkul
<b>ACADEMIC BACKGROUND</b>	<p>Bachelor of Electrical Engineering (1982) Prince of Songkhla University Songkhla, Thailand</p> <p>Master of Public Administration (1996) National Institute of Development Administration Bangkok, Thailand</p>
<b>PRESENT POSITION</b>	<p>Director Boss Computer Communication System Co.,Ltd.</p> <p>Director Aimweb Design (Thailand ) Co.,Ltd.</p> <p>Committee Boss Service Center Co.,Ltd.</p> <p>Committee Rajyindee Deveolpment Co.,Ltd.</p> <p>Committee Lorry Rail (Thailand) Co.,Ltd.</p>
<b>EXPERIENCE</b>	<p>President PSU Alumni Association (2004-2008)</p> <p>President Committee Public Relations Hatyai, PSU</p> <p>Engineering Alumni Association (2016-2017)</p> <p>Subcommittee Public Relations Hatyai, PSU Engineering</p> <p>Alumni Association (2014-2015)</p> <p>Committee NIDA Hatyai Club</p>